Closing the Ring (80 page)

Mountbatten was justified in adding, “The Japanese bid for India was virtually over, and ahead lay the prospect of the first major British victory in Burma.”

¹
See map, “Burma.”

²
“Chindit,” the familiar name for Wingate’s Long-Range Penetration Force.

15
Strategy Against Japan

The Choice Before Us___My Minute of January
24, 1944___
Arrival of Admiral Mountbatten’s Mission___The New Plan___United States Objections___Mountbatten’s Mission at Washington___The Main Japanese Fleet Moves to Singapore___Prevention of Amphibious Operations___We No Longer Command the Bay of Bengal___My Telegram to President Roosevelt of March
10___
The President’s Reply___I Give a Ruling to the Chiefs of Staff, March
20___
The Decision Accepted.

W
HILE
THE
FIERCE
AND
CRITICAL
FIGHTING
by land and air described in the last chapter was raging in Burma and the Pacific, the whole future policy of the conduct of the war against Japan was being hotly debated among ourselves in London, among the Americans in Washington, and between London and Washington. I have already mentioned the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Cairo Conference on the long-term policy in the Pacific, and the British share in it, and how this had been initialled by the President and me without our being able in the pressure of events to study it, or discuss it together or with our advisers. It was only when at Marrakesh I received a request to transmit a dispatch on the subject to the Dominions that I became aware how far the British Chiefs of Staff had developed their opinions. I found myself immediately in disagreement, and thus arose the only considerable difference which I and the War Cabinet had with our trusted military colleagues.

Briefly, the following choice lay before us: Should we send
our naval forces and any troops or air-power we could spare or transport to act with the left flank of the United States forces in the Southwest Pacific, basing ourselves upon Australia? Our Chiefs of Staff thought we should, and they had had no difficulty in reaching agreement with their American comrades in Cairo. On the other hand, I and my colleagues held that we should advance eastward to the Malay Peninsula and the Dutch islands, using India as our base. The Chiefs of Staff contended that, whereas Mountbatten could not carry out amphibious operations on a major scale until six months after a German defeat, their Pacific reinforcement plan, to which they suggested we were committed, could be begun much sooner.

As soon as I got home, I convened a meeting of the Defence Committee, where the whole subject was for the first time effectively examined and thrashed out between us.

A few days later I wrote the following minute:

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee
    24 Jan. 44

All my Ministerial colleagues who were present at the meeting on the 19th have spoken to me about the projects then expounded by the Planners in a strongly adverse sense. I myself am not in agreement with these plans, and the issue will have to be debated as between Governments. It must also be remembered that this plan is entirely different from that expounded to us by General MacArthur’s Chief of Staff, so that evidently there is a great difference of opinion even among the Americans themselves upon it.

2. No one would object to sending the handful of ships proposed to work with the American Fleet in any June operation they may have in view, and of course we should always be ready to build up a fleet in the Pacific. But no plan of war in these theatres could be considered satisfactory which provided no outlet in 1944/45, before Hitler is defeated, for the very large air and military forces we have standing in India and around the Bay of Bengal.

3. For these forces, the only effectual operation is Sumatra [“Culverin”]. I have long been convinced that this is the most practical manner of drawing off very large numbers of Japanese aircraft, and possibly of troops, or, in the alternative, of regaining important territory and securing bases from which we may strike equally at Singapore, at Bangkok, in the Malacca Straits, and along
the Japanese communications with Burma. My colleagues agree with me in thinking that it is upon this that we should concentrate our efforts, making it clear to the Americans that if we help them in the Pacific, as we shall do, we shall expect them to assist us with a proper supply of landing-craft in time to attack Sumatra in October, November, or December. This they can perfectly well do from the immense new construction of L.S.T.s which will be continuous throughout the year. …

4. We must await the arrival of the officers whom Admiral Mountbatten is sending to go into the matter fully with them, and we cannot send any telegrams to the Dominions until we have at least formed our own view.

  In mid-February 1944, Mountbatten’s Mission arrived, headed by his able American Deputy Chief of Staff, General Wedemeyer. Mountbatten did not believe the American project for a through road from Northern Assam to China could be completed for two-way traffic before June 1946. He therefore advised dropping it and expanding the existing air route instead. If this were done he would not have to recapture so large a part of Northern Burma. With the resources thus released, he wished to penetrate the enemy perimeter of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, and push rapidly northeastward from base to base along the Asiatic coast. This would open better communication with China by sea, and would be a direct help to the American advances on Japan from the Central Pacific and New Guinea. Sumatra would have to be captured first, and he proposed to do this as soon as amphibious resources were released from Northwest Europe. “Culverin” was thus revived.

This strategy was however opposed to the recommendations which the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed upon at Cairo. It raised our differences about long-term policy in an immediate and practical form. Having long been an advocate of the Sumatra enterprise, I liked Mountbatten’s new plan. I still believed that the size of the forces considered necessary for Sumatra was excessive, but nevertheless there would be a surplus over the needs of the Burma land campaign, as proposed
by Mountbatten, and I was against sending them to play a minor part in MacArthur’s operations. In this I was fully supported by the Foreign Office, who thought that the British rôle in the Far East should not be a mere minor contribution to the Americans; this was not likely to appeal to the British people. Moreover, the peoples of Asia were little interested in the Pacific islands as compared with the wide regions which meant most to them. In contrast, the strategy advocated by Southeast Asia Command would have immediate psychological and political effects which would hasten the defeat of Japan.

