Austerlitz: Napoleon and the Eagles of Europe (22 page)

While Kutuzov prepared his defensive line, 300 miles away to the north, Tsar Alexander embraced King Frederick William of Prussia over the tomb of Frederick The Great, each swearing an oath of eternal friendship and thus sealing the Treaty of Potsdam. But at a time when urgent action was required the treaty failed to deliver. Prussia virtually demanded the breaking up of the new Kingdom of Italy by seeking territorial indemnities for the king of Sardinia, who had lost lands to Napoleon, and a drawing of the Austrian boundary in Italy on the Mincio. In addition, Prussia called for the independence of Naples, Holland, the German states and Switzerland. Napoleon would never agree to the terms, but Prussia offered mediation between the warring nations and threatened, if refused, to join the Allies. Without consultation with Britain, the tsar offered Prussia and her Saxon allies the same British financial subsidies as granted to Russia and Austria and also – extraordinarily – pledged to use his influence to gain Hanover for Prussia.

Having decided upon a period of one month for France’s response to these terms, the responsibility for delivering them to Napoleon fell to the Prussian foreign minister, Count Haugwitz. But having argued that the army would not be ready to move until mid-December, he delayed his departure for another ten days, with the king’s approval, leaving Napoleon untroubled by Prussian threats. On 5 November Alexander left Potsdam to rejoin the army, but decided first on a detour to visit his sister, who had married the crown prince of Saxe-Weimar. He finally ended his leisurely family visit on 13 November. The following day Haugwitz finally set out to complete his mission. By then Napoleon was already settling into the imperial capital of Vienna.

In Vienna anxiety began to manifest itself in a population starved of official information: since the war took a turn for the worse, official sanctions suppressed the newspapers. Sir Arthur Paget wrote to London expressing this unease:

‘The consternation which prevails here is at the highest pitch, and although I am far from supposing that it would have been an easy task to calm the public mind at a moment like the present, I cannot help thinking from the facts which have come within my observation that the conduct of the Government is of a nature to augment rather than diminish the dismay which has become so general.

‘There is in truth too much reason for this dismay. The culpable pains which are taken to keep the public in the dark with respect to the situation of affairs, naturally increases the alarm…The emperor instead of shewing himself at Vienna is living at a miserable country house, in order as the people say that he may be enabled to effectuate his escape with greater facility.’
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Despite the lack of information, it was clear to the ordinary citizens of Vienna that the war was not going well. This became even more obvious when many found themselves pressed into service for the defence of their city. At the end of October one man wrote:

‘The aspect of affairs is very melancholy … for all the citizens are obliged to mount guard. All foreigners are ordered to quit Vienna in eight days, and the Hereditary States in ten days. No carriage can quit Vienna without a passport from the Police. All inhabitants are called out for the defence of the country. In a word it seems as if the enemy were close to us. No young men were seen in the streets for fear of being taken by soldiers. Every one is taken who is capable of carrying arms.’
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Paget, commenting on the raising of this levy, reported that the city required 7,000 men and strove to achieve this number ‘with a degree of severity perfectly unexampled’. Yet these citizens were not just afraid of the arrival of a victorious French army in their midst. As Paget related: ‘The greatest apprehension begins to prevail on account of the Russians of whose excesses loud complaints are beginning to be made. Their arrival here is as much dreaded as that of the French.’ A typical story that aroused these fears came from Enns:

‘We are constantly shut up – we dare not appear at our doors or windows. By adapting this precaution, we have hitherto escaped bad treatment; but alas! we see what our neighbours suffer. The order of
the Regency is, to give each Russian 1 pound and a half a day of meat, 4 pounds of bread, twelve potatoes, and a jug of beer. They have no sooner dined than they want supper; as soon as they have that they call for their next day’s breakfast; and as soon as they are satisfied, they beat their unfortunate hosts. Some poor families have twenty, and some as many as eighty to lodge.’
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While fear and confusion spread, urgent efforts to pack up and evacuate the state archives continued unabated, yet the vast military resources of the Vienna arsenal remained untouched and were left for the French. Paget, dryly questioning the Austrian government’s priorities, informed London that amongst the papers removed were ‘those even of the Chancery of Bohemia, which no Frenchmen or foreigner that ever existed would give himself the trouble to read a line’.

