China's Territorial Disputes (18 page)

For some years since 1964 or even earlier, China had orchestrated, or at least turned a blind eye to, occasional demonstrations by local fishermen and inhabitants on the Sino-Soviet border as a means of expressing defiance of Soviet “revisionism.”
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After the border clashes had occurred in March 1969, Hong Kong newspapers and news magazines obtained photographs from the Chinese authorities purportedly showing Chinese fishing boats being chased by Soviet river patrol craft, and Chinese fishermen being attacked by Soviet border guards and their dogs, as early as 1960.
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Then in 1966, the Cultural Revolution erupted in China. A salient feature of the behavior of the Maoist radicals and Red Guards was their intense hostility toward the Soviet Union and all things foreign, and there were occasional violent anti-Soviet demonstrations by Red Guards and soldiers along the Manchurian frontier.
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The Chinese were concerned over the progressively intensifying Soviet military patrols along China’s northern frontier, and became alarmed after the invasion of Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968, and the subsequent proclamation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which declared the right of the Soviet Union to intervene in socialist countries to preserve their “social system.” Following the invasion, Beijing expressed support for the people of Czechoslovakia and encouraged Albania’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.
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Since Sino-Soviet relations had by 1969 reached the point of no return, Mao permitted the border demonstrations to continue, to “signal” to the Soviet Union that China was no Czechoslovakia, and that the Brezhnev Doctrine could not be applied to Mao’s “social system.” Declassified documents from the Khabarovsk Krai territory in the Russian Far East alleged that in 1969 alone, about 300 incidents of daily cross-border incursions by Chinese
citizens
occurred.
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It becomes clear as events progressed in the Soviet Union and China how important are the preferences of leaders and the orientation of powerful domestic Level II constituencies in promoting or retarding negotiations. Early in 1969, during premier Alexei Kosygin’s prolonged absence as a result of illness, a “hawkish” group in favor of a more confrontational foreign policy line seemed to have formed around Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev, which included the Party’s chief ideologue Mikhail Suslov and defense minister Andrei Grechko.
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It was Suslov who delivered a report to the Central Committee plenum on 12 February 1964 castigating the Chinese leadership as the “main danger” to world Communism; who demolished the strongly pro-Chinese position taken by fellow Politburo member Frol Kozlov; and who engineered Khrushchev’s fall from power.
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This group was antagonistic toward the Mao regime, both because of Beijing’s flouting of the Leninist principles of the supremacy of the Party’s collective leadership during the Cultural Revolution, and China’s aggressive anti-Soviet international behavior. It wanted more forceful action in the Far East to teach Beijing a lesson and force Mao to back down from his “adventurist” anti-Soviet policy. The Kremlin leaders might have calculated that such a course of action would divert world attention from the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia and reinforce Moscow’s foreign affairs position against its Warsaw Pact allies, while at the same time creating a popular issue at home.

As for the Chinese, a forceful demonstration of strength along the frontier would help create an appropriately militant atmosphere for the Ninth Party Congress scheduled for the middle of March, and reinforce the image of Lin Biao and the PLA as the indispensable guardian of national security. Stick-fighting, kick-boxing Red Guards waving “little red books” of quotations from Chairman Mao were replaced by soldiers carrying weapons with orders to use them if provoked.
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On 19 February 1969, a plan initiated by the Heilongjiang military authorities to station three infantry battalions on Damansky/Zhenbao for defense against “revisionism” was approved by the PLA General Staff, and perhaps mindful of possible international repercussions, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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In other words, the fighting in March on Damansky/Zhenbao and other islands along the Ussuri in March 1969 and subsequent months was a conflict waiting to occur. By then, hostile feelings among both elite and masses in both countries toward each other had been incited to such a degree that the chances for resolving the border issue were as good as nil.

The Sino-Soviet border conflict:

2 March 1969-21 March 1969

Whatever happened on the little island of Damansky/Zhenbao on 2 March and 15 March 1969 is still subjected to differing claims and interpretations pending the full declassification of records. What is certain is that an exchange of fire between Soviet and Chinese troops occurred on these two occasions, and what transpired were day-long affairs of short, bloody engagements and quick withdrawals from the island, which could be of no interest or significance to general or military historians.

