Beyond Bin Laden (7 page)

Remnants of the regime, along with others, fled the country and regrouped in Pakistan; one of those who also escaped—Osama bin Laden—managed to survive and operate out of Pakistan for nearly a decade, until he was killed in May 2011. The question emerged as to what the United States would do this time around in Afghanistan; I was appointed U.S. coordinator for the future of Afghanistan by President George W. Bush. The United States helped to forge a new post-Taliban government in Afghanistan and carried out counterterrorist operations, but chose to do little in the way of providing security or creating a capable central government. I myself argued for doing more—I thought there was a possibility that in the wake of the Taliban's ouster there was a rare and fleeting opportunity to help create at least some elements of a modern state—but most of my colleagues judged that efforts along these lines would cost a good deal and accomplish little, given Afghan divisions and traditions.

Over the ensuing years, the situation in Afghanistan slowly deteriorated. The new government failed to establish much of a writ beyond Kabul. Pakistani support for the Taliban never ended, and gradually the Taliban began to make inroads back into Afghanistan. By the time Barack Obama became president, many analysts had become alarmed at the trends. This concern over Afghanistan's potential trajectory formed the backdrop to a series of decisions in 2009 that resulted in U.S. troop levels increasing from just over 30,000 to near 100,000 by mid-2010, and to the mission of these troops expanding from an emphasis on counterterrorism to something much broader, a mix of counterinsurgency and nation-building. It is no exaggeration to describe these decisions as the most consequential to date (at least in the realm of national security resources) of Barack Obama's presidency.

Much of the recent debate about Afghanistan has focused on whether this policy is likely to succeed, with "success" loosely defined as bringing about an Afghan government that can hold off the Taliban with only a modest amount of continuing American help. In theory, several more years of intense U.S. military effort will provide the time and space required to train the Afghan army and police and weaken the Taliban so that they no longer constitute an overwhelming threat or, better yet, decide to negotiate an end to the conflict.

I am deeply skeptical that this policy will work, given the nature of Afghanistan (above all, the weakness of its central institutions) and the reality that Pakistan will continue to provide a sanctuary for the Taliban. Yes, U.S. forces will succeed at clearing areas of the Taliban, but the successful building of Afghan police and army units that can maintain security in these same areas on their own by the end of 2014 is a long shot at best. Afghan military and police forces will increase in number and improve in performance, but not nearly as much as is needed. Some Taliban may give up, but many and probably most will not.

Of course, I may well be proven wrong here, and I sincerely hope I will be if the decision is made to keep U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan relatively high until the end of 2014 or even longer—as is possible if the United States bases any withdrawal decision on conditions that will be difficult to bring about. But the bigger question hovering over current U.S. Afghan policy is whether it is worth it, even if it does succeed. I would argue it is not, both on the micro (local) level and the macro (global) level.

Some perspective is required. As noted earlier, American troops have been fighting in one form or another in Afghanistan for nearly a decade. But it is essential to note that today's Afghan war is fundamentally different than the one waged immediately after the 9/11 attacks. That war was a war of necessity: The most important national interest, self-defense, was involved, and there were no promising or timely alternatives to the use of military force once it became clear diplomacy would not bring about an end to Afghan government—i.e., Taliban—support for global terrorism.

Over time, however, Afghanistan evolved into a war of choice, due to two developments. First, U.S. interests had become less than vital with the near elimination of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Afghanistan no longer represented a significant global terrorist threat, and certainly no more of one than several other countries (most notably Pakistan) in the region and in Africa. Second, there were other viable policy options available to the United States in Afghanistan, in particular a more narrow and limited counterterrorism strategy coupled with a degree of nation-building or capacity-building. The situation did not warrant the United States becoming a protagonist in Afghanistan's civil war, the adoption of a counterinsurgency strategy, or the tripling of U.S. force levels to near 100,000.

