Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know (22 page)

Naypyidaw, an area not far from the central Burmese town of Pyinmana on the Rangoon-Mandalay road and railroad some 240 miles north of Rangoon, is not the jungle site described in the foreign media but is located in scrub land near rice paddies. The capital Naypyidaw (literally, the site of the royal country; under the Japanese, the pseudo-independent state’s capital was “Rangoon Naypyidaw”) is to be designated as a special bureaucratic enclave, akin to Washington, D.C., and separate from the states and divisions that make up the administrative structure of local governance in Myanmar. It will have its own capital military command. Numerous reasons have been given for the secretive move. They range from the practical to the astrological. Foreign embassies are supposed to follow by picking building sites in that area in 2009 (since delayed), although the United States and Thailand have just constructed new embassies in Rangoon.

On July 12, 2006, the government announced that Naypyidaw would become the new capital of the state. The term
Naypyidaw
was used in precolonial Burma to designate the royal capital or palace site. On November 12, 2006, a ceremony was held for
the start of construction of a new pagoda there. Called Uppattasanti (the title of a Buddhist sutra, meaning development and stability, but invoked in the face of foreign invasions), it is supposed to rival the Shwedagon in size but stands one foot lower. The invitation card to the ceremony stated that the site was the Rajahtaninaypyitaw, or “the royal capital where the king resides.” (One of the streets is named “The King’s Friends.”) The pagoda was inaugurated by the lifting of the
hti
(umbrella) in March 2009. In 2006, the costs of Naypyidaw construction were estimated at 2.4 percent of GDP. Some believe 80,000 migrant laborers worked on its construction at a monthly cost of some K.46 billion per month (approximately US$46 million at free market rates).

There are a variety of explanations, both classical and contemporary, for the move. The capital of the country has been moved many times before under the Burmese kings. A particular site was chosen because it was auspicious, and in time the site became the center of power because the king and the throne were there. Indeed, it is evident that the timing of the move was based on astrological calculations. Some believe the cause was
yadaya
, an action taken on the advice of an astrologer to ward off potential evil. Others maintain there were numerological reasons for the move. Some now say that because Cyclone Nargis in 2008 did not touch Naypyidaw but did hit Rangoon, this demonstrates the mystical efficacy of the move. In addition, Naypyidaw lies on the fringe of the dry zone, which has been the traditional site of Burman power. The move may also be related to the nationalistic effort to “decolonize” Myanmar and eliminate the hated humiliating colonial heritage of Rangoon as the capital. Others claim that the site, near the PaO ethnic region, was chosen because Senior General Than Shwe’s wife is a PaO.

There may be strategic and political reasons for the move as well. Naypyidaw is far inland from Rangoon and is less susceptible to U.S. or foreign invasions (the military had also moved its Western Command headquarters from Sittwe, on
the sea, somewhat inland to An for the same reason, and in December 2008 announced the move of its major air force base at Mingaladon, a suburb of Rangoon, to central Myanmar at Meiktila). Its location would allow time for a protracted guerrilla war of attrition or until China might come to its aid. Others say because it is located on the edge of minority areas, this gives the central government greater control over the minority groups in that region. Naypyidaw was constructed out of scrub land with few inhabitants. It is essentially a company town and is easily controlled by the military. Thus, it is not subject to the vagaries of popular unrest as are Rangoon and the other major cities of the country. The military has complained that the government in Rangoon is subject to information leaks to the populace, and this would be less possible upcountry. The
tatmadaw
is also concerned about foreign spying in Rangoon.

Naypyidaw is divided into two new major physical sections: a civilian section housing all the ministries, employee housing, and the new Pyithu Hluttaw (legislature), and a military section; it also encompasses the neighboring town of Pyinmana and its outskirts. The civilian facilities are spread out over a vast area, with considerable distances between ministerial buildings that all look the same. Equal housing is provided to all ministers; staffs are housed in apartments that are color-coded by ministry and whose space increases as the rank of the occupant rises. There are markets, schools, a hospital, pagodas, a golf course, a zoo, and other facilities. A newly refurbished and expanded airport connects the capital to Rangoon and other cities, and the roads into Naypyidaw from the airport are sometimes six-lane divided highways. A major new limited-access divided highway connects Rangoon and Naypyidaw; it eventually will connect Mandalay. In some places, underground sprinkler systems at roundabouts keep the grass green in the hot season. There are a number of hotels. The concept is grandiose, but the isolation means increased expenditures for travel by those who need to do business with the government.

How all this construction (which evidently totaled in the hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars) was budgeted is unclear. Some say that import licenses for luxury automobiles were sold off to construction companies, others claim that the government sold buildings and land in Rangoon. Whether the construction, which continues apace, has or will be paid for is less important than other practical and even ideological elements of the move. The considerable resources required for the construction have obviously undercut the government’s interest or capacity in improving the exceedingly low level of social services provided to the general population. Furthermore, this isolation also increases the capacity of the junta to ignore the reality of the sorry state of the country as a whole and further isolates them—and through them the state—from the external world. They may feel this is positive, rather than negative, but the megalomania that such isolation may produce, combined with a exceedingly hierarchical command structure, could further aggravate the isolation of the top leadership and the unwillingness of the administration to deal with the real problems facing that country.

Buddhism is the primordial value of Burmans and some other groups, and it is the religion of about 89 percent of the population. It is associated with many rites of passage in Burman society, and many social and cultural customs are predicated on it. It, and the members of the
sangha
who practice it, have the highest social prestige; from village through university level it permeates education. It is an avenue of social mobility and prestige. As a means to rally support, it is paramount. It is also a singularly important element of political legitimacy.

