Ancient Chinese Warfare (29 page)

Nevertheless, the T’u-fang must have still posed a serious threat because suppressive efforts continued into the third month, when another 5,000 men were summoned under the king’s direction, greatly augmenting the forces already deployed.
¹¹⁴
In the fourth month the king himself, accompanied by Chih Kuo, launched an expeditionary attack.
¹¹⁵
(Oracle records confirm that the king was sufficiently troubled by the T’u-fang challenge to offer sacrifice in the temple for the campaign’s success.)
¹¹⁶
In the fifth month men were again levied, and the king’s illustrious consort, Fu Hao, was ordered into the field for an assault.
¹¹⁷
However, even her efforts must have proved inadequate, because additional troops had to be called up yet again in the seventh month prior to the king initiating another attack.
¹¹⁸
Thereafter, in the ninth month the king once again directed an attack.
¹¹⁹

After nearly a year of multiple conscriptions and numerous planned assaults, some measure of success must have been realized because the oracle strips dating to the tenth month speak about “damaging” the T’u-fang.
¹²⁰
Little is known about the subsequent months, but the enemy
could not yet have been completely quashed, because on the fourteenth day in the third month of the succeeding year, reports of multiple, apparently coordinated, Kung-fang and T’u-fang attacks were received, the most famous being from the esteemed commander Chih Kuo, which stated, “the T’u-fang have mounted a punitive attack
¹²¹
on our eastern suburbs, seriously damaging two towns. The Kung-fang have also invaded the fields in our western suburbs.”
¹²²
The king apparently levied another 5,000 men for the campaign in this same month,
¹²³
but inimical reports were once again received in the fifth month.
¹²⁴
Accompanied by Chih Kuo, Wu Ting then mounted another assault against the T’u-fang.
¹²⁵
Perhaps it was this last effort that vanquished them, because they are rarely mentioned thereafter, even though some undated fragments speak about pursuing and capturing them,
¹²⁶
and the Shang reportedly built a citadel out in their territory.
¹²⁷

Several states active in Wu Ting’s middle period vacillated between being submissive (and accordingly entrusted with defensive functions) and rebellious, particularly in times of turmoil, and therefore aggressively targeted. One particularly visible group, previously mentioned, were the Ma-fang, located in the northwest,
¹²⁸
reputedly slightly south of the Ch’iang, as evidenced by attacks that simultaneously targeted them both.
¹²⁹
As attested by reports of Ma-fang activities and royal inquiries about the prospects for attacking them, a major clash apparently unfolded after the Lung-fang campaign during the winter.
¹³⁰
Apart from being entangled in Ch’iang activities, they also acted as a Shang perimeter force and are recorded as acting in conjunction with the Wo to capture the Jung and being ordered to undertake archery in the north.
¹³¹

Finally, a concerted campaign was mounted against the Pa-fang at the end of Wu Ting’s middle years or early in the last period of his reign amid challenges simultaneously posed by the Yi, Lung, Meng, and Hsia-wei.
¹³²
Pa-fang’s location remains a matter of controversy, for rather than Sichuan, site of famed Pa and Shu cultures, they apparently inhabited the near southwest, and numerous Shang artifacts have been recovered in the Ch’eng-ku region of Shaanxi, presumably evidence of
campaigns into the general region of the Pa, Shu, P’u, and Ch’iang during the Shang.
¹³³

The campaign apparently commenced by deputing Chih Chia, presumably leading his own clan forces, to mount the initial response,
¹³⁴
but further measures proved necessary when they encountered difficulty.
¹³⁵
Queries indicate that rather than relying on the standing forces, men had to be levied and more than one general dispatched. The king asked whether he should attack the Pa in association with Chih Chia
¹³⁶
and, separately, a commander named Hsi, or whether Fu Hao should do so in conjunction with Chih Chia.
¹³⁷
(Two inquiries recorded on the same plastron close together indicate that the king was trying to decide between attacking the Pa with Hsi and the Hsia-wei with Wang Ch’eng.)
¹³⁸
This flurry of activity apparently vanquished the Pa, as inscriptions ask if the Pa are about to be defeated
¹³⁹
and suggest the final crushing blow was about to be delivered by the king in association with Chih Kuo.
¹⁴⁰

10.

