Chanakya's New Manifesto: To Resolve the Crisis Within India (18 page)

This ethical deficit is explicable because an extreme form of individualism is inherent to the way we negotiate the world around us. The goal in the Hindu way of life (as also in the religions inspired by it) is individual moksha or salvation, not collective redemption. A devotee will donate to a temple as part of a private transaction with the divine. His concern is self-centric, and rarely oriented towards societal well-being or the welfare of the larger community. Thus, whatever is projected as the larger public good is immediately put through the prism of personal return.

Paradoxically, even while guiltlessly accepting a corrupt personal world, we set great store by izzat or respectability. We genuinely believe that we are morally superior beings despite our expedient behaviour. This also explains, of course, why we moralize so easily. In any case, especially in traditional Hinduism, almost any personal wrong can be washed away by ritual expiation. The Hindu gods are benevolent, infinitely forgiving, easily mollified, and eminently bribable.

For the corrupt it is comforting that people at large, while critical of corruption in public affairs, admire the dividends it yields. The power and pelf it brings to an individual often benefits members of his extended kin and community who are not too finicky about whether the largesse is tainted or not. At the same time, the display of lavish lifestyles and money power attracts more appreciation and envy than opprobrium. But this lasts only so long as the person is not publicly caught. Then, the same approving acceptance, even condoning, of wrongdoing quickly turns to denigration. Such behaviour directly corresponds to the duality in our attitude to corruption: publicly wrong, privately right. Criminal indictment effectively enforced is, therefore, dreaded by the wrongdoer, because s/he loses respectability—very important in the Indian context—and the comfort zone of a support group which now begins to frantically distance itself from him or her.

It is true that the corrupt are very rarely brought quickly and firmly to book. This, in the context of the pervasiveness of corrupt practices, fosters two convenient—and deliberately nurtured—beliefs. The first is that nobody ever gets caught for being corrupt; the second is that everybody is corrupt. The former emboldens people to
be
corrupt. The risk is taken away from unethical conduct. There are hardly any public examples of those who have been punished for corruption. While, on the contrary, there are countless examples of those who flourish on account of it. The logical inference is ethically lethal and creates the ideological justification for misdemeanour: if to be corrupt, in small or big ways, is the norm, then why should anyone lose too much sleep about doing what everybody else is? In fact, those who do not follow the norm are considered impractical deviants, otherworldly idealists, suffering in their world of irrelevant utopianism.

It is a combination of all the above reasons which explains why, despite having before them a role model like Mahatma Gandhi who was honest to the point of obsession, India and Indians are predisposed to be corrupt. In fact, a lot of Indians still cannot quite comprehend the personal austerity of Gandhi. His imperviousness to the temptations of the material world has left us awed, but unconverted. We admire his ability to restrict his wants, but are not prepared to emulate him. His ashrams are a place of curiosity, not of inspiration. He is revered because he could renounce the lure of monetary benefit, something Indians don’t expect anyone to do. He is looked up to as a Mahatma because in his denial and sacrifice he was so different, so unlike everyone else. Moreover, his personal standards were so high that most people gave up even trying to be like him. Unfortunately, the pendulum then swung to the other extreme: since it was not possible to be like him, it was all right to be completely unlike him on questions of morality.

In addition to this quirk of the Indian psyche, corruption is encouraged by the institutional functioning of our public systems—the discretionary powers that officials have been entrusted with, absence of accountability, abundance of opaque and deliberately convoluted laws, license-permit-quota raj, dilatory judicial system, pervasive presence of the corrupt state and its predatory inspectors, and, above all, the umbilical cord between the political establishment and black money. All these have contributed to making corruption a way of life in this country, especially in the public sphere. The system is such that even those who want to be honest have little option but to compromise their morals.

Given the psyche of Indians—a product as much of thousands of years of cultural evolution as of our more recent history as a nation—it is essential that we are unsentimentally clear about what our behavioural responses to corruption are likely to be. These responses can be briefly summed up as follows:

Moral exhortation will not work as a means to eliminate or reduce corruption. A person perceived to be scrupulously honest, such as Anna Hazare, will be admired not emulated. His influence may succeed in curbing the dishonesty of some, but the impact of his movement to curb corruption will remain partial or marginal.

If the opportunity exists, or can be created, Indians will more likely than not succumb to corruption. This predisposition to moral turpitude is ascribable, as we have seen, both to a value system and circumstances. In an exceptionally competitive world, where opportunities are scarce and for every success story there are innumerable failures, any anti-corruption measure which bases itself on the robustness of individual character will fail. Conversely, any steps which are systemic and seek to overarch individual choice, by taking into account the fault lines in individual behaviour, are likely to succeed.

Fear of discovery and conviction is the most potent inhibitor of corrupt proclivities. The near certainty of quick, firm and exemplary deterrent punishment in which the fruits of corruption are liable to be seized, in addition to the loss of face that will ensue as a result of conviction and incarceration, is a powerful disincentive. If corruption becomes a matter of great risk, where the odds are heavily stacked against perpetrators, it is likely we will behave ourselves.