Just to be clear, wars of choice are not wrong per se. But before undertaking one, it is essential to demonstrate that the likely benefits of using military force will outweigh the costs, that military force will produce better results at less cost than other policies. Afghanistan does not meet these tests. It is not a major terrorist haven, and it should not be assumed it will again become one even if the Taliban make renewed inroads. It was and is an error to equate Taliban return to parts of Afghanistan with a decision on their part to allow or facilitate the return of Al Qaeda to the country. That said, if there is some renewed terrorist presence and activity in Afghanistan, the United States can and should respond to it much as it has been doing in other countries such as Yemen and Somalia.

The Afghan-Pakistan tie is at the heart of U.S. policy and its limits. There is no way the United States will be able to persuade Pakistan to become a full partner in Afghanistan (and stop providing sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban) given Islamabad's obsession with India and its view of Afghanistan as a strategic piece of real estate in its struggle with India. Even a solution to the Kashmir conflict would not change this—and there is no solution to Kashmir in the offing, certainly not in a time frame that would prove relevant to U.S. decision-making for Afghanistan.

At the macro or global level, Afghanistan is simply absorbing more economic, military, human, diplomatic, and political resources of every sort than it warrants. The $120 billion annual price tag—one out of every six to seven dollars this country spends on defense—is unjustifiable given the budget crisis that confronts the United States and the need for military (especially air and naval) modernization. The history of the twenty-first century is far more likely to be determined in the land areas and waters of Asia and the Pacific than it is on the plains and in the mountains of Afghanistan. Americans had also better be prepared for a number of future counterterrorist interventions (along the lines of Somalia, Pakistan, and Yemen) in Libya and elsewhere in the greater Middle East and Africa. This country also needs to make sure it has adequate forces for possible contingencies on the Korean peninsula and conceivably with Iran. Afghanistan is a strategic distraction, pure and simple. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates's February 2011 West Point speech makes a case for avoiding sending a large American land force into places like Afghanistan. I agree. But less clear is why the United States should continue to deploy a large number of soldiers there for the present and near future.

All this is an argument for doing considerably less than is currently being done, by transitioning rapidly (by mid- or late 2012) to a relatively small, sustainable, strategically warranted deployment, one I would estimate to be on a scale of 10,000 to 25,000 troops. The precise number of U.S. troops would be determined by the terrorist threat, training goals, the role assigned to civilians and contractors, and what the Afghans were willing to accept. The future U.S. troop presence should allow for continued counterterrorist operations and for the training of Afghan forces at both the national and local level.

Such a strategy would be consistent with existing policy; the president all along has said the United States would begin troop reductions as of mid-2011. At issue is the pace of U.S. troop reductions, as the president did not commit to any particular pace or end point.

Reductions of the scale I am advocating here, and the phasing out of combat operations against the Taliban, have a number of advantages. These actions would save upwards of $75 billion a year and sharply reduce American casualties. Doing so takes into account Afghan nationalism and the understandable popular desire to limit foreign forces in number and role. Doing less with less avoids a large footprint that would be costly and risks wearing out America's welcome. A more modest strategy is a more sustainable strategy in every way.

Continuing to do what is being done, on the scale it is being done, will not necessarily achieve more than what I suggest here, given Afghanistan's history, leadership, demography, culture, geography, and neighborhood, in particular Pakistan. And even if substantial progress is achieved in the near term, nothing suggests those gains will endure. Strategy is about balancing means and ends, resources and interests, and the time has come to restore strategic perspective to what the United States is doing in Afghanistan.

At the same time, to say that current policy in Afghanistan is not warranted by either the stakes or the prospects is not to say the United States has no interests or can achieve nothing. There is a need for continued counterterror and counterdrug operations. There is also a case for the continued training of government and local forces. The United States has an interest in seeing human rights respected in Afghanistan. A continued U.S. military presence would provide a backdrop for efforts to persuade individual Taliban troops and commanders to give up the fight and negotiate a modus vivendi with the Afghan government. The intention of keeping some American troops after 2012 takes away the argument that the U.S. is leaving Afghanistan, something that should reassure many Afghans in and out of government, those Pakistanis who want to know the American commitment is continuing beyond 2014, and those in this country who do not want to do anything that could be interpreted as losing and thereby handing a victory to extremists.