Rather than simply reacting to threats, thwarting future incursions, or deterring peripheral states with limited campaigns, efforts in the third period focused on projecting power and thoroughly eliminating enemies. Perhaps because of the considerable success achieved against the T’u-fang at the end of the previous period, the final years of Wu Ting’s reign were marked by campaigns against major enemies highly capable of withstanding Shang pressure, particularly the Kung-fang. A few experienced second period commanders remained active, but several new figures assumed martial prominence. Prefiguring subsequent conflict, the Chou became troublesome when they may have sought to exploit the power vacuum resulting from Shang preoccupation with the T’u-fang and Kung-fang. However, their rebelliousness merely elicited a strong response that coerced them into renewed submissiveness.

Another of the major peripheral powers that proved troublesome to the Shang both early and late in Wu Ting’s reign, the Fang were located somewhere in the general area of middle and southern Shanxi, perhaps centered in modern Hsia-hsien.
¹
Variously identified as members of the P’eng or Yi, though not necessarily either, they would remain formidable enemies in every reign from Wu Ting to Emperor Hsin.
²
The Fang were easily capable of mounting damaging invasions that penetrated right to the area of the capital Ta-yi and apparently did so on several
occasions.
³
Uncertainty about the outcome of engagements—who would prevail, who perish
⁴
—prompted a quest for intelligence about them
⁵
and repeated queries about whether they were coming forth in large numbers.
⁶
During Wu Ting’s reign they plundered allied Shang states
⁷
and invaded the core domain, taking small numbers of prisoners in some raids
⁸
and destroying towns in others.
⁹
King Wu Ting was compelled to levy troops and initiate resistance efforts, and on at least one occasion the Chief Horse Commander led the chariots in a rapid response.
¹⁰
Several generals and a few officials such as the
li
were eventually dispatched to quell them.
¹¹

Relatively quiescent during Wu Ting’s middle period, the Fang came forth aggressively in great numbers from the seventh through thirteenth months one year late in Wu Ting’s reign.
¹²
(Incursions had already occurred in the fourth, sixth, eleventh, and twelfth months of previous years, showing an absence of seasonal preference.) During this uprising they assaulted and damaged the incipient Chou, a subgroup of the Yi, and finally the Shang itself.
¹³
Wu Ting took the field to vanquish them
¹⁴
and also deputed others in command of separate forces, including his
shih
,
¹⁵
who apparently suffered a severe defeat,
¹⁶
prompting another commander’s dispatch in the eighth month,
¹⁷
and then Yüeh, who apparently succeeded in capturing the leader and temporarily ending the threat.
¹⁸
(Their submission is confirmed by another inscription showing them once again acceding to Shang dictates.)
¹⁹

Although it has been suggested that the Kung or Kung-fang were centered in the Chung-t’iao-shan region or northwest of the T’ai-hang Mountains, they seem to have inhabited an area northwest of the Shang in southern Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, and northern Shanxi.
²⁰
Various Kung groups frequently raided Shang allies and subordinated peoples including the Yu, Ch’üeh, T’ang, Hua, Chih, Ko, Fang, Ching, Lü, and Fu, proving that strong peripheral proto-states and tribal peoples could survive even in the face of the Shang’s great, but obviously still circumscribed, power.
²¹
They not only plundered towns, sometimes several at once, and confiscated provisions, but also seized prisoners and cattle,
²²
the latter having become readily obtainable, conveniently self-powered
objectives as a result of Wu Ting’s encouragement of agriculture and animal husbandry.

