Churchill's Secret War (51 page)

31
De, “Imperial Governance and the Challenges of War,” 10;
Biplabi
, “Annabhabe mrityu” and “Khudar jalay atmohotya,” 179–180; quoted in Brennan, “Government Famine Relief in Bengal,” 542–567; Nanavati Papers, Vol. II, 445.

32
Mahalanobis, “Mortality in Bengal in 1943.”

33
Biplabi
, “Bhogini senar sotsahos,” 51.

34
Biplabi
, “British sobhyotar sreshtho nidarshon,”109–113; Maity,
Quit India Movement
, 108.

35
Maity,
Quit India Movement
, 27–29.

36
Linlithgow Collection 2336, Telegrams from Governor of Bengal to Viceroy, February 2, 1943, and February 22, 1943; Huq,
Bengal Today
, 26.

37
Sengupta,
Bangosanghar
, 35; Huq,
Bengal Today
, 15–16; Linlithgow Collection 2336, Telegram from Governor of Bengal to Viceroy, February 11, 1943; Nanavati Papers, Vol. IV, 1104. According to Sengupta, soldiers posted on the coast of Noakhali had landed by night at a shoreline village, Sanoa, while the men were fishing at sea, and raped the women. In the early morning the fishermen had returned, chanced upon the rapists, and rushed to attack with knives; they were mowed down by machine-gun fire. Huq had tried to visit the village but was barred by the district magistrate, acting on Herbert’s orders.

38
Huq,
Bengal Today
, 30–32; Linlithgow Collection 2336, Telegram from Governor of Bengal to Viceroy, April 7, 1943.

39
Gallagher,
Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire
, 183; Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, Vol. III, 320, 893.

40
Mitra,
Tin Kuri Dash
, 161–162; Linlithgow Collection 2336, May 4, 1943; AMEL 1/6/21 file 2, Secretary of State to Prime Minister, March 4, 1943.

1
CHAR 23/11, W.P. (43) 106, “Demands on Shipping Resulting from Overseas Cereal Requirements.”

2
Behrens,
Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War
, 320; MT 59/621, “Supply of Food Grains to East Africa,” March 4, 1943.

3
Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, Vol. I, 425–426, and Vol. II, 506–507; MT 59/621, “Supply of Food Grains to East Africa,” March 4, 1943.

4
Barnes and Nicholson,
Empire at Bay
, 833, 836.

5
Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, Vol. III, 21–23, 37, and Vol. II, 998.

6
Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, Vol. II, 590.

7
Rothermund,
An Economic History of India
, 119; Barnes and Nicholson,
Empire at Bay
, 836.

8
Hess,
America Encounters India
, 94–95; Phillips,
Ventures in Diplomacy
, 218. British sensitivities precluded the naming of Phillips as ambassador to the colony.

9
Quoted in Louis,
Imperialism at Bay
, 200; Barnes and Nicholson,
Empire at Bay
, 842.

10
MT 59/657, “Imports of Cereals into India”; Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, Vol. III, 333–334, 357, 394.

11
MT 59/631, “With Sir William Croft’s Compliments: India’s Foodgrains Supply,” July 19, 1943. Also see Sen,
Poverty and Famines
, 57–63; Tauger, “Entitlement, Shortage and the 1943 Bengal Famine,” 45–72; Nanavati Papers, Vol. II, 440, and Vol. IV, 1104; and De, “Imperial Governance and the Challenges of War,” 34. Economist Amartya Sen used official harvest projections to argue that the rice shortfall in 1943 was not in itself enough to cause famine, but Tauger points out that crop infestations greatly reduced the actual harvest in Bengal. A contemporary peasants’ association gauged three-eighths of the crop to have failed; the director of
agriculture estimated 30 percent failure, while Pinnell estimated a 20 percent shortfall in Bengal.

12
Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, Vol. III, 358–362, 437.

13
Knight,
Food Administration in India
, 130.

14
Woodhead,
Famine Inquiry Commission
, 21; Nanavati Papers, Vol. II, 339.

15
WO 208/810, Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 81.

16
Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, Vol. IV, 301.

17
Linlithgow Collection 2336, Governor of Bengal to Viceroy, January 2, 1943.

18
WO 208/810, Weekly Intelligence Summary 63, January 15, 1943; Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, Vol. III, 373, 421–422; WO 208/809, “Copy of telegram from Secretary of State for India to Government of India, Food Department, dated 15th December 1942”; WO 208/809, “Copy of telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India dated 26th December, 1942.”

