Ancient Chinese Warfare (69 page)

46
Although such claims lack any evidence, this sort of interpretation is frequently found in popular works on China’s military history, such as Chang Hsiu-p’ing’s
One Hundred Battles That Influenced China
.

47
The twenty-seventh century BCE is frequently suggested as the Yellow Emperor’s reign period, whether actual or mythical/symbolic. (See, for example, Teng Shu-p’ing, KKWW 1999:5, 15.)

48
“All under Heaven” is a late term, and this well-known passage is found in the late part known as the “Shih Ts’u.” (The second part may also be translated as “Availing himself of bows and arrows, he overawed all under Heaven,” thereby emphasizing the Yellow Emperor’s aggressiveness.)

49
See Fang Li-chung, HCCHS 1989:3, 21.

50
Widespread belief in his magical powers is found in the Warring States and thereafter.

51
Recorded in some versions, the fog is apparently a later addition that may have been prompted by Warring States experience in employing smoke screens. (For the history of smoke and smoke screens in Chinese warfare, see Sawyer,
Fire and Water.
)

52
Joseph Needham, in
Physics and Physical Technology: Mechanical Engineering
, 286-303, has speculated that some sort of differential gearing may have been employed and considers it the first homeostatic machine and an initial step in cybernetics. Andre Sleeswyk, in “Reconstruction of the South-Pointing Chariots of the Northern Sung Dynasty,” has provided a further examination of the gearing, and a modern PRC reconstruction has been prominently displayed over the past decade.

53
See Yang K’uan’s extensive discussions, 1941, 65ff. As symbolized by their respective totems, the Yellow and Red Emperors’ tribes are said to have merged through these conflicts, creating the heritage venerated (and exploited) by Warring States Confucian culture. (See Lin Hsiang-keng, HCCHS 1984:1, 3-10; Wang Yen-chün, HCCHS 1988:6, 11-15; and Wu Jui and Cheng Li, CKCHS 1996:3, 4-8.)

54
Lin Hsiang-keng, HCCHS 1984:1, 3-10; Wang Yen-chün, HCCHS 1988:6, 11-15; Wu Jui and Cheng Li, CKCHS 1996:3, 4-8.

55
Several monographs on the topic have appeared in the past two decades, significantly diminishing the value of H. H. Turney-High’s classic discussion,
Primitive War
; they include Jean
Guilaine and Jean Zammit,
The Origins of War: Violence in Prehistory
; Elizabeth N. Arkush and Mark W. Allen, eds.,
The Archaeology of Warfare: Prehistories of Raiding and Conquest
; Steven A. LeBlanc,
Constant Battles: The Myth of the Peaceful, Noble Savage
; John Carman and Anthony Harding, eds.,
Ancient Warfare
; Anthony Stevens,
The Roots of War
; and Arther Ferrill,
The Origins of War
. Although no more than a hundred men could have been effectively fielded without a minimal administrative hierarchy, modern studies still tend to claim that China’s legendary period lacked any form of military organization, placing their forces below the military horizon in accord with Turney-High’s conception. (For example, see Liu Chan, 1992, 4 and 20ff.)

56
This is considered another characteristic of so-called primitive warfare. (One of the remarkable, largely unnoticed aspects of later Chinese warfare was the common practice of armies simply reflagging vanquished enemy troops and integrating them en masse, as advocated in “Waging War” in the
Art of War
. How loyal, dedicated, and enthusiastic they historically proved has yet to be examined.)

1
Two examples would be Chi-kung-shan and Wu-chia Ta-p’ing at Wei-ning in Kuei-chou, both dating to about 1300 to 700 BCE (Kuei-chou-sheng WWKK YCS et al., KK 2006:8, 11-27 and 28-39, and Chang Ho-jung and Luo Erh-hu, KK 2006:8, 57-66).

2
A classic Lungshan site of some 140,000 square meters known as “the defensive ancient city” (“Fang-ku-ch’eng”), located in Shandong, furnishes a particularly good example of fortification continuity; it was employed right through the Warring States, when it served as a stronghold on Lu’s eastern border. (See Fang-ch’eng K’ao-ku Kung-tso-tui, KK 2005:10, 25-36.)

3
Even Paul Wheatley’s erudite but now outdated examination of city growth,
The Pivot of the Four Quarters
, never ponders the craft of wall building. Furthermore, the two volumes in Needham’s
Science and Civilisation in China
series that contemplate essential aspects of fortification—
Civil Engineering and Nautics
and
Military Sieges and Technology
—barely mention Neolithic and Shang fortifications.