On 4 November the kaiser called a council of war: the city’s defences were in a poor condition and there were questions over the mood of the population. As recently as July, social unrest broke out in what became known as the ‘Baker Riots’, when dissatisfied civilians protested against increases in the price of bread, an insurrection only brought to a halt by the intervention of the military, resulting in 10 dead and 100 wounded.

Therefore, to preserve the city intact, the imperial family, government and garrison evacuated, making no attempt at defence. While the kaiser arranged his departure for 7 November and planned to move to Olmütz, where he hoped to meet with Tsar Alexander, his family set off almost immediately for Buda in Hungary. The government gave no public notice of the departure of the kaiser, adding to the ‘considerable degree of discontent’ apparent in the city.
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Before he left, Francis despatched FML Gyulai (taken captive at Ulm but subsequently released as part of an exchange for French prisoners) to Napoleon with a proposal for an armistice. This meeting took place in Linz on 8 November and resulted in Napoleon presenting Gyulai with an ultimatum: break the alliance with Russia and hand over Venice and Tirol to France – only then could talks commence. Overwhelmed by these demands and in no position to accept them, Gyulai returned swiftly, adding further to the kaiser’s gloom and uncertainty, and heralding in a period of shuffle diplomacy, as Gyulai constantly moved backwards and forwards between the two camps.

In this unsettled state of affairs Paget bemoaned what appeared to be a total breakdown in the Austrian intelligence network. Until his capture, Schulmeister offered the French command a flow of detailed information during the operations around Ulm and then again during the advance on Braunau, but the situation was very different in Vienna. On 1 November Paget informed London that in his opinion: ‘It is not possible to be more ignorant of the movements of the enemy than this Government is … as to any detail whatever, I am persuaded
that nothing is known here or at headquarters.’ Seven days later he lamented further: ‘I still observe that the ignorance here and as I am informed at headquarters respecting the movement of the enemy is beyond all credibility. They have not such a thing as a spy belonging to them.’
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Against this background of confusion in Vienna, 90 miles to his rear, Kutuzov prepared to honour his pledge to Francis and hold the line of the Enns river for as long as possible, gaining time for the intervention of General Buxhöwden and Archdukes Charles and John. But as the wet and windy weather of October turned into the icy blasts and snow of November, rapidly changing circumstances saw this resolve quickly melt away.

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*
Napoleon’s address to La Grande Armée, 21 October 1805.

Chapter 10

‘A Day of Slaughter’
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The confusion prevailing in Vienna during the first days of November soon affected those elements of the Austrian army still engaged at the front. Since the capitulation at Ulm, Vienna had confirmed Kutuzov’s position as overall military commander, but FML Merveldt, now the senior Austrian commander in the field, still received direct orders from Vienna, as well as those from the Russian commander-in-chief.

