Chinese advance, Rau's group at the United Nations introduced its proposal for a negotiated settlement. It called for an immediate cease-fire in Korea, with a promise that foreign troops would withdraw gradually from Korea and that a four-power conference (among the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the People's Republic) would be convened to settle outstanding East Asian questions, including the Taiwan issue and PRC representation in the United Nations.
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Before responding to the UN proposal, Zhou Enlai again turned to Stalin for ''advice and consultation," as he phrased it.
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The Soviet leader agreed that the time had come to lay out their terms. On January 17 Zhou accordingly rejected the UN cease-fire proposal, arguing logically that it was "designed to give U.S. troops a breathing space," and set forth instead harsher conditions: that a seven-power conference be held in China, that the People' s Republic be installed in the United Nations at the outset of the negotiations, that all foreign troops be withdrawn from Korea, and that a Great Power conference also discuss the removal of American protection of Taiwan.
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Although the Indian government was willing to pursue negotiations with the People's Republic on the basis of these terms, the United States could not accept the Chinese conditions; thus discussions of a negotiated settlement were abandoned.
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It is not difficult to understand that at this point each of the three Communist allies wanted to press for total victory against American and UN troops. The only cautionary note, as far as we know, came from CPV Commander Peng Dehuai, who was concerned about the logistical difficulties of supplying Chinese troops farther down the peninsula and about the lack of air cover for Chinese and North Korean ground forces.
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Peng was overruled, however, and despite an unexpectedly strong repulse by UN forces in late January, the Communist allies prepared a large-scale offensive for April 1951, which they believed would be the final campaign.
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As the CPV commanders phrased it in their mobilization order on April 19, "this is the campaign that will determine the fate and length of the Korean War."
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The CPV assessment of the significance of this campaign proved correct, for when the spring offensive of April and May 1951 failed to push UN forces farther south and moreover resulted in very high casualties among Chinese and North Korean troops, the Communist allies decided to pursue a negotiated settlement. Russian sources released thus far do not include records of the initial discussions among the allies regarding opening negotiations, but Chinese documents reveal that on June 2, Mao invited Kim II Sung to visit Beijing to discuss the new strategy, as Kim was reluctant to abandon hope for a total victory.
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While Kim was in Beijing, the Soviet Union took steps toward opening negotiations in Korea. We do not know what communications the three leaders had
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