Blood Cries Afar (36 page)

Louis had been in contact with his father as the Prince requested heavier siege machinery to help with the capture of the castle. This arrived in the form of a huge stone-thrower called ‘Malvoisin’ (‘Bad’ or ‘Evil Neighbour’), and joined the ranks of other machines constantly bombarding the castle; this petraria may have in fact been a trebuchet, mentioned for the first time in English sources at this siege.
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While his ships secured the sea outside Dover, Louis’s large army completed the blockade on the land side. Inside the castle were 140 knights and many soldiers, mainly Poitevin and Flemish, under Hubert de Burgh and the Flemish mercenary captain Gerard de Sotteghem. It was a strong force for a strong castle. They had been well prepared and well provisioned. Louis was billeted in a priory in the town; his leading knights also preferred the solid shelter there to life in the tented camp. They settled in for the siege.

Hubert de Burgh, ‘a brave knight’, says Wendover, led an active defence. The garrison made many sorties and inflicted heavy casualties on the besiegers. Louis’s men kept up the pressure, eating away at the castle’s defences. Louis conducted the siege operations from the field north of the castle; this gave him a clear view of the action. His first target was the north-east barbican protecting the main gates, guarded by Pierre de Créon and reinforced by strong oak timbers and a surrounding ditch. The soldiers within the garrison could be clearly seen by the besiegers as they manned the battlements to engage in crossbow exchanges with the French, one of whom, Perenaut, was obviously a crack shot because on his approach the garrison would hurry into cover. Mangonels and petrarias were repositioned to hurl their rocks at the walls and gates while from on high soldiers shot down from a tall belfry and below, under the protective mantlet of a cat, miners swung their pickaxes against the base of the ramparts. Louis then ordered his knights to make an assault; a squire by the name of Paon was the first to make his way into the barbican. Pierre de Créon stood fast at his post and was fatally struck down.

But the siege dragged on into September. The garrison’s resistance increased in proportion to the level of attack. Casualties forced the French to withdraw their lines and even their tents. There were serious manpower losses, too. As the siege became ever more protracted, many of his men returned home, including leading knights such the Count de Roussi, Jean de Montmirail, Hugh de Rumegny and others. The Anonymous says that Louis’s ‘host dwindled marvellously’. John, meanwhile, was on the move to relieve the siege of Windsor. The siege caused Louis tremendous frustration as both his momentum and the military initiative slipped away. Wendover reports that ‘he was enraged and swore that he would not leave until he had captured the castle and hanged all the garrison.’ He then increased the psychological pressure: he ordered his men to construct a highly visible market in front of the castle with the clear implication that while his forces wanted for nothing, the garrison’s supplies could not last forever. The intention was ‘to strike terror into them’ with the fear of starvation; but Wendover also implies that it was an admission of the inability of the French to take the castle by force.

A significant boost bolstered Louis, possibly around the second week of September. Alexander II of Scotland, who had taken the town of Carlisle on 8 August (the castle still held out) made a quite remarkable 400-mile march from here to Dover to greet his powerful ally.
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Keith Stringer, who has admirably compensated for the lack of historians’ attention to Alexander’s role in the war, notes that the Scottish King was able to do so untroubled by John due to first-rate intelligence and the successes of the rebels: most of Yorkshire was rendered safe by the control of Robert de Ros, especially through his castle at Helmsley, and his progress was further assisted by Earl Warenne’ s castles above Lincoln, where Alexander met up with the rebel besieging force. The knowledge that John was busy with his military activity in the West Country at this time was exploited fully: ‘the royalists were caught completely off-guard.’ His return north afterwards was more dramatic and even more successful: he made a profitable raid on John’s camp. As Stringer writes: ‘no one could deny that Alexander’s parading through England’s heartlands was a stunning feat of arms; and the unpalatable memory of his astonishing exploit remained seared on the English government’s psyche for years to come.’
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Contemporary Scottish chroniclers took note with some pride of Alexander’s journey; he had, after all, led a Scottish army triumphantly from the north of England to its south-eastern most corner and back again. No wonder it shook the English government.

There had been one episode to cast a shadow on his journey southward. During a brief siege of Hugh de Balliol’s castle at Barnard, he was joined by some barons, chief among whom was one of the leading northern barons, Eustace de Vescy, brother-in-law to King Alexander. As Eustace rode around the castle looking for weaknesses in the defence, he ventured in the range of a crossbowman who loosed his weapon at him. The bolt struck him through the forehead and pierced his brain. He died instantly.

