Ancient Chinese Warfare (68 page)

1
Just as China’s “failure” to foster scientific and industrial revolutions has been too readily attributed to the stultifying effects of Confucian doctrine, the complex question of the perceived antagonism between the civil (
wen
) and the martial (
wu
)—frequently posed as an assertion that Confucianism enervated the national will to action, thereby rendering the state impotent in the face of brutal, militant hordes who were, however, vastly outnumbered—has so far been treated simplistically. Disparate power groups exploited doctrine to their own ends, and what might be termed a debased, hypocritical form of Confucianism (as distinguished from the pristine doctrine of Confucius and his early followers) often muddled martial discussions and frequently thwarted the implementation of realistic measures. Conversely, many reigns were marked by a decidedly martial ethos and embraced outwardly directed aggressive actions that vigorously challenged all but the most sincere believers in evolved Confucian doctrine. (Naturally, beyond necessarily acknowledging core concepts such as righteousness and benevolence, “Confucian” doctrine varied greatly over the centuries and assumed many guises, ranging from simple dogma to abstruse Sung formulations.)

2
If anything has been learned from the astonishing archaeological discoveries of the past few decades, including from the so-called tomb texts—early bamboo-strip editions of books entombed millennia ago—it should be that from the Chou onward, even within well-defined schools incredible diversity has always characterized Chinese thought. Some of these “schools” consist of a single vision or particular understanding, others of immense, highly convoluted philosophical structures. Several flourished for centuries; others disappeared in mere decades. Moreover, although records of court debates and modern reconstructions of intellectual history naturally tend to discern organized, patterned activity, the voices were usually multiple. Similarly, virtually every possible viewpoint seems to have been expressed in the martial sphere at one time or another, even if only briefly, and become a motivation or justification for action. (Despite the current penchant for denigrating traditional terms such as “Confucian” and rejecting their applicability, they are retained here for their convenience in charting relative viewpoints and organizing essential concepts.)

3
Recovered from a Han dynasty tomb in 1972,
Sun Pin’s Military Methods
(
Sun Pin Ping-fa
) was composed in the last half of the fourth century BCE or slightly later by disciples or descendants of the legendary Sun Pin, whose biography is coupled with Sun-tzu’s in the
Shih Chi
. Badly fragmented, the text tends to focus more on tactical matters than does
Sun-tzu’s Ping-fa
, generally known as the
Art of War
. (For clarity and the convenience of readers, in lieu of appending extensive footnotes and parenthetical material, our translations are sometimes abridged or slightly amplified. A close translation with extensive notes for this passage may be found in Sawyer,
Sun Pin Military Methods.
)

4
“Audience with King Wei,”
Sun Pin Ping-fa.
It would have been foolhardy for him to deny, outright, the possibility that Virtue could affect others since it was already becoming a well-entrenched belief. However, Sun Pin could have mentioned several other conflicts involving lesser or almost unknown early Sage authorities. (For a reappraisal of purported clashes, see Wang Yü-ch’eng, CKSYC 1986:3, 71-84.)

5
“Preparation of Strategic Power.”

6
“Military Strategy.”

7
“Li Lun” (“Discussion of Ritual”).

8
“Shih Chün,”
Lü-shih Ch’un-ch’iu
.

9
“Li Lun.”

10
“Military Strategy.”

11
“Military Strategy,”
Huai-nan Tzu
.

12
“Benevolence the Foundation,”
Ssu-ma Fa.
(A complete translation of the
Ssu-ma Fa
, parts of which probably predate Sun Pin’s
Military Methods,
may be found in Sawyer,
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China
.)

13
“Audience with King Wei.” Sun Pin’s attribution of the four fundamental military concepts—formations, strategic power, changes, and strategic imbalance of power—to the ancient cultural heroes credited with creating the essential artifacts of civilization is uncommon.

14
“Inferior Strategy.” (A complete translation of the
Three Strategies
may be found in Sawyer,
Seven Military Classics
.) “Huang-shih Kung” means “duke of Yellow Rock.”

