Bill James Guide to Baseball Managers, The (42 page)

LaRussa’s teams issued the fewest intentional walks in the American League in 1988 and 1990, and he has been near the bottom of the league in every season of his career except 1993, when his team was somewhere in the middle. In 1996, the fewest intentional walks were issued by Minnesota (27) and Colorado (19); the most were issued by the New York Mets (73) and the Detroit Tigers (63). Bad teams tend to issue the most intentional walks, although this is not universally true.

The other “decision” categories which are top candidates to be included would be “hit-and-run attempts,” “stolen bases” and/or “stolen base attempts,” “sacrifice hits” and/or “sacrifice bunt attempts,” and “pitchouts called.”

That’s six categories and we’ve only got five spaces left, so obviously we’ve got to do a little triage. “Stolen base attempts” obviously are better than “stolen bases”; the question is, do we want to combine “stolen base attempts” with “hit-and-run attempts,” into something called “runners in motion” (“RIM”)?

I don’t think we have to do that. The hit-and-run data is interesting. Art Howe used the hit and run only 61 times in 1996; Bob Boone used it 172 times. That’s a real difference, and we’re not duplicating any other information.

A drawback is that this information can’t be reconstructed for past managers. You can’t go back to 1946 and figure out how many times Leo Durocher ordered the hit and run, but this is an argument
not
to combine the hit-and-run with the stolen base data, since the stolen base info does exist for many earlier years. If we combined them we would be losing some of the information that we
could
put into a managers record for Casey Stengel or Leo Durocher.

So we’ll use “SBA” and “H&R” (“stolen base attempts” and “hit-and-run attempts”); this leaves us three categories. One should be used for “PO,” “pitchouts called.” This is the 1996 chart:

1996 Managers
National League

1996 Managers
American League

Johnny Oates, an ex-catcher, called only eight pitchouts all season, and incidentally only three in 1995; Dusty Baker called 96. Of course, Oates had Ivan Rodriguez; you don’t
need
to call a pitchout for Ivan. Under Sparky Anderson in 1995, the Tigers called 77 pitchouts. Under Buddy Bell in 1996, they called 13.

“Sacrifice bunts,” or “sacrifice bunt attempts”? I’d like to have both and the success percentage, too, but the number of attempts obviously seems like the better piece of information. American League “sacrifice attempts” (“SA”) in 1996 ranged from 33 (Tom Kelly) up to 93 (Bob Boone). If you go back to 1995, you’ll find that they ranged from 25 (Tom Kelly) to 98 (Bob Boone). Switching back to the Tony LaRussa form:

That’s fifteen categories. There is one other piece of information I think should be included, but on which I have no data. That would be
the percentage of runs scored in big innings,
a big inning being defined as three runs or more. I think it’s a fundamental schism among managers: Play for one run, or go for the big inning? Some of the other categories here relate to that issue, but a column which addresses it directly should still be included in the chart, if the data is in fact interesting.

I wish there was some way to put something in the chart about the use of rookies. You could make up a category, “percentage of games started by rookie pitchers,” I suppose; Earl Weaver would rank extremely low in this, Joe McCarthy very high. What would you call it? “POGSBRP”? We’re looking for simplicity; if it takes a seven-letter acronym to make a title, that’s a good indication that you’re going down the wrong road.

I’d like to have something about the type of pitchers that a manager likes to use. I don’t know how to put that in there, either. Something about the average age of the roster would be good. It isn’t difficult to calculate—just multiply each player’s plate appearances by his age and divide by the team plate appearances—and it is easy to understand. There just isn’t room.

Does the manager’s record that I have proposed leave out as much as it contains? Of course. So does a hitter’s record; so does a pitcher’s record. And, of course, the record revealed here would be heavily colored by the talents of the team. Mike Hargrove in 1993 used 80 defensive substitutes; in 1995 he used 21. A few changes in personnel dramatically changed the way he used his bench.

But all statistics are colored by circumstance. Would John Smoltz win 24 games if he was still with Detroit? Of course not. Would Andres Galarraga hit 47 home runs if he played for Florida? Of course not.

I am not blind to the limits of the chart, and I’m not suggesting that you should be. My goal, essentially, is
to feed information into the discussion.
This information exists anyway, but it exists like wheat. I am trying to make it into bread. If we develop this record, if we publish it, if we get it into the record books and onto the backs of baseball cards, the average fan will know more about managers than he does now.

The records of all 1995–1996 managers are given on the following pages, with some brief comments to help the reader take in the import of the record. There is an oversight in statistical history: We have somehow forgotten to construct a record which describes the tendencies of a manager. I am trying to repair that oversight.

FELIPE ALOU

Experimented with his lineup in 1993–1994; has had more settled lineup the last two years. Doesn’t platoon much, pinch-hits less than average but uses a fair number of pinch runners and defensive subs. Was very aggressive at sending runners in 1993–1994, much less so the last two years.

SPARKY ANDERSON

Used intentional walk more than any other recent manager. Called many pitchouts.

DUSTY BAKER

Calls more pitchouts than any other contemporary manager. Doesn’t platoon much; fairly aggressive about sending runners.

DON BAYLOR

Relatively settled lineup; doesn’t platoon. Goes to the bullpen more often than any manager in history.

BUDDY BELL

Unable to draw any solid conclusions based on one year’s data. Experimented with lineup much more than Anderson did, went to the bullpen more readily. Put runners in motion much more.