The Allies began falling back from their positions on the Traun river on 1 November to the new line on the Enns, where a determined defence was to take place. On 4 November Kutuzov concentrated his Russian troops on the Enns, centred on the town of the same name, near to its junction with the Danube. FML Merveldt was occupying Steyr, 15 miles upstream, having detached Kienmayer with thirty-six cavalry squadrons about midway between the two towns. Work immediately began on the construction of fieldworks as the Allies awaited the French onslaught. On 4 November, and again on the following day, Francis wrote to Kutuzov, urging him to make a resolute defence. He concluded: ‘I put too much confidence in your intelligence to enter into details on the importance I place, initially, to the defence of the right bank of the Enns, then, that of a slow retreat to Krems and finally to the conservation of the bridgehead in front of that place.’
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While Kutuzov deployed his army on the Enns, Napoleon established his headquarters at Linz, from where he ordered his army forward. Murat, with the cavalry, followed by Davout with III Corps, kept up the pursuit of the Allies towards Steyr, where Merveldt, defending the crossing, was in receipt of a stream of confusing and contradictory instructions from Vienna. Then, as the French began closing on the river, Merveldt received an order to take his force of 6,000 men and march away from Steyr. These orders sent him into the Styrian Mountains via Weyer, Mariazell and Bruck an der Mur to Graz, where he was to make contact with Archduke Charles, marching from Italy.
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Having
received a direct order, Merveldt abandoned the town and began to move away, leaving Kienmayer to support the Russians. By the time countermanding orders arrived, compelling him to remain with Kutuzov, it was too late. As soon as the Russian general learnt that his left flank was completely open he ordered the army back from the line of the Enns. Kutuzov later wrote: ‘All the weak points of the river were defended, and I hoped to be able to hold this position for a long time; but soon, the corps placed at Steyr being forced to give up this station, I found it necessary to abandon the Enns and march on Amstetten.’
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The resolute defence of the river lasted barely a day.

Murat, now unopposed at Steyr, swiftly repaired the bridge over the river and the following day, at the head of two brigades of light cavalry, followed by Oudinot’s Reserve Grenadiers from Lannes’ corps, he once more set off in pursuit. Their route led them towards Amstetten, where the roads from Steyr and Enns merged to form the main road through the narrowing Danube valley towards Vienna. Elsewhere, Soult and Lannes continued their march as soon as they had crossed the Enns, while Bernadotte marched to rejoin the army. Marmont received orders redirecting him south towards Styria to watch for Archduke Charles, and Davout, at the head of III Corps, set out for Vienna on a more mountainous southerly route than Murat’s, to ease pressure on the overburdened road capacity in the valley. Unfortunately for the Austrians this route directed him on a collision course with Merveldt’s detachment.

The road between the Enns and Amstetten extends for about 18 miles, presenting few opportunities for strong rearguard positions, with part of the route running through extensive pine forest. However, between Strenberg and Amstetten, the road emerged from the forest into a large clearing, now carpeted with a layer of fresh snow. While the main Russian army continued its retreat, Prince Bagration formed his rearguard here for battle, strengthened by an Austrian force of four battalions of
grenz
infantry and three regiments of cavalry. These men formed the front line with a Russian horse artillery battery and the Pavlograd Hussars, while behind them Bagration arranged his Russian infantry: three battalions each of the Kiev Grenadiers, Azov Musketeers and 6. Jäger.

Murat, riding at the head of the pursuing force, harried a small fleeing cavalry rearguard through the winter landscape. Emerging from the confines of the forest into the clearing and observing the Allies drawn up before him, Murat did not hesitate from recklessly launching an immediate attack with only his escort squadron. Seeing such a tempting target, the Allied cavalry counter-charged and within moments Murat and his men were tumbling back in retreat. An aide-de-camp of Maréchal Berthier, Capitaine Lejeune, who was riding with Murat, described the dramatic events that followed:

‘The enemy overtook us, their ranks mingled with our rearguard, our men were swept down, many were taken prisoners, and we
ourselves were in danger of being captured. Murat’s horse was killed under him, mine fell in the confused rush down the steep path, and I was flung off.’
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Lejeune only saved himself by diving behind two artillery pieces, which the officer in command was double-loading with canister. As the cavalry mêlée swirled around in front of the guns, a gunner shouted a word of warning seconds before the gun spewed forth its massive charge. The shock waves brought the snow crashing down from the trees all around and the shot caused a great number of casualties amongst the Allied cavalry. As they turned and rode away in confusion, ‘great death-dealing icicles, falling from a height of more than a hundred feet, crashed upon the helmets of the fugitives with a resounding noise.’
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