Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (19 page)

Two weeks after Deng was formally named vice premier, Jiang Qing, always on the lookout for ways to arouse Mao's suspicions of Deng, chanced upon a newspaper article that praised the Chinese-built ship the
Fengqinglun
. At this point, Deng, eager to increase foreign trade, had supported the Ministry of Transportation's conclusion that China was not yet up to producing large transport ships and that in the short run, to increase trade, it was necessary to purchase foreign vessels. Jiang Qing, drawing on the newspaper article she read, wrote comments to praise the 10,000-ton
Fengqinglun
and to protest that Zhou Enlai and Deng were wasting the country's money buying foreign ships. Further, she declared that Deng's interest in buying the foreign ships showed that he, as well as officials in the Ministry of Transportation, had a comprador mentality and worshipped things foreign. Domestic vessels, she wrote, are just as good: “We can build even 10,000-ton ships like the
Fengqinglun
.”
¹¹⁴

The next volley came at a Politburo meeting on October 17, when Jiang Qing again attacked Deng, this time verbally, for supporting the purchase of foreign ships, and for being a slave to the West. China, she repeated, could produce its own excellent ships. Deng was ordinarily able to keep his cool, but under Jiang Qing's continued attacks, he lost it. Deng, who was then also angry at Jiang Qing for trying to promote her ally Yang Chengwu to be chief of staff, replied angrily that when he had traveled abroad a half-century earlier, he had traveled on a 40,000-ton ship made in the West and that even then a ship of that size was not unusual. In short, China was far behind in shipping and Jiang Qing was out of touch. After Deng exploded, at Li Xiannian's urging, he left the room, red-faced with anger.
¹¹⁵
Deng later confessed to Zhou Enlai that Jiang Qing had attacked him seven or eight times during Politburo meetings and he could no longer stand it.
¹¹⁶

The day after Deng's October 17 outburst at the Politburo meeting, Wang Hongwen, on behalf of the Politburo, flew to Changsha. Echoing Jiang Qing's comments, he tried to raise doubts in Mao's mind about Deng's abilities to play such an important leadership role. The meeting, however, only increased Mao's doubts about whether Wang was the best person for his job.
¹¹⁷
Two days later, on October 20, when Mao met Danish prime minister Poul Hartling in Changsha, Deng Xiaoping was invited to join the reception.

By this time, the two ladies, Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng, had briefed Mao on the confrontation between Jiang Qiang and Deng Xiaoping in Beijing. Mao was furious at Jiang Qing, who was clearly continuing to carry on political attacks when he wanted her to quiet down.
¹¹⁸
During the next month Mao criticized Jiang for interfering, for criticizing government documents (like the decision to buy foreign ships), for issuing documents without consultation, and for trying to form her own leadership team against the wishes of the majority. Alluding to characters in a play by Xi Xiangji, Mao told Jiang to act like a kind old lady, not a scheming matchmaker. Mao did not dismiss her. She had proved to be a determined ally in attacking whomever Mao wanted to be attacked, and he might again need those skills. At least for the moment, however, as he began to prepare for the forthcoming 4th National People's Congress, he held her back while encouraging Deng to take on a greater role.
¹¹⁹

In December 1974, Zhou Enlai left his hospital bed and flew to Changsha to meet Mao. The two men were convening to decide on appointments for the key leadership positions in Beijing, and because they knew that neither had long to live, their work had great urgency. Following a major cancer operation on June 1, Zhou Enlai was so frail he could not carry on his daily work, and his plane carrying him to Changsha was like a small hospital, with doctors on board.
¹
Mao, suffering from heart trouble and from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS, also known as Lou Gehrig's disease), had been told that he had less than two years to live. His eyesight had deteriorated and his slurred speech was difficult to understand. But despite their health problems, both of the leaders' minds remained clear. Mao and Zhou, despite their differences, shared a commitment to choosing leaders for the party and the government who would continue their life's work.

In Changsha they were joined by Wang Hongwen, then thirty-nine, who was in charge of the daily work of the party. Although it was not formally stated, the expectation was that if those whom they selected performed well, they would continue to serve after Mao and Zhou had left the scene. The party appointments they decided on were to be officially approved at the Second Plenum, scheduled for January 8–10, 1975, and the government appointments were to be officially approved at the National People's Congress (NPC) that would be held immediately thereafter. Zhou's physical condition prevented him from long daily sessions, so the three stretched their meetings out over five days, with ample time for rest. They met daily from December 23 to December 27, except on December 26, Mao's eighty-first birthday, when Mao and Zhou met alone.

In preparation for the meetings in Changsha, Zhou had consulted with government leaders for several weeks, winnowing down the list of names of those they considered best for the top positions. After Zhou and his staff worked through three drafts of the list of proposed appointments and the agenda for the NPC, the final versions, which were forwarded to Mao a few days before their meetings, became the basis for discussion.

Mao, though aged and infirm, still possessed the power to shake up the country. In December 1974, however, his top priority was stability and unity. His sharp attacks on Zhou during the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius had ended, and the two towering leaders now worked together as before.
²
In their meetings, Mao expressed his continued dedication to the revolution, but in fact he approved the selection of experienced officials whom Zhou and his underlings in Beijing considered most able to lead the government and guide the economy.
³
Buoyed by Mao's support for high officials who would provide a more stable political environment—one that would promote orderly economic growth—Zhou Enlai returned to Beijing exhausted, but exhilarated.