Louis went to meet Alexander at Canterbury before bringing him to Dover. With Alexander was the force besieging Lincoln before the truce was arranged there. Also at Dover by now were the Counts of Perche and Brittany, recently arrived from France; Perche was to play a leading role at the climax of the war. Thus it was that a notable and sizeable congregation assembled to witness Alexander pay homage to Louis. This was a moment of great symbolic significance. It was quite something to have over two-thirds of the barons recognise the 28-year-old Louis as their lord; but here we have one king publicly acknowledging another king. In the absence of the Archbishop of Canterbury to perform the religious ceremony of coronation, Louis instead at least had the eminent satisfaction of his
de facto
role as King of England being affirmed in practical terms: as Wendover explains his action, Alexander was paying homage to Louis for the lands he held in England from ‘the King of the English’.
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But neither the accolade nor the Scottish troops were of help to Louis at Dover. Alexander, his promise to pay homage fulfilled, had to return home and the siege of Dover continued. John, as we shall see shortly, was on the march and Louis was needed elsewhere. Efforts to take the castle were intensified. His miners had all the while been sapping away at the gatehouse towers. The tunnel, which still exists, went under one tower. The roof was propped up with timbers, which were set alight and the sappers withdrew. When the supports burned through, a tower collapsed and Louis’s men charged into the breach. But they were repulsed vigorously by the defenders, who killed the French knights Guichard de Baugy and Jean de la Rivière. The gap was then refortified with large timbers, crossbeams and barricades of oak trunks. Whether this material had been brought in in readiness for the siege, or whether the defenders followed typical besieged practice and were stripping the buildings is unclear. The bodies of the knights killed were taken back to France for burial.

Louis’s siege operations – and indeed his whole movement of men in the south and south-east – were severely hampered by the guerrilla activities of a royalist band of archers living in the great forests of the Weald under the inspirational leadership of a folk hero who was determined to fight against oppression. The French invasion of England in 1216 provides an historical figure as a possible inspiration for the Robin Hood stories, which may well have developed around this time. The guerrilla force’s leader was William of Kensham, a royal bailiff, and his men were volunteer archers from the seven hundreds of the Weald, all loyal to the crown, who fought against the French during their occupation of southern England. Based in the great forest of the Weald in Kent and the south, this group waged highly effective ambush warfare against the French occupiers. We have only a tiny amount of information on William, but it is telling that such a little-known figure very quickly took on a popular folk name: Willikin of the Weald.
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Roger of Wendover writes of ‘a young man named William’ who, collecting a company of 1000 bowmen, took to the deep forests and ‘continued to trouble the French throughout the whole war, and slew many thousands of them’.
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The Anonymous speaks admiringly of his ‘noble prowess’ and how he was ‘renowned in Louis’s army’.
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The author of the
History of William Marshal
confirms William’s effectiveness: writing of French losses, he instructs the reader to ‘witness the deeds of Willikin of the Weald’.
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He inspired fear in French ranks as they tried to make their way from London to the southern port of Winchelsea, where at one point he even had Louis trapped. He also made an effective raid on the French siege camp at Dover. Lest he be considered too romantic and dashing a hero, he apparently had a brutal tendency to behead his prisoners. His contribution to the war effort was recognised by both John and his successor. Records suggest that William survived the war and lived to the year 1257.

