Closing the Ring (76 page)

I also sent the following message to M. Tsouderos on April 6: “I was much shocked to hear of your resignation, which seems to leave Greece forlorn at a moment of peril for her national life. The King, whom I have just seen, tells me he has not accepted your resignation. He is coming out to Alexandria next week. Surely you can await his arrival.”

The situation in the Greek Army and Navy had by now further deteriorated, and Venizelos announced that he could no longer accept office. M. Tsouderos replied on April 7: “I shall remain at my post, as the laws of Greece require and as you desire, until this present crisis has found lawful solution. If the King waits until he returns to Egypt before he resolves this crisis, I fear that by that time there may be no longer any opportunity of resolving it.”

Mr. Leeper telegraphed to the Foreign Office on April 7:

“What is happening here among the Greeks is nothing less than a revolution.

“It is under such conditions that a makeshift Greek Government in exile, suffering from all the weakness which that implies,
has been trying to cope with the situation. It has failed completely, but has been handicapped by being able to make no legal change without the sanction of the King at a distance. …”

Our Ambassador hoped however that the situation could be settled in Cairo without the King’s presence. “The King of Greece’s return here at present would certainly provoke fresh trouble. Tsouderos and all his colleagues are strongly of this opinion. He would find himself isolated and unable to do anything, and would be a grave embarrassment to us.” He asked the Foreign Office to do everything in their power to stop his return. “In the circumstances in which we are living here at the moment, the advice of people on the spot should, I submit, be accepted. My views are shared by everybody here.”

*  *  * *  *

The King of Greece came to luncheon with me in London on this day. I showed him the Ambassador’s telegram without comment. He said he would go to Cairo at once. I thought he was quite right.

Prime Minister to Mr. Leeper
    7 Apr. 44

I have discussed the situation with the King. He is resolved to return to Cairo, leaving by air Sunday evening, and notwithstanding your telegram (which I have shown the King) I consider he is right to do so. If, as you say, what is happening in Cairo is a Greek revolution, I cannot advise him to stay away and allow the issue to be decided in his absence. … All local Greek politicians and agitators should at the same time be warned that we shall not hesitate to take adequate measures of security to prevent agitation and demonstrations which might threaten law and order in Egypt and the position and authority of the King and the Greek Government. … You should inform M. Tsouderos that I count on him to remain at his post until the present crisis has found a lawful solution. …

This is an occasion for you to show those qualities of imperturbability and command which are associated with the British Diplomatic Service.

  And the next day I added:

Prime Minister to Mr. Leeper
    8 Apr. 44

Weather permitting, the King will leave Sunday night. Meanwhile, it is M. Tsouderos’ duty to stand to his post. Of course, if he can get M. Sophocles Venizelos to stay with him, all the better. When the King arrives, the British Security Service must ensure his personal safety. He may require a few days to make up his mind, and must on no account be hustled. I am asking the military commanders to move the Greek Brigade as fast as possible to Italy. They will of course weed out recalcitrant elements. In the same way the Admiral is expected to preserve the discipline of all ships under his command, using no more force than is necessary.

For you yourself there is a great opportunity. You should stick to the line I have marked out and not be worried about the consequences. You speak of living on the lid of a volcano. Wherever else do you expect to live in times like these? Please however be careful to follow very exactly the instructions you are receiving from me, namely, first in priority, order and discipline to be maintained in the armed forces; secondly, the safety of the King’s person to be ensured; thirdly, every effort to be made to induce Tsouderos to hold office till the King returns and has had time to look around; fourthly, try to get Venizelos to remain with Tsouderos; fifthly, celebrate Easter Sunday in a manner pious and becoming.

*  *  * *  *

On April 8, a Greek destroyer refused to obey orders to proceed to sea unless a Government was formed which would include E.A.M. representatives. The mutinous Greek Brigade had taken up defensive positions round their camp, and trouble was expected in the small Greek Air Force units as well. I was forced to give up my hopes of getting the Greek Brigade sent to Italy. Later, I telegraphed to General Paget, who commanded the British forces in Egypt:

Prime Minister to General Paget
    8 Apr. 44

A mutinous brigade threatening its officers should certainly be surrounded and forced to surrender by stoppage of all supplies. Why do you leave out water? Will this not bring the desired result quicker? Obviously, these troops should be disarmed. I agree that the hope of getting them to Italy may have to be abandoned. Keep me fully informed of plans for disarming. We cannot tolerate political revolutions carried out by foreign military formations for which we are ultimately responsible. In all cases large numbers of British troops should be used so as to overawe, and thus minimise bloodshed.

  I also sent Mr. Leeper a full statement of our policy for use with the Greeks.

Prime Minister to Mr. Leeper
    9 Apr. 44

Our relations are definitely established with the lawfully constituted Greek Government headed by the King, who is the ally of Britain and cannot be discarded to suit a momentary surge of appetite among ambitious
émigré
nonentities. Neither can Greece find constitutional expression in particular sets of guerrillas, in many cases indistinguishable from banditti, who are masquerading as the saviours of their country while living on the local villagers. If necessary, I shall denounce these elements and tendencies publicly in order to emphasise the love Great Britain has for Greece, whose sufferings she shared in a small measure, being, alas, not then armed as we are now. Our only desire and interest is to see Greece a glorious, free nation in the Eastern Mediterranean, the honoured friend and ally of the victorious Powers. Let all therefore work for this objective, and make it quite clear that any failure in good conduct will not be overlooked.

I had been working very hard to arrange the movement of the Greek Brigade into Italy. Here they might still take part in the entry into Rome which is to be expected during the summer. This brigade, the 1st Greek Brigade, representatives of the army which had beaten back the Italian invader and were only felled by the treacherous and brutal intervention of the German hordes, had and still has the chance of raising the name of Greece high in the world. It is a lamentable fact that they should have signallised this opportunity by an undignified, even squalid, exhibition of indiscipline, which many will attribute to an unworthy fear of being sent to the front.

