Crisis and Command: A History of Executive Power from George Washington to George W. Bush (49 page)

Despite these setbacks, Eisenhower's management of foreign policy and national security has won him high marks. In the years immediately after he left office, scholars ranked him as a below-average President, struck as they were by the contrast between Kennedy's image of energy and youth and Eisenhower's bumbling public performances and moderate policies. History has since revised its opinion. With the opening of his papers, the image of Eisenhower as a detached, grandfatherly chairman of the board has given way to a "hidden-hand" Presidency in the words of Fred Greenstein.
29
Eisenhower was a shrewd politician who was fully in command of his administration and made almost all of the important policy decisions himself. Strategists credit Ike with pursuing the most sensible version of containment, one that matched the nation's ends with limited means. He achieved deterrence without actually going to war.

The exercise of presidential power did not become necessary only in crises, nor did it exert an inevitable pressure toward conflict. Eisenhower rejected the traditional isolationism of the Republican Party, but he also overruled the advice of his military and civilian advisers to seek a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union and China. Only the executive branch could successfully develop and pursue a coherent strategic policy that avoided sharp swings between isolationism and unnecessary war. Eisenhower presided over a stabilization of the Cold War that contained the Soviet Union, deterred incursions against core allies in Europe and Asia, and limited the defense burden on the economy.

Even Cold War Presidents who do not rank highly today found their greatest moments during times that demanded the exercise of constitutional power. While John F. Kennedy's glamorous public image and premature death have won him a popularity that persists to this day, his historical reputation has steadily declined. Kennedy oversaw the Bay of Pigs fiasco, first sent American troops to Vietnam, risked nuclear war over Berlin and Cuba, engaged the United States in counterinsurgency wars, and failed in his efforts to reach an understanding with the Soviets. Kennedy pursued a strategy of "flexible response" that paralleled NSC-68's call for almost unlimited resources to pursue a more activist foreign policy.
330
But JFK's finest hour did come in foreign affairs. He ordered a naval blockade of Cuba to prevent Soviet construction of intermediate-range nuclear ballistic missiles, which had the ability to reach most of the continental United States. Although styled a "quarantine," the blockade was an act of war under international law -- it required the use of naval force to block shipping from reaching Cuban ports. Kennedy could not justify the quarantine under any theory of self-defense or authorization by the United Nations. The Soviets and Cubans had not attacked the United States, and the nuclear missiles themselves were incomplete. Even if the missiles had been finished, a Soviet attack could not have been said to be imminent -- the traditional test under international law for the pre-emptive use of force.
331
Rather, Kennedy used force and the threat of a wider conflict to prevent a dramatic shift in the balance of power toward the Soviet Union, which at the time had only a limited force of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

As we now know, American forces came perilously close to a military conflict with Soviet and Cuban units, which could have escalated into a nuclear exchange -- the President had earlier served notice that any missile launch from Cuba would trigger a full retaliatory response on the Soviet Union. Kennedy never sought any formal authorization from Congress for his actions, though he did meet with congressional leaders to inform them. Several of the leaders recommended that Kennedy invade Cuba, advice he did not take. Rather, JFK carefully maintained the blockade until the Soviets agreed to dismantle the missiles, in exchange for U.S. removal of medium-range nuclear missiles from Turkey and a pledge not to invade Cuba.
332
Critics of presidential power believe that the Constitution must be read to require congressional approval of the use of force. They believe that a more difficult process will "'clog' the road to combat," in John Hart Ely's words, and so keep the United States out of war.
333
World War II shows that this go-slow approach can have a steep cost -- congressional delay can keep the United States out of wars that are in the national interest. Madison's acceptance of the War of 1812 demonstrates the opposite as well: Congress can force the nation into senseless wars. American involvement in Vietnam reveals a third dimension. Congressional participation is no guarantee against poor judgment, ineffective tactics, or just bad luck.

President Lyndon Johnson sought and received the approval of Congress for the Vietnam War in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, passed in August 1964 after an alleged attack by North Vietnamese gunboats on U.S. Navy destroyers in international waters. Controversy continues over whether North Vietnamese forces truly attacked the warships and whether the vessels invited the attacks by supporting covert operations in northern territory. LBJ ordered retaliatory strikes and asked Congress for support, but informed the public only that the North's attacks represented deliberate and unprovoked aggression. In a resolution enacted unanimously in the House and by 88-2 in the Senate, Congress declared that it "approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." The United States was prepared, "as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force," to defend any SEATO nation "requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."
34

Presidents received consistent support from Congress throughout most of the Vietnam War. Congress approved LBJ's 1965 decision to increase dramatically American military involvement with full financial support. The escalation began in the spring of 1965 with Operation Rolling Thunder, which launched a three-year bombing campaign of North Vietnamese targets. Ground deployments began with 4,000 marines in March but quickly reached 200,000 by the end of the year, and 500,000 within two years. Congress overwhelmingly approved the appropriations for the 1965 escalation and the expansion of the draft. Congressional and popular opinion did not fully turn against Johnson and the war until the Tet Offensive in January 1968, which turned a military defeat into a media victory for the North. Even so, Congress continued to provide the men and material for Nixon's new strategy of "Vietnamization" to take hold.
35

Richard Nixon ranks among the below-average Presidents in American history, stuck between Herbert Hoover and Zachary Taylor. To the extent Nixon's Presidency benefited the United States, it came in foreign affairs. His administration introduced detente toward the Soviet Union and the historic opening to China, which created new fissures in the communist bloc. Henry Kissinger's surprise trip to China was carried out in secrecy, even from the State Department, and Nixon extricated the United States from Vietnam, albeit at a high cost (one-third of all American casualties in Vietnam occurred under his Presidency).

