Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan (6 page)

BOOK: Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan
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Built-in doublespeak

From the very start, the Muslim Brotherhood has been based on an ambiguity: that of being at one and the same time an organized movement and a way
of thinking. The movement's founding law, which dates from 1945, defines
an "active member" as someone who has pledged allegiance to the Guide, but
the great majority of those committed to serve the Brotherhood's ideology
do so on an informal basis. These agents spread al-Banna's message and his
methods, without being an integral part of the organization.

The movement had, to be sure, an official structure that represented
it in political dealings with institutions. The Brotherhood even had a flag:
two crossed swords with the Koran as a background. The organization's
officers introduced themselves as members of the Muslim Brotherhood if,
in so doing, negotiations with the Egyptian government or other administrations were facilitated. But the Brotherhood consisted of much more
than this official facade. Some sections were engaged in infiltration operations that were of necessity undercover. Other sections organized terrorist
attacks that had to be publicly condemned so as not to discredit the official
line taken by the head office. Steps were taken to separate, as far as possible, the sections that were in the public eye from the undercover cells,
either because the latter were more radical or because their mission had to
remain confidential. This led to the creation of an unofficial branch, known
as the Secret Organization, in charge of the most sensitive operations. As
well as this division into official and secret branches, the informal nature of the movement's organization meant that it was always possible to prevent
its active supporters from being identified. If a member of the Brotherhood was caught engaged in a mission prejudicial to the movement's public image, the official branch could deny having any connection with him.
And conversely, if the fact of being exposed as a Muslim Brother threatened
the success of a mission, the latter could always deny belonging to the organization. You could say it was the movement's golden rule. Many fraternities resort to lies and dissimulation in their dealings with the outside world
if that serves to protect them and help them achieve their objectives-the
Muslim Brotherhood more so than any other. Trained in the Sufi fraternity,
al-Banna admitted that he had been marked for life by the advice given him
by his sheikh, who taught him the advantages of speaking with two voices:
"I remember that, among his wise teachings, one was to prevent the Brothers who were his disciples from expressing themselves too freely in debates
on judicial issues or on obscure questions, or to repeat in front of ordinary people what atheists, strangers, or missionaries might have said. He
advised them: `Discuss these questions among yourselves and study them
in the company of those who are well informed; but as for ordinary people,
speak to them in such a way as to have an immediate influence and render them more obedient to God."'46 This sentence, quoted by Tariq Ramadan in On the Origins of the Muslim Renaissance, shows us-better than any
analysis could-where his habit comes from of speaking with one voice to
people outside his community and with another to people within it.

Islamists in general have learned how to lie in order to avoid exposure. This principle even bears a name: taqiyya. The Shiites applied this prerogative when lying or even when swearing that they were not Shiite in order
to survive when they were persecuted by the Sunnis for their religious beliefs.
The reflex has remained with them. It spread to the Sunni Islamists intent
on furthering their cause despite the strict surveillance they were under in
Arab countries. Today, it is used by Islamists living in the Western democracies, not in order to avoid arrest, but simply as a means of pursuing their ends
while remaining disguised.

Students of Islamism, who have heard militants say one thing in public and another when with their brothers, have become accustomed to this kind
of doublespeak. Many have been disconcerted by the doublespeak until they
have come to understand that this behavior forms an integral part of Islamist rhetoric. For Jean-Yves Chaperon, a reporter for Luxembourg's radio
and television (RTL) who has been covering the subject for many years, it
no longer comes as a surprise: "With the Islamists you'll always find this
kind of duality: sweetness on the outside, and fire within."47 Nonetheless, it
is always a bit disconcerting when somebody lies to you, often with a broad
smile. Another Islamist speciality is to make totally unacceptable remarks
in the most angelic manner. Hassan al-Tourabi is a prime example of what
the Muslim Brotherhood is capable of producing (although he has since
denied any connection with the Brotherhood). He often astounds his listeners by his habit of stirring up hatred in a good-natured, almost likeable,
manner. This friendly host studied in Paris, where he founded the Association of Islamic Students of France. He enjoys receiving French journalists
in order to explain to them, in the most cheerful of tones, how his social
model will, in the end, destabilize the entire planet.4$ This trait is even
more crude in the case of Omar Bakri, for many years the London leader
of the now banned Al-Muhajiroun, a man who makes no secret of the fact
that he has organized trips to Afghanistan and served as an agent of AlQaeda propaganda. He delights in summoning journalists and proclaiming, a broad smile on his face, that he is a fervent supporter of bin Laden,
and that non-Muslims will soon be defeated or will burn in hell. To utter
such anathemas in the very heart of the West, without taking the slightest
risk thanks to the right of free speech, is, for him, an additional source of
pleasure. It should be mentioned that such statements would, in his native
country of Syria, result in his immediate imprisonment, and probably in
his torture. The situation is a bit more complex for activists whose objective
is strategic. They are obliged to tone down their rhetoric, even to learn how
to lie-with a smile that expresses their disdain for the naivete of non-Muslims. And who can blame them? It is typical Western naivete to think that
one can form an opinion of determined, anti-democratic militants by relying on good impressions and to believe that fanatics dorit lie. The result is that Western journalists, when confronted by Islamists who are even a little
cunning, are constantly thrown off the track.

