Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know (27 page)

There is increasing landlessness in rural areas as the population has expanded. Landlessness affects 25 to 40 percent of the rural population. Fertilizer is scarce, and farmers only receive one-third of the export price of rice (compared to 50 to 60 percent of the price for Vietnamese farmers). Paddy prices have dropped 50 percent from 2007 to 2008, so farmers are in even more need. Debt has increased with usurious interest
rates of 10 to 15 percent a month, sometimes 100 percent daily interest in the bazaars. The state provides only about 30 percent of the agricultural credit required. Because land is state-owned, even those farming cannot use it as collateral. The government denies that these conditions are serious.

Environmental degradation has become rife. The overcutting of hardwoods, especially teak, is well known. Extinction of wildlife is evident. Mangrove forests have been destroyed for shrimp farming, increasing the devastation of Cyclone Nargis and in turn being decreased by it. Pollution stemming from uncontrolled gold and other mining, as well as the construction of major dams for hydroelectric power and irrigation, many of which are sponsored by the Chinese, is rampant. Some of these problems lie in the hands of minority cease-fire groups, but most responsibility must fall on the Myanmar government.

Whatever government evolves from the 2010 elections—or even whether there is a civilian/military government through negotiations or because of a popular uprising against the present or future government—the needs of the state will be enormous. Yet should change occur, there will be very high expectations for immediate progress that will place inordinate pressures on a new administration of any stripe. The Burmese people will expect deliverance from economic as well as political oppression, and the government, if its policies were acceptable to the external world, would also expect immediate and substantial assistance. If such a new government were democratic (or at least pluralistic), then the disparate local demands may become tumultuous. The honeymoon period for any new government is likely to be quite short.

A massive infusion of funds would be required—a figure of about US$1 billion had been rather arbitrarily mentioned a decade ago, but this is probably a gross underestimation. Yet the absorptive capacity of the state is likely to be extremely limited. Recalculating government budgets based on a realistic,
floating, and unitary exchange rate would be required. Examination of the viability of the state economic enterprises (the public sector) would be needed (they have increased from 624 enterprises to 794 between 1988 and 2008). Ensuring the autonomy of the central bank will be necessary. Updated skills in technology and science will be required. In any of these efforts, Burmese would have to be trained in a wide variety of analytical and planning skills that are currently lacking, and most of this would have to be done abroad. Foreign advisors/consultants would be necessary but subject to political scrutiny and probable criticism. Multilateral donors are more likely to be acceptable. Given the present and likely future role of the military in the society, there is an obvious need to expose the upcoming military elite to international standards of military responsibility through overseas training programs.

Yet the present policies of most donors preclude supplying the depth of training required to manage a sophisticated and increasingly complex economy and society. To wait for change when such needs are obvious is to invite future problems that could undercut any positive political developments that might occur.

The military might, as it did in 1972, recognize that more multilateral and bilateral assistance was required, and the world’s humanitarian concerns might prompt efforts to assist a new government if that new government diminished its repressive measures. But the past is not prelude. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank now have criteria, lacking earlier, for transparency, good governance, and at least some semblance of popular participation in the political process for assistance to take place beyond humanitarian or relief support. In spite of the U.S. administration’s supposed strong democracy stance, the reentry of the U.S. assistance program in 1979 did not consider that as a necessary criterion for its foreign aid program or for
its military training under the International Military Education and Training program in spite of legislation to the contrary.

Under the new constitution, it seems likely that Japan would begin new aid programs, although pressures from the United States might cause some anguish in the Foreign Ministry.

It is also questionable whether international nongovernmental organizations would increase their programs in Myanmar unless the new government issues more relaxed guidelines for its operations. In some cases, directives of control from the center are often sporadically or partly implemented in the field. The stringency of control will probably depend on the degree of confidence the new administration has in its own capacities and tenure, as well as the ability of local officials to achieve mandated targets or resolve problems.

Democracy is neither inevitable nor inaccessible in Myanmar. If it were to come, it would not be instantly born fully formed from the head of some Zeus-like person or event. Democracies evolve, often in unbalanced directions, and political cultures also evolve to accommodate and then encourage democratic continuity and deepening. A political system recognized internationally as a democracy is certainly possible over time in that country. But to expect that even a peaceful transfer of power to a real civilian regime would automatically, ipso facto, result in such a system, which seems to be the unsophisticated international mantra of the moment, is more than unrealistic. That is not to claim that there should not be political change, just that evolution is far more likely than revolution in this instance. The range of criteria to define democracy is complex, and elections are just one element of that process.

The new government, still run by the military but under civilianized auspices, will claim that its “discipline-flourishing democracy” is in place with a multiparty system and an elected
legislative branch not only at the center but in each of the states and regions and down to township levels. The government will also claim that any criticism of its democracy is a form of Western prejudice and that Myanmar, because of the nefarious imperialistic designs of the United States and its minions, is being discriminated against. Although there was muted Western criticism of Suharto’s Indonesian “democracy,” the West has been unwilling to accept the Burmese protestations of democratic governance with anything less than a complete elimination of the Burmese military from power. This is highly unlikely to happen. There has been growing international realization, on the other hand, that the military must be part of the solution to any of Myanmar’s multitude of problems.

However, if there were to be a major change in the power structure in the country and the military were to relinquish titular control, would there be democracy in Myanmar? Titularly, democracy as defined by some form of representative government administratively might be in place, but the spirit of compromise and the degree of plurality that are at the core of the democratic process would take time to evolve. The opposition is united only by its antagonism to the junta. It would have to develop policies that would satisfy the very diverse demands of many different populations. Furthermore, within the country now there are few who understand democracy, as two generations have been prevented from legally studying or reading about it, let alone experiencing it. One Burmese observer described his country as “politically gelded for fifty years.” Another wrote that “since 1962, the Burmese military has occupied the entire political matrix.” A few understand the process, most prominently Aung San Suu Kyi, but a new generation has to be inculcated into the mysteries of this particular cult. Now, the electoral cries for democracy may equally be interpreted as calls for the elimination of the military in executive positions.