4
Despite many hundreds of archaeological reports, only a few synthetic overviews such as P’ei An-p’ing, KK 2004:11, 63-76, and Shao Wangping, JEAA 2 (2000), 195-226, have appeared. (See also Shao’s “The Interaction Sphere of the Longshan Period.”) A few works have discussed city history, including Ch’ü Ying-chieh,
Ku-tai Ch’eng-shih,
2003; Ning Yüeh-ming et al.,
Chung-kuo Ch’eng-shih Fa-chan-shih,
1994; and Yang K’uan,
Chung-kuo Ku-tai Tu-ch’eng Chih-tu-shih Yen-chiu
. Valuable materials also appear in Li Liu,
The Chinese Neolithic: Trajectories to Early States,
and Chang Kwang-chih and Xu Pingfang, eds.,
The Formation of Chinese Civilization
.

5
Other than at Ma-chia-yüan Ku-ch’eng, no evidence has yet been reported for defensive works atop walls, not unexpectedly since erosion has affected almost every wall so far excavated.

6
For the history of aquatic warfare in China, see Ralph Sawyer,
Fire and Water.

7
In “Military Disposition,” Sun-tzu states: “One who cannot be victorious assumes a defensive posture, one who can be victorious attacks. By assuming a defensive posture your strength will be more than adequate.” In “Planning Offensives” he further observes: “The highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy’s plans; next is to attack their alliances; next to attack their army; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities.” The passage continues with a sweeping condemnation of the wastefulness of citadel assaults, though not their complete exclusion. (For further discussion and a complete translation of the
Art of War
with historical introduction and textual notes, see Sawyer,
Sun-tzu Art of War
.)

8
The eighty-eight pits at Ts’u-shan near Wu-an in Hebei held varying amounts of desiccated grain, which, when freshly stored, would have weighed over 50 metric tons. (See Jen Shih-nan, KK 1995:1, 38-39.) Similar reserves (such as 120 metric tons at Ho-mu-tu) have been found at
other sites. However, rather than a surplus, they may have been the basic subsistence requirement for the coming year.

9
The Neolithic is generally taken as encompassing 10,000 to 3500 BCE, though others extend it to 2100, the reputed date of the Hsia’s inception. Bronze metallurgy emerged during the Hsia; nevertheless, as it remained primarily a stone culture, the first two centuries are sometimes subsumed within the Neolithic as well.

10
“A Small State with Few People” in the traditionally received text. (For a complete translation and contextual discussion, see Sawyer,
The Tao of War
.)

11
See Jen Shih-nan, 37. (Various dates have been derived from the recovered artifacts, resulting in controversy.)

12
Jen Shih-nan, 37-38.

13
Yen Wen-ming, KKWW 1997:2, 35.

14
Site descriptions are based on P’ei An-p’ing, KK 2004:11, 66-67, and Chang Hsüeh-hai, KKWW 1999:1, 36-43. There are numerous difficulties reconstructing the earliest stage and disagreements about how to interpret the archaeological evidence. Some archaeologists have dated the site to nearly 6000 BCE, but the more commonly recognized range is Yen Wen-ming’s 5450 to 5100 BCE (cited on page 35 of
The Formation of Chinese Civilization
).

15
Another P’ei-li-kang platform site in Henan was not only surrounded by water on three sides, but also further protected by two shallow ditches about half a meter deep that could have functioned for drainage or demarcation as much as defense. (One of the ditches varied between a functional 1.65 and 5.15 meters in width, but the other was only 0.75 to 1.1 meters wide.) However, the location’s desirability is evident from its continuous occupation into the Erh-li-t’ou cultural phase (Chang Sung-lin et al., KK 2008:5, 3-20).

16
For site reports see Kan-su-sheng WWKK YCS, KK 2003:6, 19-31, and Lang Shu-te, KK 2003:6, 83-89. Only minimal information on the ditch has yet been provided.

17
Lin-t’ung Chiang-chai, which was continuously occupied right into the Warring States, was protected by a circular ditch that encompassed approximately 55,000 square meters or slightly more than Pan-p’o. However, as the ditch itself has not yet been analyzed, little can yet be said about its profile or overall significance. (For a basic report, see Honan Sheng Kung-yi-shih Wen-wu Pao-hu Kuan-li-suo, KK 1995:4, 297-304, as well as Ning Yüeh-ming’s appraisal,
Ch’eng-shih Fa-chan-shih
, 13.)

18
For a basic discussion of the Yangshao culture that was originally defined by its red-tinged pottery (in contrast to the black pottery of the later Lungshan period), see K. C. Chang, 1986 (which covers Pan-p’o on pp. 112-123) or Yen Wen-ming,
Yang-shao Wen-hua Yen-chiu
. Yangshao culture, generally dated from 5000 to 3000 BCE, was centered in the Kuan-chung area and included Gansu around the T’ien-shui River and the upper reaches of the Ch’ing-shui, the middle and upper reaches of the Luo River, the upper portion of the Han River in Shaanxi, the southern portion of Ching-hsi, and the Yü-hsi area, with the Wei River as the focus (Chang Hung-yen, KKWW 2006:5, 66-70, and WW 2006:9, 62-69, 78). Our discussion of Pan-p’o is primarily based on Ch’ien Yao-p’eng’s two articles, KK 1998:2, 45-52, and KK 1999:6, 69-77. However, also see Yen Wen-ming, SCKKLC, 146-153. (Evidence indicates that Lin-t’ung Chiang-chai was occupied well into the Warring States period.)

