Art of War (Barnes & Noble Classics Series) (57 page)

8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system.

 

[The Chinese] is explained by Tu Mu as “the way in which facts leak out and dispositions are revealed.”

This is called “divine manipulation of the threads.”

 

Mei Yao-ch’ên’s paraphrase shows that what is meant is the
control
of a number of threads.

It is the sovereign’s most precious faculty.

 

[General Baden-Powell writes:] “Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry leaders, had officers styled ‘scout masters,’ whose business it was to collect all possible information regarding the enemy, through scouts and spies, etc., and much of his success in war was traceable to the previous knowledge of the enemy’s moves thus gained” [
Aids to Scouting
].

9. Having
local spies
means employing the services of the inhabitants of a district.

Tu Mu says: “In the enemy’s country, win people over by kind treatment, and use them as spies.”

10. Having
inward spies
, making use of officials of the enemy.

 

 

[The Chinese term] includes both civil and military officials. Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good service in this respect: “Worthy men who have been degraded from office, criminals who have undergone punishment; also, favourite concubines who are greedy for gold, men who are aggrieved at being in subordinate positions, or who have been passed over in the distribution of posts, others who are anxious that their side should be defeated in order that they may have a chance of displaying their ability and talents, fickle turncoats who always want to have a foot in each boat.

“Officials of these several kinds,” he continues, “should be secretly approached and bound to one’s interests by means of rich presents. In this way you will be able to find out the state of affairs in the enemy’s country, ascertain the plans that are being formed against you, and moreover disturb the harmony and create a breach between the sovereign and his ministers.”

The necessity for extreme caution, however, in dealing with “inward spies,” appears from an historical incident related by Ho Shih: “Lo Shang, Governor of I-chou, sent his general Wei Po to attack the rebel Li Hsiung of Shu in his stronghold at P’i. After each side had experienced a number of victories and defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse to the services of a certain P’o-t’ai, a native of Wu-tu. He began by having him whipped until the blood came, and then sent him off to Lo Shang, whom he was to delude by offering to co-operate with him from inside the city, and to give a fire signal at the right moment for making a general assault. Lo Shang, confiding in these promises, marched out all his best troops, and placed Wei Po and others at their head with orders to attack at P’o-t’ai’s bidding.

“Meanwhile, Li Hsiung’s general, Li Hsiang, had prepared an ambuscade on their line of march; and P’o-t’ai, having reared long scaling-ladders against the city walls, now lighted the beacon fire. Wei Po’s men raced up on seeing the signal and began climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while others were drawn up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred of Lo Shang’s soldiers entered the city in this way, every one of whom was forthwith beheaded. Li Hsiung then charged with all his forces, both inside and outside the city, and routed the enemy completely.” [This happened in 303 A.D.]

11. Having
converted spies
, getting hold of the enemy’s spies and using them for our own purposes.

 

 

By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them from the enemy’s service, and inducing them to carry back false information, as well as to spy in turn on their own countrymen. . . .

Ho Shih notes three occasions on which converted spies were used with conspicuous success: (1) by T’ien Tan in his defence of Chi-mo [chapter IX, paragraph 24, note]; (2) by Chao Shê on his march to O-yü [chapter VII, paragraph 4, note]; and (3) by the wily Fan Chü in 260 B.C., when Lien P’o was conducting a defensive campaign against Ch’in: The King of Chao strongly disapproved of Lien P’o’s cautious and dilatory methods, which had been unable to avert a series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to the reports of his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and were already in Fan Chü’s pay. They said: “The only thing which causes Ch’in anxiety is lest Chao Kua should be made general. Lien P’o they consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be vanquished in the long run.”

Now this Chao Kua was a son of the famous Chao Shê From his boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed in the study of war and military matters, until at last he came to believe that there was no commander in the whole Empire who could stand against him. His father was much disquieted by this overweening conceit, and the flippancy with which he spoke of such a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that if ever Kua were appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies of Chao. This was the man who, in spite of earnest protests from his own mother and the veteran statesman Lin Hsiang-ju, was now sent to succeed Lien P’o.

Needless to say, he proved no match for the redoubtable Po Ch’i and the great military power of Ch’in. He fell into a trap by which his army was divided into two and his communications cut; and after a desperate resistance lasting 46 days, during which the famished soldiers devoured one another, he was himself killed by an arrow, and his whole force, amounting it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly put to the sword.

12. Having
doomed spies
, doing certain things openly for purposes of deception, and allowing our own spies to know of them and report them to the enemy.

 

Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning: “We ostentatiously do things calculated to deceive our own spies, who must be led to believe that they have been unwittingly disclosed. Then, when these spies are captured in the enemy’s lines, they will make an entirely false report, and the enemy will take measures accordingly, only to find that we do something quite different. The spies will thereupon be put to death.” . . .

As an example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions the prisoners released by Pan Ch’ao in his campaign against Yarkand [chapter XI, paragraph 36, note]. He also refers to T’ang Chien, who in 630 A.D. was sent by T’ai Tsung to lull the Turkish Khan Chieh-li into fancied security, until Li Ching was able to deliver a crushing blow against him. . . .