Beyond Bin Laden (6 page)

 

Civil Conflicts

 

The divisions between Pakistan's military and civilian leadership are by no means the only cleavages in its complex society. In fact, Pakistan can only be understood as a house divided—by differences of language, region, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, sect, tribe, ideology, and political affiliation, among others. Pakistan's identity is unresolved in important respects, its national unity contested by separatists and pan-Islamists alike. And more than a half century after its founding as a homeland for South Asia's Muslims, Pakistan remains bitterly divided over the meaning of Islam and its role in state and society.

These differences are too often ignored or go unnoticed by Americans, who routinely seek the answer to only one question: "Is Pakistan with us or against us?" The reality is that some within Pakistan are committed to a worldview that directly contradicts that of the United States. They are America's enemies, and they can be found in positions of power and influence at all levels of society. In the most extreme cases, the United States must act against these groups with military force or covert operations. In most instances, however, they are better marginalized or discredited in ways that sap their capacity to hold sway in the future.

The vast majority of Pakistanis, on the other hand, are principally concerned about issues with little direct bearing on relations with the United States or the problem of international terrorism. They are simply struggling to make ends meet, and are chiefly concerned with kitchen-table issues: jobs, local disputes, and the basic inability of their government to keep the peace. Their religious beliefs are more likely to be characterized by conservatism than extremism. Indeed, having suffered significantly from nearly every form of terrorism since 9/11, the vast majority of Pakistanis—eighty percent—believe that suicide bombing is never justified.

That said, this majority holds America at least partly accountable for stirring the hornets' nest of Afghanistan in ways that have victimized innocent Pakistanis. They are not yet convinced that America has a great deal to offer them, mainly because they have not felt the benefits of the billions of dollars in U.S. assistance that have been channeled to Pakistan. But these Pakistanis are not implacably hostile to the United States, even if they would undoubtedly prefer to live in a world where America was less directly involved in their affairs. Most, in fact, seek ends that are broadly compatible with American interests and values. According to a recent Pew survey, more than sixty percent of Pakistanis seek improved relations with the United States. In short, if the United States is to succeed in building any long-term engagement with Pakistan, it will have to do a far better job winning over this centrist, if silent, majority.

To be sure, the United States already has friends in Pakistan, some in positions of authority. Admittedly a dwindling minority, these Pakistanis need quiet American support, encouragement, and protection. They will only be marginalized if they appear U.S. stooges, but without American assistance, they make easy targets for the radicals. Pakistan's liberals do not offer a broad enough base for the United States to found a relationship; their numbers are simply too small. But they do create an essential space for nonviolent political activism and debate, the loss of which would further tilt Pakistan's balance to the violent extremes. Moreover, they offer a competing model for Pakistan's overwhelmingly young population, which is clamoring for change in Pakistani society but has yet to decide whether to pursue that end by political participation or militant action.

 

Pakistan's Future(s)

 

Contrary to the dire predictions of some American analysts, Pakistan's internal cleavages do not mean that the country faces the prospect of imminent collapse. But Pakistanis are in the midst of a violent national debate over their core principles. The outcome of that debate will determine whether Pakistan gradually falls into a deeper morass of internal instability, takes on a far more revolutionary and disruptive foreign agenda, or manages to find its way back into the mainstream of the international community.

If present trends—demographic, economic, political, and security—hold, Pakistan is likely to lurch toward ever-greater instability. As the years go by, its military and police may lack the capacity to maintain order, not simply along the tribal borders with Afghanistan, but within Pakistan's burgeoning cities. If today Pakistan is understood as confronting pockets of insurgency, then in the future the state may very well be reduced to holding only pockets of control. A moth-eaten Pakistan need not succumb to any one group, but its already weak governing institutions and military and political leaders would simply retreat behind the walls and gates of their own heavily fortified compounds, leaving their less fortunate countrymen to fend for themselves.

In certain respects, this future has already arrived. Most Pakistanis survive not with any assistance from the state, but through family, tribal, and community networks. But absent a reversal of negative trends, this pattern would simply be exacerbated over time, with informal local leaders asserting control over more and more functions traditionally associated with the state. And perhaps the most fundamental change would come if the military, Pakistan's predominant state institution, were forced to accept its inability to impose order over historically stable regions. This prospect is hardly inconceivable. Pakistan's army has been stretched thin by its counterinsurgency efforts in the hinterlands of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. If significant unrest were to spread to Pakistan's largest province, Punjab, the army could be pushed beyond its military and political limits and forced into retreat.

Rather than a future of gradual decay, it is possible that Pakistan could face a revolutionary movement, one that transforms latent public discontent into a fundamental change in national leadership and direction. However, it is hard to envision such a radical outcome in the near term. Not only is the Pakistani army still too strong and disciplined, but no other individual or group has the sort of national stature needed to sweep across Pakistan's many internal divisions and promote a new vision for the state and society. In this manner, Pakistan's fractiousness and diversity may obstruct revolution.

Yet the recent experience of the lawyers' movement that led to the ouster of President Musharraf suggests that Pakistani civil society has a capacity to organize in ways that were previously underappreciated. That movement was steered by informal social and professional networks and new forms of communication that initially left traditional political parties in the passenger's seat. Pakistanis also witnessed their military's lack of will—or capacity—to crack down violently on protests from within the nation's Punjabi heartland.

If Pakistan does see a revolutionary future, it is possible that some aspects of the lawyers' movement will reassemble, perhaps more violently and under a very different ideological banner. Because Pakistan has already experienced democratic movements as well as the frustrations of civilian rule, it is less prone to an exuberant Tahrir Square–style uprising. As one liberal Pakistani recently lamented to me, "We've had our equivalent democratic movement, and what has it achieved? Far too little. The next revolution can only be led by the Islamists." Whether Islamist or simply hard-line nationalist, a Pakistani revolution is unlikely to bring it closer to the United States.