19
For example, Ch’ien Yao-p’eng believes the site flourished from 4770 to 4190 BCE or almost 600 years, but others such as Ning Yüeh-ming et al., 1994, 12-13, date it as late as 4000 BCE.

20
Ch’ien Yao-p’eng, KK 1999:6, 69.

21
Both Pan-p’o and Lin-t’ung Chiang-chai are marked by raised platforms and well-smoothed earth. It should be noted that Ch’ien Yao-p’eng, 46, believes that simply widening the walls, as was also done at P’eng-t’ou-shan, should be understood as an afterthought to ditch excavation rather than a deliberate attempt to solidify them and increase their height. In contradiction, Chang Hsüeh-hai concludes that the interior mounded wall was actually the result of a later,
more deliberate effort, and notes that there is evidence for a third ditch some ten meters beyond the main one that may have partially furnished the dirt for the inner wall or a no longer visible outer wall. (See Chang Hsüeh-hai, KKWW 1999:1, 41-43.)

22
See Ch’ien Yao-p’eng, KK 1998:2, 48-52.

23
For a recent discussion see Pi Shuo-pen et al., KKWW 2008:1, 9-17. Yen Wen-ming, WW 1990:12, 21-26, also briefly discusses the site’s significance, but cites somewhat different measurements, including 160 by 210 meters for a total area of 33,600 square meters. (The settlement’s probable appearance is depicted in Chang Kwang-chih and Xu Pingfang, eds.,
The Formation of Chinese Civilization
, 68-69.)

24
For three illustrative sites, see SHYCS Nei Meng-ku Ti-yi Kung-tso-tui, KK 2004:7, 3-8.

25
Liu Kuo-hsiang, KKWW 2001:6, 58-67. In contrast, the settlement at Hou-ma Tungch’eng-wang identified with the Miao-ti-kou culture has a ditch about 11 meters wide and 2.6 meters deep. (See Kao T’ien-lin, KK 1992:1 62-68, 93.)

26
Hu-pei-sheng WWKK YCS, KK 2008:11, 3-14.

27
For a general discussion of the nature of the Chinese city, see Liu Ch’ing-chu, KK 2007:7, 60-69.

28
Key site reports include Hunan-sheng WWKK YCS et al., WW 1993:12, 19-30, and Hunan-sheng WWKK YCS, WW 1999:6, 4-17. Also useful are Chang Hsü-ch’iu, KK 1994:7, 629-634, and P’ei An-p’ing, KK 2004:11, 69-70. (The diameter to the interior side of the walls is just 310 meters.)

29
The account that follows is based on P’ei An-p’ing, KK 2004:11, 69-70.

30
Discussion of this site is based on Chang Yü-shih et al., WW 1999:7, 4-15; Ch’ien Yao-p’eng, WW 1999:7, 41-45; Li Hsin, KK 2008:1, 72-80; and Jen Shih-nan, KK 1998:1, 1.

31
Contrary to claims of analysts such as Ch’ien Yao-p’eng.

32
Based on Hsi-shan’s engineering, Ch’ien Yao-p’eng, WW 99:7, 41-45, claims that the Yangtze area lagged behind the Yellow River in tamped earth techniques. (Pan-p’o is marked by a gradual slope rather than the sharp profile that can only be accomplished with framing.) However, others have claimed that the Yangtze area was more advanced.

33
See Li Hsin, KK 2008:1, 72-80.

34
For a brief overview of Lungshan sites and culture, see Shao Wangping, “The Interaction Sphere of the Longshan Period.”

35
For site reports see Ho-nan-sheng WWKK YCS, KK 2000:3, 1-20; Yüan Kuang-k’uo, KK 2000:3, 21-38; and Yüan Kuang-k’uo, KK 2000:3, 39-44. Although Shao Wangping cites a core date of 2300 BCE for the site and most would see a break about 2100, some controversy has arisen over whether it was immediately occupied by Erh-li-t’ou cultural members or there was a hiatus. The site was finally abandoned late in Erh-li-t’ou’s fourth period.

36
Yüan Kuang-k’uo believes climatic warming may have speeded the demise of Lungshan civilization, but few others would attribute it directly to increased rainfall, especially since the climatic optimum had long been passed and disagreement exists over the actual pattern. However, the western wall was apparently destroyed by flooding near the end of the Lungshan period but then rebuilt. Yüan identifies Meng-chuang with the legendary Kung Kung, who reputedly helped quell the floods of antiquity (but should have considerably predated this era, being closely identified with Yü), and asserts that the site was abandoned for two centuries after the flood.