Beyond Peace (10 page)

There are neither easy answers nor readily available road maps for navigating the massive changes in post-Soviet political territory. The Soviet empire left a terrible heritage of economic inefficiency and excessive centralization. Its populations lack entrepreneurial skills, capital, and the work ethic. More dangerous, these nations are riddled with ethnic grievances, dominated by a suspicion of compromise, and bereft of any real democratic traditions. Their antagonisms will be played out across artificial borders established by communist masters in order to divide and conquer.

What kinds of foreign policies do we want to encourage in Russia and its newly independent neighbors, and what kinds of Western policies should be adopted to encourage democratic and free-market reforms in those nations?

Throughout my career as a congressman, senator, Vice President, private citizen, President, and former President, I was
rightly described as an unapologetic Cold Warrior and enemy of communism. Some consider it ironic that having been a lifelong critic of Moscow's inhumane, expansionist policies under communism, I now visit Moscow annually as a proponent of massive Western private and public investment and support. I have not changed. My position has changed because the democratic revolution in Russia has created a unique historical opportunity to bring Russia into the community of Western nations and to lead Moscow away from its authoritarian and imperial past. We now have a vital interest in promoting a stable and nonaggressive Russia and in consolidating the independence of the non-Russian republics of the former Soviet Union.

Some observers have argued that it makes no sense to help build up Russia because Moscow might someday reemerge as a strategic antagonist, this time of the right instead of the left. Any strong nation can become a potential adversary as a result of a change in leadership or some other unanticipated development. But basing our policy on such a contingency would require an element of cynicism that would violate American foreign policy traditions. We did not act this way toward Germany and Japan after World War II, and we should not act this way toward Russia after the Cold War. Throughout the Cold War we spoke out against communism not only because of the threat its proponents posed to us but also because of the plight of the millions who lived under it. It would be the height of hypocrisy for any Western statesman who spoke movingly of the plight of the Soviet people living under the communist yoke to withhold the hand of friendship from the Russian people now that communism has been defeated.

Russia has the potential to become a great power again. It has a rich civilization, a proud history, a deep tradition in the arts, enormous natural resources, and a strong people capable of great suffering and sacrifice, as they demonstrated so vividly during World War II. There are some who say that it would be in our interest for Russia to disintegrate and to become weak.
This is not one of our options. Russia will inevitably be strong again. The only question is whether a strong Russia will be a friend or an adversary of the West. We must do everything in our power to ensure the former rather than the latter.

The twentieth century was Russia's lost century culturally as well as politically. The nineteenth century was the golden age of Russian music, art, and literature. Czarist rule was dictatorial and repressive, but it at least permitted some artistic expression. Communist rule sought total control of mind, body, and spirit, stifling the creativity that is the soul of any people. Great works are generated by individual inspiration, not by consensus. The democratic revolution in Russia holds out the hope that it will once again find its creative voice and share its great talents with the world.

Our interest in a strong Russia does not mean that our support for the Russian government should be unequivocal. We would criticize what we considered irresponsible behavior by England, France, or Japan, and we should not hesitate to criticize the Russians should they take actions we believe are inconsistent with our interests and those of peace in the world. But we should not withhold support from Russia now because of the possibility that it might take on a hostile character in the future. Practically speaking, our influence at such a time will be greater if our economic and political relations with Russia are strong. Morally speaking, we owe the Russian people our support now. Personally speaking, I am glad that I lived to see the Russian tricolor flying over the Kremlin, to shake the hand of a pro-Western leader within its walls, and to say to my fellow Americans, from the unique perspective of the quintessential living Cold Warrior, that it is time for us to match our rhetoric with our money in supporting our new friends in the democratic Russian republic.

No practicing American politician or diplomat has ever dealt with a nation like the new Russia. It is not a defeated enemy like Japan or West Germany that we are nursing back to
health. It is not an ally like France or England, with which we have obvious historical and strategic interests in common. It is not a strategic adversary like the old Soviet Union. It is a powerful, independent nation with which we have some interests in common and some interests, prospectively, in conflict. Those used to the easy answers of the Cold War will have to find a new measure of maturity and subtlety if they are to develop constructive policies toward post–Cold War Russia, a fundamentally friendly great power that may at times pursue its interests in an aggressive manner that we will find objectionable.

In terms of military strength, including nuclear weapons, Russia is still one of the most powerful nations in the world. If economic and political reforms succeed, within a generation it could once again achieve the status of superpower. As Russia grows in power and influence, the United States should be candid when our views do not coincide. But the inevitable clashes in our views must be seen as differences between friends and not between potential enemies.

The most dangerous mistake we could make would be to ignore our differences or attempt to drown them in champagne and vodka toasts at feel-good summit meetings. Rather than papering over differences with diplomatic gobbledygook, we must find ways to disagree without damaging one of the world's most important strategic relationships.

The second most dangerous mistake would be to neglect our responsibility for assisting Russia in its transition to freedom, or arrogantly to scold or punish it for every foreign or domestic policy transgression, as though it were an international problem child. I saw Helmut Kohl in Bonn after visiting Moscow in early 1994, and he had an apt summation of the importance of treating Russia as a great power. “My mother was a wise, simple, pious woman,” he said. “She told us several adages that apply to politics as well as to private life. One was that you always meet everyone twice in your lifetime. The first time, always have in mind the impression you will make the second
time. We are going to meet these Russians again in a few years, I'm convinced of that.”