19
Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, Vol. III, 476–477.

20
Barnes and Nicholson,
Empire at Bay
, 867.

21
WO 208/809, “Government of India, Food Department to Secretary of State for India,” January 10, 1943; Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, Vol. III, 479–480.

22
Smith,
Conflict over Convoys
, 130.

23
CAB 195/2, W.M. (43) 7th Meeting, 57; Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, Vol. III, 492, 510.

24
Sinha and Khera,
Indian War Economy
, 55.

25
WO 208/809, Extract from the Conclusions of the 3rd (43) meeting of the Lord President’s Committee, January 15, 1943; CO 852/427/2, From Secretary of State for India to Governor General, January 16, 1942; Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, Vol. III, 515.

26
MT 59/621, Government of India, Food Department to Secretary of State for India, January 20, 1943; WO 208/809, “Background Note on the Food Situation,” September 24, 1943; Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, Vol. III, 581.

27
Behrens,
Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War
, 313–315.

28
Hancock and Gowing,
British War Economy
, 206; Smith,
Conflict over Convoys
, 242–243.

29
MacDougall,
Don and Mandarin
, 32.

30
Smith,
Conflict over Convoys
, 130; MT 59/108, “The United Kingdom Import Situation in 1943,” February 9, 1943; MT 62/73, Prime Minister from Cherwell, January 2, 1943.

31
MacDougall,
Don and Mandarin
, 26.There would have been ninety-two sailings in February, so the cut was actually to 43 percent.

32
As paraphrased in Behrens,
Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War
, 320. The original Ministry of War Transport document could not be located.

33
Behrens,
Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War
, 340–342.

34
Plaque at Keoladeo Bird Sanctuary.

35
Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, Vol. III, 439–440.

36
Ibid., 536, 558–559.

37
Ibid., 589–590, 469, 632; quoted in Roberts,
Masters and Commanders
, 350; Barnes and Nicholson,
Empire at Bay
, 872.

38
Phillips,
Ventures in Diplomacy
, 231, 234; Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, Vol. III, 652–653, 687–688.

39
Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, Vol. III, 690; CHAR 20/107, For Lord Halifax from Prime Minister, February 21, 1943.

40
Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, Vol. III, 659, 669, 730, 718, 770–771; Churchill,
The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate
, 736.

41
Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, Vol. III, 737–738.

42
Quoted in Smith,
Conflict over Convoys
, 159.

43
Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, Vol. III, 473–478.

44
Nanavati Papers, Vol. II, 356.

45
WO 208/809, “Shipping—Indian Wheat Requirements,” January 21, 1943; MT 59/377, British Merchant Shipping Mission from Ministry of War Transport, January 22, 1943, and March 1, 1943; Cherwell Papers H137/20; AMEL 1/6/14 File 1, Secretary of State to Viceroy, February 18, 1943; CAB 195/2, W.M. (43) 32nd Meeting, 91.

46
AMEL 1/6/14 File 1, Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, February 21, 1943; MT 59/621, “Supply of Food Grains to East Africa,” March 4, 1943.

47
MacDougall,
Don and Mandarin
, 32; Behrens,
Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War
, 325; Hancock and Gowing,
British War Economy
, 267.

48
Cherwell Papers F231/36; MT 59/108, “The United Kingdom Import Situation in 1943: Table III,” February 9, 1943.

49
Hancock and Gowing,
British War Economy
, 431, 424–425; CAB 195/1, W.M. (42) 98th Meeting, 84.

50
Hammond,
Food
, Vol. I, 75–76, 185–186; CAB 195/1, W.M. (42) 89th Meeting, 75.

51
Hancock and Gowing,
British War Economy
, 422–423; Hammond,
Food
, Vol. III, 534.

52
CAB 195/1, W.M. (42) 98th Meeting, 85.

53
Hammond,
Food
, Vol. I, 268–269, and Vol. III, 613, 615.

54
Kevin Smith, private communication; Hancock and Gowing,
British War Economy
, 357; Behrens,
Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War
, 325. Total stocks of food and raw materials were 15.8 million tons in December 1942 and 15.5 million tons in June 1943. Imports in this period were 10.8 million tons plus about 0.15 million tons from Eire. Consumption, being imports plus stock used, was therefore 11.3 million tons. So excess of stock over consumption was 4.5 million tons.