Kung raiding parties also rampaged eastward into the Shang heartland. Even though the contingents were small, the frequency and geographical scope of their aggressiveness forced Wu Ting to respond dramatically or suffer a debilitating loss of prestige. As chronicled by some 400 oracular inscriptions, these intertwined incursions and responses constituted the longest-running conflict of his era. Early incursions must not have been considered particularly damaging, because Wu Ting had essentially ignored them in favor of assaulting the Pa, T’u, and Hsia-wei.
²³
However, they not only continued throughout his reign but also grew more intense after Fu Hao’s death, finally concluding after a three-year concerted effort largely under the king’s personal direction.
²⁴
Prior to initiating suppressive measures, Wu Ting neutralized the T’u-fang so as to ensure that they would be unable to exploit the army’s absence and make further inroads.
²⁵
Before the Kung-fang would finally be vanquished, numerous generals had to be summoned, sometimes participating in campaigns with the king or individually deputed to go forth and crush the enemy.
²⁶
These include Fu Ching;
²⁷
Ch’in;
²⁸
Wang Ch’eng;
²⁹
Chih Kuo,
³⁰
who seems to have led the king’s advance forces
³¹
and whose fate was a subject of inquiry;
³²
Yüeh, who similarly attacked the Kung
³³
but was also severely imperiled by them;
³⁴
Fu;
³⁵
several princes, including Hua
³⁶
and Shu;
³⁷
Shih Pan;
³⁸
a number of high ministers; and at least two members of the proto-bureaucracy, the Tuo Ch’en
³⁹
and Tuo P’u.
⁴⁰
Troops were specifically levied at least three times and the various commanders sent out in succession, whether to continually harass the enemy, reinforce field troops, or act as separate forces to confine the obviously mobile enemy.

The final, concerted campaign against the Kung-fang, which required more than two full years to conclude, has been reconstructed from a number of oracular inscriptions.
⁴¹
Having previously encountered little opposition because of Wu Ting’s preoccupation with the T’u-fang, the Kung-fang were particularly vigorous and troublesome. In the thirteenth month of a year late in his reign, the king again received a report that the Kung had come forth and plundered four towns, including Hsien,
⁴²
a site that would eventually serve as the springboard for their counterattack in the first month of the next year.
⁴³
Whether the forces dispatched
in response failed to intercept the enemy or the engagement proved indecisive, the Kung reappeared eighteen days later.
⁴⁴
The third month then witnessed simultaneous, apparently coordinated attacks by the Kung-fang and T’u-fang on Chih’s eastern and western borders, as already noted in the T’u-fang account.
⁴⁵

The Kung mounted another incursion in the fourth month, seizing ten prisoners.
⁴⁶
This affront must have particularly rankled because the king quickly initiated a major suppressive campaign, levying troop numbers of 3,000 and 5,000 men and personally going forth on what might be interpreted as a heavy reconnaissance effort (since the inscriptions specify he was going to “look into” the situation), no doubt intended to result in a major engagement.
⁴⁷
Even though this was followed by a so-called punitive campaign of uncertain success, in the fifth month the Shang again suffered a Kung attack. However, the king somewhat surprisingly ordered Chih Kuo to accompany him in an assault on the T’u-fang.

In the seventh month at least three more sites were attacked, including the Wo, who were probably situated near Cheng-chou, well within the Shang heartland.
⁴⁸
Since several inscriptions indicate that in the eighth and ninth months the king entreated the spirits for aid, the challenge posed by the Kung must have dominated martial concerns.
⁴⁹
However, the spirits apparently remained unresponsive, because a highly visible enemy offensive in the tenth month compelled the king to dispatch Yüeh and other experienced commanders to counter their unremitting aggression.
⁵⁰
This suppressive thrust continued into the thirteenth month, when the king and Yüeh again led forth campaign armies.
⁵¹

The first month of the new year witnessed unabated Kung incursions.
⁵²
Although datable records are lacking for the intervening period, even in the tenth month Yüeh, the campaign’s commander, was still in the field battling them.
⁵³
King Wu Ting further reinforced his efforts by dispatching coalition infantry forces to mount an attack in the twelfth month.
⁵⁴
Finally, following the mobilization of further reinforcements in the fourth month of the succeeding year, inscriptions show that Shang forces were reaching and presumably pummeling the Kung, evidence that the conflict must have been nearing a conclusion. From the inquiry’s
negative formulation it appears the Kung were no longer capable of mounting an attack, and the main question had become whether they wouldn’t be captured.
⁵⁵
Thereafter, although their conflict probably did not fully conclude until the king’s successor’s reign (after which they are only sporadically mentioned), the Kung apparently migrated further out into the steppe, abandoning the inner lands to Shang occupation.