Although Sino-Soviet border incidents were frequently reported to have been occurring since January 1967, the Soviets appeared to have been caught by surprise in the first attack.
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The Chinese apparently ambushed and mauled a Soviet detachment on Damansky/Zhenbao.
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The Chinese seemed not only militarily but also politically prepared, quickly launching a mass movement the following day which included more than 400,000 people. Even more people participated in public protests and demonstrations over the next few days, and altogether some 260 million people, or one third of the PRC population, took part.
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However, these public displays of support were nowhere near as violent as the staged attacks on the Chinese embassy in Moscow on 7 and 8 March by rock-throwing “mobs” numbering 50,000 and 100,000 respectively, for the purpose of breaking the embassy’s windows and terrorizing its staff.
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On 15 March, Soviet troops had their revenge, by initiating a confrontation with the Chinese that resulted in a clear-cut Soviet victory on the island, with superior firepower and heavy Chinese casualties.
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Both sides lodged diplomatic protests against each other immediately after the occurrence of both incidents. As the conflicts were occurring, the Soviet side started a flurry of diplomatic activity aimed at both isolating China diplomatically and forcing it to come to the negotiating table on Soviet terms. Soviet defense minister Grechko arrived in India on 2 March, the day the first conflict started, and held talks with Indian officials on coordinating policies against China.
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While Soviet ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin briefed American secretary of state William Rogers on the border incidents,
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Soviet embassy officials in West Germany, Japan, France, Austria, Italy and Canada kept themselves busy explaining the Soviet case to their host government officials.
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On 17 March, Brezhnev tried but failed to rally support from socialist countries represented at a Warsaw Pact meeting in Budapest, Hungary.
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The crisis with China was not having the effect of drawing the Warsaw Pact countries militarily or politically closer to the Soviet Union, as the Soviets had hoped. The “Euro-communists” were non-committal, never having forgiven the Soviets for invading its “fraternal socialist country” of Czechoslovakia. However, the most important factor behind the shift in thinking of the Kremlin leadership that prodded Soviet premier Kosygin to telephone Beijing on 21 March to discuss means of easing the border crisis, was not the result of Moscow’s failure to assign blame for the border clashes with China. Rather, it appeared to be the concern of the Soviet leadership that excessive pressure on China might impel the Mao regime to strike back militarily or seek a rapprochement with its arch enemy the United States.
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The Kosygin telephone call appeared to mark a watershed in Soviet management of the Sino-Soviet conflict. In the earlier phases, when Moscow appeared to have been desirous of teaching the Chinese a lesson without any serious effort to seek a border settlement, Brezhnev “the hard-liner” had figured prominently. In the latter phase, Kosygin “the dove” seemed to have assumed a leadership role, when military and psychological pressure were accompanied by offers of talks aimed at resolving the border issue.
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However, whether playing coy or genuinely confused by his offer, the Chinese leadership refused to speak with Kosygin, and insisted that he communicate through regular diplomatic channels.
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Although Kosygin’s bold attempt at promoting “reverberation” with the Chinese had for the time being failed, nonetheless, the diplomacy of Moscow’s China border policy may be dated from this moment.

“Chicken” diplomacy in the aftermath of the conflict:

