Camelot's Court: Inside the Kennedy White House (57 page)

Chapter 8: “If We Listen to Them, None of Us Will Be Alive”

279  
And Schlesinger in particular
: Schlesinger,
Journals
, 156–61.

280  
In the summer of 1962
:
FRUS: Vietnam, 1962
, 484–97, 506–10, 541.

280  
Kennedy was reluctant
: Ibid., 543–46; Gibbons,
The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War
, 12–21.

280  
At the end of July:
FRUS: Vietnam, 1962
, 546–56; Shapley,
Promise and Power
, 160–61.

281  
In August, the State Department
:
FRUS: Vietnam, 1962
, 581, 583–84.

282  
In September, Kennedy sent
: Dallek,
Unfinished Life
, 495–500, 506–17.

283  
Aside from conversations:
Branch,
Parting the Waters
, 656–70; Schlesinger,
Robert Kennedy
, 315–16; Dallek,
Unfinished Life
, 514–18.

283  
While Kennedy temporarily fixed
:
FRUS: Vietnam, 1962
, 636–41, 660; Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings
, vol. 2, 165, 169.

284  
No one close to Kennedy
:
New York Times
, Aug. 19, 28, 1962; Oct. 9, 1962;
FRUS: Vietnam, 1962
, 596–601.

285  
Joe Mendenhall
:
FRUS: Vietnam, 1962
, 649–50, 661–62, 671–72.

286  
At the center of the administration’s
: Ibid., 679, 687.

287  
While the administration struggled
:
FRUS: Cuba, 1961–1962,
947–49; Poole,
History of the Joint Chiefs
, 159–60.

287  
John McCone
: Halberstam,
Best and Brightest
, 152–53.

288  
The minute McCone saw evidence
:
FRUS: Cuba, 1961–1962
, 947, 950, 955, 957.

289  
Roger Hilsman
: Halberstam,
Best and Brightest
, 123, 190;
FRUS: Cuba, 1961–1962
, 963–66, 968, 1045, n. 1; Michael Forrestal, OH, JFKL; Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings
, vol. 1, 130–31.

290  
In trying to mute speculation
:
FRUS: Cuba
, 1004, 1052, 1070–71.

290  
When news of the Soviet buildup
:
FRUS: Cuba
, 1002–1003; JFK Press Conference, Sept. 13, 1962, available online.

290  
As with CIA and military
: See Matthias Uhl and Vladimir I. Ivkin, “‘Operation Atom’: The Soviet Union’s Stationing of Nuclear Missiles in the German Democratic Republic, 1959,”
Bulletin: Cold War History Project
(Fall/Winter, 2001): 299–306. Also see Dallek,
Unfinished Life
, note for p. 537 on p. 787, recounting my conversation with Raymond L. Garthoff, March 19, 2002;
FRUS: Cuba
, 1083–84.

292  
At the beginning of October:
Foreign Relations of the United States: Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 13–15; Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings
, vol. 2, 393–95; McGeorge Bundy, OH, JFKL; Widmer,
Listening In
, 77.

293  
Kennedy was convinced
: Dallek,
Unfinished Life,
538, 544;
FRUS: Cuba, 1961–1962
, 1047;
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 28.

293  
The result shocked Kennedy
: Bird,
Color of Truth
, 226–27; Goldstein,
Lessons on Disaster
, 72–73; McNamara,
In Retrospect
, 32, 117; Schlesinger,
Journals
, 171–72; Thomas,
Robert Kennedy
, 209.

295  
The presence of the missiles
:
Robert Kennedy in His Own Words
, 14–16.

296  
Shortly before noon
: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings
, vol. 2, 397, n. 10, 409–11, 413–14; Jacqueline Kennedy,
Historic Conversations
, 273, n. 73, 274, 276, 278.

297  
Bundy, acting CIA director
:
Presidential Recordings
, Vol. 2, 399–402, 407–11, 413, 423.

299  
Listening to the discussion
: Ibid., 404–407, 411–13, 416, 421;
Robert Kennedy in His Own Words
, 38, 44; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali,
“One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964
(New York: Norton, 1997), 214.

300  
During the meeting
,
Bobby
: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. 2, 416, 425.

301  
In the five hours before the group
: Ibid., 427–28;
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 45–47, 49, n., 100.

302  
The same group of advisers
: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings
, vol. 2, 429–33.

302  
Rusk and Martin now weighed in
: Ibid., 433–35.

303  
Unwilling to decide
: Ibid., 435–39. On McNamara and nuclear weapons, see Shapley,
Promise and Power
, 119–20; McNamara,
In Retrospect
, 345; Robert S. McNamara,
Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy
(New York: PublicAffairs, 1999), 158–59.

304  
Kennedy’s hard line
: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. 2, 439–43.

305  
Yet he could not discount
: Ibid., vol. 2, 444–47.

305  
McNamara didn’t think the timing
: Ibid, vol. 2, 448–50, 468–69. On RFK and Bolshakov, see Fursenko and Naftali,
“One Hell of a Gamble,”
109–14; Robert F. Kennedy,
Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis
(New York: Norton, 1968), 19–22, 26–27; Isaiah Berlin, OH, JFKL.

307  
After Kennedy left:
Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings
, vol. 2, 463–65.

308  
The recorded conversations
: For Stevenson’s letter, see
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 101–102; Dallek,
Unfinished Life
, 576.

