Being Soviet: Identity, Rumour, and Everyday Life Under Stalin 1939-1953 (30 page)

^{150
Let. RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 242, ll. 21–4.}

^151
Pravda
, 22.05.43, p. 1.

^{152
Inf. RGASPI f. 17, op. 88, d. 594, l. 8.}

^{153
Sv. Ibid. op. 125, d. 181, l. 5.}

^{154
Inf. Ibid. op. 88, d. 594, l. 14. See also: ll. 8, 16, 37; op. 125, d. 181, l. 3; Sv.}

TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 685, l. 178.

^{155
Mem. Werth also reports that this was the common assumption. Werth,}
Russia at
War, 674.

^{156
Inf. RGASPI f. 17, op. 88, d. 594, l. 1; Sv. op. 125, d. 181, l. 1; op. 88, d. 594, l.}

44; op. 122, d. 55, l. 8.

74
Being Soviet

the informal news network for years to come.
^{157
A wide spectrum of}
Soviet citizens fused the idea that the Red Army was carrying more than a fair share of the wartime burden with notions of allied exploitation, and concluded that the Anglo-Americans were extracting concessions from the USSR in return for their support.

The same process of
bricolage
was applied to a number of other surprising decisions within the unofficial rumour network. One com- mon claim was that the Allies had forced the Soviet government to change its policy on the Church.
^{158
In 1942 a wave of rumours}
speculated that the relaxation of strictures against celebrating Easter was a political move ‘to please England and America’.
^{159
N.A.K. was}
arrested in 1943 for passing on the rumour that ‘England and America forced us to open the churches and re-establish them’.
^{160
The idea that}
official policy towards the Church was being dictated by the Allies was so widespread that even some of the agitators in Voznesensky
oblast’
considered it to be true.
^{161
Allied meddling in Soviet internal life was}

also employed to explain the absence of a May Day celebration in 1945,
the reintroduction of epaulettes on officers’ uniforms, the introduction of a new Soviet anthem, or the lack of a major offensive in late 1944.
^{162
Another category of rumour speculated on the changes that would be}
introduced after the war as a result of pressure from the Allies. These rumours were based on the idea that the Allies were already forcing the USSR to ‘go to the old way’.
^{163
It seemed logical to infer that further}
changes were imminent. The most widespread story was that the Allies were demanding the abolition of collective farms in the USSR.
^164
Such
rumours appear within a variety of sources and contexts. Audiences at

^{157
Proc. GARF f. R8131, op. 31a, d. 76746, l. 12; d. 47092, ll. 3–4. Let. Soviet}

agitators were still writing to Bolshevik asking for help in understanding this question in
1947–8. See: RGASPI f. 599, op. 1, d. 3, l. 64; d. 6, l. 47.

^{158
On the church in wartime, see Merritt Miner,}
Stalin’s Holy War
. He argues that

changes in church policy were not largely for an international audience.

^{159
Ibid. 161.}

^{160
Proc. GARF f. R8131, op. 31a, d. 21382, l. 9.}

^{161
Inf. RGASPI f. 17, op. 122, d. 30, ll. 44–5.}

^{162
Sv. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 1449, l. 27; Mem. Ermolenko,}
Voennyi dnevnik
, 98; Proc. GARF f. R8131, op. 31a, d. 16696, l. 20; d. 47092, ll. 3–4.

^{163
Proc. GARF f. R8131, op. 31a, d. 13905, l. 3.}

^{164
Mem. Werth,}
Russia at War
, 945; G. Bordiugov, trans. R. W. Thurston, ‘The Popular Mood in the Unoccupied Soviet Union: Continuity and Change during the War’, in Thurston and Bonwetsch, eds.,
The People’s War
, 63; Borisov et al.,
Rossiia i
Zapad, 289; HIP. A. 9, 121, 15.

Perfidious Allies? 1941–45
75

agitational meetings frequently asked whether collective farms would be
preserved after the war.
^{165
Petrushevich, a collective farmer of the village}
of Kiianka, Chernigovskii
oblast’
, stated in August 1945, ‘I have not read the decisions of the Conference [Berlin] myself, but I have heard from some people that at the conference the Allies demanded of the Soviet government that they liquidate the
kolkhozy
.’
^{166
N.V. Nashadim}
claimed to a friend in June 1945 that, ‘soon America will dictate to the Soviet Union to divide the
kolkhoz
land amongst the peasants and our government will do it.’
^{167
When asked to describe a typical piece of}
news obtained by word of mouth, one respondent to HIP remembered, ‘Yes, we got many rumours such as: When the war is over the collective

