Austerlitz: Napoleon and the Eagles of Europe (40 page)

Having left his men drawn up outside Sokolnitz, Langeron rushed off to speak to Buxhöwden, the overall commander of the Allied left wing. Langeron was now desperate, for it was clear the army was in a bad position. But when he reached Buxhöwden, he realised his commanding officer was drunk and his frustration and anger got the better of him:

‘His face was crimson and he appeared to me to have neither his head nor even his reason. I told him what had happened on the plateau and that we were turned and surrounded by the enemy. He answered me rather coarsely: “My General, you see enemies everywhere.” I replied to him, in truth, with little enough respect: “And you, Count, you are not in a fit state to see them anywhere.”’
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Buxhöwden did not forget Langeron’s insubordination and was to have his revenge later. But Langeron was not alone in condemning Buxhöwden’s lack of activity. An Austrian staff officer who was present, Hauptmann Jurczik, ‘dared to reproach Count Buxhöwden for his uncertainty and his inaction’ with, as Langeron put it, ‘even more force than me.’

Buxhöwden had, in fact, received the earlier order from Kutuzov to retire, but as it failed to spell out the total defeat of Allied forces on the plateau, he ignored it. He discussed the situation with Kienmayer and Stutterheim and decided to stay put and hoped to alleviate whatever the problem was by finally pushing back the French right. But now, with French formations flowing over the edge of the plateau, it was clear that the battle plan had gone badly wrong and it was time, belatedly, to save what he could of his command.

The only option apparent to Buxhöwden was to march back eastwards, passing Augezd, with the plateau on the left and the frozen expanses of Satschan lake on the right: beyond Augezd, across the Littawa stream, he presumed he would find IV Column. He issued orders to the closest regiments (the Vladimir, Yaroslavl and New Ingermanland Musketeers and Kiev Grenadiers) of I Column – those dubbed by Langeron as Buxhöwden’s ‘guard of honour’ as so far they had not fired a shot – to prepare to march. Then for the protection of their open left flank, he ordered the artillery commander of I Column, Count Sievers, to reform his two twelve-gun batteries facing the plateau and extend them towards Augezd. The timing was opportune, for no sooner were the guns in position than Beaumont’s dragoons appeared from the direction of Sokolnitz. Tempted by the sight of the retreating Russian infantry they began to advance, but a well-ordered fire by Sievers’ guns forced the French cavalry away up onto the plateau.
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Increasing pressure building up against the men Langeron had left facing Sokolnitz had already forced them to give ground towards Telnitz. West of Telnitz, Kienmayer and Dokhturov realised the danger developing behind them and commenced pulling their men back through the village, by which time Buxhöwden was already leading the way to Augezd. Dokhturov ordered General Maior Löwis to organise a rearguard in and around Telnitz to delay any French pursuit, supported by Kienmayer’s cavalry, while the
grenzer
infantry followed the remaining regiments of I and II Column in pursuit of those already making for Augezd.

After Napoleon had issued his orders for the redirection of the central part of the army, he rode to the southern end of the plateau. Once there, he followed the gentle downwards slope to the tiny Chapel of Saint Antonin, which nestled on a lower spur overlooking the village of Augezd and the frozen Satschan lake. Here he found Vandamme and Soult watching the Allied forces making their way eastwards. They recognised the need to close down this route to the Allies, for once they passed beyond the Augezd defile they were safe, but for the moment there was nothing they could do as they waited anxiously for the first of Vandamme’s fatigued and wounded division to arrive. The first two Russian battalions were already emerging from Augezd when the leading unit of Vandamme’s division finally arrived at the chapel. Soult, giving, as far as Thiébault was concerned, his first order since he launched his corps at the Pratzen Plateau early in the morning, ordered Vandamme to stop them.
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Immediately a single battalion of 28ème Ligne bundled down the slope and cut the road leading from Augezd to Hostieradek: the trap was sealed. The time was close to 3.30pm.

