An Inoffensive Rearmament (15 page)

Under the basic directive of establishing the National Police Reserve, General Willoughby, as chief of the G-2 Section, was given responsibility with General Courtney Whitney, chief of the Government Section, for clearing all nominees for leadership in the organization. The Japanese National Rural Police, a national police organization serving in the rural areas of Japan, was given responsibilities by the Japanese government for recruiting for the NPR. Significantly the Public Safety Division of G-2 SCAP was responsible for surveillance and supervision of the National Rural Police. Accordingly, General Willoughby, as the chief of intelligence and the boss of the Public Safety Division, exercised a two-way control over the selection, clearance, and approval of the rank and file of the NPR. He had direct control through American channels and indirect control through the Public Safety Division.

Under the directives, it was natural that the Public Safety Division of SCAP should work closely with our Advisory Group on the NPR recruiting program, but it became rapidly evident to me that Colonel Pulliam, head of the Public Safety Division, had one objective: to install the Imperial officers of the Demobilization Bureau in the NPR. When we spoke to him about the purge directive, he waved his hand disdainfully. We were building a Japanese army and to hell with international directives.

One day, about the end of July, General Shepard asked me to come into his office. When I walked in I found a neat, soldierly, and forceful-looking Japanese talking to the general through our interpreter, Nicky Endō.

“Colonel Kowalski,” General Shepard began, “I would like to present Colonel Hattori of the Japanese Imperial Army.”

I extended my hand, perking my ears up sharply. Colonel Hattori, I mused. Who the hell is he? We exchanged pleasantries through Nicky, and shortly Colonel Hattori bowed to General Shepard and me and left the office.

“That's a good-looking soldier,” I said, turning to the general. “Who is he?”

“You're going to see a lot of him,” General Shepard answered. “That's your opposite number.”

“You mean, General, he's going to be the chief of staff of the NPR?”

“Well let's say he's General Willoughby's nominee. Colonel Pulliam advises me that Hattori was a member of the Imperial General Staff. He is credited with having planned the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia. I am told he's a top soldier. He's General Willoughby's number one man in the Demobilization Bureau. Yes, Willoughby wants him to be chief of staff.”

“But what about the prohibition of the use of purgees in the NPR?” I asked with deep concern. “Is the purge directive to be revoked?”

“That's not our responsibility,” responded Shepard. “We organize and train them. I'm not responsible for recruiting them.”

“But, General,” I persisted, “does General Whitney know about this fellow?”

“I don't know, and I don't care,” answered General Shepard. “That's a matter for Willoughby and Whitney. You and I, mostly you, have your work cut out for you. I am advised that the Japanese Demobilization Bureau is prepared to furnish us not only Colonel Hattori but a complete cadre of qualified former military officers for the NPR. I want you personally, without any member of the staff knowing it, to prepare a cadre list for a four-division force. Try to keep the list under a thousand. Show the rank and position of each cadre officer you think we'll need. Try to have something for me tomorrow.”

My orders were clear.

That night, I hurriedly studied the tentative tables of organization that Colonel Albergotti was developing for the NPR and concluded that an effective force of 75,000 troops could be organized with a cadre of 917 qualified Japanese officers. The next day, I submitted my suggested list of positions to General Shepard, who after a short discussion approved my recommendations. That afternoon, the Japanese Demobilization Bureau was put to work searching their files to find 917 individuals with the qualifications and rank necessary to fill our requirements.

General Willoughby now disregarded all directives. Two days after I had met him, Colonel Hattori was back in our headquarters with Colonel Pulliam and six former officers of the Imperial Japanese Army. Pulliam told us the Japanese had been selected to command the six NPR induction centers that were to be established. In the brief conversation I had with the members of the Japanese
cadre, I learned that they had been assembled from all over Japan. It was obvious that these officers had been chosen long ago for the roles they were now to play in the recruitment program. Each had already been assigned to a specific station and was at our headquarters for his final orientation before taking command of his post. Willoughby had done a tremendous planning job and now Pulliam and Hattori were executing his plan with perfection.

The situation was moving so rapidly that I hardly had time to think about the change in policy we had undergone. Obviously, as far as the NPR was concerned, the purge was off. I was deeply disturbed by this turn of events and decided that I should know more about Colonel Hattori and those of his colleagues who would assume high posts in the new military establishment. Some very interesting information was uncovered for me.

Colonel Takushirō Hattori was born in 1901. At the outbreak of the Pacific War, he headed the Strategic Section of the Imperial General Staff (Daihonei Rikugun Sakusenka). Later he served as one of the military secretaries to the prime minister, General Hideki Tōjō.

In 1936, Colonel Hattori was alleged to have been a member of the notorious “Manchuria Clique” within the army. This was a group of military officers who had become convinced that the civilian government was either corrupt or incompetent. Foreign policy, they contended, especially for Manchuria and North China, should be determined by “those on the spot” in Manchuria, meaning of course the military clique. They further argued that such policy should conform to what they described as “absolute military necessity” in the field and that it was up to the civilian government to adjust itself to these necessities. “A very interesting person, this Colonel Hattori,” I thought.

In 1944, Colonel Hattori became a member of a special group of influential staff officers of the Imperial General Staff who were responsible for coordinating the overall policy of the conduct of war. The regular group included four army colonels and four navy captains and was joined from time to time by aides to the prime minister and the war and navy ministers. Colonel Hattori obviously was one of the key officers of the Imperial General Staff.

