Austerlitz: Napoleon and the Eagles of Europe (23 page)

More French troops rushed forward and the encounter quickly developed into a fierce battle, but in the face of repeated attacks the Allies held their ground. Kutuzov personally witnessed the clash, and fearing the outcome, ordered Miloradovich forward with the reserve, exhorting them to ‘Act as befits Russians.’
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In fact, they arrived just as Bagration began to retire. Miloradovich fed his four infantry regiments into the battle, supported by the Mariupol Hussars. The bitter struggle continued, swinging one way and then the other. Murat tried an attack on the Russian right but was driven back: he launched another against the left but was similarly repulsed. The Russians then threw forward the grenadier battalions of the Apsheron and Smolensk Musketeers against Oudinot’s grenadiers. Miloradovich ordered them not to fire: instead he urged them to remember how Suvorov taught them to use their bayonets in Italy.
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The Russian attack forced Oudinot’s men back, but fighting continued with no quarter given until both sides were exhausted. For many French troops this level of ferocity was a new experience. An officer wrote:

‘In this moment where the French infantry and Russian infantry approached corps to corps, Oudinot’s grenadiers showed the greatest intrepidity, the Russians a wild courage: wounded, mutilated, they fought with fury, even when we had disarmed them; these same prisoners attacked their escort.’
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After some five hours of relentless fighting, which carried on into the night, the exhausted French gave ground and fell back, taking their prisoners with them. Miloradovich, having achieved his aim of delaying Murat’s pursuit, did not linger on the battlefield any longer than necessary. He began to retreat once more, through Amstetten and across the Ypps river on the trail of the main army, heading towards Melk. Both sides claimed victory as silence once more descended on the forest clearing: its carpet of snow now stained red with the blood of the fallen.

The determination of the Russian rearguard made a deep impression on Napoleon and convinced him that they would soon stand against him in a major battle. Studying the map it appeared the most likely spot for such a confrontation would be at St Pölten on the Traisen river, the last defensive position of any strength on the road to Vienna. To add to Kutuzov’s difficulties, Napoleon created a new provisional corps. With this formation he hoped to threaten Allied communications with Moravia by blocking the strategically important bridge over the Danube near Krems, and to delay any reinforcements heading towards Kutuzov from north of the river. This ad hoc corps, commanded by Maréchal Mortier, was created by drawing in the divisions of Dupont (VI Corps) and Dumonceau (II Corps), which, separated from their own corps after Ulm, had marched down the Danube via Passau to Linz. To these Napoleon added Gazan’s division from V Corps and the 4ème Dragons, and on 6 November they crossed the Danube at Linz.

Mortier’s orders were to march along the north bank of the river, in conjunction with Lannes’ advance on the south bank, but keeping to his rear. He was to keep a watchful eye on Bohemia to the north, where Archduke Ferdinand had escaped after Ulm and where any possible Prussian intervention may appear, and push cavalry patrols far ahead to search for signs of the enemy. A large flotilla of boats of all sizes was authorised to maintain communications between Mortier and Lannes across the Danube. Yet there were flaws in this plan. At Linz, Napoleon was already some distance behind Murat and the leading elements of Lannes’ corps – on 6 November the distance was close to 40 miles – and communication was suffering.

As Mortier led his men across the Danube on 6 November, Murat and Lannes, having recovered overnight from their fierce encounter at Amstetten, tentatively pushed forward again. Expecting at any moment to run into another determined rearguard, they were puzzled to find an empty landscape. They increased their pace for the rest of the day, and the following day too, through the eerily deserted countryside without finding any trace of the Allies. It was as though the Russians and Austrians had vanished. North of the Danube, in an effort to keep up with these two rapidly moving corps, Mortier pushed Gazan’s division ahead, leaving the others to come on as best they could along the single narrow road which hugged the north bank of the river.

Elsewhere, the French pursuers were more successful. Davout’s corps soon encountered FML Merveldt’s Austrian detachment. While Merveldt’s route towards Styria took him on higher tracks forcing his men to struggle through deep snow, Davout’s corps advanced on a lower roadway where he was able to make up ground before turning towards Mariazell. On 6 November he caught up with a part of the Austrian baggage train trailing behind the infantry. His men joyously raided the wagons, discovering in them, amongst other items, a very welcome supply of sky blue Hungarian infantry trousers, ankle boots, linen drawers and greatcoats: a great boon in the icy weather.

