CHAPTER 6. WHITE CAR SYNDROME
1
Nate Thayer and Susumu Awanohara, “Cambodia Takes a Bath,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
October 15, 1992, p. 56.
2
E.V.K. Fitzgerald, "The Economic Dimension of the Peace Process in Cambodia,” in Peter Utting, ed.,
Between Hope and Insecurity:The Social Consequences of the Cambodian Peace Process
(Geneva: UNRISD Report, 1994), p. 44.
4
In 1992 and 1993, 65 percent of all UN food aid in Cambodia went to returnees, though they made up just 4 percent of the population. W. Courtland Robinson,
“Something Like Home Again”: The Repatriation of Cambodian Refugees
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1994), p. 59.
5
William Branigin, “Missteps on the Path to Peace; Problems Mount and Budgets Soar,”
Washington Post,
September 22, 1992, p. A1.
6
The United States, which had made the largest commitment in Tokyo, had only delivered $14 million of its pledged $135 million. Japan, the second-largest donor, had coughed up just $9 million. Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 722 (1992), February 13, 1993, para. 31, p. 8.
7
Philip Shenon, “Most Cambodians See Nothing of Aid,”
New York Times,
February 21, 1993, sec. 1, p. 10.
8
Jarat Chopra, “United Nations Authority in Cambodia,” Watson Institute for International Studies Occasional Paper no. 15, 1994, p. 65.
9
When a UN spokesman was asked whether the entire Bulgarian force could be withdrawn, he acknowledged that they “behave in a manner that makes all of us blush,” but said they could not be repatriated because “it would be a terrible insult” to Bulgaria. William Branigin,“Tarnishing the U.N.’s Image in Cambodia; Bulgarians Chided for Monkey Business,”
Washington Post,
October 29, 1993, p. A33.
10
A health ministry study found that 77 percent of Cambodians did not know what a condom was. William Branigin, “Key Phases of UN Peace Operation in Cambodia Seen Breaking Down,”
Washington Post,
October 4, 1992, p. A33.
11
Report on Public Perceptions of UNTAC in the City of Phnom Penh, Information/Education Division Analysis Report, September 18, 1992, p. 102.
12
“French U.N. Army Commander Orders Brothels Removed,”Agence France-Presse, November 1, 1992.
13
Terry McCarthy, “Hot Tempers Rise on the Seamier Side,”
Independent,
October 19, 1992, p. 12.
14
As on the military side, the quality of UN police varied. Singapore, for instance, sent a designated unit of seventy-five police who had been prescreened for the mission.They had ten years’ police experience and arrived on the heels of a special eight-week training course, where they were taught intercultural communication and lectured in Cambodian history. Janet E. Heininger,
Peacekeeping in Transition:The United Nations in Cambodia
(New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994), p. 80.
15
Nayan Chanda, “Cambodia: I Want to Retake Power,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
February 4, 1993, p. 20.
18
Nate Thayer, “Cambodia: Legal Weapon,”
Far Eastern Economic Review
, January 21, 1993; “Khmer Rouge Release 21, but Take 46 More Peacekeepers Captive,” Agence France-Presse, December 17, 1992.
19
Chopra, “United Nations Authority in Cambodia,” p. 27.
20
SVDM to Marrack Goulding, “Our Recent Conversations,” February 12, 1993.
21
Indochina Digest,
March 12, 1993, quoted in Chopra, “United Nations Authority in Cambodia,” p. 42.
22
William Branigin, "Montagnards End Fight Against Hanoi,”
Washington Post,
October 11, 1992, p. A46.
23
Nate Thayer, "The Forgotten Army,”
Far Eastern Economic Review,
September 10, 1992, p. 18.
24
Colonel Y-Pen Ayun to SVDM, handwritten “DECLARATION, September 28, 1992.”
25
SVDM to Lionel Rosenblatt, October 10, 1992.
26
SVDM to UNHCR headquarters, “Chronology of Events,” October 1992.
27
Robinson,
“Something Like Home Again,”
p. 63.
