American Pharaoh (71 page)

The Chicago Freedom Movement finally got its turn to lay out its position. The movement’s nine-point proposal focused on Daley
and the city, not the Realtors. It called for the city to step up enforcement of fair-housing laws, through a program of real
estate–office testing and filing complaints against violators. The civil rights delegates also wanted a commitment that the
CHA would stop building high-rises in the ghetto, and a promise that urban-renewal programs would in the future be used to
decrease segregation. When King asked Daley if he would agree to the demands aimed at the city, he quickly said he would.
Once again, King’s efforts to engage Daley in combat were defeated by the mayor’s unwillingness to disagree. The movement
delegates would have little choice but to aim most of their fire at the parties at the table who continued to resist. Not
long after Daley agreed to King’s demands, Swibel began to chip away at the terms. It would be hard, he said, for the CHA
to agree to a total moratorium on high-rises in the ghetto, since the agency intended to build some high-rises for the elderly,
and might not be able to get land elsewhere. Rather than suggest that an exception be made for elderly housing, Swibel instead
substantially restated the public housing demand, saying that he was agreeing “that we will build non-ghetto low-rises as
much as feasible.” For good measure, Swibel also asked the civil rights movement delegates to have the American Civil Liberties
Union’s recently filed
Gautreaux
lawsuit, which challenged racial discrimination by the CHA, withdrawn.

Marciniak made one of Daley’s favorite points: that the open-housing problem was a “metropolitan” one, and that the Chicago
Freedom Movement needed to spend more time working on opening up the suburbs. It was true that the suburbs were every bit
as exclusionary as the city’s white ethnic neighborhoods, and that opening them up would give Chicago blacks a broader range
of choices about where to live. The problem was, there was little civil rights activists could do to open the white suburban
ring. The Freedom Movement had leverage with Daley because it posed a two-pronged threat to the Democratic machine’s hold
on power. Its activism in black neighborhoods had the potential to radicalize black voters and drive them away from the machine.
And its rallies in ethnic neighborhoods threatened to push the machine’s white base to move to the suburbs. It was in Daley’s
interest to reach a compromise with the movement before it started to erode his hold on power. But the Freedom Movement had
nothing to threaten the Republican suburbs with. It also had few legal weapons at its disposal, since the Illinois legislature
had refused to pass an open-housing law that applied to the suburbs, and suburban governments were not about to pass their
own civil rights laws. Daley may have been right that Chicago was being singled out, but as a practical matter the Freedom
Movement had little choice.
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The original plan was for the summit to last no more than two hours, but Daley told Heineman he wanted to work through to
an agreement. Heineman went along. “We’re going to stay here,” he told the crowded parish meeting room. “I have no plans to
recess except for lunch.” At this point, Thomas Ayers gave the first indication of where the business community stood. “I
think we support all the points in the proposals of the Chicago Freedom Movement,” he said, following Daley’s lead and further
isolating the Realtors. It was now virtually everyone in the room against the real estate industry. “The key problem, the
core problem, is that Realtors refuse to serve Negroes in their offices,” Bevel said. “And that must change.” The Real Estate
Board representatives in the room insisted that they could not speak for all Chicago real estate agents. But King tried to
lift the real estate delegates to a higher moral plane. “I appeal to the rightness of our position and to your decency,” he
told them. “I see nothing in this world more dangerous than Negro cities ringed with white suburbs. Look at it in terms of
grappling with righteousness. People will adjust to changes but the leadership has got to say that the time for change has
come. The problem is not the people in Gage Park. The problem is that their leaders and institutions have taught them to be
what they are.”