309  
By Thursday morning
: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings
, vol. 2, 512–15.

310  
As the advisers convened
: Ibid., vol. 2, 516, 521–24.

310  
McNamara was more supportive
: Ibid., vol. 2, 525–29.

311  
Kennedy was not convinced
: Ibid., vol. 2, 528–29, 541, 550, 552.

311  
If Kennedy needed support
: For a portrait of Bohlen, see Isaacson and Thomas,
The Wise Men
; Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings
, vol. 2, 524–25;
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 96–97, 107.

312  
Bohlen’s departure:
Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings
, vol. 2, 515, n. 20;
Robert Kennedy in His Own Words
, 18.

313  
Kennedy was also content to have
: On Thompson, see Taubman,
Khrushchev
, 397, 449–50, 458; Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings
, vol. 2, 532–35, 539, 547–49.

314  
After two days of discussion
: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings
, vol. 2, 557, 563, 565, 567–68.

314  
A series of evening meetings
: Ibid., vol. 2, 572–77.

315  
It is striking that Kennedy
: Dallek,
Unfinished Life
, 92–94, 517; Reeves,
President Kennedy
, 363.

315  
The meeting confirmed his assumption
: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings
, vol. 2, 580–98.

317  
Kennedy was also angry
: Schlesinger,
Robert Kennedy
, 511.

317  
While Kennedy had concluded
: Sorensen,
Kennedy
, 692;
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 116–22.

318  
Despite his show of confidence
: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. 2, 600–01;
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 126–36, 141–51, 162–63.

319  
On Monday, October 22
:
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 153, 157–63.

319  
The initial Soviet response
: Ibid., 170–71, 174–75.

319  
That evening, at the end
: Ibid., 177; Robert Kennedy,
Thirteen Days
, 49, 98.

320  
October 24 was a day
:
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 177; Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. 3, 183–85; Fursenko and Naftali,
“One Hell of a Gamble,”
258; Robert Kennedy,
Thirteen Days
, 52; Schlesinger,
Robert Kennedy
, 514.

321  
There were also hopeful signs
: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. 3, 188, 191, 196–97, 209–10.

321  
Yet the crisis was far from over
: Ibid., 197; Shapley,
Promise and Power
, 176–78.

322  
But even if Kennedy:
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 174–75, 185–87.

322  
But Schlesinger passed along:
Ibid., 187–88, 198.

323  
Kennedy sent his reply:
Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. 3, 232–81;
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 210–12, 224–26, 232.

324  
On Friday morning
: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings
, vol. 3, 286, 297–302, 309–10, 313, 317, 321, 323, 328.

324  
If he had to resort
: Ibid., 346–48.

325  
Meanwhile, all this talk
: Ibid., 331–36; Fursenko and Naftali,
“One Hell of a Gamble,”
259–60, 263–65.

325  
And then at about nine
:
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 235–40.

326  
Although an end to the crisis
: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings
, vol. 3, 356–87.

327  
The discussion continued
: Ibid., vol. 3, 387–483, especially 387–400 and 427–28. For JFK to NK, Oct. 27, 1962,
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 268–69.

328  
The letter was to be hand-delivered
: Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings
, vol. 3, 483–88.

328  
Kennedy had ample reason
:
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 275.

329  
Kennedy was spared
: Fursenko and Naftali,
“One Hell of a Gamble,”
283–87; Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings
, vol. 3, 512–17.

329  
Kennedy and his civilian advisers:
Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings
, vol. 3, 517–18
;
Mimi Alford,
Once Upon a Secret
, 93–96; Jacqueline Kennedy,
Historic Conversations
, 236, 262–63; Isaiah Berlin, OH, JFKL; Michael Beschloss,
The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963
(New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 544. JFK’s remark to Galbraith is quoted by Sheldon Stern, “Noam Chomsky and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Oct. 18, 2012, History News Network, online. JFK to McNamara, Nov. 5, 1962, Box 274, National Security File, JFKL; Poole,
History of the Joint Chiefs
, 183–85.

331  
What lessons did Kennedy
: Schlesinger,
Robert Kennedy
, 507; Schlesinger,
Thousand Days
, 831; Jacqueline Kennedy,
Historic Conversations
, 254, 271; Zelikow, May, and Naftali, eds.,
Presidential Recordings
, vol. 3, 518;
Robert Kennedy in His Own Words
, 18, 420. Also see James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch,
Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), 249, 352–56, on the likelihood of a nuclear exchange.

333  
Bobby should have included
: Anatoly Dobrynin,
In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986)
(New York: Times Books/Random House, 1995), 78–79, 84–93.

Chapter 9: “Mankind Must Put an End to War”

335  
In December 1962:
Gallup, vol. 3:
The Gallup Poll, 1959–1971
, 1793, 1796, 1798–99, 1810; Meyer Feldman to JFK, Aug. 15, 1963, POF; O’Donnell and Powers,
Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye
, 13; PPP: JFK, 1963, 828; Schlesinger,
Journals
, 185.

336  
Only Vietnam cast a shadow
:
FRUS: Vietnam, 1962,
750–51, 757–58, 761, 763–65, 789–96.

337  
After visiting Vietnam
: Ibid., 779–87, 797–98; Halberstam,
Best and Brightest
, 205–08; Gibbons,
The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War
, 131.

338  
A front-page
New York Times
story:
Gibbons,
The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War
, 132–34; O’Donnell and Powers,
Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye
, 15; David Kaiser,
American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson and the Origins of the Vietnam War
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 180;
New York Times
, Dec. 3, 1962.