Chanakya's New Manifesto: To Resolve the Crisis Within India (17 page)

2.73  Ultimately, the issue of inner party democracy is not something that can be codified through rules written in stone. It has to be fostered by the political leadership of each party.

2.74  Finally, there is the issue of the conduct of politicians within Parliament. Parliament cannot continue to function as it currently does with its proceedings frequently held hostage by the members. The entire agenda of governance is derailed by its repeated adjournments. The nation, and particularly its youth, feels a deep sense of alienation from democracy itself when they see the behaviour of our MPs and legislators in Parliament and the state assemblies. Much of the nonsense that goes on in our various legislative chambers can be sorted if the presiding officers exercise the powers that are vested in them. The speaker of the Lok Sabha is invested with wide-ranging disciplinary powers. S/he decides when a member speaks and for how long; s/he can ask a member to discontinue his or her speech; s/he decides what should not go on the record; s/he can direct a member to withdraw from the house for a specific period; any member who flouts the speaker’s orders or directions can be named by the speaker, and in such cases may have to withdraw from the house; s/he is the guardian of the rights and privileges of the house; it is the speaker’s sole discretion to refer any question of privilege to the Committee of Privileges for examination, investigation and report; s/he can issue warrants to execute the orders of the house; s/he decides on Points of Order; the speaker’s rulings regarding interpretation of constitutional provisions relating to the house or Rules of Procedure are binding; the ‘directions’ which s/he issues on Rules of Procedure are generally treated as sacrosanct; the security of the tenure of the speaker’s office is protected since s/he can be removed only through a resolution of the house passed by a majority, only on specific charges, and not just imputations or interpretations; the speaker’s salary and allowances are not voted upon but are charged to the Consolidated Fund of India. In short, s/he represents the honour and dignity of the house, and has the powers to enforce them.

2.75  The powers of the chairperson of the Rajya Sabha, and of the presiding officers of state chambers, are similar.

2.76  With such powers at hand, why do presiding officers not exercise them to maintain the discipline and decorum of the house? Perhaps the slide into parliamentary chaos over the years is due to the lack of any presiding officer taking a resolute stand to stem it. Moreover, it has often been the case in the past that the speaker of the Lok Sabha has been a possible candidate for upward elevation, to the post of vice president or president. This factor is even more obvious in the case of the chairperson of the Rajya Sabha who is also the vice-president of the country. When such ambitions are at stake it is understandable—but for the sake of the country not condonable—if both the incumbents of these posts do not wish to alienate members through tough but valid responses to unacceptable behaviour.

2.77  Whatever the reasons, the time has come to take some clear-cut and resolute decisions with regard to the proper functioning of our Parliament and state assemblies.

2.78  To begin with, any member who flouts the rules or breaks the decorum of the house should, after being warned, be named by the presiding officer and asked to withdraw from the house.

2.79  Any member, who has been asked to withdraw from the house on three occasions at any time in the course of the life of the house, should be suspended from the house. The duration of suspension would be for the balance period of the session, during which the suspended member would not be entitled to any allowances or benefits that would otherwise have accrued to him or her as a member of the house.

2.80  If a member who has been suspended, again infringes the rules or established decorum of the house in a manner sufficient to attract the notice of the presiding officer, s/he should be disqualified from membership of the house for the balance period of the life of the house, or three years, whichever is more.

2.81  No member shall enter the well of the house. This has become routine practice now and is a blatant violation of the rules and decorum of the house. Such behaviour is not about the expression of democratic freedoms but contempt of democratic practices. Any member who violates this absolute injunction should be expelled for the balance period of the life of the house.

2.82  Apart from misbehaviour which is defined in the rules of the house, for which responses by presiding officers are suggested above, any act of vandalism or physical violence in the house by any member will attract immediate expulsion for the entire balance period of the life of the house or three years, whichever is more.

2.83  The house should never be adjourned. Parliament functions on the taxpayer’s money and is expected to complete in an orderly manner its prescribed number of sittings in order to fulfil the mandate for which the people elected its members. In mature democracies Parliament is only ever adjourned in the event of a major crisis. If members wish to walk out of the house they are welcome to do so, but they cannot disrupt the proceedings or decorum of the house in order to force an adjournment. Those who do so must be dealt with in accordance with the suggestions made above.

2.84  The sanctity of Question Hour should be maintained at all times unless there are pressing reasons to suspend it for which the leader of the house and the Opposition leader should have approached the presiding officer in advance.

2.85  The nation expects reasoned debates of the highest calibre from its elected representatives. The Opposition must establish the validity of its point of view through the dignity and substance of debate and not through slogan shouting. The treasury benches’ response should be likewise.

2.86  Leaders of all political parties must give a written assurance to the presiding officer at the commencement of every session of Parliament or house that they will try and ensure that their members behave in strict conformity to the rules and decorum of the institution. If the members of any particular party are noticeable in their infringements of house decorum, the presiding officer should be entitled to hold the party’s leaders to account.

2.87  All these measures are within the existing powers of presiding officers and must be used to preserve the dignity and decorum of Indian democracy. If presiding officers, for partisan or personal reasons, neglect or do not carry out their responsibilities, they should be held accountable. It is for members of the house to decide on how to do so.

Democracy is a matter of pride for India. It is now time for us to rid ourselves of the distortions that have crept into the way our democratic institutions function; if the suggestions made above are implemented firmly, India’s democracy can once again fairly and effectively represent its constituents—the people of India.

CORRUPTION

Just as it is impossible not to taste honey or poison that one may find at the tip of one’s tongue, so it is impossible for one dealing with government funds not to taste, at least a little bit, of the king’s wealth.