An additional argument against withdrawing is that great powers need to be careful about making dramatic policy changes. Revising a policy is one thing; reversing it quite another. A reputation for reliability is important. This line of thinking, however, should not be employed to justify a continued commitment of large numbers of lives, dollars, and time on behalf of questionable goals.

Consistent with the desirability of maintaining a military presence in Afghanistan, I support talks between the U.S. and Afghan governments on a long-term security relationship, one that would include U.S. forces remaining in the country for some time to come. There is obviously a significant degree of internal Afghan and regional resistance to this notion. To help allay some of these concerns, there should be no permanent U.S. bases or permanent U.S. troop presence. The arrangement could be for an initial period of five to ten years and could be canceled by either side with one year's notice.

For any number of reasons, it is impossible to discuss the future of Afghanistan without also discussing Pakistan. Pakistan is widely acknowledged to be more important than Afghanistan given its population, its arsenal of nuclear weapons, the presence of large numbers of terrorists in its territory, and the reality that developments in Pakistan can have a profound impact on the trajectory of India, sure to be one of the most important countries in the world.

More specifically, there is the widespread view that the United States has to do a great deal to stabilize Afghanistan lest it become a staging ground for groups that would undermine Pakistan. But it is Pakistan that is providing sanctuary and support to the Afghan Taliban who are the greatest threat to Afghanistan's stability. The Pakistanis are doing so because they want to retain influence over their neighbor and to limit Indian inroads.

Why the United States should be more concerned than Pakistan that Afghanistan could one day endanger Pakistan is not clear. More important, this view exaggerates Afghanistan's actual and potential influence over developments in Pakistan. To be sure, Pakistan is a weak state. But this weakness results more than anything from internal divisions and poor governance. If Pakistan fails, it will be less because of insurgents coming across its borders than from decay within them.

It is hard to imagine a more complicated bilateral relationship than the one between Washington and Islamabad. Pakistan is at most a limited partner; it is not an ally, and at times it is not even a partner. There are many reasons for the mutual mistrust; what matters is that it is pervasive and deep. The United States should be generous in providing military and economic assistance only so long as that assistance is made conditional on how it is used. U.S. markets should be more open to Pakistani exports. But Americans must accept that there will always be clear differences between how they and most Pakistanis see the world, and sharp differences of opinion on what is to be done. Under these circumstances, U.S. foreign policy should follow a simple guide: The United States should cooperate with Pakistan where and when it can, but act independently where and when it must. The successful operation that killed Osama bin Laden in May 2011 is a case in point.

Interest is growing in the possible contributions of diplomacy to U.S. policy. Three potential paths are receiving considerable attention. One involves the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban. There is talk of moving toward some sort of a new "shura" that would attempt to integrate the Taliban into the formal ruling structure of Afghanistan. The second path involves India and Pakistan. A third path involves neighboring and regional states, including Pakistan as well as Iran, India, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and others. This would resemble the "6 plus 2" forum that facilitated Afghan-related diplomacy in the past.

I judge prospects for a major breakthrough on either the Afghan/Taliban or India/Pakistan front to be poor. The weak and divided Afghan government enjoys at best uneven support around the country. The Taliban are themselves divided. Pakistan has its own agenda. It is far from clear that the situation is ripe for a power-sharing accord that would meaningfully reduce, much less end, the fighting. India and Pakistan are far apart and, again, it is not clear that the leadership in either government is in a position to undertake significant negotiations involving meaningful compromise. None of this is reason not to explore these possibilities, but expectations should be kept firmly in check. Prospects might be somewhat better for reviving a regional forum, though, and this possibility should be pursued.