The monarchs relied on Buddhism, as we have seen. Buddhism was also integral to the rise of Burmese nationalism and anti-colonial activism. U Nu could win an election in 1960 because
of his association with Buddhism and a platform of making it the state religion. The military understood that this prompted rebellions among some Christian minority groups, and after the coup of 1962 stressed the secular concept of socialism as the state’s rallying cry, even while ensuring that Buddhist rites and authority (subject to state control) were respected.

The SLORC/SPDC has engaged in a concerted campaign to use Buddhism for political legitimacy. There are continuous stories in all the media related to the good Buddhist works of the
tatmadaw
. Offerings to and the feeding of monks are frequent activities. Pagodas have been built and many repaired, including the renowned Shwedagon in 1999. Some sarcastically say that Myanmar’s color television is only green and yellow—the military and the monks. The state has raised funds for good Buddhist works, and private funds donated through state and military organizations get the karmic merit, which is the basis of such giving. When monks (on two occasions) turned over their begging bowls and refused to accept offerings of food from the military, the military considered them to be virtually treasonous acts of defiance. In 1990, monks in Mandalay demonstrated, and the military raided various monasteries and arrested some 400 monks, claiming in justification they were simply purifying the
sangha
as King Anawrahta had done in the eleventh century.

The monks demonstrated in 2007, marching peacefully through the streets of Rangoon while protected by youth. This was a defiant act, demonstrating to the populace that the administration had not cared for the people, whose meager livelihood deteriorated even further because of the abrupt rise in prices associated with the removal of subsidies on gas and oil. When these religious and nascent but quiescent political marches were infiltrated by political opponents of the regime and political slogans against the junta were seen and heard, the military violently cracked down on both the monks and the general population involved. At least thirty-one persons were killed and many injured.

The images of these brutal actions against the most revered figures in the society were seen on international television and, even more important, by many Burmese through satellite television. The population was horrified, and it became evident that however much the junta had tried to build up its image of religiosity (because of personal beliefs or for political legitimacy purposes or both), they had lost the authority they so assiduously cultivated. In March 2009, Senior General Than Shwe dedicated the Uppatasanti pagoda at Naypyidaw. Only a foot shorter then the magnificent Shwedagon pagoda in Yangon, it was an act of merit that enhances the legitimacy of the new capital, the regime, and personally the senior general and his wife. But if one were to point a single act that undermined the prestige of the
tatmadaw
’s leaders, it was the violent suppression of the Saffron Revolution.

The violent suppression of the Saffron Revolution, which as noted was neither saffron nor a revolution, was the watershed that has probably destroyed the legitimacy of the junta because it struck at the primordial Buddhist values of the Burman population. Named after the traditional color of the Buddhist monk’s robes (which are no longer saffron but a dull reddish brown) and named in line with the orange, rose, and other multicolored democracy revolutions in other countries, the demonstrations by Buddhist monks was significant in itself, but it was also significant in that this violent suppression was seen live on television by many urban Burmese, those tens of thousands who have satellite television dishes. For the first time in Burmese history, violent suppression by the state was not simply a matter of rumor but was palpably visible. The violence was further spread through videos posted on the Internet. Even the military, whose leadership is devoutly Buddhist, may have been conflicted by the actions the junta authorized.

The immediate spark was economic—the August 15 government-mandated abrupt rise in the price of gasoline and energy. The causes, however, are far more profound and reflect the pent-up frustration so evident throughout the country that occasionally boils over (as in 1974, 1988). When the military raised the price of energy overnight without warning, its immediate effect was on the poor. Buses raised fares the poor could not afford. Around the world such changes, often advocated by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have led to demonstrations and riots. Buddhist monks had noted that people could no longer donate the usual amount of food to the monasteries because of economic deprivation, and some were bringing children to temples and asking the monks to feed them because the families could no longer do so. Monks in Pakokku in central Myanmar demonstrated on September 5 and were roughed up by the military, who refused to apologize.

The demonstrations then moved to Rangoon, where thousands of young monks marched quietly through the streets without political slogans (some even by Aung San Suu Kyi’s house on September 22, a remarkable event), flanked by students and youth who were to protect them. As the demonstrations grew with some 50,000 marching on September 24, they became more political, and even the flying peacock flag of the NLD was seen. The junta stepped in and violently beat the monks and demonstrators on September 26 and followed up by raiding local monasteries, closing a few of them, and making night raids on the homes of those they believed were supporters of the demonstrations. While the United Nations says that 31 persons died, some foreign accounts say 100 died. A Japanese photographer was shot dead, creating tensions between the two states. On October 11, the UN Security Council issued a presidential statement call for restraint and the early release of political prisoners. ASEAN issued a statement that it was “appalled” by the use of automatic weapons against the
sangha
.

The military was bent on denying the public outcry. It is unlikely that many of the military themselves believed the
state’s explanation that those monks demonstrating were “bogus,” incited by the imperialists (the United States) and their perfidious minions, together with the opposition. Because foreign observers have limited access to the military hierarchy, they can only surmise through indirect or surrogate evidence that the crackdown and later the cyclone led to any significant cracks, splits, or fissures in the junta and its associates. Differences in personalities and programs have been evident for some time, but as we have seen, such issues do not necessarily result in open, public splits. The military may recognize that open fissures in the
tatmadaw
could lead to chaos (which the military always invokes as one of its constant fears) and/or the end of military rule.