Desperate to escape from their relentless pursuers, grenadiers from IR4 Deutschmeister attached themselves to the artillery harnesses to help pull the cannon through. But on 8 November Davout closed to striking distance and at Mariazell the luckless Merveldt was soundly beaten, escaping with only about 2,000 men through the mountains towards Graz and reaching Geisdorf on 11 November. From there he retired with his dispirited men into Hungary, arriving at Raab, some 70 miles south-east of Vienna, eight days later.

The fruitless search by Murat and Lannes for the retreating Allied army finally came to an end on the same day that Davout won his victory at Mariazell. After two days’ exhausting pursuit they came upon the army drawn up in battle order at St Pölten, just as Napoleon had anticipated. Unwilling to tackle such a large formation, Murat despatched the news back to Napoleon, who was still at Linz, now some 70 miles to the rear, urging him to come forward.

Napoleon left Linz on 9 November, already conceiving a plan to surround Kutuzov. However, the Russian commander, alerted to the approach of a French formation along the north bank of the river, had no intention of allowing Napoleon to corner him in such an unfavourable position and prepared to move away from St Pölten at once. He sent officers back to inspect the fortifications protecting the bridge over the Danube near Krems, but, despite the assurances of Kaiser Francis, the work had made little progress. In light of this Kutuzov considered his only choice of action was to abandon St Pölten, and by definition Vienna too, cross to the north bank of the Danube and destroy the bridge behind him. This important bridge was the last crossing point before Vienna, and once safely across he knew he would gain the time he desperately needed to reorganise his exhausted troops and await reinforcements from Russia.

The kaiser still clung to the hope that Kutuzov could be persuaded to protect Vienna, and to this end sent FML Heinrich von Schmitt to headquarters, where he arrived on 6 November. Schmitt bore a letter of introduction from the kaiser, personally recommending his appointment as chief of staff, a function Kutuzov had fulfilled himself since becoming commander of the army shortly after Ulm. Part of Schmitt’s mission was to induce Kutuzov to fight a battle before Vienna, but in this he failed. Kutuzov wrote to the kaiser to justify his decision. He informed Francis that the French were approaching his rear and intending to trap him against the Danube and then cleverly went on to explain that in fact he was following the kaiser’s original orders to the letter:

‘I dare to assure you, Your Majesty, that in the full sense of the word I was disputing every single step of the enemy. Bloody battles of the rear guard serve as proof of this. However, I could not have held Napoleon any longer without entering a fully-fledged battle, which would be against the orders given to me by Your Majesty.’
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And so, during the night of 8–9 November, Kutuzov fell back towards the Danube. Kienmayer remained before St Pölten with his cavalry, screening the position from the French, with orders to retire on Vienna when pressed. It was not until the evening of the 9 November that Murat recognised the true role of Kienmayer’s cavalry. Then, with the last of Kutuzov’s men safely over the river and the bridge already burning, the Austrians melted away and fell back to Vienna, 35 miles to the east. Here they joined a force hastily assembling outside the city preparing to defend the massive Tabor bridge over the Danube.

Blinded by the illusionary prize of the Austrian capital, Murat spurred his cavalry forward on the morning of 10 November, urging Lannes and Soult to follow him with all speed. But it is possible that Murat failed to realise Kutuzov had crossed the Danube, and thought him still retiring on Vienna: certainly Napoleon did not expect this move, which would leave Vienna undefended.

Because of the great distances involved, it was not until the night of 10–11 November that the emperor learnt of this turn of events, while at his new headquarters at Melk Abbey. It was a setback to his plans. He realised now that there was no quick end in sight and the Allies would gain time to draw in reinforcements. And this news came on the same day that he was digesting details of the defeat of Franco-Spanish navy at Trafalgar. Seething with anger, he lashed out at Murat. At 3.30am he despatched a peremptory message, calling on him to halt his advance on Vienna and criticising him for not seeking new orders when the Russians passed over the Danube and for rushing on Vienna without knowing the emperor’s wishes. He ended with the rebuke: ‘You were ordered to pursue the Russians with your sword in their ribs. It is a curious way of pursuing them to move away from them by forced marches.’
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The order reached Murat just 6 miles from the city. Of the rest of the army, Lannes was marching from St Pölten towards Murat, Soult stood on the Traisen with detachments towards the Krems, Bernadotte had reached Amstetten and orders sent to Davout ordered him to halt his march on Vienna at Mödling. But the real problem lay on the north side of the Danube as Napoleon was now very much aware. The corps of Maréchal Mortier was alone and unsupported and rapidly approaching Kutuzov’s army.