Thus,
Chanakya’s New Manifesto
states:

3.1      Laws against dishonest behaviour cannot be based on abstract notions of idealism and a lofty code of conduct.

3.2      Gandhiji’s unblemished personal idealism perhaps made us believe that individuals will voluntarily make the correct moral choice. However, the decades after 1947 have incontrovertibly proven that unless the systemic architecture to prevent corruption is strong and unyielding, individual choices are likely to be corrupt, amoral or downright immoral. Our efforts to root out corruption must, therefore, be system-centric, not individually focused.

3.3      Piecemeal solutions will not suffice as they will only result in the corrupt figuring out new ways to be dishonest. To counter this, any measures that are taken need to get to the heart of the problem while ensuring deterrence that is uncompromising and swift. At the same time, the complexity and widespread nature of the problem should lead us to be realistic in our response. To try and do too much too quickly will inevitably lead to failure. It is better to think clearly; concentrate on specific areas of action.

3.4      After careful consideration, it is suggested that our attempt to eradicate corruption be concentrated on five key areas. These include reform of the funding and financial accountability of political parties, and the political system; the neutral infusion of technology into as many areas as possible where the common man has to deal with government; the elaboration and finalization of a model legal framework ensuring transparency and fair play in all laws relating to the disposal or acquisition of national resources and government procurement processes; and the institution of deterrent action in a time-bound and exemplary manner for all acts of corruption. This, in turn, presupposes substantive judicial reforms; and, the creation of an independent and effective Lokpal or ombudsman.

3.5      As is abundantly clear, corruption in the funding and expenses of political parties is the fountainhead of much of the corruption in the country. Measures to deal with this have been discussed at length in the chapter on democracy. It is a fact that corruption can never be eliminated in the country until substantive reform takes place in this arena. The first major step in this direction must be the passage of effective legislation on electoral reforms.

3.6      The neutral intervention of technology severs the role of the human intermediary in the interface between the citizen and the government.

3.7      The role of technology is essential because the presumption must be that, in its absence, unaccountable and unmonitored discretionary powers will be misused by officials for corrupt purposes. This is not a cynical approach. For the reasons explained earlier, and based on verifiable experience, this presumption is valid most of the time.

3.8      It is common knowledge that ordinary citizens seeking their due in terms of caste, birth, marriage and domicile certificates, electricity connections, voter’s cards, ration cards, copies of land records, income certificates, driving licence renewals, etc. suffer the most because of the extortionate practices of venal officials. Technology, which short-circuits this vicious nexus, is a key ally in the fight against corruption.

3.9      The efficacy of using technology to overarch corruption is proven. Earlier, touts in cahoots with clerks, demanded and received bribes for as simple a thing as train reservations. Today, online reservations for rail and air travel have eliminated such unscrupulous intermediaries. The same effect can be seen in the online refund of taxes, and the application for passports. In many cities, including Delhi, the payment of property tax provided a rich opportunity to bribe takers. Now, their role has been nullified by a clearly defined self-assessment scheme allowing for payments to be made by an online portal or through banks. Such examples can be multiplied.

  3.10  It is imperative therefore that, through the enabling legislation of the union government, all states mandatorily adopt a Right to Public Services (RTPS) Act immediately. This act, even allowing for variations in each state, must have the following compulsory elements: clearly identified services encompassing as many areas as feasible where the ordinary citizen needs to interact with the government; multiple modalities, including online access, to apply for or to avail of these services; a clear-cut time frame for the services to be rendered by a clearly designated authority; not more than one appellate authority for the final disposal of the service requested and a specified time frame for disposal by the appellate authority; a computerized tracking method to monitor the status of each application; in case of failure to deliver, exemplary deterrent punishment for the official responsible for providing the service; annual evaluation by a third party of the working of the act.

  3.11  As many as thirteen states have attempted, with varying measures of success, to introduce and implement such an act. Only two states, M.P. and Bihar, have achieved appreciable success. The fight against corruption cannot allow for such a haphazard, uneven and incomplete approach to the adoption of a tool of such pivotal importance.

  3.12  M.P. and Bihar have made noteworthy progress because the Madhya Pradesh Public Services Guarantee Act, 2010 and the Bihar Right to Public Services Act, 2011 incorporate, to a great degree, the essentials mentioned above. A specific department (in the case of M.P.) and a specially created agency (in the case of Bihar) have been earmarked to implement the act; the notified services have been selected carefully to cover the maximum needs of citizens; apart from online access, multiple facilities including offline and public service counters have been set up at all block offices, district collectorates and other government offices; standardized formats for applications have been worked out with streamlined and clear-cut procedures; call centres and a voice response system (VRS) have been installed to clarify the queries of citizens; the penalty provisions for the erring official are exemplary, starting from
250 per day for delay or failure to deliver, and going up to a maximum of
5,000; an important innovation is that the amount by which the non-compliant official will be penalized is the same as the amount offered in compensation to the aggrieved applicant; an extensive ICT based online tracking system has been set up as a monitoring mechanism.