In the same way the Greek Navy, which is full of daring seamen and is playing a worthy part upholding its country’s good name, should not suddenly have tried to meddle with politics and presume to dictate a constitution to the Greek people. I believe that both of these two forces can be brought back to a high sense of
national honour and duty if courageous leadership is forthcoming, backed by overwhelming force in reserve.

All the time I have been planning to place Greece back high in the counsels of the victorious nations. Witness how we have included them in the Italian Advisory Council and tried to send a brigade to take part in the impending victories in Italy. Greeks who are in safety in Egypt under our protection, equipped with our vessels or armed with our weapons or otherwise in security under the military authority of the British Commander-in-Chief Middle East, will place themselves in an abject and shameful position before all history if they allow their domestic feuds to mar their performance of the solemn duties to their country of which they have become the heirs. They may easily, by selfish, excitable behaviour, reduce Greece to a country without expression either at home or abroad, and their names will be stained as long as history is written.

The King is the servant of his people. He makes no claim to rule them. He submits himself freely to the judgment of the people as soon as normal conditions are restored. He places himself and his Royal House entirely at the disposition of the Greek nation. Once the German invader has been driven out, Greece can be a republic or a monarchy, entirely as the people wish. Why then cannot the Greeks keep their hatreds for the common enemy, who has wrought them such cruel injuries and would obliterate them as a free people, were it not for the resolute exertions of the Great Allies?

*  *  * *  *

General Paget now reported to me that, as the 1st Greek Brigade had mutinied against its officers and refused to hand in its arms under specific orders from him, he proposed to take direct action to carry out such orders. I telegraphed on April 9: “These small-scale events are developing rapidly, and I fully concur with the action you are taking. …
You will have achieved success if you bring the brigade under control without bloodshed. But brought under control it must be. Count on my support.
”

The Greek Brigade was now surrounded by superior British forces. Its strength was forty-five hundred men, with over fifty guns, which were all deployed in defensive positions against us. On April 12, I sent further directions to Mr. Leeper and all others concerned:

Prime Minister to Mr. Leeper
(
Cairo
)        12 Apr. 44

There can be no question of making terms with mutineers about political matters. They must return to their duty unconditionally. They must submit to be disarmed unconditionally. It would be a great pity to give any assurances about the non-punishment of ringleaders. … The question of clemency would rest with the King. Let me know how this stands before taking any decisive action.

  And further:

Prime Minister to Mr. Leeper and all Principals concerned (Cairo)
    14 Apr. 44

Surely you should let lack of supplies work its part both in the camp and the harbour before resorting to firing. You should use the weapon of blockade to the full and defend yourselves against attempts to break out. Do not worry too much about the external effects. Do not show yourself overeager to parley. Simply keep them rounded up by artillery and superior force and let hunger play its part. On no account accept any assistance from American or Russian sources, otherwise than as specially enjoined by me. You have ample force at your disposal and plenty of time. It is much more important that the [mutineers] should be reduced to proper discipline than that any particular Greek Government should be set up. It would even be harmful if a brigade and a flotilla had been permitted to meddle in political issues.

My latest information reports that the situation of the Greek Brigade shows signs of improving and that they have finished their rations. You should take full advantage of these tendencies and keep me informed.

  And the next day:

Prime Minister to Mr. Leeper
    15 Apr. 44

Do not be influenced by possible anti-British sentiment among the local Greeks. It would be a great mistake to end this grave business up in a pleasant kiss all round. That might come later as an act of clemency from the King and his new Government. We
have got to get these men into our hands disarmed, without conditions, and I trust without bloodshed.

*  *  * *  *

Meanwhile, the King had arrived in Cairo, and on April 12 had issued a proclamation stating that a representative Government composed largely of Greeks from within Greece would be formed. The next day Venizelos took office in succession to Tsouderos, and steps were taken in secret to bring out representatives from metropolitan Greece.

I now reported the whole position to President Roosevelt, who was sympathetic to my view and to King George of Greece.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt
    16 Apr. 44

The outbreak in the Greek Army and Navy followed closely on the establishment in the mountains of Greece of the Political Committee sponsored by E.A.M., and there is little doubt that the extremist elements, who have long been working to subvert the allegiance of the Greek forces to their legitimate King and Government, seized on this as a Heaven-sent opportunity for open and violent action. The dissident elements are undoubtedly opposed to the King and in favour of a republic, but throughout the disturbances there have been almost no direct attacks on the King’s personal position, and the only specific demand put forward is that the Greek Government should take immediate and effective steps to recognise and associate with themselves the Political Committee in Greece.

This crisis came at a particularly unfortunate moment, since M. Tsouderos had already sent an invitation to a number of moderate politicians in Athens urging them to come to Cairo to join the Government. He had also invited representatives of E.A.M., the Communist-controlled organisation which has created and now dominates the Political Committee. Tsouderos was thus doing everything in his power to create a truly representative Greek Government.

In this programme he had the support of his colleagues, and they appear to have had no hand in provoking the disturbances in the Greek forces. But they were extremely jealous of Tsouderos’ position, and used the trouble in the Greek Army, which was at first on a small scale, to get rid of him. Feeling that he had lost
control of the situation, Tsouderos resigned and proposed Venizelos for the Premiership. The trouble in the Greek Army rapidly spread to the Navy, and assumed the proportions of a full-scale mutiny in both forces. The politicians in Cairo realised that the matter had gone beyond one of personal rivalries or ambitions, and their only thought was to find some candidate for the Premiership sufficiently notorious for his Left Wing views to be acceptable to the mutinous element in the forces.