The Mao-Zhou Succession Plan, December 1974

Before Mao and Zhou met, it was already assumed that Wang Hongwen would remain as first vice chairman of the party. They also agreed that major responsibility for leading government work would officially be assigned to Deng Xiaoping. Deng had capably filled in for Zhou after his June 1 operation, and Mao announced his support for Deng to be the first vice premier in October. At the NPC meeting, it would become official. In addition to his major responsibility for leading the government, Deng was to be promoted to high positions in both the party and the military.

Wang Hongwen and Deng Xiaoping would formally carry on the work as top leaders in the party and government, but they remained in effect apprentices to Mao and Zhou, who retained the titles of chairman and premier until their deaths. Wang and Deng would continue to receive directions from the two senior leaders, and Mao retained the power to replace them at any time if he was dissatisfied with their performance.

On January 5, 1975, then, Central Committee Document No. 1, the first document of the year, listed Mao as chairman of the party and the Central Military Commission (CMC) and named Deng as vice chairman of the CMC and chief of the General Staff. At the Second Plenum of the 10th
Party Congress, held January 8–10, Wang Hongwen was confirmed as the first vice chairman of the party Central Committee (ranked after Mao and Zhou), and Deng was named a vice chairman of the party Central Committee and a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. And at the NPC meeting, held January 13–17, 1975, Deng officially became first vice premier.

To Mao, the team of Wang and Deng was a promising combination. Wang, a former rebel leader completely beholden to Mao and with no independent power base, could be counted on to lead the party along Mao's revolutionary path and would display ample respect for Mao's personal legacy. Deng, meanwhile, with his wide knowledge, experience, and proven leadership abilities, would direct foreign affairs and the complex work of the government.

Anyone who knew Wang and Deng realized that Wang, with so little experience in high positions, would in fact wield far less power than Deng, who had mastered the workings of the party and government during his ten years as general secretary and who was not bashful in exercising power. But by placing Wang Hongwen in the higher position, and by giving responsibility for propaganda to the radicals, led by Jiang Qing, whatever tendencies Deng might have had to depart from Mao's legacy (like those he had displayed in the early 1960s) could be kept under control. Mao had criticized Jiang Qing for her excesses and her ambition, but he knew that she was tough and thoroughly reliable in supporting his propaganda line.
⁴
Furthermore the radicals, under Jiang Qing and with the help of Yao Wenyuan, took charge of the party newspaper, the
People's Daily
, and its theoretical journal,
Red Flag
, while Zhang Chunqiao, also a radical, took charge of the Political Department of the People's Liberation Army.
⁵

Zhou's Farewell, January 1975

On January 13, 1975, when the NPC convened for its first meeting since January 1965, Mao remained in Changsha. Zhou, drawn and pale from late-stage cancer, in his last major public appearance, presented the government's work report. Behind the scenes, Deng had supervised preparation of Zhou's speech. So as not to exhaust Zhou, Deng had told the drafters to keep it to fewer than five thousand characters, much shorter than a typical work report. Deng, acutely aware of Mao's remaining power and determination, filled the report with Cultural Revolution rhetoric. In the speech, Zhou
praised the Cultural Revolution and its models, Dazhai and Daqing, and said, at one point, “Our primary task is to deepen, broaden, and persevere in the movement to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius”—a moment that must have struck the audience as especially poignant because Zhou himself was one of the main targets in that campaign.
⁶

When he finished speaking, the NPC members, many of whom had been tearful during Zhou's painful performance, gave him a standing ovation for several minutes. This emotional response showed their respect for a dying leader who had dedicated his life to the party and the country, who had served with such distinction and had protected so many of them during the Cultural Revolution, but yet had suffered unfairly at the hands of Mao. Looking forward, many hoped that the devastation of the Cultural Revolution would soon be over, and that the country could finally take on the task that Zhou had first enunciated eleven years earlier and again spelled out in his report—achieving the four modernizations (of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology) by the end of the century.
⁷

On February 1, 1975, at a smaller meeting of leaders of the various ministries and commissions associated with the State Council, Zhou explained that in the future he would no longer attend their meetings. “The Chairman directed that the first vice premier is Deng Xiaoping. The Chairman said that Deng is an able person with a strong political ideology and a rare talent.... I cannot ordinarily take part in these meetings. In the future, I asked Deng Xiaoping to chair such meetings.” In fact, for almost a year, beginning with his trip to the U.N. meetings in May 1974, Deng had been hosting foreign visitors and performing other duties as a substitute for Zhou Enlai, but in February 1975 authority was firmly passed to Deng, allowing him to take full charge as long as Mao was not too upset. Deng, respectful of Zhou, often visited Zhou in the hospital and explained with appropriate modesty that he was helping the premier because of his illness.
⁸
In fact, Deng had taken charge.

Consolidating Party Leadership Teams

For Deng, the issue in 1975 was how to retain Mao's support while restoring order and setting China on a path for growth. To help himself stay on Mao's good side, Deng paid great attention to his favorite themes. He repeatedly praised Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and avoided criticism of the Cultural Revolution. In early 1975, too, Deng creatively combined
several of Mao's expressions to support his own agenda. The “three directives,” which Mao himself had never linked, were first presented together in a speech Deng gave on May 29, 1975. They were, first, to oppose revisionism; second, to promote stability and unity; and third, to improve the national economy.
⁹
The inclusion of the first statement, about revisionism, provided public reassurance to Mao that Deng was determined not to follow the bourgeois path for which he had been criticized during the Cultural Revolution. But it was also meant as sugar for helping the medicine go down. For by emphasizing in the same breath Mao's support for stability and unity, and for improving the national economy, Deng made it difficult for Mao to oppose the rather dramatic steps he was taking to both stabilize and reinvigorate a China weary from the excesses of the Cultural Revolution.