55
Cherwell Papers, F255/1 and F255/3/1, 2; CHAR 23/11, “The Shipping Position.” Also see Appendix LIV in Behrens,
Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War
, 325. Stocks totaled 15.8 million tons in December 1942 and 15.2 million tons in January 1943.

56
MT 59/108, “The United Kingdom Import Situation in 1943,” February 9, 1943; Cherwell Papers F255/1; Smith,
Conflict over Convoys
, 174–176.

57
Leighton and Coakley,
Global Logistics and Strategy
, 694, 702; Cherwell Papers F255/3/2. Kevin Smith states that Gross’s estimate of essential British imports was based less on actual calculation than on political considerations (personal communication).

58
CAB 195/1, W.M. (42) 98th Meeting, 84.

59
Cherwell Papers, H298/21.

60
CAB 195/2, W.M. (43) 2nd Meeting, 45–46.

61
Cherwell Papers, F255/1; Smith,
Conflict over Convoys
, 130.

62
Smith,
Conflict over Convoys
, 196; Behrens,
Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War
, 325; Hammond,
Food
, Vol. I, 274.

63
Hammond,
Food
, Vol. I, 169(footnote), 277, and Vol. III, 544; CHAR 23/10, “Home Food Production,” December 24, 1942; Cherwell Papers F255/1; Hancock and Gowing,
British War Economy
, 433.

64
Hancock and Gowing,
British War Economy
, 357–358; Hammond,
Food
, Vol. III, 534, and Vol. I, 276; Behrens,
Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War
, 325. Stock of wheat and flour totaled 1.8 million tons in December 1942 and 2.2 million tons in June 1943. So 0.4 million tons of stock were built up in these six months, while imports were 1.9 million tons. Consumption, being imports minus stock increase, comes to 1.5 million tons. Thus wheat consumption per month was 250,000 tons, which amounts to stocks in December 1942 of about seven months.

65
CAB 79/59, March 9, 1943, and April 9, 1943; Cherwell Papers F255/3/2.

66
WO 208/809, Government of India to Secretary of State for India, April 17, 1942, and May 2, 1943.

67
MT 59/631, “Indian Wheat Requirements”; Nanavati Papers, Vol. II, 341.

68
MT 59/694, Mance to Anderson, December 29, 1942; MT 59/694, Note by H. S. Mance, April 8, 1943.

69
Cherwell Papers F255/3/2; Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, Vol. III, 515, 581.

70
Gupta,
Towards Freedom
, Part II, 1843; Nanavati Papers, Vol. II, 353.

71
MT 59/621, “Brief for Shipping Committee”; MT 59/694, “Brief for the Shipping Committee”; Ghosh,
Famines in Bengal
, 18, 3; Gupta,
Towards Freedom
, Vol. II, 1829; WO 208/818, Weekly Intelligence Summary 76, April 16, 1943. In total, about 80,000 tons were received, but India was also forced to re-export some 20,000 tons.

72
Nanavati Papers, Vol. IV, 1013; Gupta,
Towards Freedom
, Vol. II, 1837–1838; Ghosh,
Famines in Bengal
, 17; Narayanan,
Famine over Bengal
, 61.

73
Nanavati Papers, Vol. V, 1372; CSAC, Pinnell Papers, Memoir, 97; Mansergh,
The Transfer of Power
, Vol. III, 544.

74
Nanavati Papers, Vol. II, 513; CAB 195/1, W.M. (42) 153rd Meeting, November 16, 1942, 181–182.

75
Nanavati Papers, Vol. II, 552.

76
Nanavati Papers, Vol. I, 216–217; Ghosh,
Famines in Bengal
, 31; Sinha and Khera,
Indian War Economy
, 4; MT 59/631, “Exports from India by Sea”; India Office Records R/3/2/37, August 31, 1942; MT 59/621, “Area Outside Jurisdiction of M.E.S.C.,” April 22, 1943.

77
Famines in nineteenth-century India and Ireland were aggravated by the British authorities’ adherence to free-market policies; see Woodham Smith,
The Great Hunger
, 127, 408. A half-kilogram of cereal a day may not be enough to save an adult, but almost half the famine victims were children under ten years of age. So a ration scale varying around such an average would suffice.