A strong middle class is usually associated with democratic governance. Yet an indigenous middle class has been weak; most in that category were not Burmans. The strength of a
middle class of Burmans will only slowly develop. There is, however, an intellectual class, once active in the civilian era, that could once again emerge if the strictures of control of information and expression were to be loosened. This, too, is likely to be an extended and gradual process.

Because democracy is a process, there are intermediate stages that might be encouraged. The most obvious is some form of political pluralism. Fostering this development is possible through assistance in the development of civil society. The old adage that Burmese do not join organizations except for those with a religious focus has been disproved by survey work and the response to Cyclone Nargis. Even under the present administration, these organizations have grown, and they include (but are not limited to) those localized around a monastery or school. Those at the ward level, and even national ones that are apolitical in nature, although often treated with suspicion and infiltrated, continue. They were given a great impetus by Cyclone Nargis, when they performed admirably to bring relief to those affected areas. For them to have an impact on democratic growth, there needs to be close interplay among networks of such organizations.

Whatever government is in power, the tendency will be for those elements of the Burmese political culture, discussed earlier, to take effect. The short-term prognostication would tend toward considerable trouble, but in the longer term that culture will evolve, and if the educational system can be improved and freed from the rigidities of the SLORC/SPDC, one would expect considerable positive change in that society.

The roles of the major powers, especially the United States and the European Union, have generally been counterproductive in terms of improving the sorry state of the people in Myanmar. The imposition of various economic sanctions that have periodically increased has not produced their intended effect—regime
change. Rather, the vituperative language of much of the world has prompted a nationalistic response that on many occasions became strident and xenophobic. Although sanctions provide the moral high ground to those imposing them, they have been proven to be ineffectual. Even if sanctions were enforced by all of Myanmar’s neighbors—and none of them now do so—it seems likely that the junta would resist and retreat into itself. Yet there is no possibility of regionally approved sanctions—Myanmar is too strategically located and too richly endowed with gas and other products in demand.

The major Western powers will remain suspect in any government elected under a new constitution. Insofar as they might provide economic or humanitarian assistance for projects or activities, these are likely to be accepted as long as they do not formally engage in policy. Myanmar in 2007 received about US$2 per capita in foreign assistance, compared to twenty-five times that amount for Laos. Informal policy discussions on an individual level may be welcome, but whatever changes or reforms occur, they must appear to come from within. Japanese support is likely to become extensive under an elected government. Chinese and Indian assistance is already a given. Some in the
tatmadaw
regret that it indicated a willingness to go along with Western concerns, such as on anti–opium production activities, because the response from the United States especially was not positive. In fact, it undercut those who had proposed making some overtures, exposing them to internal Myanmar criticism.

The Burmese will object to any role by foreigners that appears to be condescending and infringing on what they regard as Burmese sovereignty. The tendency to publicly lecture the Burmese of any persuasion (and indeed most countries) is counterproductive.

Of all the organizations in the foreign community, ASEAN probably stands the best chance of assisting reform in Myanmar,
but even that role is likely to be marginal. The political heritage of each of the member states has politically questionable pedigrees. Noninterference into the internal affairs of any of these states is an ASEAN cardinal principle. There has been growing dissatisfaction with Myanmar, especially after the 2003 attack on the NLD in central Myanmar (in 2006 Myanmar forfeited the ASEAN chair) and because of the suppression of the Saffron Revolution in 2007. ASEAN would likely claim that there has been modest political progress should the elections of 2010 go smoothly. Following them, it is quite possible that ASEAN will accept the political progress that the Burmese claim under their new government, and Myanmar may finally chair ASEAN after that time.

In November 2007, the ASEAN states, including Myanmar, signed the ASEAN Charter, which their governments ratified by the end of 2008. The Charter contains a human rights provision but without stipulations of monitoring, enforcement, and penalties. Myanmar has signed that document, but what provisions will be considered and how it might operate are vague at this writing. Because there is an antitrafficking provision in the Burmese constitution, starting to discuss enforcement of that section would not be held to be discriminatory against Myanmar. The problem is widespread within the region.

In spite of previous Burmese respect for the United Nations—indeed, a Burmese citizen, U Thant, was its secretary general—the United Nations has proven to possess only marginal influence. The United Nations initiated ineffective dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi through two different special envoys of the secretary general, and Secretary General Ban Ki Moon visited Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis. But little significant or lasting results followed, except expected platitudes. Through Chinese and Russian efforts, the UN Security Council has effectively blocked U.S. efforts to censor Myanmar. There have been fourteen General Assembly resolutions on the human rights situation in Myanmar between 1991 and 2008. On July 14, 2008, a group of Burmese dissident organizations
led by the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB) filed a petition to the UN Credentials Committee to challenge the credentials of the SLORC. On August 1, the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) supported that effort to recommend to the UN General Assembly that the credentials of the SPDC to the United Nations be withdrawn because of violations to various human rights provisions. This was, as anticipated, rejected by the United Nations on September 23, 2008. In August 2008, the new UN Human Rights envoy, Tomas Ojae Quintana, visited Myanmar but was not allowed to see Aung San Suu Kyi. In early 2009, the NCUB announced that it intended to form a “government in exile,” thus creating factional issues with the NCGUB, which already considers itself in that role.