To force the North Vietnamese to the bargaining table, Nixon secretly ordered U.S. ground and air intervention into neutral Cambodia, which the North Vietnamese had been using to transport reinforcements into the South. When announced to the public, protests erupted domestically, but efforts in Congress to cut off funds failed. In December 1972, Nixon ordered bombings of Hanoi and other North Vietnamese cities to press for a peace agreement, which was reached in Paris the following month. The Justice Department, relying on a speech by then-Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist, defended Nixon's Cambodian bombings and his other Vietnam War decisions as an exercise of the Commander-in-Chief power.
36
On a different front, the United States threatened the use of force in the Middle East during the 1973 Yom Kippur War in order to ensure the survival of Israel and prevent the conflict from escalating beyond the region.

Watergate weakened the Presidency to the point where Congress changed the balance of powers in its favor. In the 1973 War Powers Resolution (WPR), Congress authorized the President to introduce the American military into hostilities, whether actual or imminent, only with a declaration of war, specific statutory authorization, or an attack on the United States or its forces. The WPR requires that the President "in every possible instant shall consult with Congress" before sending the armed forces into hostilities (or imminent hostilities) and that he must report to Congress within 48 hours afterward. It requires the President to terminate the intervention 60 days after the report unless Congress authorizes the use of force. Nixon vetoed the act on the ground that it violated the President's war authorities, but two-thirds of Congress overrode him. Every President since has refused to acknowledge the WPR's constitutionality, and several have undertaken action in violation of its terms. In these conflicts, Congress chose to allow the President to take the initiative in war-making but also to suffer the political consequences alone.
37

Like Eisenhower, President Reagan received little respect from scholars and pundits, who had always dismissed him as little more than an actor, and when he left office, Reagan was considered a below-average President. The passage of time has given scholars a newfound appreciation, and he now ranks along with Truman and Eisenhower, among the top Presidents in our history. Reagan came to office when the United States seemed to be in retreat on the world stage, and left it with the Soviet Union on its way to collapse under the weight of its economic inefficiencies and military spending. Critics have suggested that Reagan turned out to be lucky, as he had been all his life, and just happened to be in the Oval Office when internal problems caused the Soviet Union to crumble. Yet, the United States was back on its heels when he took office in 1981. Watergate had led to congressional restrictions on executive power in foreign affairs, the Soviets had achieved superiority in nuclear as well as conventional arms, and the aftermath of Vietnam and the Iranian hostage crisis had given rise to the idea that America was an over-muscled Gulliver whose great military strength was of little use.
38

No one would have predicted in 1981 that eight years later the Soviet Union would disappear, and the Warsaw Pact along with it. Few scholars thought that the West's liberal constitutionalism and market economics would prevail, and our nation's preeminent Cold War historian, John Lewis Gaddis, concludes that Reagan contributed to the victory of the United States and its allies in the Cold War. Reagan adopted a national security strategy that would place high demands on the economy for resources and a large buildup of the military. Unlike NSC-68 and Flexible Response, however, the Reagan Doctrine did not aim to react in the same manner and place to block the Soviets. It built up forces in order to challenge the Soviets to a competitive arms race that would bankrupt their economy, while pursuing rollback in the Third World.

Reagan also introduced a strong element of moral values into containment. Under detente, as practiced by Nixon, Ford, and Carter, the superpower struggle had lost its moral content. Reagan, however, had no difficulty declaring the Soviet Union an "evil empire," one that would be consigned to the "ash heap of history." In 1987, Reagan gave a speech in front of the Berlin Wall, demanding, "Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!" Historians today believe that Reagan's decision to challenge the legitimacy of the Soviet Union, which was heavily criticized by congressional leaders, was an essential element of America's victory in the Cold War.
39

In the developed world, the Reagan administration pursued a strategy of expanding American conventional and nuclear forces to force the Soviets to strain their economy to keep pace. Central to his plan was the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), announced in March 1983, which aimed to develop a space-based weapons system that could shoot down Soviet missiles in flight. Despite opposition from many congressional leaders, the legislature eventually provided $60 billion for SDI research. Reagan supplemented SDI with an upgrade of America's nuclear forces, including the B-1 bomber, the MX nuclear missile, and the Pershing II medium-range nuclear missile in Europe.

Congress cooperated by voting for substantial increases in American military spending. Under the Carter administration, defense-related spending ranged between $244-247 billion, about 4.6 percent of GNP. By the end of Reagan's first term, Congress approved a buildup that reached $358 billion annually. Defense spending would peak at $380 billion in 1986 and level out to $374 billion by the end of the second term. Under Reagan, the military spent more in constant dollars than it did during the Vietnam or Korean Wars, though as a portion of GNP it was on a par with spending between 1972 and 1974.
40

Despite the large buildup, Reagan's approach to containment bore more resemblance to Eisenhower's New Look than to Kennedy's Flexible Response. Rejecting detente, the Reagan Doctrine supported anti-communist insurgents in the Third World with the goal of reversing Soviet gains. In National Security Decision Directive 75, the administration declared its policy "to contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism." As approved by President Reagan, American national security policy declared: "The U.S. must rebuild the credibility of its commitment to resist Soviet encroachment on U.S. interests and those of its Allies and friends, and to support effectively those Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures or oppose Soviet initiatives hostile to the United States." The Reagan administration sent covert assistance to the contras in Nicaragua, to the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, and to rebels in Angola. While these projects met with success in pressuring Soviet military and economic resources, they involved no U.S. ground troops. American involvement was limited to intelligence support, covert operations, and military and technical aid, while the local forces conducted the fighting on the ground.
41