Closing the Ring (41 page)

Mr. Eden then turned to the question of Turkey, and pointed out that we could not at present give the necessary effective support. The question of a joint approach to Turkey was deferred until later. The Russian proposal about Sweden was also mentioned. Sweden would clearly demand guarantees about Finland, a matter which the Russians were reluctant to discuss.

*  *  * *  *

In the evening, Eden called upon Stalin and for over two hours discussed a large variety of topics. First in importance, as we have seen, was the question of the Arctic convoys. The conversation then turned to the proposed meeting of the three
heads of the Allied Governments. Stalin was insistent that this should take place at Teheran.

On the whole, the conversation seemed to go well.

*  *  * *  *

Mr. Eden had now received my telegram of October 20, and sent his comments. He said that the Russians were completely and blindly set on our invasion of Northern France. It was the one decision in which they took an absorbing interest. They asked again and again whether there had been any change in the understanding given to Stalin by the President and myself after the Washington Conference in May, that we would invade in the early spring of 1944, and when would the operation start.

On the first point he had assured them that there had been no change, but had emphasised the three conditions
³
which must be present to allow the expedition to be launched with any chance of success. On the second point it was thought better not to give the actual date, but Mr. Eden assured them that all preparations were going forward to attack in the spring after the weather became favourable.

  I replied by return:

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary (Moscow)

23 Oct. 43

If we force Turkey to enter the war, she will insist on air support, etc., which could not be provided without detriment to our main operations in Italy. If however Turkey enters on her own initiative, perhaps moving through a phase of non-belligerency, we should not have the same obligation, and yet great advantages might be reaped. Obviously timing is vital, and dependent upon what is the aggressive strength of the enemy in Bulgaria and Thrace.
The prize would be to get into the Black Sea with supplies for Russia, warships, and other forces. This is what I call “giving Russia the right hand
”
⁴
Such a movement by Turkey is not impossible, especially if the Germans should begin to cut their
losses in the Balkans and withdraw towards the Danube and the Save.

2.
Finland and Sweden
. It would be a great advantage to bring Sweden into the war. We do not think the Germans have the strength to undertake a heavy invasion of Sweden. We should gain a new country and a small but good army. Our gains in Norway would be far-reaching. Valuable facilities would be afforded to Russian air forces. For ourselves, we can do far better bombing of Germany from East Anglia, where we are mounted on a vast scale, than from Sweden, where everything would have to be improvised and imported by air. Our range from England over Germany is just as good as from Sweden. In fact, with present British facilities plus those we hope to acquire north of Rome, there is no part of Germany we cannot reach with great weight.

3. Personally I would like to see Turkey come in on her own, and also Sweden. I do not think either of them would be overrun, and every new enemy helps Hitler’s ruin. I suggest however that the first step is to find out what we and the Russians want and what will help both of us most in both quarters, and then as a second step go into ways and means immediately thereafter. Try this and let me know.

  And two days later, I added.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary

25 Oct. 43

Further reflection confirms my view that we should not discourage the Russian desire that Turkey and Sweden should of their own volition become co-belligerents or actual allies. The Russians should not be put in the position of arguing for this and we of simply making difficulties. We should agree in principle and let the difficulties manifest themselves, as they will certainly do, in the discussion of ways and means. They may well be overcome or put in their proper place and proportion. Anyhow, we ought not to begin by crabbing everything.

*  *  * *  *

The serious telegram, recorded in an earlier chapter, from General Eisenhower reporting General Alexander’s appreciation of the battle in Italy, had now reached me.
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I repeated it to Eden and asked him to show it to Stalin. I added:

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary

26 Oct. 43

The reason why we are getting into this jeopardy is because we are moving some of our best divisions and a large proportion of vital landing-craft from the Mediterranean in order to build up for “Overlord,” seven months hence. This is what happens when battles are governed by lawyers’ agreements made in all good faith months before, and persisted in without regard to the ever-changing fortunes of war. You should let him know, if you think fit, that I will not allow, while I am responsible, the great and fruitful campaign in Italy, which has already drawn heavy German reserves into action, to be cast away and end in a frightful disaster, for the sake of crossing the Channel [“Overlord”] in May. The battle must be nourished and fought out until it is won. We will do our very best for “Overlord,” but it is no use planning for defeat in the field in order to give temporary political satisfaction.