Buxhöwden just missed escaping through Augezd before the French obstructed his path to safety. Then the rest of Vandamme’s leading two brigades arrived, and despite the traumas already suffered by 4ème Ligne and 24ème Légère, at the hands of the Russian Horse Guards, they, with the remaining battalion of 28ème Ligne: ‘rushed like a torrent down upon the village, in which a sharp fire of musketry at first took place, but which was of short duration, before they gained possession of the village.’
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The attack not only captured the village but 2/4ème Ligne also netted Polkovnik Sulima of the Moscow Regiment and two battalion standards, but the main body of the regiment managed to retreat back towards Telnitz.
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At the head of the following units, Buxhöwden veered away from danger and made a dash towards a ‘rotten wooden bridge, covered with manure, and intended for the passage of cattle’, which crossed over the marshy ground and a broad, deep stream feeding Satschan lake. Buxhöwden and his entourage led the way across but behind them an Austrian gun and limber proved too much for the weak structure, which collapsed beneath its weight, sealing this escape route too. Unconcerned by the fate of his men behind him, Buxhöwden rode on towards Austerlitz, leading just the two battalions that passed safely through Augezd, having exerted command over about 34,000 men at the commencement of the battle. A short while later Czartoryski, who was endeavouring to discover what was happening on the left wing, saw him approaching. Of this encounter Czartoryski wrote: ‘The poor general had lost his hat, and his clothes were in disorder; when he perceived me at a distance he cried, “They have abandoned me! They have sacrificed me!” He continued his retreat, and I hastened to join the [tsar].’
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In desperation, the mass of men following Buxhöwden took the only other option and moved tentatively onto the frozen surface of Satschan lake. Some
of the battalion artillery followed too, severely testing the strength of the ice as those fleeing slithered their way across. A French witness described this bleak white expanse ‘blackened by the scattered multitude of fugitives’.
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Vandamme’s artillery had also now arrived close to the chapel above Augezd and immediately unlimbered and opened fire on the disorganised mass of Russians below. At the same time, Vandamme’s successful capture of Augezd allowed his infantry to turn their attention to Sievers’ Russian batteries. These gunners refused to abandon their guns and kept firing until overwhelmed by infantry emerging from Augezd and attacking their open right flank.

Back on the ice the inevitable happened. The sheer concentration of weight at first caused the ice to crack and then break, dumping the horrified Russian soldiers into the black icy waters. Fortunately the lake was shallow – rarely more than chest-deep – and once they overcame the initial shock, the men were able to struggle on. But soon, artillery fire directed on the lake made the horror more acute for those desperately wading through the freezing mud and water. For some, particularly the wounded, it proved too great an exertion and they slipped below the surface to a watery grave. Others, helped along by comrades, struggled on, while compassionate French soldiers waded in and hauled back those they could reach. Napoleon made much of this episode in his reporting of the battle, claiming 20,000 Russian soldiers drowned. This is pure propaganda. A few days after the battle the lake was drained. Discovered in the mud were ‘Twenty-eight to thirty cannon, 150 corpses of horses and only two or three human corpses’.
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Local estimates suggest as few as 200 men in total lost their lives crossing the Satschan lake; others up to 2,000: but not 20,000.

Langeron, with two of his adjutants and three officers of the Vyborg Musketeers gathered together a small group of soldiers close to the destroyed bridge. Chaos and confusion were everywhere. As the French approached, Langeron, having abandoned his horse, led this knot of men on foot, struggling through the wide expanse of marsh and stream beds to relative safety on the other side and followed the general line of retreat. The deterioration of the army greatly shocked Langeron: ‘after the passage of the streams … No two men of the same company remained together, all were mixed up and confused: the soldiers threw away their guns and no longer listened to their officers, or their generals.’
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Seeing the fate that awaited those who ventured onto the ice, Dokhturov turned the units still on dry land and marched them back toward the rearguard near Telnitz. Here Dokhturov consulted with Kienmayer and decided that the only means of escape now open to them lay to the south, across a narrow causeway separating the Satschan and Menitz lakes, which would open up a route along the south side of the Satschan lake. Although it would only allow little more than two men abreast to pass, there was no other option. Kienmayer immediately rode ahead with the 4. Hessen-Homburg-Husaren and some Cossacks to secure this route by taking up a position on high ground between
Satschan and Ottnitz. From here, overlooking Augezd, the Austrian cavalry hoped to deter any French attempt to cross the streams and marshes to cut Dokhturov’s retreat. The rest of Kienmayer’s Austrian cavalry – 3. O’Reilly Chevaulegers and 11. Szeckel-Husaren – pushed forward a little to shield the rest of the army as it prepared to file away to the south. The
chevaulegers
formed the front line and the Sysoev and Melentev Cossack Regiments joined the force, hovering on their flanks.