29 March 1969-10 September 1969

The most likely explanation for the 2 March Chinese provocation is that a calculation by Chinese leaders that, since confrontation with the Soviets was deemed unavoidable, initiating a short but sharp warning blow would deter future Soviet encroachments and force them to reassess their border policy. A high-level defector to the US recounted how the events on Damansky had the effect of an “electric shock” on the Kremlin, with the Politburo “frantically” worrying about how inadequate their superiority in weaponry would be in coping with the assault of “millions of Chinese.”
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What followed was a high-stakes game of “chicken,” with the Soviets trying all ways and means to cajole, exhort, threaten and entice the Chinese back to the negotiating table, and the Chinese holding out for as long as they deemed was advantageous or safe for them to do so. As a follow-up to Kosygin’s telephone call, the Kremlin dispatched a note to Beijing on 29 March proposing a cease-fire and the resumption at the earliest possible date of the stalled 1964 Sino-Soviet border talks.
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On 11 April, Radio Moscow proposed that talks re-open in Moscow on 15 April or “in the near future convenient to the Chinese side.”
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Interestingly, the 29 March note was sent to China one day before the opening of the Ninth Chinese Communist Party Congress, and the 11 April proposal on reconvening the border talks was floated while the Congress was still in session. The Soviets under the direction of Kosygin probably felt that Mao Zedong and Lin Biao were basically opposed to the border talks, and sought to boost the influence of moderates like Zhou Enlai by demonstrating flexibility on the conditions under which talks would proceed. It might have been with this objective in mind that the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
Pravda,
published an article on 3 May charging Lin Biao with personal responsibility for the first Ussuri clash.
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The precise effect of this attempt at Soviet “reverberation” to seek out a negotiating partner on the Chinese side was admittedly difficult, if not impossible, to gauge. Lin Biao had not fallen from power as yet, and the Chinese were sounding as bellicose as ever. However, we have to credit the Soviets for making the effort to attempt a breakthrough in the tense border standoff.

On 24 May the Chinese finally sent a long-awaited reply to the Soviet note of

29 March. The reply charged the Soviet Union with sole responsibility for the border incidents and reasserted China’s claims to Zhenbao Island. However, the note also proposed a cease-fire along the “line of actual control” on the Amur-Ussuri frontier, demanded the annulment in principle of the “unequal treaties,” but agreed that these treaties might be taken as the basis for the settlement of border disputes. In view of the fact that the 15 April date proposed by Moscow for the reopening of boundary negotiations had already long passed, the Chinese suggested that another date be agreed upon through diplomatic channels. The Soviet answer to the Chinese reply was to insist on Soviet ownership of Damansky Island and alleged Chinese responsibility for the clashes. Nevertheless, it welcomed Beijing’s agreement in principle to hold border talks and suggested that they be resumed in Moscow within two to three months.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union started to apply even more pressure to force Beijing into renewing the 1964 talks. On 7 July, at the international conference of Communist parties, Brezhnev tried to reach out to moderate elements within the Chinese Communist Party by declaring that the Soviet leadership “did not identify with the declarations and actions of the present Chinese leadership with the aspirations, wishes, and true interests of the CCP and the Chinese people.”
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Brezhnev also made an ominous pitch for his “Asian Collective Security Conference” at the same meeting, leading to Chinese suspicions that it was a ploy to involve India and some Southeast Asian countries in containing China.
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Not to be diplomatically outmaneuvered, China returned fire with a propaganda blitz of its own, showing “documentary” films in its embassies in Asia, Europe and Africa in August and September on the “real” story behind the Soviet “provocation” of the Chinese border. These films bore deliberately provocative titles like
Anti-Chinese Atrocities of the New Tsars
and
Down with the New Tsars.
After an intense skirmish on 13 August at the Kazakh-Xinjiang border, the first time fighting had taken place outside Manchuria, the Soviets were sufficiently alarmed to have a Soviet embassy official in Washington sound out an American State Department official on the likely US reaction to a Soviet strike on Chinese nuclear facilities.
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It was later revealed that the Soviet leadership seriously considered a pre-emptive strike at this time, with defense minister Grechko advocating the use of nuclear weapons to “once and for all get rid of the Chinese threat.”
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With no reply yet from Beijing as the three-month deadline set by Moscow passed, a
Pravda
editorial on 28 August warned China of worldwide conflagration if war were to break out under conditions of modern technology.
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It was under such a dark and foreboding cloud of possible nuclear war that Kosygin, on his way back to Moscow from Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh’s funeral in Hanoi, received word from Beijing that Chinese premier Zhou Enlai would meet with him at Beijing airport to discuss the border crisis. Perhaps after all, the threats and cajoling by the Soviet leadership had managed to alter the preferences of their Chinese counterparts a little, if just enough to move them away from intransigence against any form of meeting.