farms must be destroyed, because Roosevelt asked Stalin to destroy
them.’
¹⁶⁸

In his history of the partisan struggle, Armstrong suggests that the
government intentionally sponsored this idea to rally popular support. However, he admits that there is no documentary evidence that this is the case.
^{169
The prosecution of individuals such as M.S. and F.E.}
in 1944 for holding ‘counter-revolutionary conversations’ about the fact that the collective farms were to be abolished also casts doubt on the idea that the regime was covertly promoting this idea.
^170
Other
rumours focused on the Allies’ supposed post-war demands for national independence in certain regions of the USSR, for free trade within the Soviet Union, or for Western-style democracy.
^{171
Whether as an expla-}
nation for changes that had already taken place, or a potential cause of alterations to come, the idea that the Allies were applying pressure to extract concessions from the Soviet government was a potent and widespread concept in the wartime USSR.

^{165
Inf. RGASPI M-f. 1, op. 32, d. 304, l. 23; Sv. TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 1479,}

ll. 1–4.

^{166
Sv. TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 1449, l. 43.}

^{167
Sv. Ibid. d. 1477, l. 9. See also: d. 1626, l. 12; Inf. RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 136,}
l. 50; Proc. GARF f. R8131, op. 31a, d. 30527, ll. 7–9.

^{168
HIP. A. 9, 121, 15; B8, 645, 10.}

^{169
Armstrong,}
Soviet Partisans in World War II
, 246–7. Some respondents to HIP did claim that agitators had spread these rumours: HIP. B8, 645, 10; A. 3, 27, 16. More likely is the claim of one respondent that the government did ‘not officially approve these rumours but they did nothing to dispel them either’. A. 31, 445, 57.

^{170
Proc. GARF f. R8131, op. 31a, d. 30527, l. 8. See also: d. 39494, l. 13, and}
d. 380347, l. 7.

^{171
Sv. TsDAHOU, f. 1, op, 23, d. 890, l. 85; d. 892, l. 91; d. 685, l. 6; HIP. B11,}

64, 54.

76
Being Soviet

Another prominent wartime rumour, whose success was dependent
on this idea of allied exploitation, was that the USSR would be forced, against its will, into joining the Anglo-American war against Japan. Soviet citizens were desperate to return to ‘ordinary life’ when the war ended in May 1945. Workers who had been mobilized for construction submitted requests to return home and for a return to normal working hours.
^{172
The most commonly asked question, cited in every one of the}
sixteen lists of questions at the end of the war, was ‘Will the USSR now fight with Japan?’
^{173
Rumours about troop transfers to the Far East were}
widespread during the three months of peace between 9 May and the Soviet declaration of war on 9 August.
^{174
The levels of anticipation were}
so high that the story that war had already broken out circulated a number of times before 9 August.
^{175
The operating assumption that}
underwrote these rumours, like those concerning forthcoming changes to Soviet society, was that the USSR was being forced to act against its will by the Allies.

There was little enthusiasm for the war against Japan when it did
begin.
^{176
The controller of the Irkutsk radio corner, Luk’ianov, voiced}
his opinion that ‘Our government always screws up . . . The Allies forced this war on us and they will ride on our shoulders.’
^{177
Listeners at}
agitational meetings in Arkhangel’sk
oblast’
asked, ‘Is it true to say that the English love to get others to do their dirty work? They will again not fight with Japan and we will pour out our blood?’
^{178
In Pskov}
oblast’
another voiced the view that ‘A war with Japan is not terrible to us but what is terrible to us is England who as our ally pulled us into a war with Japan.’
^{179
The idea that the Allies were exploiting the Soviet Union and}
serving only their own interests remained a powerful explanatory frame- work up until the end of World War II.

The origins and transmission of these rumours bear little resemblance
to Viola’s image of anti-regime peasants spreading apocalyptic tales.
^{180
Rumours about allied perfidy were passed on by intellectuals, managers,}

^{172
Sv. RGASPI f. 17, op. 88, d. 469, ll. 23–32, 163.}

^{173
Ibid. ll. 5–217.}

^{174
Mem. Werth,}
Russia at War
, 1001; Sv. RGASPI f. 17, op. 88, d. 469, ll. 89–92.

^{175
Sv. RGASPI f. 17, op. 88, d. 469, l. 96.}

^{176
HIP. B4, 64, 7.}

^{177
Sv. RGASPI f. 17, op. 88, d. 469, ll. 55–6.}

^{178
Sv. Ibid. pp. 6–9.}