2. It will therefore be necessary for you to make it clear that the assurances you have given about May “Overlord,” subject to the specified conditions, must be modified by the exigencies of the battle in Italy. I am taking the matter up with President Roosevelt, but nothing will alter my determination not to throw away the battle in Italy at this juncture, so far as the King’s armies are concerned. Eisenhower and Alexander must have what they need to win the battle, no matter what effect is produced on subsequent operations. This may certainly affect the date of “Overlord.”

  I concluded my comments on this subject three days later:

Prime Minister to Mr. Eden (Moscow)

29 Oct. 43

There is of course no question of abandoning “Overlord,” which will remain our principal operation for 1944. The retention of landing-craft in the Mediterranean in order not to lose the Battle of Rome may cause a slight delay, perhaps till July, as the smaller class of landing-craft cannot cross the Bay of Biscay in the winter months and would have to make the passage in the spring. The delay would however mean that the blow when struck would be with somewhat heavier forces, and also that the full bombing effort on Germany would not be damped down so soon. We are also ready at any time to push across and profit by a German collapse. These arguments may be of use to you in discussion.

*  *  * *  *

In the evening our Ambassador and Ismay accompanied Mr. Eden to the Kremlin. Molotov was with Stalin. Eden opened the proceedings by handing Stalin the Russian text of Eisenhower’s telegram about the situation in Italy. Stalin read it aloud to Molotov. When he had finished, he showed no trace of disappointment, but said that according to Russian Intelligence there were twelve Anglo-American divisions fighting six German divisions south of Rome, and that there were a further six German divisions on the river Po. He admitted however that General Alexander was likely to have the better information. Mr. Eden said I was anxious that Stalin should have the latest account of the situation in Italy, and should know not only that I was anxious about it, but also that I was insistent that the battle in Italy should be nourished and fought out to victory whatever the implications on “Overlord.” He added that the vitally important decisions now confronting the Allies made it all the more necessary that the three heads of Governments should meet as soon as possible.

Stalin observed with a smile that if there were not enough divisions a meeting of the heads of Governments could not create them. He then asked point-blank whether the telegram which he had just read meant a postponement of “Overlord.” Eden replied that until it had been fully examined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and decisions made about improving the position, it was impossible to say, but the possibility must be faced. He quoted the passage in my telegram, that we were determined to “do our very best for ‘Overlord,’ ” but that it was “no use planning for defeat in the field in order to give temporary political satisfaction.” There were two difficulties: first, landing-craft, and, secondly, moving seven battle-tried divisions to the United Kingdom at the beginning of November for the spearhead of the “Overlord” assault. Perhaps the moving of some or all of them would now have to be postponed, but whether or not this would affect the date of “Overlord,” and if so to what extent, it was impossible to say.

Stalin then turned to questions of general strategy. As he saw it, there were two courses open to us: to take up a defensive
position north of Rome and use all the rest of our forces for “Overlord,” or to push through Italy into Germany.

Mr. Eden said that the first alternative was what we had in mind. There was no intention, so far as he knew, to go beyond the Pisa-Rimini line. This would give us depth north of Rome and air bases for bombing Southern Germany. Stalin clearly thought we were right, and said that it would be very difficult to get through the Alps, and that it would suit the Germans well to fight us there. After the capture of Rome, British prestige would certainly be high enough to permit us to pass over to the defensive in Italy.