I was quite sure that American minds would move in a different direction. I was not therefore surprised at a passage in President Roosevelt’s telegram to me of February 25, 1944:

  I am gravely concerned over the recent trends in strategy that favour an operation toward Sumatra and Malaya in the future rather than to face the immediate obstacles that confront us in Burma. I fail to see how an operation against Sumatra and Malaya, requiring tremendous resources and forces, can possibly be mounted until after the conclusion of the war in Europe. Lucrative as a successful “Culverin” might be, there appears much more to be gained by employing all the resources we now have available in an all-out drive into Upper Burma so that we can build up our air strength in China and ensure the essential support for our westward advance to the Formosa-China-Luzon area.

  This did not augur well for the success of Wedemeyer’s Mission. They presented themselves in Washington in March to the American Chiefs of Staff. They were not the first in the field. Admiral Mountbatten’s Commanders-in-Chief had fully supported his plans, but not so his Deputy, the American General Stilwell. This was understandable, as Stilwell combined the office of Deputy with several others, notably that of Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek. It was not a good arrangement on the part of the Americans, but we had had no option but to consent. Stilwell favoured every measure which might conceivably aid China, and believed that supply by road could begin sooner than Southeast-Asia Command expected. He was entitled to urge his views on Admiral Mountbatten, and when
they were not accepted, to represent them with Mountbatten’s consent to his superiors in Washington. But he also permitted himself, without Mountbatten’s knowledge, to send a mission to Washington to state his case there.

The American Chiefs of Staff had recently decided that though General MacArthur’s advance towards the Philippines should continue, the main attack should be made by Admiral Nimitz from the Central Pacific against Formosa. They therefore thought the strategic value of liberating Malaya and the Dutch East Indies would be small and tardy. They saw no need for any attack on Sumatra. Their hearts were still set on flying more supplies to China over the “Hump” and building the Burma Road. They also had a new plan for basing long-range bombers in China to attack Japan, which would need more to supply tonnage than they had so far required. Wedemeyer marshalled the arguments for Mountbatten’s proposals with great skill, but he failed to convince his auditors and masters.

*  *  * *  *

However, at this very time an unexpected event of the first importance occurred. The main Japanese Fleet, including seven battleships, moved from the Central Pacific to Singapore. Their purpose was uncertain. Probably it was chiefly to station them nearer to the oil supplies of the Dutch East Indies; but they might break into the Bay of Bengal. This possibility put a stop for the time being to “Culverin” or other amphibious adventures in Indian waters. We no longer had even local naval superiority. I immediately recognised this unpleasant fact.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee
    7 Mar. 44

The plan for Sumatra was made on the assumption that no considerable detachment would be made from the Japanese main fleet. This was of course pure assumption based on what it would be reasonable for the enemy to do, and there never could be any guarantee that the enemy would not do unreasonable things. However, at that time the Japanese were believed to be concerned in defending Truk and Rabaul and other outposts against the United
States, and in holding themselves in readiness for the possibilities of a fleet action. They have now abandoned any such intentions, if they had them, and, falling back from their outpost line, are able to make defensive dispositions of their fleet which includes the stationing of a strong force at Singapore. While that fleet is there, it is evident that we could not do Sumatra, or anything like it, unless our own naval forces were built up to the point where we should welcome a fleet action. It is very much for the advantage of the United States that the Japanese should be held at Singapore. The longer they are there, the greater the opportunities for Admiral Nimitz to act with freedom and advance with rapidity. How long the Japanese can afford to remain at Singapore depends upon the progress of the American advance. It seems quite certain they will have to reunite their fleet and, having reunited it, will have again to contemplate the idea of a general engagement for the sake of the Philippines or nearer home. The probabilities of their coming back to Singapore, should they leave it, can only be assessed in relation to the situation prevailing at the time. The longer we can detain them in their present position at Singapore, the greater the help we can give the United States. This will be achieved by continued preparations for large amphibious attacks the moment they are forced by the United States main advance to reunite their fleet and withdraw into the Pacific.

2. Make sure this minute is put before the Joint Planners.

  Meanwhile, our discussions with our Chiefs of Staff were long and sometimes tense. The policy of helping General MacArthur or Admiral Nimitz depended on what size of force could be based on Australia, and whether on the east or north and west coasts. We had insufficient information, and further investigation was admittedly needed. It would obviously be a very great strain on our shipping. In March, we seemed to have reached a deadlock among ourselves at home. The Chiefs of Staff felt that the Americans were expecting us to send a fleet to the Pacific for operations which might occur in June. I therefore thought it necessary to clear up this point with the President and also to inform him of the whole position.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt
    10 Mar. 44

In the Final Report of the Cairo Conference, the Combined
Chiefs of Staff reported that they had “approved in principle as a basis for further investigation and preparation” an over-all plan for the defeat of Japan. This plan contemplated the dispatch to the Pacific of a detachment of the British Fleet which was provisionally scheduled to become operational in the Pacific in June 1944. Although you and I both initialled the Final Report, neither of us had had the opportunity of going into these matters personally as we were concerned with affairs of more immediate urgency. Since then the War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff have been “investigating,” and we have not so far reached united conclusions. Meanwhile, the Japanese Fleet has arrived at Singapore, which constitutes in my mind a new major fact.

2. After the surrender of the Italian Fleet in September 1943, I was very keen on sending a detachment of our Fleet as quickly as possible to the Pacific, but when I opened this to Admiral King, he explained to me how very strong the United States Navy was already in those waters compared with the Japanese, and I formed the impression that he did not need us very much. I have also seen several telegrams from our naval representatives in Washington which tend to confirm the above impression. On the other hand, I am told that Admiral King has informed the First Sea Lord that he would like to have our detachment, provided it did not arrive until August or September, when its logistic requirements could more easily be met. I am, in the upshot, left in doubt about whether we are really needed this year.