28
Ron Moreau, “Cambodia: ‘This Is My Home,’”
Newsweek
, February 22, 1993, p. 38.
29
SVDM, interview by James S. Sutterlin, May 5, 1998, Yale-UN Oral History, p. 15.
30
Robinson,
“Something Like Home Again,”
p. 46.
31
SVDM, “Refugee Repatriation and Reintegration in Cambodia,”
The UNTAC: Debriefingand Lessons, Report and Recommendations of the International Conference, Singapore, August 1994
(London: Kluwer Law International, 1995), p. 151.
32
SVDM to Ogata, “On visit of secretary-general to Cambodia, April 18-20, 1992,” May 6, 1992.
33
Nicholas Cumming-Bruce,“Sixth UNVictim Shot Dead in Cambodia,”
Guardian
, April 9, 1993, p. 11. The fallout from the incident underscored the fragility of many UN member states’ relationship with UN peacekeeping. In Japan the murder kicked off a debate that had been intensifying throughout the month. The constitution of Japan, the second-largest donor to the United Nations, “renounced war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” In 1992 the Japanese parliament passed an international peacekeeping law that allowed six hundred Japanese soldiers and police to join UNTAC. But these troops served as engineers, road builders, and police, and according to law, they would have to be withdrawn if full-fledged war erupted. Some members of Parliament suggested that day had come.
34
“Angola: UN Secretary-General’s Envoy Margaret Antsee Reportedly to Be Replaced,” BBC News, May 11, 1993.
35
“Angola: UN to Appoint New Special Envoy Soon,” Inter Press Service.
36
“Angola Peace Parley Resumes,” Agence France-Presse, May 14, 1993.
37
“Angola: UN to Appoint New Special Envoy Soon,” Inter Press Service. The person chosen in Vieira de Mello’s stead was former Malian foreign minister Alioune Blondin Beye, who arrived in June. Beye died in a plane crash in 1998 as he shuttled between African capitals in pursuit of a settlement.
38
Chopra, “United Nations Authority in Cambodia,” p. 49.
39
“Akashi Declares Campaign a Success Despite Violence,” Agence France-Presse, May 20, 1992.
40
The official budget was $1.6 billion. But if one adds the pledged rehabilitation and repatriation assistance and off-budget costs, the amount came to $2.5-$2.8 billion. Michael W. Doyle,
UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC’s Civil Mandate
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1995), p. 29.
41
SVDM, interview by Sutterlin, p. 25.
42
SVDM to Courtland Robinson, August 9, 1993.
43
SVDM, draft proposal, “Deceit and Estrangement: The Aborted Relationship Between the KR and the Cambodian Peace Process (1989-1993).”
44
SVDM to Ogata, “Clearance to Engage in a Research Project Related to My Cambodia Experience,” September 20, 1993.
45
Christine Dodson to A. Henning, “Mr. Vieira de Mello: Request for Clearance to Engage in a Research Project,” October 29, 1993.
46
Lisa Coulombe to SVDM, June 23, 1992.
47
John Burns, “Sarajevans Jeer as U.N. Leader Urges Restraint,”
New York Times
, January 1, 1993, p. A1.
48
George Gordon-Lennox and Annick Stevenson,
Sergio Vieira de Mello: An Exceptional Man
(Geneva: Éditions du Tricorne, 2004), p. 67.
49
In December 1992 the first Bush administration sent 28,000 troops to Somalia to participate in a feeding mission. In May 1993 the Americans departed, handing off peacekeeping tasks to a smaller UN force. The largely non-American successor force was authorized at 28,000 troops, but only 16,000 troops deployed. The larger U.S. mission had deployed only in southern and central Somalia, while the smaller UN force was mandated to secure the whole country. After the June 1993 massacre of twenty-five Pakistani blue helmets, Clinton sent 400 Army Rangers and 130 Delta Forces to Somalia and offered a $25,000 reward for the capture of Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed.
50
Bill Clinton, news conference, October 14, 1993.