After the surrender of Japan, officers who had held posts such as these were purged or worse, but Colonel Hattori, probably because of his special qualifications, was singled out for service with SCAP and assigned to the Demobilization Bureau. He and his colleagues escaped the purge because it became obvious to
the occupation authorities that if the staggering task of demobilizing and repatriating the Japanese Imperial forces was to succeed, SCAP had to utilize knowledgeable former military officers of the Imperial Army and Navy. Accordingly, an executive directive was issued providing that “a person (otherwise qualifying as a purgee) who cannot be replaced by others may be appointed to public office by the authority of the Prime Minister.” This enabled the G-2 to organize the Demobilization Bureau and staff it with former Imperial officers.

Colonel Hattori, in the five years since the end of the war, had surrounded himself with many distinguished officers, including at least two aides of General Tōjō: Colonel Susumu Nishiura, who had been chief of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry (Rikugunshō Gunmuka), and Colonel Kumao Imoto, former member of the Strategic Section of General Staff. There were others of equivalent stature, I was told, who would surely join Colonel Hattori in the NPR. I thought, “It's not for me to ask why, but to do or die.”

In preparing the initial weekly report, which was to be submitted to the chief of staff of GHQ from our Advisory Group, General Shepard asked me to include a statement that he had conferred with Mr. Mori concerning the organization of the NPR. I was puzzled because I could not remember any visitor by that name. I also noted to my surprise that he had not asked me to report on the meetings we had with Colonel Pulliam, Colonel Hattori, and the former Imperial colonels. When the report was typed, I walked in with it to General Shepard's office. As he reached for his pen to sign it, I asked, “General, who is Mr. Mori? I don't remember him visiting us.”

His hand stopped as though he had been shot, and when he looked up, his face was flushed. “That's Colonel Hattori,” he answered.

“I don't understand,” I began “This report goes to the Chief of Staff of GHQ.”

“Mori is a G-2 cover name for Colonel Hattori,” explained General Shepard. “Colonel Pulliam asked me to use it. He said that General Willoughby didn't want G-3 and the Governmental Section to jump him about using purgees in the NPR. He wanted me to give him time to discuss the matter with General MacArthur personally.”

“But you can't be a party to this maneuver,” I interjected. “After all, this is an official report on our activities. The deputy chief of staff, the chief of staff and very likely General MacArthur will read it. Personally, I don't like what General Willoughby is trying to do to you. You're right in the middle with this report.”

When General Shepard didn't answer I decided that I had said enough. I'm sure he thought my comments over very carefully, though, because the next day he came into my office and said, “Get your cap, Frank. I want you to accompany me to GHQ. You haven't met General Fox, the deputy chief of staff, and I'd like to have him know you.”

After introducing me to Major General Alonzo P. Fox, General Shepard brought out our weekly report and turned it over to the deputy chief. Then, to my surprise, he proceeded to explain in detail the Mori situation and his meetings with Colonel Hattori and the other officers of the Japanese Imperial forces. I was very proud of my boss at that moment and genuinely relieved to have CASA disentangled from this affair. Nevertheless, I was deeply disturbed by what appeared to me to be an underhanded maneuver by the G-2 Section to bring purgees into the NPR against written directives and obviously in a way that would circumvent opposition from other GHQ staffs.

Later that day, it was necessary for me to visit Colonel Laurence E. Bunker, aide to General MacArthur. After completing my business, Colonel Bunker asked me, “Frank, how's the organizing of the NPR going?”

“Well, as you can understand we've had our problems,” I said. “We have no experienced Japanese in the NPR because of the purge policy, and most of the work has to be done by our American staff. But I understand, with the acceptance of General Willoughby's plan to use former career officers, things will go much better.”

Colonel Bunker whirled around in his chair, his eyes blazing. “What do you mean?” he asked.

“I have the impression that the purge policy is to be revoked, or at least we'll be permitted to use some former officers of the Japanese Imperial forces in the NPR.”

“The general hasn't approved that,” snapped Colonel Bunker. “He will never agree to the use of purgees in the NPR. General Willoughby better stop this one-man resistance before someone's head comes off.”

Leaving Colonel Bunker's office, I was satisfied that no purgees would be authorized in the NPR for some time. Even if Colonel Bunker did not go to General MacArthur directly, I knew he was friendly with General Whitney and his message would reach its destination.

As I had anticipated, on August 9, 1950, General Shepard, on instructions from GHQ, called in ex-Colonel Hattori and the six former Imperial officers who
were to command the induction centers and informed them that for the present they and the other career officers were ineligible for the NPR.

The G-2 Section, however, was not prepared to give up yet. General Shepard was visited by an intelligence officer whose mission was to induce the chief of CASA to incorporate Colonel Hattori and his Imperial Army associates into the Advisory Group. He explained that the occupation forces purge directive provided certain categories for exceptions. Under these exceptions, Colonel Hattori and other distinguished Imperial officers were authorized to work for SCAP. G-2 would make these officers available to CASA. He pointed out that the Japanese police officials and civilians who were being assigned to the NPR were not qualified to organize, train, and develop a military force. Colonel Hattori and his staff would provide liaison and guidance. He cautioned, however, that the assignment of the Demobilization Bureau officers would have to be handled in the strictest secrecy to avoid criticism from the other sections of the GHQ staff. He assured General Shepard there would be no problem; G-2 would make sure no one found out about the operation. Colonel Hattori and his specially selected staff, he said, were exceptionally qualified for the task, and they were organized to assume a major part of the organizational load. CASA in fact would have little to do except supervise. Then he tipped his hand.

“We think it's very important that we do this,” he said. “The arrangement will enable the Hattori team to keep abreast of developments in the NPR, and in this way prepare them for taking over command of the force when the misfits they are now sending you are thrown out.”

By this time, General Shepard had had enough of the G-2 Section's intrigues to outwit the supreme commander. Supported by General Fox, he decided to make a clean break. I was genuinely pleased when finally one day he instructed me, “From now on I want you to give G-2 nothing to do with the NPR. If they ask for information or progress reports, refer them to the office of the deputy chief of staff, General Fox.”