Camelot's Court: Inside the Kennedy White House (58 page)

339  
In public, he tried to maintain
: JFK Press Conference, Dec. 12, 1962, JFKL.

339  
Events in January
:
FRUS: Vietnam, Jan.–Aug., 1963
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 1–3; Roger Hilsman,
To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy
(New York: Dell, 1968), 447–49.

340  
Because Mansfield’s report
: Hilsman,
To Move a Nation
, 453–54;
FRUS: Vietnam, 1963,
3–4, n. 1, 5, 49–50, 52, 60.

341  
Kennedy at once read
: Ibid., 63, 73, 89–91, 94–95, 97–98. On the tensions between the civilian and military advisers, see John M. Newman,
JFK and Vietnam
(New York: Warner Books, 1992), 305, 312–13.

342  
For the next three months:
PPP: JFK, 1963, 11, 20, 34, 243–44.

343  
While Kennedy stood aside, the debate
: David Halberstam,
The Making of a Quagmire
(New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), chapters 6 and 7. For the Wheeler quote, see Hilsman,
To Move a Nation
, 426.

344  
The argument in Washington and Saigon
:
FRUS: Vietnam, January–August 1963
, 105–06, 126–28, 132–33.

345  
The one thing policymakers
: Halberstam,
Making of a Quagmire
, 90.

345  
The U.S. military
: Ibid., 89–90.

346  
There were also dissenting voices
: Ibid., 93–101. Also see Neil Sheehan,
A Bright Shining Lie: America in Vietnam
(New York: Random House, 1988).

346  
The State Department also downplayed
:
FRUS: Vietnam, January–August 1963
, 161–62, 169–73, 189.

347  
Robert G. K. Thompson
: Ibid., 193, 198–200, 205, 207–13
.

348  
Still, Diem and the Nhus
: Ibid., 207–13, 222–25, 232–35, 243–46.

349  
By the spring of 1963
: Ibid., 256–58, 261–62, 265, 268, 270
;
taped conversation, May 7, 1963, JFKL.

349  
In May, if Kennedy needed
:
FRUS: Vietnam, January–August 1963
, 277–78, 283, 294–300, 303–05.

350  
Kennedy was caught between
:
New York Times
, May 5, 1963; JFK Press Conference, May 22, 1963; O’Donnell and Powers,
Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye
, 16. Also see Newman,
JFK and Vietnam
, 319–25, who argues that Kennedy was playing a double game: talking in public about winning the war, while using it as a cover to withdraw under the guise of victory.

351  
Because Kennedy had lost
:
FRUS: Vietnam, January–August 1963
, 316–24.

351  
Pressure to dump Diem
:
New York Times
, June 9, 14, 16, 1963;
FRUS: Vietnam, January–August 1963
, 362–64, 366–69, 374, 377–78, 381–83.

352  
Rusk’s warning to Diem
: Dallek,
Unfinished Life,
594–606.

355  
Despite Kennedy’s injunction
:
FRUS: Vietnam, January–August 1963,
386–87, n. 5, 393–95, 405–09, 413–15;
New York Times
, June 14, 1963.

356  
Kennedy’s eagerness
:
FRUS: Arms Control
, 599–601;
Foreign Relations of the United States: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges, 1961–1963
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 204–05, 234–36, 238–40.

356  
Khrushchev’s response
:
FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges
, 238–39, 247–49, 253–55, 262–65; Seaborg,
Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban
, 178–81, 184–85.

357  
Although Khrushchev clearly:
Seaborg,
Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban
, 193–95; PPP: JFK, 1963, 80.

357  
Prime Minister Macmillan
:
FRUS: Arms Control
, 655–58, 676–78, 683–87, 693–99.

358  
On May 30, Kennedy
: Ibid., 707–08;
Saturday Review of Literature,
Nov. 7, 1964; Norman Cousins,
The Improbable Triumvirate: John F. Kennedy, Pope John, Nikita Khrushchev
(New York: Norton, 1972), 111–20.