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Daley had been sitting back for some time now — in a pose one participant described as “Buddha-like” — watching contentedly
as the Freedom Movement focused its discontent on the real estate industry. When Raby suggested that the meeting be adjourned,
Daley spoke up to urge that the proceedings continue. What was needed, he said, was for the Real Estate Board to “get on the
phone to their members and do something about these demands now.” Daley’s comments came as a surprise, and they put considerable
pressure on the real estate representatives to modify their uncompromising position. One member of the real estate contingent
tried to stall for time, saying, “We cannot possibly deal on the phone — we cannot possibly work out a resolution to these
things today.” But Daley’s allies in the room followed his lead. In the guise of “summarizing” what had transpired, Heineman
told the Real Estate Board that “the monkey, gentlemen, is right on your back, and whether you see it as fair or not, everyone
sees that the monkey is there.” The question now, Heineman told them, was “how are you going to deal with the demands placed
on you?” Swibel had been acting throughout the negotiations, according to one participant, as “the chief cheerleader for Mayor
Daley,” and at this point he launched into an impromptu pep rally. “We need a victory for Mayor Daley, a victory for the City
of Chicago.” At the mention of a victory for Daley, a groan went up from the Freedom Movement side of the room.
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The decision was made to break off the summit until 4:00
P.M.
, to give the real estate representatives time to talk with their board. During the break, King and the Freedom Movement had
lunch at the Catholic Interracial Council, and negotiated further over whether to agree to a moratorium on marches. The consensus
was that they should accept a moratorium only in exchange for significant concessions on open housing. Daley telephoned Real
Estate Board chairman Ross Beatty during the break and made it clear he expected the board to change its stand. “In the interest
of the city of Chicago, you cannot come back here this afternoon with a negative answer,” Daley told him. The pressure worked,
and Beatty announced that his organization was modifying its position. The Real Estate Board made a general commitment to
freedom of choice in housing as the right of every citizen, and promised to withdraw its opposition to state-level open occupancy
legislation. It also agreed that the board would remind its members of their duty to obey the Chicago fair housing ordinance.
At the same time, the board warned that further marches would “harden bigotry and slow down progress,” and that “if demonstrations
do not terminate promptly, we may lose control of our membership, and be unable to fulfill the commitments we have here undertaken.”
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The board’s new position was an improvement over its earlier intransigence, but it was unclear how much of an improvement.
To some observers, it appeared to be a “complete reversal” and “the most significant result” of the summit. But it was obvious
that the board’s concessions had been carefully crafted. Withdrawing opposition to a state open housing law, for example,
was an empty gesture. Even if the Chicago Real Estate Board went along, the Illinois Association of Real Estate Boards would
ensure that these bills did not become law. Some of the other positions were drawn so fine that they were hard to follow.
“We’ve heard your statement,” Raby told Beatty, but “we’re not sure what you’re saying.” After some time spent trying to determine
exactly what the board was offering, Bevel said that the real issue was not complicated. “The question is whether Negroes
are going to be served at your office tomorrow morning,” he told the Realtors. Several speakers said that concern was already
addressed in the city’s existing fair-housing ordinance, but Bevel kept pressing for concrete changes. “Gentlemen, in Memphis,
in 1960, we had a series of marches to try to open up the restaurants, and finally, we had a meeting like this and what was
agreed was not that they were going to pass a law or anything like that,” Bevel said, now standing up. “The power structure
said that they were going to see to it that we could eat in Memphis and one week later we went out and we ate and we have
been eating in Memphis ever since. Now that’s what we want here today. I want to re-emphasize that we need Negroes to be served
in real estate offices. And you people here can see that will happen.”
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To some on the civil rights side, the Chicago Real Estate Board’s new position was still inadequate. King had whispered, “This
is nothing” when Beatty finished talking. Perhaps sensing that it had been a mistake to let Daley get out of the negotiations
early simply because he had said yes to everything, Raby tried to pull Daley back in from the sidelines. “Now, I want to know
when the mayor will see that an ordinance is enacted to require that all real estate dealers post in their windows the open-occupancy
law and a statement of policy on nondiscrimination,” Raby demanded. But Daley had no interest in being drawn back in. “I said
already this morning that I would do that,” Daley responded testily, “and I keep my word.” Daley once again underscored the
need for a regional solution. What was needed was a fair-housing law that covered the whole metropolitan area, he said, and
such a law would have to be passed at the state level. “The Democrats have always supported a state open-occupancy law,” he
said, again trying to shift the focus away from himself. “The Republicans have fought it.” Edwin Berry, branding the Realtors’
offer “totally unacceptable,” also pressed Daley to be part of the solution. “I want to ask Mayor Daley, if the Chicago Real
Estate Board can’t do something about our demands, can you?” Daley made a vague statement about how the city would “act as
an agency through the Human Relations Commission” and again shifted the focus to the Real Estate Board. “I think they’ve done
a lot,” Daley said. “It shows a real change that they’ve come in here indicating that they will no longer oppose open occupancy.”
