China's Territorial Disputes (33 page)

Leaders should also suppress or at least play down the activities of nationalistic and other obstructionist organizations and groups. By portraying themselves as champions of their country’s territorial sovereignty, and seizing on nationalist issues which they know few of their fellow citizens can openly disagree with without risking censure, they are able to make use of their compatriots’ territorial concerns to create difficulties for negotiators engaging in territorial discussions. If the negotiators proceed with the discussions, they stand to lose popular support within their domestic constituencies; if they yield to domestic pressure and stop the negotiations, they may be accused by their counterparts in the other claimant countries of being unreliable negotiating partners, which may have the effect of decreasing the size of win-sets for future inter-state negotiations. The consistent refusal of the Indian leadership to recognize the Tibetan government-in-exile organized by the Dalai Lama in Dharmsala, despite the preferences of many parliamentarians, and Nehru’s firm rejection of pleas from his parliamentary opposition to sever diplomatic relations with the PRC during the time of the Sino-Indian War, contributed in no small measure to the eventual normalization of relations and reduction of border tension, given the sensitivity of the Chinese government to the issues of Tibetan separatism and regime legitimacy. In a similar vein, as John Garver has observed, the Chinese government seems to have been making sure in recent years that open Chinese publications or official statements should contain nothing that could provoke India’s security concerns and justify Indian efforts to restrict Chinese military-security ties with the South Asian countries. In discussing Indian threats to China, all articles have been expected to make clear that such “threats” are merely Indian perceptions, that those perceptions are inaccurate, and that there is no substance to the “China threat.”
⁷⁰

Another winning strategy for negotiators would be to openly promote the popularity of their negotiating counterpart, in order to increase their counterpart’s win-set and thus increase both the odds of success and their own bargaining power. Zhou Enlai’s last visit to India in April 1960 to try to resolve the boundary dispute was unsuccessful because it was perceived by the Indian mass media, politicians and citizenry as a whole as a visit from the enemy to present them with an ultimatum to settle a disagreement on his terms. The spectacle of Zhou flying around the region to conclude boundary agreements with India’s neighbors only encouraged the perception by Indians that he was attempting to crudely induce or implicitly bully India into reopening border negotiations. On the other hand, Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in December 1988 was generally credited by officials and commentators on both sides as changing the course of Sino-Indian relations from one characterized by a boundary stalemate to the building of trust and cooperation in the military, economic and socio-cultural spheres. Rajiv managed to refocus the elite and masses of both countries from suspicion and prejudice to peace and cooperation through high-profile “reverberation.” Further bilateral visits by Indian and Chinese leaders affirmed their respect for the line of actual control as the
de facto
boundary on the ground and promoted the agreements on the CBMs.

5 The McMahon Line/Aksai Chin dispute

1    For analyses of British imperial policy in India toward Tibet and formation of the Sino-Indian border, please read Alastair Lamb,
The China-India Border: the Origins of the Disputed Boundaries
(London: Oxford University Press, 1964);
idem, The McMahon Line,
2 vols (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966); Dorothy Woodman,
Himalayan Frontiers
(New York: Praeger, 1969); Neville Maxwell,
India’s China War
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1970); L. C. Green, “Legal Aspects of the Sino-Indian dispute,”
China Quarterly,
1960, no. 3; and Jing Hui, “Zhong-Yin dongduan bianjie zhenxiang” [The Truth about the Eastern Sector of the Sino-Indian Border],
Guoji Wenti Yanjiu
[International Studies], no. 1, 1988.

2    The full text of the letter from Sir Claude McDonald, British Minister in Peking, to the Chinese Foreign Affairs Office on 14 March 1899 can be found in R. A. Huttenback, “A Historical Note on the Sino-Indian Dispute on the Aksai Chin,”
China Quarterly,
April-June 1964, 202-203.

3    Neville Maxwell, “China and India: The Un-Negotiated Dispute,”
China Quarterly
, July-September 1970, no. 43, 48.

4    Maxwell, “China and India: The Un-Negotiated Dispute,” 50.

5    See Appendix 1,
Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet region of China and India, April 29,1954,
and accompanying note, in Liu Xuecheng,
The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations
(Lanham MD: University Press of America, 1994), 185-191.

6    Neville Maxwell,
India’s China War
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), 93.

7    Sreedhar, “Problems and Prospects of Sino-Indian Trade,”
India Quarterly
, April-June

1976, vol. XXXII, no. 2,143-144.

8    Maxwell, “China and India: The Un-Negotiated Dispute,” 59.

9    
Ibid.
, 60.

10    
Ibid.

11    Liu,
The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations
, 24.

12    
Peking Review
, “Chinese People Will Not Tolerate Foreign Intervention in Tibet:

Speeches on Tibet by NPC Delegates,” 29 April 1959, vol.2, no. 7, 8-14.

13    Steven A. Hoffman,
India and the China Crisis
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 75-77.

14    
Peking Review
, “The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru’s Philosophy,” 12 May 1959, vol. 2, no. 19, 6-15.

15    Liu,
The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations
, 29.

16    
Ibid.

17    For a detailed description of debates in the Lok Sabha, India’s lower house of parlia

ment, from 30 March 1959 to 16 March 1960, read chapter 5, “Tension on the Border, 1959-1960,” in Nancy Jetly,
India-China Relations, 1947-1977: A Study of Parliament’s Role in the Making of Foreign Policy
(Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities Press, 1979), 79-127.    
'

18    For a very detailed and complete historical analysis of the Sino-Burmese settlement, see Dorothy Woodman,
T he Making of Burma
(London: Cresset, 1962).

19    M. Taylor Fravel, “Closing Windows on the Frontier: Explaining China’s Settlement of Territorial Disputes,” paper presented at the Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts, 29 August-2 September 2002, 23.