The recent flap over the indictment of a highly placed Russian mole in the CIA was a glaring example of how unprepared many Americans are to think of Russia as a great power with its own interests and prerogatives. Many observers were quick to condemn Yeltsin, even though the mole was first recruited under Gorbachev. But the demands that we should not send aid to a country that spies on us were disingenuous at best. How many of these same critics called for a cutoff of our massive aid to Israel in the wake of the Pollard spy case, where Israeli intelligence was spying on the United States? As that incident and others show, most nations reserve the right to gather intelligence about both friends and foes. Although the Cold War had been over for more than three years, the CIA budget in 1993 was an estimated $30 billion. What did we spend it on—finding out whether they were growing coffee instead of cocoa in Ghana?

Twenty-seven years ago, two years before I took office as President, Charles de Gaulle told me that the United States should reestablish relations with China before its power impelled us to do so. A generation later, China's explosive growth and burgeoning economic, diplomatic, and military power represent a total vindication of de Gaulle's assessment. A similar sense of anticipation must govern our relations with Russia. Its seemingly overwhelming problems will not last forever. Its human and natural resources, and thus its capacity to recover and ultimately to excel, are virtually unlimited. The United States and the West should develop a collaborative, businesslike relationship with Russia today so that when we meet these Russians again, we will do so as friends, if not necessarily as partners, rather than as potential adversaries.

What the United States wants most from Russia is a nonaggressive foreign policy. While being sensitive to Russia's legitimate interests, the administration, in discussions with the Yeltsin government, should not hesitate to raise questions about
aspects of Russia's international conduct that affect our interests. Our support for Russia's reformers does not justify failing to present security concerns to Moscow forthrightly and early on, while there is still a possibility of having an impact without causing a conflict.

Any attempt to reestablish the Russian empire by force, coercion, or destabilization of its neighbors would be contrary to U.S. interests. To avoid any possible misunderstanding, the American government should make this clear to the Russian leadership at the outset. In addition, the other newly independent states need to be reassured that America's desire for partnership with Russia does not imply neglect of their security interests.

While the collapse of the Soviet empire may be seen as a historically progressive development, the disintegration of the Russian Federation would be a different matter. It is hard to imagine an amicable divorce between the central government in Moscow and the Russian republics and regions. Twice before in Russian history—in the seventeenth century during the so-called Time of Troubles, and at the beginning of the twentieth century during the rule of the Provisional Government of 1917—separatist trends split Russia apart. The separation triggered bloody civil wars and the emergence of governments in Moscow that came to power through the barrel of the gun, reunited Russia with an iron fist, and soon became a menace to Russia's neighbors.

It is impossible to overstate the dangers of a civil war in a nation with thousands of nuclear weapons, dozens of nuclear power stations, and numerous depots with chemical and perhaps biological weapons. The consequences of such a conflict would inevitably extend far beyond Russia's own borders.

Stability does not mean the re-creation of a unitary state. Russia is too big, too complex, too diverse a country to be run from the Kremlin in an efficient yet democratic way. The most stable arrangement for Russia is a genuine federation as set forth
in the new Russian constitution, under which the republics and regions have considerable control over their own affairs and a meaningful voice in the central government.

The Russian armed forces do not now represent a serious threat to the United States. Russia lacks any serious nonnuclear force projection capability. Its conventional forces are grossly understaffed and underpaid. Military manpower has fallen below the 1.5 million authorized by the former Supreme Soviet and continues to shrink. Draft dodging is a chronic problem: In the spring of 1993, 60 percent of all eligible males avoided the draft. The military does not have the necessary funds for even minimally adequate training, and its logistical base is deteriorating rapidly. Major offensive operations outside the former Soviet region are completely beyond the capability of the Russian military for the foreseeable future. The strategic nuclear forces, in the absence of any serious conflict, are not a significant threat to the United States. Today, with Russia's GNP roughly a third of the former Soviet Union's, it will be difficult to rebuild the military machine from scratch.

At the same time, the West must take note of warning signs on the horizon. Russian military thinking is becoming more nationalistic and more assertive in defense of Russia's interests in the other former Soviet states bordering on Russia, and more supportive of the use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy.

Russian policy toward other post-Soviet nations represents the greatest dilemma for the United States. A new attempt by Moscow to rebuild its empire would be a tragedy for Russia and its neighbors alike. In view of the Russian-Soviet historical legacy, it is understandable that Russia's neighbors are sensitive to any signs of new assertiveness on Moscow's part. It took Germany and Japan several decades to rehabilitate themselves after World War II, and even today some European and Asian nations are nervous about Berlin's and Tokyo's more assertive conduct.

Perceptions and fears of aggression have real consequences
in that they affect international security. The United States cannot be indifferent to the fears of Russia's neighbors, particularly because in many instances those fears are based on new, disturbing elements in Russia's own behavior. There is considerable evidence that Russian security thinking during the two years since the collapse of the Soviet Union has moved in a more aggressive direction. Force has become a more acceptable instrument in Russian foreign policy, and the “divide and rule” technique is frequently relied upon by the Kremlin in such places as Georgia and Azerbaijan.

That Russian policy has become more assertive, even heavy-handed, is not in dispute. Yeltsin and his pro-Western Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, talk proudly about the newly muscular defense of Russian interests in the “near abroad”—the Russians' term for the other former Soviet republics. Ukrainian President Kravchuk and former Latvian President Anatoly Gorbunous, now Speaker of the Parliament, are ex-communists and not anti-Russian firebrands. But they personally expressed concern to me last year about the Russian tendency to push their countries around.

Still, I do not think a new imperialism looms. I have spoken with many Russian politicians of different persuasions, including President Yeltsin, who were nostalgic for at least some aspects of the former Soviet empire. But with the exception of the supernationalistic fringe, all the Russians with whom I have spoken seem to understand that the past can no longer be recreated. Russia's Defense Minister, General Pavel Grachev, has told me that he was adamantly opposed to any Russian military intervention in former Soviet republics. Others confirmed that the understaffed and poorly supplied Russian armed forces were not enthusiastic about a greater role outside their country's borders.