15
At least according to an incident recorded in his
Shih Chi
biography, which, though dubious, was accepted as genuine throughout the imperial period. In the midst of a crisis he reportedly advised an endangered ruler, “I have heard that in civil affairs there must be martial preparation and that in martial affairs there must be civil preparations.” (He is also noted as having asserted that he never studied military affairs, only ritual and ceremonial ones, thereby providing crucial ammunition for antiwar factions. The
Analects
also contains his offhand remark that he never studied military deployment.) Certainly one of the core issues of Chinese military history, it is beyond the scope of the present volume. However, for an interesting defense of Confucianism not being responsible for China’s military weakness over the centuries, see Kuo Hung-chi, CKCHS 10 (1994): 65-71; for an overview of Chinese attitudes toward warfare and its causes, see Sawyer, “Chinese Warfare: The Paradox of the Unlearned Lesson,”
American Diplomacy Magazine
(Fall 1998); and for contrast, the initial chapters of
Military Technology: Missiles and Sieges
.

16
In addition to the PRC’s dedicated effort to establish the historicity (and priority) of ancient Chinese culture, Chinese popular media draw on every aspect for plots and content.

17
Some of the more insightful among the many articles that have appeared in recent decades include Li Yung-hsien, HCCHS 1988:10, 13-20; Li Hsien-teng and Yang Ying, HCCHS 2000:3, 9-19; Huang Huai-hsin, KKWW 1997:4, 33-37; Ting Shan, BIHP 3, 517-536; Liu Fan-ti 1999, 70-74; Wang Wen-kuang and Chai Kuo-ch’iang, 2005:9, 1-8; Li Tsung-t’ung, BIHP 39, 27-39; Chao Shih-ch’ao, HCCHS 1999:2, 43-45; Ch’en Ku-ying, HCCHS 1985:7, 4-16; Liu Chung-hui, CKCHCHS 1 (1997): 11-15; Ch’en Hsü, HSLWC 293-302; and Ho Kao, LSYC 1992:3, 69-84. Articles by Western writers include Charles Le Blanc, 45-63, and Gopal Sukhu, EC 30 (2005- 2006), 91-153.

18
This is anachronistic because the “hundred surnames,” later a term for the ordinary people but initially a reference to those granted the equivalent of surnames, the nobility, did not exist in this period.

19
Generally taken as atmospheric factors or the
ch’i
(
pneuma
or vapor) of the five quarters: north, south, east, west, and middle. This reflects Warring States five-phase (or -element) correlative thought.

20
Five types of animals are enumerated, including two bears, reflecting the theme of “five” throughout. They are variously interpreted as the symbols or totems for five clans or tribes, although practitioners in China’s long martial arts tradition like to believe he trained his warriors in fighting techniques derived from the individual animals.

21
“Wu Ti Pen-chi.” Although most scholars assign the Yellow Emperor to the Lungshan period, a few such as Hsü Shun-chan (KKWW 1997:4, 19-26) date his activities as early as the middle Yangshao.

22
“Tao Shih.” The clause “the blood flowed for a hundred
li
” is a recurrent literary device used to describe other battles as well, particularly the Chou conquest at Mu-yeh. (A
li
was about a third of a mile.)

23
The “blood was great enough to float a pestle” is another trope often employed to describe the battle at Mu-yeh.

24
T’ai-p’ing Yü-lan
,
chüan
15, citing the
Chih-lin
. Chuo Li is said to have been in the vicinity of Beijing, as a local name implies.

25
Chüan
17, “Ta Huang-pei Ching,”
Shan-hai Ching.
For a more extensive mythical recounting, see T’ao Yang and Chung Hsiu, 1990, 504-508.

26
Snakes and dragons figure prominently in several legends about the Yellow Emperor and Ch’ih Yu, both men supposedly being descended from snakes on their mothers’ side but from the bear and ox respectively on their fathers’. The Yellow Emperor is frequently associated with a white dragon, and one legend has the white dragon battling with either a red or black tiger, presumably Ch’ih Yu’s clan, which perishes (T’u Wu-chou, HCCHS 1984:3, 9-14).

27
“Feng Shan Shu,”
Shih-chi
. Ssu-ma Ch’ien notes the eight were said to have been established by the T’ai Kung (traditionally recognized as the founder of the state of Ch’i) and that an altar to Ch’ih Yu had been found on Ch’i’s western border (which would befit Ch’i’s strong military heritage). Somewhat contradictorily, Ch’i is also noted for having esteemed the Yellow Emperor. (See Hu Chia-ts’ung, HCCHS 1991:1, 19-26.) Various dates based on myths, archaeology, and outright assumptions have been suggested for this clash, 2700 to 2600 BCE being the most common.