359  
Cousins’s urgings
: Sorensen,
Kennedy
, 821–26; PPP: JFK, 1963, 459–64;
FRUS: Arms Control
, 710–14; Dallek,
Unfinished Life
, 618–21.

360  
But Castro
: The documents covering the discussions in November about the IL-28s are in
FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges
; JFK’s quote is on 223; and
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
. For an excellent summary of the dispute, see Fursenko and Naftali,
“One Hell of a Gamble,”
290–310.

361  
Yet Kennedy could not ignore
:
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 379–80, 394, 499, 548, 574, 582–83.

362  
For many of Kennedy’s advisers
: Ibid., 587–89, 597, 608. See Russell D. Hoffman, “The Effects of Nuclear Weapons,” online, 1999, who cites the 1962 Air Force pamphlet;
Robert Kennedy in His Own Words
, 247–48; Schlesinger,
Thousand Days
, 337–38; taped conversation, Dec. 5, 1962, POF, JFKL.

363  
On December 27
: JFK Conference with Joint Chiefs, Dec. 27, 1962, Box 345, National Security File, JFKL.

364  
Two days later, Kennedy spoke
: Richard Goodwin, “President Kennedy’s Plan for Peace with Cuba,”
New York Times
, July 5, 2000;
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 635–36; O’Donnell and Powers,
Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye
, 276–77; Schlesinger,
Robert Kennedy
, 535–38; Lawrence Freedman,
Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 225–26; Jacqueline Kennedy,
Historic Conversations
, 193–94.

365  
There were good reasons
:
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 648–51.

365  
Kennedy liked Bundy’s plan
: Ibid., 658–62, 665.

366  
Kennedy wanted
: Ibid., 666–68, 670–75; and Schlesinger,
Robert Kennedy
, 538.

366  
Kennedy was torn
:
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 668–69, 681–88.

367  
At an NSC meeting
: Ibid., 681–94, 698–99, 708–10.

369  
By March, Kennedy:
Ibid., 713–18; RFK to JFK, March 14, 1963, Box 35, Theodore Sorensen Papers, JFKL; Schlesinger,
Robert Kennedy
, 538–39; Thomas,
Robert Kennedy
, 239.

370  
But he had limited control
:
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 728, 732–34.

371  
The raids opened a new round
: Ibid., 739–43.

372  
Under pressure from the CIA and the Florida
: Ibid., 748–54. Also see Taubman,
Khrushchev
, 578–81.

373  
Had Kennedy’s advisers:
Gallup,
The Gallup Poll, 1959–1971
, 1993, 1800, 1807, 1811, 1815.

373  
In response to all the cross pressures
:
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 754–56, 759–60; Bundy,
Danger and Survival
, 462.

374  
On the same day Kennedy wrote
:
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis,
761–64.

375  
The discussion of how to deal with Castro
: Ibid., 780, 791, 795–97, 802–04, 814, 821–23.

376  
And so the CIA just continued
: Ibid., 822, 828–34, 837–38, 842–45, 851. McCone’s warning is in recently released material in the RFK Papers, JFKL.

Chapter 10: “The Two of You Did Visit the Same Country, Didn’t You?”

379  
In the second half of 1963
: Widmer,
Listening In
, 86, 208–09.

380  
Kennedy sent a stellar delegation
: Schlesinger,
Thousand Days
, 902–09.

380  
The more difficult battle:
Taubman,
Khrushchev,
603.

381  
Kennedy’s principal problem
: Poole,
History of the Joint Chiefs
, 102–04; JFK–Mike Mansfield telephone conversation, Aug. 12, 1963, JFKL; Bernard J. Firestone, “Kennedy and the Test Ban: Presidential Leadership and Arms Control,” in Douglas Brinkley and Richard T. Griffiths, eds.,
John F. Kennedy and
Europe
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 82–85.

382  
Bringing the Chiefs to support
: Poole,
History of the Joint Chiefs
, 104–05; telephone conversations: JFK-LeMay, July 19, 1963; JFK-Rusk, July 24, 1963; JFK-Truman, July 26, 1963; JFK-Fulbright, Aug. 23, 1963, JFKL; Firestone, “Kennedy and the Test Ban,” 88–93.

