Being Soviet: Identity, Rumour, and Everyday Life Under Stalin 1939-1953 (29 page)

^{134
Int. Boris Romanovich, Moscow, September 2004.}

70
Being Soviet

conducted on the Belorussian front in 1944. Moreover, the discursive
power of the Soviet propaganda machine made it likely that significant proportions of the population would be influenced by its version of wartime Soviet patriotism.

However, the hegemony of the Soviet press concerning the internal
dynamics of the Grand Alliance did not extent to the interpretations Soviet citizens placed on this state of affairs. A large number of alterna- tive inferences concerning this military imbalance circulated within the word-of-mouth network at this time. These explanations shared the official press’ vision of the internal military dynamics of the alliance, but differed as to the implications of that state of affairs.

The Soviet press failed to provide a clear explanation for the allied
failure to open the Second Front throughout 1942 and 1943. The most common question asked about the Second Front was
why
is it not open? It was asked at every agitational meeting in Kursk
oblast’
during April

1943.
^{135
Many agitators struggled to provide an answer. At a May 1942}

gathering of agitators in Arkhangel’sk, several of those present confessed
that they did not know what to say when the workers asked about the Second Front.
^{136
A wartime}
frontovik
remembered in a similar vein that ‘Many questions were asked about relations with the Allies but the
zampolits
gave evasive answers.’
^{137
This void in explanation fed directly}
into the informal world of rumour and speculation that flourished in the USSR. Soviet citizens employed the ‘tactic’ of
bricolage
to draw their own conclusions about why the Allies were failing to fulfil their duty in the shared struggle against Hitler. They fused the information they received from the official press with pre-existing assumptions about Britain, America, and international affairs to generate a wealth of rival interpretations within the informal news network.

Whether they regarded it in a positive light or not, many Soviet
citizens concluded that the Allies were taking advantage of the USSR. This narrative of allied exploitation is evident in a vast array of different sources generated by the state, Soviet citizens themselves, and later interviewers. Vselevod Vishnevskii, who became a well-known author, echoed one of the most common conclusions within the rumour

^{135
Inf. For example: RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 136, l. 58.}

^{136
Inf. GAOPDiFAO f. 834, op. 2, d. 203, ll. 40b–44b. The chair of the meeting}
simply told them that they should read the newspapers and everything would become clear. See also f. 296, op. 1, d. 1551, l. 50 for a similar problem.

^{137
HIP. B4, 64, 7.}

Perfidious Allies? 1941–45
71

network, when he wrote in his diary that the Allies hoped to ‘manoeuvre
to protect their forces until Germany and the USSR have drained from each other the maximum of blood and arrive for the finale of the war’.
^{138
Others held that the Allies were holding off because they were}
convinced the USSR was about to collapse. Anatolii Rybin wrote in his diary in early 1942 that, ‘Our allies were also waiting, believing in our powerlessness to carry out significant active operations.’
^{139
Such com-}
ments were also common in the
svodki
gathered by the Secret Police, which often recorded speakers attributing sinister causes to allied inac- tion. A senior scientific worker of the Biology Institute based in Ufa, Zerov, concluded in March 1943 that ‘It is clear that they are not inclined to actively help us, and are almost as afraid of our victory as of Hitler’s.’
^{140
The strange story of Rudolph Hess’s flight to England}
led numerous individuals to question Alexander Werth in 1941 about whether he was ‘quite sure that no deal had been made’ between Britain and Germany.
^{141
Andrei Ivanovich, a wartime}
frontovik
, affirmed this attitude during an interview when he remembered that, ‘We thought that they were waiting and hoping for us to destroy the Germans.’
^142
In
the absence of a clear official narrative, Soviet citizens employed the ‘tactic’ of
bricolage
to provide their own speculative explanations for the allied failure to act.

Many of these comments regarding the Allies’ failure to open the
Second Front went much further than the official press in their criticism of the Allies. A May 1942 report to Agitprop noted that some of the questions asked about the Second Front expressed ‘a sharp tone of address to England and the USA’. At a gathering of activists in Lenin
raion
, Moscow, a piece of paper was handed in with the question, ‘When in what month will the Second Front be open? Perhaps on the 31 December 1942 with 15 soldiers and a beaten up tank?’
¹⁴³

G. M. Moskalenko wrote to Stalin in March 1943, urging him to
begin preparations now for the inevitable future conflict with the

^{138
Mem. Vishnevskii,}
Leningrad: Dnevniki voennyx let. 2 Noiabria 1941 goda
31

dekabria 1942 goda
(Moscow, 2002), 109. See also: Sv. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 125,

l. 11.