28
“Ti Shu,”
Kuan-tzu.

29
As will be discussed in the weapons section, nothing more than a dirk existed around 2600 BCE. There are various lists for the five weapons, some of which include chariots and armor.

30
See Hsiao Ping, CKKTS 1994:11, 7-12.

31
Because maple leaves turn red in the fall, the (bronze) shackles that restrained Ch’ih Yu are said to have turned into a forest of maple trees; maple trees continue to be venerated by Miao remnants even today. (Wang Yen-chün, HCCHS 1988:6, 11-12.)

32
For further discussion, see Wang Chih-p’ing, 1999:4, 95-98.

33
For a discussion of the widespread Han admiration for Ch’ih Yu (contrary to the idea that the Han only esteemed Confucian values), see Wang Tzu-chin, HCCHS 2006:6, 70-75.

34
Found at Ma-wang-tui and now included among the collated texts known as the “Huang Ti Ssu-ching.”

35
See Chang Ch’i-yün, 1961, vol. 1, 22-25.

36
Directing troops deployed for battle was one of the most formidable problems of antiquity. China early on developed formations and segmentation and control measures that allowed generals to command rather than simply lead from the front. Citing an ancient text, in “Military Combat” the
Art of War
states: “Because they could not hear each other, they made gongs and drums. Because they could not see each other, they made pennants and flags.” Drums were particularly emphasized. (For example, see “The Tao of the General,”
Wu-tzu
; “Strict Positions,”
Ssu-ma Fa
; and “Orders for Restraining the Troops,”
Wei Liao-tzu
.)

37
The classic military writings adroitly exploit righteousness as a motivating factor. For example, the
Ssu-ma Fa
’s first chapter, “Benevolence the Foundation,” elaborates the conditions under which justified campaigns might be mounted.

38
Chang Ch’i-yün believes they crossed during the winter when the Yellow River would have been frozen (which would obviate any need for boats). However, the climate was considerably warmer at this time, and the water’s volume probably was greater due to higher rainfall levels, making it unlikely that it would have fully frozen; crossings in later times required placing a rope across to create an ice barrier.

39
Several scholars have noted that stories about important events, particularly those identified with place-names, tend to enjoy localized preservation. Although not primary evidence, some have proven to retain surprising vestiges of ancient events.

40
Lü Wen-yü, HCCHS 2000:1, 10-17. Conversely, Teng Shu-p’ing (KKWW 1999:5, 15-27) identifies the Tung Yi with Ch’ih Yu and sees the conflict as emblematic of the clash between Hua-Hsia cultural predispositions in the middle and upper reaches of the Yellow River and Tung Yi manifestations in Shandong. (Teng’s interpretation seems somewhat problematic because the Tung Yi totem was a bird, whereas Ch’ih Yu had an ox head, a difficulty that Teng
somewhat unsatisfactorily deflects by claiming that they subsequently acquired the bird association.) Teng also believes that four jade Tung Yi artifacts discovered in the west in Shanxi and Shaanxi provide evidence of the severity of this primordial clash, because Ch’ih Yu’s clan had to disperse to the west and south after their defeat.

41
Li Yu-mou, CKKTS 1994:2, 39-45.

42
Wang Yen-chün, HCCHS 1988:6, 11-15.

43
However, note that the Fu and Sui may have been two tribal groups rather than a single individual. In addition, not everyone agrees that the Yellow Emperor came from the west and Ch’ih Yu from the east, while arguments about whether Ch’ih Yu should be identified with the Miao in the south or the Tung Yi continue unabated. For example, Hsiao Ping (CKKTS 1994:11, 7-12) argues for Ch’ih Yu having been one of the great ancestors of the early southern Miao chieftains, who were in turn descendants of the Nine Li and active around the Yangtze’s middle reaches, especially the vicinity of Tung-t’ing and P’o-yang lakes.

44
Not impossible if they represent the late Shandong Lungshan cultural strata, in which bronze weapons began to appear, although in minuscule numbers.

45
How much wetter the east would have been is highly questionable. (There has always been a significant difference in total rainfall between the north and south rather than the east and west, accounting for rice being a southern staple.) This interpretation would require that Ch’ih Yu be a representative of lower Yangtze culture and may perhaps be grounds for rethinking the conflict, as these coexistent cultures were quite dynamic and resilient.