Just as it is impossible to know when a fish moving in water is drinking it, so it is impossible to find out when government servants in charge of undertakings misappropriate money.

It is the power of punishment alone, when exercised impartially in proportion to the guilt, and irrespective of whether the person punished is the king’s son or enemy, that protects this world and the next.

The Arthashastra

It is time to ask ourselves why a nation which was led to freedom by a man of the unimpeachable rectitude of Mahatma Gandhi has become one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Is there something inherent in our character that allows us to tolerate, condone and encourage corruption? Are we as a nation ambivalent about the notion of right and wrong? Do we accept as normal the gulf between precept and practice? In short, are we as a people intrinsically predisposed to be corrupt?

The reasons these questions need to be asked is because no prescription for practicable change will work unless it bases itself on the actual psyche of a people. It must be calibrated according to the way a people are, the values they hold, and how they perceive a malaise; the incentives and disincentives that are likely to bring about change should also be worked out carefully.

Of course, corruption is not unique to India. What is unique is the level of its acceptance, and the ‘creative’ ways in which it is sustained. Indians do not subscribe to antiseptic notions of rectitude, as are common in, for example, the Scandinavian countries. Our understanding of right and wrong appears to be related far more to achieving whatever result is desired than to absolute notions of morality. To pay something to an official to lubricate the movement of a file is right if it smoothens the way to the desired goal. The payment of a bribe is routinely looked upon as a matter of judicious investment, not morality. No invocation to Lakshmi, the goddess of wealth, emphasizes the importance of making money only by conventionally legitimate ways. The goddess represents wealth and prosperity; she is worshipped for these, not for how that prosperity was arrived at.

In fact, for all the condemnation that corruption publicly provokes, Indians are ambivalent about the practice. They consider it bad when they have to bribe when they don’t want to; they consider it good if a bribe gets them what they want. In this sense, corruption is like litmus paper; it takes on the colour of the specific experience. The immorality associated with it is subsumed by an ingrained inclination to be worldly-wise. The world is not inherently fair; it does not guarantee a level playing field; the end is more important than the means. In such a paradigm, corruption is a consequence of a well-understood transaction: give to the world what is unavoidable, in order to get from it what you want; and take from it what it can give, in order to obtain for yourself what you desire. In a cut-throat world, the immediate task is to get on with the job, to reach the desired goal, to finesse an obstacle. The premium is on pragmatism and flexibility, to be able to seize an opportunity when it comes, and to profit when possible. What matters is not fixity of principle but clarity of purpose.

Ethics then do not have an absolute or unalterable definition in this country. A breach of morality is linked to circumstance, and certain deviations are considered acceptable if the circumstances so dictate. At least in Hinduism, there is no binding or universal code of conduct that gives unequivocal primacy to the moral dimension. ‘India has no developed indigenous ethical system—it has concentrated more on the mythical apprehension of an ultimate reality which transcends good and evil than on differentiating between good and evil acts.’
²²
Dharma is an undefined and ephemeral ideal, too subtle (sukshma
)
to be etched in stone—as Yudhishtira, the very symbol of integrity, himself says in the
Mahabharata
. In everyday life, it is in fact noteworthy for the exemptions it grants to correct behaviour as normally understood. A man can do no wrong if he acts to protect his svadharma, conduct that is right for his jati or station. He cannot be held accountable for actions that are a part of his ashramadharma, conduct that is appropriate to one’s stage in life. He cannot be penalized for transgressions made in the interests of kuladharma, conduct that is right for one’s family. And finally, almost anything he does would be justified in a situation of distress or emergency, when he is thought to be guided by his appadharma, conduct that is called for in a moment of crisis.

The essential point I’m trying to make is that Hindu tradition, for all its philosophical loftiness, has always allowed for a convenient response to the moral imperative. Ethics are conceptually grounded in a utilitarian framework where there are no uncontested definitions of right and wrong. The only consistent concern is the end result. In the pursuit of the desired goal, morality is not so much disowned as it is pragmatically devalued. ‘Hindu ethics has its public face—dharma, or normative rules—and its private wisdom, or pragmatic rules, to distinguish between the principles men espouse and the tactics they adopt.’
²³
The consequence of this is an expedient relativism, a willingness to compromise moral absolutes in the interests of personal gain or a ‘larger’ purpose. Success, in terms of status, power and money, matters. It subsumes moral niceties.

In such a world view, corruption is, remarkably enough, equated with a form of morally-neutral entrepreneurship. A businessman looks upon the payment of a bribe as part of the fixed cost he needs to incur to get over asphyxiating regulatory controls and a shamelessly extortionist bureaucracy, or a cost-effective means to buy immunity from wrongdoing. The payment is sometimes an inconvenience, but there are no startling moral issues involved in the transaction. Those accepting bribes consider the additional income a legitimate perk of the job. In fact, those who take graft and those who pay it are both ‘entrepreneurs’, bound by the same amoral motivation to use money in the most effective way. In this sense, the issue of corruption is entirely removed from the moral domain; it becomes simply a matter of costs, investments, return, tactics and profit.

It is for this reason that most Indians find no contradiction between corruption in their personal lives and condemnation of it in public. The realm of ethics is not a seamless whole, uniting private actions and public ideals. It is compartmentalized, with different yardsticks for both. This makes it possible, without the slightest psychological tension or burden of guilt, for us to express outrage about the menace of corruption and condone it where our own actions are concerned. Quite understandably, therefore, we are unable to comprehend the correlation between personal malfeasance and the larger public good. This also explains why we are adept at creating the best laws and institutions in theory while we go about routinely subverting them in practice.