^{139
Mem. A. Rybin,}
My byli soldatami: Frontovoi dnevnik voennogo zhurnalista,
1941–1945 gody (Moscow, 2000), 89.

^{140
Sv. TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, d. 685, l. 99.}

^{141
See: Mem. Werth,}
Russia: The Post-War Years
, 48; Inf. GAOPDiFAO f. 296, op. 1, d. 1413, l. 110.

^{142
Int. Andrei Ivanovich, Moscow, July 2004.}

^{143
Inf. RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 82, l. 18.}

72
Being Soviet

Anglo-American powers.
^{144
An indiscrete Soviet lecturer at the Interna-}
tional Club in Murmansk generated a furore in October 1943 by ‘diminishing’ the allied war contribution.
^{145
He appealed to his}
Anglo-American audience with the question: ‘Do you want to extin- guish Hitlerism?’ When they replied ‘yes’ he responded ‘Then open the Second Front!’
^{146
Vasili Ermolenko noted in his diary, after the Tehran}
Conference, that ‘Now the Allies will not wriggle out of the responsi- bility to open the Second Front. They are such cunning ones . . . It is not properly allied behaviour.’
^{147
Il’ian Lvoevich remembered events in}
similar terms when he told me that he thought the allied actions in the Balkans were ‘an incomplete fulfilment of their responsibilities as allies’, and Viktor Dmitrovich claimed the Second Front was launched, ‘in a betraying manner. It was necessary earlier.’
^{148
The Ukrainian}
academic Bulakhovskii, in Ufa, summed up this mood in October 1942 when he complained that ‘the Allies have defrauded us’.
^{149
When they applied the ‘tactic’ of}
bricolage
, Soviet citizens often con- cluded that allied bad faith was the clearest explanation for the military imbalance within the alliance. This notion often fuelled anti-Allied resentment as Soviet citizens concluded the USSR was being exploited by its wartime partners.

The idea that the Allies were taking advantage of the Soviet govern-
ment became a staple element within Soviet wartime rumours. These rumours did not contest the idea that the USSR was doing more than its fair share of the fighting against the Wehrmacht. They simply employed the ‘tactic’ of
bricolage
, supplementing the available information with explanations that circulated within the word-of-mouth network. As a result, Anglo-American manipulation became the default explanation for surprising shifts within government policy during the war. As the head of Propaganda Groups in the Central Committee, Petrosian admitted in a letter to Zhdanov and Aleksandrov in March 1944 the ‘false logic that the Soviet state needed to make concessions

^{144
Let. RGASPI f. 588, op. 11, d. 885, ll. 8–9.}

^{145
For a discussion of the International Club see Chapter 3.}

^{146
Inf. RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 131, ll. 132–3. Dmitriev was subsequently rebuked}
for his indiscretion.

^{147
Mem. Ermolenko,}
Voennyi dnevnik
, 29.

^{148
Int. Il’ian Lvoevich, Moscow, May 2004; Viktor Dmitrovich, Moscow, Septem-}
ber 2004.

^{149
Sv. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 125, l. 14.}

Perfidious Allies? 1941–45
73

to the capitalist world’ was extremely widespread, even amongst party
members, during the war period.
¹⁵⁰

This line of reasoning was clearly evident in the reactions of many
Soviet citizens to the dissolution of the Comintern in May 1943. The news that the body which governed the international Bolshevik parties had been disbanded came as an enormous surprise to the Soviet population. The official explanation was that each party would now pursue their own path during wartime.
^{151
The population of the USSR}
was not convinced. Party reports from around the USSR admitted that it had left the population ‘bewildered’.
^{152
The head of propaganda in}
Molotovsk
raikom
, in Sverdlovsk, admitted that ‘if we talk about mood we have to admit that there is a lot of surprise and confusion’. The deputy head of the party organization in factory number 694, ‘directly admitted that he is afraid to go to the shop floor at the moment as he is afraid that the workers will ask him questions about the Decree’.
¹⁵³

Reports drafted by the NKVD, Agitation and Propaganda, and
Orginstruction
Departments over the following days all noted that the most common reaction to these events was to assume that it was a concession forced on the USSR by their Allies. The Orginstruction department for Gorky
oblast’
noted that, ‘A number of questions were given by the workers . . . the majority of which came to one: “Isn’t the dissolution of the Comintern connected with the demands of our Allies?”’
^{154
The reports repeatedly note that the dissolution was consid-}
ered a concession (
ustupka
) under the pressure (
davlenie
) of the

Allies.
^{155
Within the informal oral news network the decision was}

associated with the recent visit of Davis to the USSR or the recent
Anglo-American meeting in the USA. Others concluded that it was the price for the opening of the Second Front.
^{156
The idea that allied}
pressure had been responsible for the decision remained a truism within