Closing the Ring (43 page)

  A few days later, I addressed myself to the President.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

1 Oct. 43

I am somewhat worried by the way in which our great changes in the High Commands are being broken to the public. So far nothing has been said here, but almost every day some statement is made in the United States about Marshall, and I shall certainly be asked questions when Parliament meets on Tuesday, the 12th. Moreover, it would be difficult for me if Marshall’s appointment to the Chief Command in Britain were to be announced apart from Alexander’s succession in the Mediterranean. Rumour runs riot, and is fed by carefully balanced and guarded statements, such as that made by Stimson reported in today’s papers. An impression of mystery and of something to be concealed is given. This is a fine field for malicious people. All this would be blown away by publication of the clear-cut decisions to which we have come. In all the circumstances I hope you will see your way to a simultaneous announcement by us both of the changes, coupled with a statement that they will be brought into effect as soon as convenient to the military situation.

2. Will you also consider my difficulties in the consequential appointments. For instance, I understood that Marshall would like Montgomery for Deputy, or, alternatively, to command under him the British expeditionary armies in “Overlord.” This would entail my clearing the Home Command here, now held by General Paget. An opportunity is now open for this, as General Pownall, who was formerly Commander-in-Chief Iraq and Persia, goes with Mountbatten to India as Chief of Staff, and I can post Paget to Iraq and Persia. It is difficult and also harmful to leave these commands vacant for long.

3. Some of the United States papers seem to have begun attacking Mountbatten bitterly, and he has been affected by accounts telegraphed here describing him as “the British princeling and glamour boy who has ousted the proved veteran MacArthur from his rightful sphere,” or words to that effect. The prominence given to the Indian Front Command by these controversies is of course leading the Japanese to reinforce in that quarter, and intelligence to this effect has already been received. We are told that a large number of correspondents are proceeding or trying to proceed from the United States to Delhi, and that expectation is rife of an early beginning of the campaign. On the other hand, the floods and the monsoon rains will of course prevent any decisive action till the New Year. But this cannot be stated publicly without relieving any anxieties of the Japanese. The prospects of having a formidable band of correspondents champing their bits in Delhi is not a pleasant one, and it would help our fighting chances if everything possible could be done to damp down controversy and publicity in this area.

4. In these circumstances a plain statement of what we have settled for all theatres, including Commanders, their Chiefs of Staff, and one or two of the principal officers, all brought out together, would in my opinion be a great advantage. I could, if you desire, draft such a statement and submit it to you.

  The President replied:

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister

5 Oct. 43

The newspapers here, beginning with the Hearst-McCormick crowd, had a field day over General Marshall’s duties. The drums were beaten rather loudly by the rest of the press for a few days, but it is pretty much of a dead cat now. It seems to me that if we are forced into making public statements about our military commands we will find ourselves with the newspapers running the war. I therefore hope that nothing will be said about the business until it is actually accomplished. It may be that the situation, other than newspaper criticism by our political enemies, will warrant a joint announcement sooner than I have anticipated, but at the moment I earnestly urge that we say nothing. I agree with you that at the appropriate time we must make an over-all statement relative to commands, and I fully appreciate your position at home, but I do not think that the difficulties about secondary commands throughout the world are adequate reasons for making the major announcement in regard to Marshall.

I will do what I can about Mountbatten, because I realise that some of our press have been treating him very badly, although, on the whole, he has come out of it very well. Certainly American public opinion thoroughly approves of his appointment. I agree with you that we should not permit any undue optimism about this [Burma] campaign either at home or abroad. Nevertheless, there is a very proper feeling that Mountbatten will prosecute vigorously anything he is assigned to do.

I hope very much that you will agree that statement about Marshall need not be made at present.

  I found the delay in the American decision embarrassing, and on October 17, I cabled to the President:

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

17 Oct. 43

It seems to me that it is becoming very necessary to have a decision about the High Commands. Unless there is a German collapse, the campaign of 1944 will be far the most dangerous we have undertaken, and personally I am more anxious about its success than I was about 1941, 1942, or 1943.

  Nearly a fortnight passed before I received an answer, and then it was indeterminate.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister

30 Oct. 43

Preparations for “Overlord” seem to have reached a stage from which progress is difficult unless and until the Commander is appointed. As you know, I cannot make Marshall available immediately. I am none the less anxious that preparations proceed on schedule agreed at “Quadrant,” with target date May 1. I suggest you may care to consider the early appointment of British Deputy Supreme Commander for “Overlord,” who, in receipt of precisely the same measure of support as will eventually be accorded to Marshall, could well carry the work forward. If I may make proposal, I suggest appointment of Dill, Portal, or Brooke.

*  *  * *  *

By the beginning of November, we became aware that the President himself and his advisers desired that the Supreme Commander of “Overlord” should also command the Mediterranean,
and that the President’s idea was that Marshall should command both theatres, and play them in one with another. I presumed that this would be from a headquarters at Gibraltar. I thought it necessary to make the British position clear without delay. As the matter was not suited at this stage for a direct interchange between me and the President, I thought it better to tell Field-Marshal Sir John Dill to talk about it to Admiral Leahy, the Chairman of the American Chiefs of Staff Committee at Washington.