So neither the gradual decay of Pakistan's state nor a dramatic revolution would serve U.S. interests. Fortunately, Pakistan also has the capacity for incremental growth, reform, and stability. A brighter future will, however, require major breaks with present practice. These must come not only in Pakistan's regional security strategy, as described above, but in the way it governs. Pakistan's massive disparities in wealth and power, which privilege a tiny elite and leave tens of millions illiterate, impoverished, and unhealthy, are inconsistent with a strategy for national economic growth.

Among many critical reforms, Pakistan must break the political logjam that impedes raising taxes even to levels common among other developing societies. Only by integrating itself in the regional economy, in particular the booming Indian marketplace, will Pakistan escape its anemic growth rates. Only by reducing corruption, streamlining bureaucracy, and improving security might Pakistan become a serious magnet for foreign direct investment. And only by improving power, communications, and transportation infrastructure will Pakistan be better able to compete in manufacturing and other industries. Many Pakistanis are fully aware of all these needs, but the political barriers that stand in the way of implementing reforms show few signs of giving way. Without external pressure and assistance, Pakistan is unlikely to overcome these obstacles on its own.

 

The Next Chapter in U.S.-Pakistan Relations

 

In the aftermath of Osama bin Laden's killing, it is possible that existing fissures between Islamabad and Washington could push the relationship into free fall. It is also possible that both sides will find ways to patch up their immediate differences and return to a slightly modified version of the mutually frustrating pattern of cooperation that characterized the recent past. Yet the next chapter in U.S.-Pakistan relations could also be one in which the United States presses the advantages offered by Bin Laden's death and generates the sort of positive momentum last seen in 2001.

It is worth recalling that shortly after 9/11, Pakistan's leaders faced a clear ultimatum from Washington: Either support American efforts against Al Qaeda or consider yourselves enemies of the United States. At that time, the choice was fairly obvious. No rational Pakistani seriously doubted America's will or capacity to avenge Al Qaeda's attacks. To oppose the inevitable U.S. victory over Al Qaeda and its Taliban host was considered foolhardy, suicidal. As a consequence, Musharraf's Pakistan engineered a significant, if clearly incomplete, policy shift. Hundreds of Al Qaeda terrorists and sympathetic affiliates were swept up in joint CIA-ISI operations.

But as the years passed, and as Bin Laden survived, Washington shifted its gaze to Iraq, and the Taliban reconstituted in Afghanistan's south and east. The momentum shifted. U.S. success in the region appeared less certain, then increasingly unlikely. The powerful aura of inevitable American victory gave way to doubts about its commitment, capacity, and unity. These doubts strengthened the hand of the Taliban and convinced Pakistan's military leadership that hedging its bets against U.S. failure in Afghanistan would best serve their long-term interests. Washington also did too little to support political changes within Pakistan that might have eased the path toward fundamental strategic change, such as bolstering the strength of reformers or demonstrating the practical economic value of U.S. partnership.

By killing Bin Laden, the United States now has the opportunity to retake the regional initiative and shift momentum in its favor. In combination with the U.S. military surge in Afghanistan, a new aura of inevitable success may be forged. A shift may occur in the terms and pace of a negotiated settlement process with insurgents who have clearly separated themselves from international terrorism.

For Pakistan, the Bin Laden operation provides a powerful reminder of Washington's capacity to eliminate its enemies, and a demonstration of why Islamabad must cut ties with militants, root out Al Qaeda from its midst, and forge a new strategy for the future. If U.S. leaders can stress that they are similarly committed to eliminating the threat posed by other Al Qaeda affiliates, including the Haqqani network and LeT, they may finally begin to dispel Islamabad's mistaken confidence that working with such groups serves Pakistan's purposes. And if that message is combined with an American commitment to help secure a sound economic future for Pakistan's masses, then Washington will have seized the fullest possible opportunity offered by Bin Laden's death.

 

Daniel Markey
is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He held the South Asia portfolio on the State Department's Policy Planning Staff and is writing a book about the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

 

 

I have been involved with Afghanistan off and on for more than thirty years. I first visited as a researcher in the late 1970s in the months preceding the Soviet-engineered coup. Just over a decade later, Afghanistan was part of my portfolio of responsibility when I served as the senior director for Near East and South Asian Affairs on the National Security Council staff of President George H. W. Bush. It was in the first weeks of that administration—in February 1989, to be precise—that the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan came to an end.

Just over a decade later (in January 2001) I found myself back in government. This time around it was the State Department, where I was director of policy planning. I was sitting in the small inner office of the new secretary of state, Colin Powell, discussing what we would try to accomplish in the world over the next few years. At the end of a ninety-minute conversation, Powell asked me if there was any one thing in the world that worried me most. "Sure," I said. "Pakistan." I cited its nuclear weapons program, its weak and divided government, and links between Pakistan's security services and both the Taliban and various terrorist groups.

My concerns were confirmed just eight months later, on 9/11. Al Qaeda depended on the hospitality and support of Afghanistan's Taliban regime, and the Taliban in turn were heavily dependent on the support of Pakistan. The Bush administration told the Pakistani government it had to choose between supporting the Taliban and maintaining a relationship with the United States. The Pakistanis agreed to distance themselves from the Taliban government, but the Taliban never ended their support for Al Qaeda. As a result, the United States intervened militarily alongside anti-Taliban Afghans, ousting the Taliban regime in relatively short order.