383  
As he was winning his fight
:
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 837–38, 848, 853.

383  
Still, no matter how much
: Ibid., 861–63.

384  
Despite Kennedy’s plea
: Ibid., 864–65.

384  
Kennedy, supported by Bundy and McNamara
: Schlesinger,
Robert Kennedy,
551–52;
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 868–70.

385  
The CIA immediately countered
: Ibid., 871–73
.

385  
At the same time, Kennedy saw
: Ibid., 875–77; Poole,
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
,
1961–1964
, 184.

386  
Ending agitation about Cuba
:
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 877.

386  
Still, the president, Bobby
: Schlesinger,
Robert Kennedy
, 552–53;
Robert Kennedy in His Own Words
, 376.

387  
On October 31, Attwood
:
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 879–83, especially 882.

388  
Like Castro, Kennedy found
: Schlesinger,
Robert Kennedy
, 553–54;
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis
, 883–89.

389  
Castro was not
:
Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1963
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office 1964), 872–77; Schlesinger,
Robert Kennedy
, 554–56; Dallek
Unfinished Life
, 662–63.

391  
Pressure on Diem to settle:
FRUS: Vietnam, January–August 1963
, 432, 447–49, 451–53.

392  
What was Kennedy supposed to believe
:
New York Times
, July 3, 1963;
FRUS: Vietnam,
455–56, 465–66, 470–78, 481.

393  
At a July 17 press conference
: JFK Press Conference, July 17, 1963.

393  
At the end of July
:
FRUS: Vietnam, January–August 1963,
541–43.

394  
On August 5, when the press
: Ibid., 553–55, 557–60.

394  
On August 15, Kennedy met
: Ibid., 567; JFK–Henry Cabot Lodge taped conversation, Aug. 15, 1963, Tape 104/A40, JFKL.

395  
Kennedy, of course, could not control:
New York Times
, Aug. 15, 1963;
FRUS: Vietnam, January–August 1963
, 584, 589.

395  
For all his antagonism:
Robert Kennedy in His Own Words
, 161–65; Reeves,
President Kennedy
, 363;
FRUS: Vietnam
, 585–88, 590–91
.

395  
On August 21, when reports
: Tape 106/A41, Aug. 21, 1963, JFKL;
FRUS: Vietnam,
598–602, 604–05.

396  
Embassy dispatches
:
FRUS: Vietnam
, 611–14, 620–25
.

397  
On August 24, Forrestal
: Ibid., 625–26, 628–31. On the controversy, see Gibbons,
The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War
, 148–50.

397  
On August 26, Kennedy met
: Tape 107/A42, Aug. 26, 1963, JFKL;
FRUS
: Vietnam, 638–41.

398  
While the White House debated
: Ibid., 647, 649.

399  
But the problem of what to do
: Ibid., 650, n. 6, 653, 658–59.

399  
The 4
P.M.
meeting
: Ibid., 659–65; tape 107/A42, Aug. 27, 1963, JFKL.

400  
The struggle over how to proceed
:
FRUS: Vietnam, January–August 1963
, 668, 670–72.

400  
Meanwhile, back in Washington
:
FRUS: Vietnam, August–December 1963
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 1–9; tapes 107/A42, 108, and 108/A43, all Aug. 28, 1963; Schlesinger,
Robert Kennedy
, 713–14.

401  
At the evening meeting
:
FRUS: Vietnam, August–December 1963
, 12–17.

402  
During all this debate
: Schlesinger,
Thousand Days,
968–73.

403  
The pressure on Kennedy
:
FRUS: Vietnam, August–December 1963,
20–31, 35.

403  
The problem, however
: Ibid., 38, 53, 55, 63–64, 66, 76, 78–79.

404  
Later that morning, at another
: Gibbons,
The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War
, 160–61;
FRUS: Vietnam, Aug–Dec. 1963,
69–74. The mea culpas of McNamara and Bundy are respectively in McNamara,
In Retrospect
, and Goldstein,
Lessons in Disaster
. Interview with McGeorge Bundy, Sept. 25, 1993.