In light of the concessions from the Realtors, Daley insisted that it was now time for the Chicago Freedom Movement to settle.
“We have agreed to virtually all the points here and everyone says that they are going to move ahead,” he said. “Now let’s
not quibble over words; the intent is the important thing. We’re here in good faith and the city is asking for your help.”
Heineman again lined up with Daley in pushing the Freedom Movement toward an agreement. “Bill, now you said the statement
is worthless,” Heineman said to Berry, whom he knew well. “But isn’t point three, the willingness of the board to stop opposing
the state open-occupancy law, a significant change?” Under continuing pressure from Heineman, Berry began to back down. “Well,
on fourth reading I would have to concede that the third statement is something.” Yes, Heineman said, “It is a concession.”
¹³

The talk turned next to whether to institute a moratorium on open-housing marches. Heineman expressed his view that since
the negotiators appeared to be “well on our way to realization” of an agreement acceptable to all sides,” it would be appropriate
for the demonstrations to “cease until we see if these agreements are working out.” But the Freedom Movement was less certain
about how much progress had really been made. “I don’t think we’re nearly so clear on all of these things as Mr. Heineman
thinks,” Raby said. Andrew Young spoke of the critical importance of desegregating the city, which he believed was getting
lost in all the talk about stopping the marches. The violence surrounding the open-housing marches had prompted this summit,
Young argued, but everyday life in the ghetto was more violent than the marches. “It is more dangerous in Lawndale with those
jammed-up, neurotic, psychotic Negroes than it is in Gage Park,” Young said. “To white people who don’t face the violence
which is created by the degradation of the ghetto, this violence that you see in Gage Park may seem like a terrible thing.
But I live in Lawndale and it is safer for me in Gage Park than it is in Lawndale. For the Negro in the ghetto, violence is
the rule. So, when you say, cease these demonstrations, you’re saying to us, go back to a place where there is more violence
than where you see violence taking place outside the ghetto.” It was an eloquent statement, but Daley missed its point. “Did
I hear you say that we are going to have more violence in this city?” he asked. No, Young said, he was just saying that the
ghetto was inherently a breeding ground for violence. “The city didn’t create this frustration, or this situation,” Daley
said. “We want to try to do what you say.”
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The discussion was threatening to move away from open housing to the larger, and far more complicated, issue of general conditions
in the ghetto. Raby asked whether the Cook County Department of Public Aid would place the families in its charge in housing
outside of poor, black neighborhoods. And he wanted to talk about the CHA’s policy of building high-rises in the ghetto. Heineman
tried to steer the negotiations back to the question of open housing, saying, “We understood that your proposals were on these
two pages.” But Young insisted that the real issue was “a plan to implement what is on these two pages.” Swibel said the marches
should be stopped immediately, for a period of twelve months, a suggestion that elicited groans from across the table. Charles
Hayes, a black representative of the Packinghouse Workers Union, warned that empty promises were not enough, and that the
civil rights negotiators had to have something concrete to take back to black people outside the closed doors of the summit.
“I think that you need to be a Negro to really understand what the situation is here,” Hayes said. “[W]e can’t go out after
these negotiations and tell the guy on the street that what we got was an agreement from the Chicago Real Estate Board that
they philosophically agree with open occupancy. The people want to hear what we’re going to do for them now. If I as a union
negotiator ever came back to my men and said, ‘I got the company to agree that philosophically they were in support of seniority,’
I’d be laughed out of court.”
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