Read Brothers in Arms Online

Authors: Odd Arne Westad

Tags: #Political Science, #International Relations, #General, #test

Brothers in Arms (35 page)

BOOK: Brothers in Arms
6.97Mb size Format: txt, pdf, ePub
ads
page_98<br/>
Page 98
you could send them as soon as possible. With regard to the participation of 8 fighter divisions in battles, in accordance with your advice, I gave an order to the General Staff to draw up a plan."
Responding to Stalin's admonitions to maintain vigilance at the front, Mao informed him that he had given "an order to Comrade Peng Dehuai that our troops firmly hold the line of defense at the second and third defensive lines and create a new defensive line." Returning to the issue of a future offensive, he explained that "the position at the front in June will be such that our forces will be comparatively weaker than those of the enemy. In July we will be stronger than in June and in August we will be even stronger. We will be ready in August to make a stronger blow to the enemy."

30

The Communist allies apparently agreed with Mao's suggestion that the Soviet Union take the initiative in pursuing negotiations, for on June 23, 1951, Jacob Malik declared in a scheduled address over the UN radio network that "the Soviet peoples further believe that the most acute problem of the present day the problem of the armed conflict in Korea could also be settled. This would require the readiness of the parties to enter on the path of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question."
Retreating from the harsher terms the Chinese had laid out in January, Malik declared that "the Soviet peoples believe that as a first step discussions should be started between the belligerents for a cease-fire and armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th Parallel."
31
On June 27, in a meeting with U.S. Ambassador Alan G. Kirk in Moscow, Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko confirmed the message communicated in Malik's June 23 speech and suggested that the negotiators should confine the discussions to military matters, avoiding political or territorial considerations.
32
In the heated debate within the Truman administration that followed Malik's initiative, several officials opposed entering negotiations on the grounds that the Communists were only buying time to reinforce their troops. As Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg put it, "we are now hurting the communists badly and any respite given them by an armistice would only permit them to build up to start fighting again. . . ."
33
However, due largely to the arguments of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the United States decided to enter negotiations. Military leaders of both sides opened armistice talks at Kaesong on July 10, 1951. As the talks dragged on without producing an agreement, however, the perception that the Communists were not "sincere" in pursuing a negotiated settlement became increasingly influential in Washington.
For the broader discussion of the Cold War, it is thus important to establish the motives of the Chinese, Soviets, and North Koreans in entering armistice negotiations in July 1951. Without access to the original documents on the Chi-

 

page_99<br/>
Page 99
nese side, the picture is not entirely clear; in some respects the Russian documents seem to contradict accounts written on the basis of published Chinese documents.

34
At this point, however, it appears from the Russian documentary record that the Chinese leadership viewed armistice negotiations in Korea as one tactic in the ongoing struggle of the People's Republic with the United States and its allies, a straggle that would long outlast the conflict in Korea. As Marxist revolutionaries, Mao and his associates viewed their regime as inherently at war with the United States. Therefore, an armistice in Korea was not pursued to restore the warring parties to a state of normal diplomatic relations. Instead it was sought as an expedient that, if achieved on terms favorable to China, could improve the nation's position for the time being by relieving it of the burden of fighting in Korea.

The party leadership defined China's new policy toward the war as "negotiating while fighting." According to the memoirs of Nie Rongzhen, the acting chief of staff, when the Central Committee met to consider what course to take following the failed fifth offensive of April-May 1951:
most of the comrades present at the meeting felt that our forces should stop in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel, continue fighting during the armistice talks, and strive to settle the issue through negotiations. . . . Of course, should the war continue, we had nothing to fear and would grow stronger in the fight but not without difficulty. With Comrade Mao Zedong presiding, the meeting finally endorsed the policy of simultaneously fighting and negotiating, a policy which we conscientiously carried out.
35
In other words, since the war had become difficult, they would seek to end it through a negotiated settlement. However, if favorable terms could not be achieved, they would continue to fight, despite the cost; Beijing maintained this policy for the remainder of the war.
Mao's telegrams from late June and early July 1951 provide further evidence that he was preparing for future military operations in Korea while simultaneously pursuing a negotiated settlement to the conflict. On June 21 Mao asked Stalin to consider the applications for additional armaments and supplies he had sent via Gao and to deliver these goods from July through the end of the year "so that the various military units in the Korean theater of military operations receive replenishment according to . . . what is advantageous for the conduct of military operations."
36
On June 26 Stalin replied affirmatively to a telegram from Mao that informed him that

 

page_100<br/>
Page 100
the government of the PRC intends to send fighter divisions armed with MiG-15s to Korea for participation in the military actions, which will be much better than sending divisions armed with MiG-9 planes. It is therefore necessary in the course of one and a half to two months to retrain the 6th, 12th, and 14th fighter divisions, which are armed with MiG-9s, on MiG-15s, with a calculation of sending them to the front in September 1951.

37

On June 28 General Stepan Krasovskii, Stalin's representative in Beijing, reported to the Soviet leader that at a meeting on June 27, "Comrade Mao Zedong expressed the opinion that the 6th, 12th and 14th fighter aviation divisions, which have been trained on MiG-9s, must retrain on MiG-15s before being sent to the front. The period of retraining was established as one and one half to two months, so that these divisions could take part in the forthcoming operations in Korea."
38
On July 2, 1951, eight days before negotiations began, Mao Zedong instructed Peng Dehuai, Gao Gang, and Kim II Sung that "the period of preparations for and conduct of negotiations with representatives of the enemy will occupy approximately 10-14 days" and asked them during this period
to make every effort to increase the personnel of the front line units and especially to replenish them with arms and ammunition. . . . It is necessary to be prepared for the fact that after the signing of an agreement on cessation of military operations it will be impossible to transfer the aforementioned personnel and armaments. . . . I ask you to think about what could occur after the signing of an agreement on cessation of military operations and be prepared for everything that needs to be done.
39
The first weeks of the negotiations focused on establishing the agenda and determining the demarcation line that would separate North and South Korea. The UN command first insisted on using the current front line, which ran to the north of the thirty-eighth parallel, as the demarcation line, then made an unreasonable proposal to use a line deep in the Chinese/North Korean rear as the new boundary. This proposal angered and offended the Chinese delegation, who countered with a proposal to designate the thirty-eighth parallel as the demarcation line, since the battle line was constantly shifting north and south of that line. However, a telegram from the Chinese delegation at Kaesong on August 12, addressing the impasse reached on this issue, reveals an assumption that reaching an armistice agreement on acceptable terms would provide time to rebuild Chinese/North Korean forces before renewing the straggle in Korea. The negotiators informed Mao Zedong that

 

BOOK: Brothers in Arms
6.97Mb size Format: txt, pdf, ePub
ads

Other books

Solace of the Road by Siobhan Dowd
Fearless by Rafael Yglesias
Deceptions: A Collection by Walker, Shiloh
Dust to Dust by Ken McClure
Breakdown: Season One by Jordon Quattlebaum
In the Wet by Nevil Shute
Justice at Risk by Wilson, John Morgan