Meanwhile things had not been going any better at the siege of the other great southern royal castle at Windsor.
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The Anonymous drily comments of Robert de Dreux and the Count of Nevers and their besieging force, ‘long were they there, and little did they gain.’ In charge of the mighty fortress was Engelard de Cigogné with 60 knights and their retainers; despite the massive contrast to Odiham, Engelard defended his new castle with equal tenacity and his skills as ‘a man well tried in war’, says Wendover. As at Dover, the garrison would often burst from the castle in violent sorties that frightened the French. Twice the garrison broke the besiegers’ main petraria. The Anonymous reports that during the siege a knight from Artois by the name of Gullaume de Cerisy was killed; apparently it was no great loss as his death went unlamented ‘because he was hated by many’. The precarious position of Windsor and Dover spurred John into action. At the beginning of September he set out on a major campaign. It was to be his last.
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We have no definitive view of John’s paramount strategic objective for the last campaign: intercepting Alexander’s army as it returned to Scotland; marching on Windsor to force directly its relief; or burning the lands of the barons to undermine their power bases and in the hope that the provocation would compel them to leave Windsor, Dover and Lincoln to defend their own regions. Turner and others believe that the ‘furiously energetic’ John only feinted at Windsor, but ‘actually aimed at East Anglia, hoping to meet the Scottish King on his way north’.
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There may appear to be a feeling of exigency about John’s movements; this is not at all to say that it was directionless, but rather that John’s army was flexible in its response to situations in the field. All three objectives could be part and parcel of an overall strategy; but of the three, the last – drawing away enemy forces from the great sieges – seems to dominate and it certainly fits in with the pattern of John’s style of warfare: avoiding a decisive engagement and putting his energy into a defensive castle strategy and an offensive ravaging one.

There is also the question of the timing of the campaign. There clearly was an urgency to act if Dover and Windsor were to stay out of French and baronial hands. There may also have been the concern that some of the remaining loyal one-third of barons would start to go over to Louis. Whether John had fled from the initial French advances in array or beat a judicious tactical defeat can be argued; but certainly now was an opportune moment for John to counter-attack. He had held the line in the west of the country with important bases in eastern rebel territory. The desertions seemed to have reached their natural limit and now time was not on Louis’s side. The Earls of Salisbury and York returned to John’s side, as did William the Marshal’s heir; John, calculating how much he needed the return of prodigal sons, was magnanimous in his neediness. On Louis’s side, the comments from the Anonymous that Louis was losing men fast is confirmed by the annals of Dunstable: ‘Day by day the followers of the French dwindled.’
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Robert de Dreux, a leading commander of the French forces, returned to France at this juncture. Nor were the Cinque ports fulfilling their submission oath to Louis as they continued to aid John by naval actions in the Channel. The overall position was still highly favourable for Louis, but, crucially, he had lost the momentum.

John’s campaign was a belated but necessary counter-attack, a testing of the strength and resolve of the enemy by a violent and intimidating incursion into their secure territory in the hope of regaining the initiative. Charting John’s campaign movements is not straightforward and exact dates can be hard to confirm: Stringer notes ‘the increasingly punishing and erratic nature of John’s itinerary’.
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Having secured his position in the west, on 2 September he left Cirencester with his army and Savary de Mauléon to reach Reading four days later, having travelled through Burford, Oxford (staying here for three days) and Wallingford. He was augmenting his forces by collecting men from royal garrisons along the way. After two nights at Reading he went to nearby Sonning where he stayed until the 13th. In so doing he was placing himself within striking distance of Windsor. This obviously unnerved the besiegers. Their fears increased when a contingent of John’s Welsh archers approached the siege camp at night and fired into the host and a substantial skirmish broke out. The joint Franco-baronial force readied themselves in battle array for a full-scale engagement which never came.

John withdrew – the Anonymous admits he does not know who counselled this move – and on 15 September ravaged his way through baronial lands from Walton-on-Thames through Aylesbury and Bedford, reaching the recently rebel-held Castle of Cambridge the following day. The besiegers at Windsor held a quick war council and decided to follow him. ‘Gaining little or no advantage at Windsor Castle’, says Wendover, ‘they determined to lift the siege.’ They did this at night, leaving their tents behind and burning their siege machines, and made a forced march to Cambridge in an attempt to intercept John. Wendover reports the rumour that the Count of Nevers, who counselled this strategy, did do because he was in the pay of King John.
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Had John moved away from Windsor because he felt confident matters could be left with Nevers? Or was he gambling successfully that his actions would draw off the besiegers and grant Windsor some temporary relief? The latter offers a more likely pertinent analysis. The ravaging of lands was a classic diversionary tactic of medieval commanders attempting to draw away besiegers from strongholds; it worked here and throughout the war. It was harvest time, and the damage being done was calculated and massively destructive. The barons and French may well have agreed a truce with the garrison; the latter had seen John come and then go. And again we come to John’s consistent policy of battle avoidance: Coggeshall tells of how John ‘fled’ from the barons at Windsor.
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It makes more sense to see the Franco-baronial force at Windsor pursuing the King to force him into a decisive engagement and protect their lands rather than a battle-shy John risking a full-scale battle to relieve Windsor.