A Brother or not a Brother?

"I have no functional connection with the Muslim Brotherhood," Tariq
Ramadan made a point of declaring for the benefit of the press. As if the
Brotherhood was a party that issued membership cards. As if the lack of a
formal tie vindicated the rehabilitation of his grandfather and the teaching
of the latter's thought to European Muslims-without any attempt to adopt
a critical perspective. "It's time to put a stop to these fantasies," he declared
to the Nouvel Observateur. "I am independent; there are differences of opinion between me and the Brotherhood in regard to matters of doctrine, even
if one of my uncles, Al-Islam al-Banna, is a member of the movement's governing body. But you know, the Brotherhood is not a homogeneous organization. There are differing groups and subgroups ... "49 There are, in effect,
different tendencies within the Brotherhood. But it is important to understand that these differences concern questions of method-never the objectives to be attained. It is quite likely that certain Muslim Brothers do find
the heir's methods a bit too modern for their taste. But that does not make
of Tariq Ramadan a modern Muslim! You can be communist without having the party card and you can disagree with other communists; but that
doesn't turn you into an anarchist. Wherever he goes, Ramadan spreads the
form of Islamism that he inherited. An ambassador for Islamism who is all
the more dangerous and difficult to pin down since he claims to be autonomous. Antoine Sfeir, founder of the Cahiers de l'Orient [The Orient Review],
who has written several books on Islamism and who was one of the first
to have exposed Tariq Ramadan's doublespeak, is certainly not mistaken in
saying: As far as I'm concerned, he is no doubt one of the key figures of
the Brotherhood. "50 Richard Labeviere, a Radio France International (RFI)
reporter and author of several books on Islamist terrorism, backs him up. In
April 1998, in the course of a trip to Cairo, he had occasion to interview the
head of the Brotherhood, Guide Machour. The latter confirmed the fact that belonging to the Brotherhood was not a question of "being a member" or "not
being a member," but a question of adhering to a certain way of thinking; he
added: "The work carried out by Hani and Tariq is totally in keeping with the
purest traditions of the Muslim Brotherhood."51

Violence? What violence?

Tariq Ramadan vehemently denies that his grandfather had anything to do
with the ever-increasing recourse to violence in the name of Islam. In his
eyes, Hassan al-Banna is "by no means the `father' ofthat `modern Islamism
characterized by violent demonstrations and simplistic, obtuse anti-Western
prejudice."52 Listening to him, one tends to forget that al-Banna founded a
movement that intended to raise high the flag of Islam by whatever means,
even if this meant "death on the road to God": "Despite the portrait given
of him by the British colonizers (who, in Egypt and elsewhere, have always
accused their opponents of the worst violence and the most horrible crimes)
al-Banna never killed anyone or arranged for a political assassination,"
declared Ramadan in Questioning Islam53-even at the cost of escalating from
revisionism to negationism.