This southward movement of the remaining Allied forces quickly attracted French attention. Consequently, a battery of Garde Impériale horse artillery established itself close to the northern bank of the lake and opened up on the Russians as they filed over the causeway. This concentrated target soon came under heavy bombardment, and when a howitzer shell hit an ammunition cart the resulting explosion prevented many following vehicles passing the spot. Fortunately for those following on foot, the ice of the Menitz pond – which held firm – proved their ally, allowing them to pass the burning obstruction and continue their march. Even so, as Stutterheim recalled, ‘The Russian infantry, fatigued and exhausted, retired very slowly.’
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Determined to prevent this gradual escape of the Allies, Beaumont’s dragoons advanced to engage the protective Austrian cavalry. Three French dragoon regiments attacked in a column of squadrons hoping to punch through the Austrians, who formed with their squadrons in line. The 3. O’Reilly Chevaulegers spurred their horses forward, and by the time the two forces met, the Austrian formation considerably overlapped both French flanks and was able to swing in onto the column and cause a great number of casualties. To bring help to their desperate comrades, another two dragoon regiments rode towards the struggling mass, but coming under heavy fire from a cavalry battery attached to the Austrian
chevaulegers
, they quickly found themselves in difficulty too. But the dragoons managed to break off the engagement and flooded back the way they had come, with the disordered Austrians in close pursuit.

Fortunately for the dragoons, one formed regiment of their division remained and this, the 21ème Dragons, launched themselves at the O’Reilly Chevaulegers and sent them scrambling back to rejoin the hussars and Cossacks. However, all the time more and more Allied troops were escaping across the causeway. Increasing French pressure on Telnitz had finally driven out the rearguard from the village and they too had joined the exodus to the south. Now the last of the infantry formations, the Moscow Musketeer Regiment, which had lost heavily at Augezd earlier, fell back to take up a strong position on a hill resting on Satschan lake south of Telnitz. Here they formed a final rearguard, protecting the causeway and offering support to the cavalry as they withdrew.

Unfortunately for GD Beaumont, Napoleon had watched the failure of his dragoons to break the Austrian resistance. An officer on Soult’s staff, Saint-
Chamans, standing close by, observed the emperor ‘in an evil temper’: ‘He caught sight of a staff officer who had accompanied the division. “Go back there”, said the emperor, “and tell the general in command from me that he’s no bloody good!”’
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While the O’Reilly Chevaulegers waited the order to retire they recovered quickly, despite being under fire, and advanced once more against the mass of dragoons, who were still reforming behind the 21ème Dragons. But as they approached the French line it parted to reveal another horse artillery battery of the Garde Impériale. Blasted at close range, the Austrian cavalry turned and fell back with their supporting units and artillery to the hill south of Telnitz held by the Moscow Regiment, allowing this, the last of the Allied infantry to retreat across the causeway. Despite coming under increasing artillery fire and suffering heavy casualties, the Austrian cavalry continued to hold this position, supported by their battery, which eventually managed to quieten the French fire. The cavalry held on to this exposed position until the last of the Russian infantry passed to safety, when they too peeled away and crossed the narrow causeway. As soon as they vacated the hill, French troops rushed forward to occupy it and their artillery continued to fire on the retreating cavalry until it moved out of range.
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The last Allied troops had withdrawn from the battlefield. The time was between 4.00pm and 4.30pm, the sky had darkened, and the freezing drizzle that had fallen for a while turned to sleet mixed with flurries of snow.