The discussion then turned to the other point of attack. Mr. Eden said that we might be able to stage a diversionary attack against Southern France synchronising with “Overlord.” If we could secure a bridgehead with a couple of divisions it might be possible to use the French divisions which were trained and equipped in North Africa. Stalin thought that this was a good idea, since the more we made Hitler disperse the better. These were the tactics he was employing on the Russian Front But would there be enough landing-craft?

He then put the question, “Will the postponement of Overlord’ be one month or two months?” Mr. Eden said that he could not possibly give an answer. All that he could state definitely was that we would do our very best to launch “Overlord” at the earliest possible moment at which it had a reasonable prospect of success, and that it was most desirable that the three heads of Governments should meet as soon as possible. Stalin entirely agreed, but said that there was some hesitation on the part of the President about going to Teheran. When Eden suggested Habbaniya, both he and Molotov firmly refused. Stalin said that he himself could not go far away so long as there was an opportunity of continuing to damage Hitler’s armies. The Germans had recently moved some tank divisions from France and Belgium to the Soviet Front, but they were short of equipment and raw materials. It was essential to give Hitler no rest, and he volunteered that the Soviet armies would not have had the success that they had won if the Germans had been able to move from the West the forty divisions which were pinned there by the mere threat of our invasion. The Soviet fully understood this contribution to the cause.

Mr. Eden said that the Marshal well knew that the Prime Minister was just as keen on hurting Hitler as he was. Stalin fully acknowledged this, but added with a gust of laughter that I had a tendency to take the easy road for myself and leave the difficult jobs to the Russians. Eden refused to agree, and mentioned the difficulties of naval operations and our recent heavy losses in destroyers. Stalin became serious again, and said that his people spoke little about naval operations, but realised how difficult they were.

  The whole talk [cabled Mr. Eden] went off surprisingly well. Stalin seemed in excellent humour, and at no point in the evening was there any recrimination about the past or any disposition to ignore real difficulties that face us. This may only have been a first reaction and second thoughts may not be so good, but it is significant that he should have gone out of his way to acknowledge the contribution we were making by merely pinning forty German divisions in the West, and his sympathetic references to the difficulties of naval operations and to the necessity for landing-craft, etc., seemed to show that he no longer regards an overseas operation as a simple matter. It is clear however that he expects us to make every effort to stage “Overlord” at the earliest possible moment, and the confidence he is placing in our word is to me most striking.

  There had been many signs during the Conference that the Soviet Government sincerely desired permanent friendship with Britain and the United States. They had met us on a number of points, both large and small, about which we foresaw difficulties. Stalin had shown understanding of our problems, and so far there had been no unsatisfactory afterthoughts.

  Molotov [said Mr. Eden] has shown that spirit on many occasions, notably as chairman of our Conference today, when we had
our final session on military matters. Though he was obviously disappointed at the outcome of what I had told him and Stalin last night, and at our failure wholly to endorse in a manner satisfactory to him Soviet proposals about Turkey and Sweden, he conducted our business with an evident desire to avoid embarrassment to either country. As an indication of good will I received a message from him tonight that our two imprisoned sailors had been pardoned.

Russian representatives have given many other signs of an intention to open a new chapter. Your gesture in respect of convoys has made a deep impression. For the first time for many years Molotov and a number of his colleagues came to dinner at this Embassy tonight. Mikoyan, whose task it is to keep these people informed, was especially eloquent in his tributes to your personal share in the sailing of these convoys.

In this atmosphere I would give much to be able to close the Conference with some tangible evidence of our good will. I am quite sure that if I could give them some encouraging message about their desire to have a small share of the Italian Fleet the psychological effect would be out of all proportion to the value of the ships, whatever that may be. The Ambassador and Harriman fully endorse this view. If it is impossible to give a specific reply before I leave it will be greatest help to me if I can at least tell Monsieur Molotov that in principle we agree that the Soviet Government shall have a share of the captured Italian ships and that the proportion for which they ask is reasonable. Details can be worked out subsequently, including dates of delivery. If you can do this to help me, I feel sure that the return will more than justify your gesture. I beg your aid.