Hassan al-Banna was quite explicit in his praise for the armed jihad that
he considered to be the highest form of courage. In 1940, he described, for
the benefit of the Muslim Brotherhood, what holy war entailed: "What I
mean by holy war (jihad) is the duty that must be obeyed until the day of resurrection and which God's messenger sets down in these words .... The
first stage in the sacred war is to expel evil from one's own heart; the highest stage is armed combat in the service of God. The intermediate stages are
waging war with one's voice, one's pen, and one's hand, and by words oftruth
addressed to unjust authorities."54 This glorification of armed combat as the
supreme degree of the jihad was not a vain formula. In the months that followed, the Brotherhood decided to create a secret armed section, the Special
Organization. Its mission was to prepare a selected number of militants for
armed resistance. Tariq Ramadan does not deny the fact, but he describes
it as a way of preparing for self-defense, an understandable concern when
they were up against the British, who might well decide "to physically elim inate their opponents"-or in case "they refused, after repeated urgings, to
leave the country."55 The truth of the matter is that the Special Organization
was primarily engaged in sending militants to fight in Palestine. Even before
the creation of Israel in 1947, the Brotherhood sent armed squads to track
down the Jewish immigrants. Tariq Ramadan takes pride in recounting these
events: Al-Banna provided assistance to the Palestinians by sending them
an advisor and a specialist in military training, raising funds to buy weapons, and setting up training camps that he ran jointly with members of the
Special Organization. Volunteers came to Palestine in groups to support the
resistance."56 Later on, another armed group in Palestine was to claim close
links to the Brotherhood-Hamas. Its very existence suffices to refute the
idea that the Brotherhood's ideology has nothing violent or fanatic about it.
But Ramadan takes pains to explain that, in Palestine, violence has nothing
violent about it, since it is legitimate: "Hassan al-Banna was opposed to violence and approved of the use of arms only in Palestine as a way of resisting
Zionist colonialism. "57

Tariq Ramadan was well aware of the fact that his grandfather had called
for a jihad, but he vindicated him by explaining that the call was strictly limited
to situations of "legitimate defense" or "resistance in the face ofinjustice"58-
two criteria that are highly subjective. On this basis, violence was legitimate
when it was a question of facing up to Nasser, just as it was in opposing British occupation. Or just as it will be every time that any obstacle threatens
to block the Muslim Brotherhood's quest for domination. Ramadan is brazen enough to claim that the association has never been responsible for acts
of violence. Yet in March 1948, for example, a judge was assassinated for
having condemned a Muslim Brother. And on December 28 of the same
year, before al-Banna's death, the Brotherhood claimed responsibility for the
assassination of Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha.59 These deaths could not
have occurred without the Guide's knowledge.

Hassan al-B anna had, on occasion, barred activists who were in too much
of a hurry to go into action, as he did in 1938-39, not because he repudiated
the idea of an armed jihad, but because he felt the time was not ripe. During
this period, his movement was gaining ground among the people. He was intent on consolidating his political influence, and therefore sought legitimacy. If the Brotherhood were to be condemned for illegal acts, for assassinations or for setting off riots, it would disrupt the evolution of his campaign. In 1948, the Brotherhood went too far; another assassination tipped
the scales and the organization was dissolved by military decree. On November 15, a demonstration organized by the Brotherhood to honor their "martyrs" degenerated into a riot, in which two British officers were killed in their
jeep. Those in charge often lost control of the young activists that they had
fanaticized. Despite what Tariq Ramadan has said, the organization that his
grandfather created was bound to produce fundamentalists who-when it
appeared that indoctrination alone would not suffice-would be tempted,
sooner or later, to take up arms in order to achieve their objectives. However, the fact that violence was a last resort is considered by Hassan al-Banna's grandson to be proof of great moderation in their choice of tactics. He
turns the cool and calculated radicalism of his grandfather into something
more spiritual. By way of example, he cites one of al-Banna's speeches, in
which the latter tells his followers to weigh the pros and cons of using force
carefully, but to take responsibility for whatever course is deemed necessary.
"The Muslim Brotherhood will use force only as a last resort, when there is no
other choice, and when they are convinced that they have achieved total faith
and union. And if they must employ force, they will be dignified and sincere,
they will give advance notice and wait for a reply; only then will they advance
with nobility and pride, prepared to bear the consequences of their decision
with confidence and calm."6° In other words, the Muslim Brotherhood has
no intention of calling for an armed revolution, but they will be forced to do
so if they dorit get their own way. This it what Tariq Ramadan, fascinated by
the rhetoric, calls the Muslim Brotherhood's "clear perception."

BOOK: Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan
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