20    K. Raman Pillai,
India’s Foreign Policy: Basic Issues and Political Attitudes
(Begum Bridge and Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1969), 134, 139.

21    For a detailed description of debates in the Lok Sabha, India’s lower house of parliament, from 26 April 1959 to 13 August 1960, read chapter 6, “The Widening Chasm, 1960-1962,” in Nancy Jetly,
India-China Relations, 1947-1977,
128-171.

22    Neville Maxwell, “China and India: The Un-Negotiated Dispute,” 67.

23    Liu,
The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations,
35.

24    For a detailed description of debates in the Lok Sabha, India’s lower house of parliament, from 26 April 1959 to 13 August 1960, read chapter 7, “Invasion and Ceasefire,” in Nancy Jetly,
India-China Relations, 1947-1977,
172-199.

25    See
India Quarterly
, January-March 1967, vol. XXIII, no. 1: Balraj Madhok, “India’s Foreign Policy: The Jana Sangh View,” 3-7; Surendra Mohan, “India’s Foreign Policy: The PSP View,” 8-15; Cushrow R. Irani, “India’s Foreign Policy: The Swatantra View,” 16-20.

26    Balraj Madhok, “India’s Foreign Policy: The Jana Sangh View,”
India Quarterly
, January-March 1967, vol. XXIII, no. 1, 5.

27    Liao Kuang-sheng and Allen S. Whiting, “Chinese Press Perception of Threat: The U.S. and India, 1962,”
The China Quarterly,
January-March 1973, no. 53, 80-97.

28    Liao and Whiting, “Chinese Press Perception of Threat, 95.

29    Liu,
The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations,
35-36.

30    
Sino-Indian Border Conflict,
2hrs, Beijing Film Studios, 1993, videocassette.

31    Strobe Talbott,
Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, Vol. II
(Boston: Little, Brown,

1974), 308-311. To appreciate Khrushchev’s attitude, his words should be quoted at length:

I believe it was Mao himself who stirred up trouble with India. I think he did so because of some sick fantasy. ... I think Mao created the Sino-Indian conflict ... to put us in a position of having no choice but to support him.

32    V P. Dutt,
India’s Foreign Policy
(New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1984), 215-216.

33    Leo M. Van Der Mey, “How to Exchange Ambassadors?: The Diplomatic Dialogue between India and China after the 1962 War,”
Diplomacy and Statecraft,
July 1997, vol. 7, no. 2,160-161.

34    Walter K. Andersen, “The Domestic Roots of Indian Foreign Policy,”
Asian Affairs
, fall 1983, vol.10, no. 3, 50.

35    Andersen, “The Domestic Roots of Indian Foreign Policy,” 51.

36    
Beijing Review
, “To Develop or to Impair Sino-Indian Relations?,” 26 October 1981, no. 43, 9-10.

37    Nancy Jetly, “Sino-Indian Relations: A Quest for Normalization,”
India Quarterly
, January-March 1986, vol. XLII, no.1,58.

38    Manoranjan Mohanty, “India-China Relations: A Positive Frame,”
India Quarterly
, January-March 1985, vol. XLI, no. 1, 22.

39    John W. Garver, “The Indian Factor in Recent Sino-Soviet Relations,”
China Quarterly
,

March 1991, no. 125, 74-75.    
'

40    Garver, “The Indian Factor in Recent Sino-Soviet Relations,” 80-81.

41    Baranath Bhat, “Sino-Indian Economic Relations: An Overview,”
China Report
, November-December 1984,18.

42    Bhat, “Sino-Indian Economic Relations: An Overview,” 23. See also Shri Prakesh,

“Economic Dimensions of Sino-Indian Relations”
China Report,
1994, vol.30, no. 2, 226-51.    
'

43    Ramesh Thakur, “Normalizing Sino-Indian Relations,”
The Pacific Review
, 1991, vol. 4, no. 1.

44    Nancy Jetly, “Sino-Indian Relations: Old Legacies and New Vistas,”
China Report
, 1994, vol. 30, no. 2, 217.

45    J. K. Baral, Pramod Panda and Nilanchai Muni, “The Press and India-China Relations,”
China Report,
1989, vol.2, no. 4, 359-373.

46    Surjit Mansingh and Steven I. Levine, “China and India: Moving Beyond Confrontation,”
Problems of Communism,
March-June 1989, 45.

47    Bonnie Glaser, “China’s Security Perceptions: Interests and Ambitions,”
Asian Survey
,

1993, vol. 33, no. 3, 267.

48    Bertil Lintner, “Chinese Army Bolsters Burmese Forces,”
Janets Defence Weekly,
27 November 1993, vol.20, no. 22,11.

49    John W. Garver, “Sino-Indian Rapprochement and Sino-Pakistan Entente,”
Political Science Quarterly,
1996, vol. 111, no. 2, 326.

50    
Economic and Political Weekly
(Bombay), “Statistics,” 17 October 1992, vol. XXVII, no.

42, 2276.    
'

51    “China: Jiefangjun Bao Interview with Former Envoy to India Cited,” ^S/S-CHI-98-147, 27 May 1998.

52    Shibu Itty Kuttickal, “Brothers in Trade,”
Today
(Singapore), 26 June 2003, 30.

53    The eleven countries of Southeast Asia are Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, Singapore, Indonesia, and Timor Leste.

54    Zheng Ruixiang, “Xin xingshi xia de Zhong-Yin guanxi,”
Guoji Wenti Yanjiu,
1993, no. 4, 5.

55    Surjit Mansingh, “India-China Relations in the Post Cold War Era,”
Asian Survey,
March 1994, vol. XXXIV, no. 3, 295.

56    
滞
/S-CHI-92-036, 24 February 1992.