Prime Minister to Field-Marshal Dill (Washington)

8 Nov. 43

You should leave Admiral Leahy in no doubt that we should never be able to agree to the proposal of putting the “Overlord” and Mediterranean Commands under an American Commander-in-Chief. Such an arrangement would not be conformable to the principle of equal status which must be maintained among the great Allies. I cannot accept a combination of the two Commands under one Commander-in-Chief. This would place him above the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and would also affect the constitutional control of the movements of forces by the President as United States Commander-in-Chief and by the Prime Minister acting on behalf of the War Cabinet. I should certainly never be able to accept responsibility for such an arrangement. Hitherto we have successfully prevented any carping here at the fact that we have been fighting and sustaining casualties in Tunis, Sicily, and Italy on something like a two-and-a-half-to-one basis, although we are serving loyally under a United States General. If I were to attempt to propose anything such as is suggested above there would be an explosion. However, this will not occur while I hold my present office. You may at your discretion impart the above to Mr. Hopkins.

  The next day Dill saw Leahy, and made my attitude towards the unification of the “Overlord” and Mediterranean Commands quite clear. Leahy, though personally disappointed, accepted the position, saying, “If that is the opinion of the Prime Minister there is nothing more to be said about it.” Dill also saw Hopkins, whom he reported as similarly “disappointed.”
“At any rate,” said Dill, “Hopkins and Leahy know how useless it would be to return to the charge, and I hope they won’t.”

*  *  * *  *

I had hardly got home after my visits to the Citadel, the White House, and Hyde Park during the Quebec Conference, already described, when I turned again to the theme of a meeting of the three heads of Governments which logically followed the Anglo-American conversations. In principle there was general agreement that this was urgent and imperative; but no one who did not live through it can measure the worries and complications which attended the fixing of the time, place, and conditions of this, the first conference of what were then called the Big Three. I give a full account here, because the tale is at least a diplomatic curiosity.

I addressed myself first to Stalin, who I knew favoured the idea of a rendezvous at Teheran.

Prime Minister to Premier Stalin

25 Sept. 43

I have been pondering about our meeting of heads of Governments at Teheran. Good arrangements must be made for security in this somewhat loosely controlled area. Accordingly I suggest for your consideration that I make preparations at Cairo in regard to accommodation, security, etc., which are bound to be noticed in spite of all praiseworthy efforts to keep them secret. Then perhaps only two or three days before our meeting we should throw a British and a Russian brigade around a suitable area in Teheran, including the airfield, and keep an absolute cordon till we have finished our talks. … Thus we shall have an effective blind for the world Press, and also for any unpleasant people who might not be as fond of us as they ought.

2. I suggest also that we use the expression “Cairo Three” instead of Teheran, which should be buried, and also that the code-name for the operation should be “Eureka,” which I believe is Ancient Greek. If you have other ideas let me know, and we can then put them to the President. I have not said anything to him about this aspect yet.

  Stalin’s reply was direct and positive.

Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill

3 Oct. 43

I have no objection to the diversionary preparations which you intend to carry out in Cairo. Regarding your proposal to throw British and Russian brigades into the region of “Cairo Three” several days before our meeting in that city, I find this measure inexpedient, as it would cause an unnecessary sensation and would decamouflage the preparations. I suggest that each of us should take with him a sufficient police guard. In my opinion this would be enough to secure our safety. …

  In fact, a complete cordon was established and the military and police forces used, especially by the Russians, were numbered by thousands.

*  *  * *  *

As I could not be sure whether the President would be allowed by his security advisers to go to Teheran, I suggested alternatives. One of these was a desert encampment around the Air Force Training School at Habbaniya, which had made so brilliant a defence in 1941. Here we should have been absolutely by ourselves and in perfect security, and the President would have had no difficulty in flying thither in a few hours from Cairo. I therefore telegraphed this proposal to him.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

14 Oct. 43

I have a new idea about “Eureka,” which I have asked Anthony [at that time in Moscow] to try on Uncle Joe for subsequent submission to you if U.J. agrees. There is a place in the Desert which I now call “Cyprus,” but whose real name is Habbaniya. This would be a much easier journey for you from Cairo than “Cairo Three,” and very little longer for U.J. We could put up three encampments and live comfortably in perfect seclusion and security. I am going into details on the chance of agreement in the trinity. See also, meanwhile, St. Matthew,
chapter 17
, verse 4.

President Roosevelt to the Prime Minister

15 Oct. 43

I have finally sent the following telegram to Uncle Joe, and I think your idea is an excellent one. St. Peter sometimes had reainspirations. I like the idea of three tabernacles. We can add one later for your old friend Chiang.

“The problem of my going to Teheran is becoming so acute that I feel I should tell you frankly that, for constitutional reasons. I cannot take the risk. The Congress will be in session. New laws and resolutions must be acted on by me after their receipt, and must be returned to the Congress physically before ten days have elapsed. None of this can be done by radio or cable. Teheran is too far to be sure that the requirements are fulfilled. The possibility of delay in getting over the mountains—first east-bound and then west-bound—is insurmountable. We know from experience that planes in either direction are often held up for three or four days. …

“In many ways Cairo is attractive, and I understand there is a hotel and some villas out near the Pyramids which could be completely segregated.

“Asmara, the former Italian capital of Eritrea, is said to have excellent buildings, and a landing-field good at all times.

“Then there is the possibility of meeting at some port in the Eastern Mediterranean, each one of us to have a ship. … Another suggestion is in the neighborhood of Baghdad. …

“In any event, I think the Press should be entirely banished, and the whole place surrounded by a cordon so that we would not be disturbed in any way.

“I am placing a very great importance on the personal and intimate conversations which you and Churchill and I will have, for on them the hope of the future world will greatly depend.

“Your continuing initiative along your whole front heartens all of us.”

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

16 Oct. 43

I entirely agree with the telegram you have sent to Uncle Joe about “Eureka.” Let me know what he replies.

  Stalin was however adamant on Teheran.