In an attempt to keep pace with the rapid advance of Lannes’ corps, Maréchal Mortier pushed Gazan’s division ahead of the rest of the newly-formed corps, although Napoleon’s plan for an extensive flotilla to link the two formations had failed due to a lack of suitable vessels. On the afternoon of 10 November, Gazan’s men arrived at the village of Dürnstein, about 31/2 miles west of Krems. Despite orders requiring him to scout far ahead, the majority of Mortier’s cavalry were operating on his left flank, in the passes leading towards Bohemia. It was not until his infantry advance guard approached the tiny twin villages of Ober and Unter-Loiben, just beyond Dürnstein, that he encountered any Allied activity. Here, a small Austro-Russian patrol fell back before him, while in the
background, the bridge over the Danube still smouldered. It all contrived to convince Mortier that the Allied army was in retreat. He followed up until he encountered resistance just outside Krems, his advance guard falling back to a position at Rotenhof. Gazan’s division prepared to settle down for the night, intending to continue their advance in the morning.

Kutuzov, however, had learnt from some French prisoners that the force advancing towards him formed only a single division of some 5,500 men, its nearest support, Dupont’s division, standing at Marbach some 26 miles to the rear, with another division (Dumonceau’s) beyond that. With encouragement from FML Schmitt, Kutuzov decided to attack, leaving his new Austrian chief of staff to draw up the plans. A little after midnight, in the early hours of 11 November, two Russian columns, a total of approximately 10,000 men, marched off into the freezing night. They planned to climb the rugged snow-covered hills and swing around behind Gazan’s division, descending through narrow passes back down to the Danube by about 8.00am. In the meantime, volunteer ‘deserters’ entered the French camp to help persuade Mortier that only a rearguard stood before Krems, in an attempt to hold Gazan in the trap. This image Kutuzov reinforced by leaving only 2,500 men under Miloradovich in front of Gazan. The generally poor condition of the Allied army meant the rest of his command adopted supporting or reserve positions and were not involved in the attack. But Kutuzov did receive the welcome addition of General Leitenant Rosen’s column. These were the men redirected towards the Turkish frontier in August, then recalled: now they had finally caught up with the army.

At 7.00am on the morning of 11 November Miloradovich moved forward to engage Gazan’s advance guard, now reinforced by a few cavalry squadrons. Driving these men back, Miloradovich attacked aggressively and gained the village of Unter-Loiben, but the intensity of French fire from Ober-Loiben drove him back. For the next five hours the two sides attacked each other ferociously until, at noon, it appeared Miloradovich’s men were finished. Sensing the moment Mortier ordered Gazan’s men forward, driving the Russians all the way back to Rotenhof, where the first exchanges took place earlier that morning, and then further back towards Stein on the very outskirts of Krems. Finally, at about 1.00pm, with the situation looking bad for Miloradovich, the first of the flanking formations, five battalions commanded by General Maior Strik, appeared on the French left. The conditions the troops experienced in the hills were atrocious and only by dogged determination did they fight their way through the snow-covered hills to the Danube.

Now Mortier began to fall back, pursued by Miloradovich, reinforced by four battalions from Rosen’s newly arrived column. Reinvigorated, the Russians forced Mortier back in a fighting retreat all the way to Ober-Loiben. Then at around 3.30pm, much to Mortier’s dismay, more Russian troops emerged from
the hills in his rear and advanced against Dürnstein. After a fierce assault on the town the Russians, under General Leitenant Dokhturov, drove the French defenders out, cutting off Mortier’s retreat and forcing him back towards the impassable rising ground which hemmed in the battlefield to the north.