Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (18 page)

Mao's decision to send Deng to the United Nations was made at the last minute. Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua was given scarcely a week to prepare the speech. When Qiao, who was thoroughly familiar with Mao's views, completed a draft of the speech, he sent it to Mao, who wrote, “Good. Approved.”
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Qiao's speech, which Deng read to the United Nations, basically represented Mao's new view of the world as one in which nations were
allied not by their commitment to the Communist revolution, but by their economic development: he described them as first-world, second-world, and third-world countries. Against this background, Mao, through Qiao and Deng, described how although he had hoped the United States would join China to oppose the Soviet Union, recent setbacks—notably, the Brezhnev visit to Washington—convinced him that the United States and the Soviet Union were scheming together. Mao was now hoping to unite the developed countries of the second world and the developing countries of the third world against the two superpowers.

Officially, Foreign Minister Qiao, the sophisticated, knowledgeable diplomat whose family was rich enough to have supported his university training in philosophy in Germany, was head of the delegation. Knowledgeable people at home and abroad, however, understood that Deng held the real power. Chinese leaders saw the trip to the United Nations as a major breakthrough, a coming-out party in the council of nations. Though ill, Zhou Enlai and an estimated two thousand others went to the airport to send off the delegation. Zhou also joined the large crowd at the airport that welcomed the delegation back on April 6.
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Deng's speech to the United Nations was received with an unusually long period of applause. Because of its size and potential, China was seen as a rallying force among the developing countries. The delegates of the developing countries were especially pleased with Deng's statement that China would never become a tyrant and that if it were to ever oppress or exploit others, then the rest of the world, especially the developing countries, should expose China as a “social imperialist” country and, in cooperation with the Chinese people, overthrow the government.

While at the United Nations, Deng held side meetings with leaders from various countries. He was cautious in answering questions and making comments because he had witnessed Mao's severe criticism of Zhou and he had had only a week to prepare for the visit. Instead, he referred the difficult questions to Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua. Personally, Deng was well received by other foreign leaders and by the foreign press.
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Since the basic ideas in his speech about the third world came from Mao and because Americans were not happy to be linked with the Soviets, the speech is not among Deng's speeches included in his
Selected Works
.
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In New York, Deng and Kissinger met for the first time a few days after the speech. At their initial meeting, Kissinger was somewhat taken aback by Deng's direct, blunt style. Deng was courteous but he had a tough message from Mao: knowing how Zhou Enlai had been criticized for being soft
on the United States, he ensured he would not be made vulnerable to such charges. Deng conveyed Mao's displeasure at the United States for standing on China's shoulders to reach détente with the Soviet Union through agreements on missile control. He also repeated Mao's view that the Soviet Union's strategy was to “feint toward the East” in order to strike the West, that is, that the United States should be on its guard against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, Deng told Kissinger, was then anti-Chinese but its real target was the West.
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Deng also expressed the fear that the United States no longer regarded the Soviets as its key adversary and might encourage China to fight the Soviet Union, thereby weakening both socialist adversaries.
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Kissinger later compared Deng's direct style with the subtle, polished, and urbane manner of Zhou Enlai. Noting Deng's unfamiliarity with some of the global issues raised in the discussion, his frequent references to Mao, and his passing questions on to Qiao Guanhua, Kissinger said that Deng seemed to be on a “training mission.” Deng's cautious manner in 1974 was to be in striking contrast to his confidence in meetings with foreigners beginning in mid-1978 after he was more experienced in meeting foreign leaders and Mao was no longer alive to receive reports of Deng's comments.

Kissinger also observed that compared to Mao and Zhou, who sought to improve relations with the United States primarily for security reasons, Deng focused on domestic developments and was already thinking about what improved relations with the United States could do for China's modernization.
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Kissinger later came to have high regard for Deng's abilities in representing China.
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Zhou's name was never mentioned by any member of the Chinese delegation to the United Nations. In fact, several friendly references from Kissinger to Deng concerning Zhou went unacknowledged. When Deng said that Confucius was conservative and that to emancipate people's thinking, Confucius needed to be criticized, Kissinger asked if that view had any practical relevance for contemporary individuals. Deng replied that criticism of a conservative ideology does in fact have implications for those individuals who represent those ideologies.
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The message, though indirect, was loud and clear. Deng was not assisting Zhou but replacing him.
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On Sunday, when Deng's schedule in New York allowed some free time, his staff inquired what he would like to do. Without hesitation, Deng said, “Visit Wall Street.” To Deng, Wall Street was the symbol not only of American capitalism but also of American economic might. Deng had an instinct for finding the source of real power and wanting to understand it. Although Wall Street was closed on Sundays, Deng still had his staff take him there, so
at least he could get an impression of the place.
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Deng was allotted only a few dollars to spend on the trip, and his personal office director, Wang Ruilin, was sent off to buy some thirty-nine-cent toys at Woolworth's for Deng's grandchildren. Tang Minzhao, Nancy Tang's father (who was also the editor of a leftist Chinese-language newspaper in New York), with his own funds purchased for Deng a doll that could cry, suck, and pee. When Deng took it home, it was a great hit.
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Deng flew home from New York by way of Paris, where he stayed several days in the Chinese embassy. It was his first visit to France since leaving there in 1926. While there, he enjoyed coffee and croissants, as he had half a century earlier. For security reasons, he was not allowed to walk around the city. His staff tried to locate the places where he had lived, but they found no trace. Before flying home Deng bought two hundred croissants and some cheese, which, upon his return, he divided up and distributed to Zhou Enlai, Deng Yingchao (Zhou Enlai's wife), Li Fuchun, Nie Rongzhen, and other fellow revolutionaries who had been with him in France in the 1920s.

Mao considered Deng's visit to the United Nations a great success and continued to assign him the major role in welcoming foreign visitors. Mao allowed Wang Hongwen to sit in on meetings with foreign visitors, but he did not participate actively in the discussions. In fact, before 1973, Wang had never met any foreigners.
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On June 1, only a few weeks after Deng's speech at the United Nations in New York, Zhou Enlai entered the hospital for another operation and stopped meeting foreigners. At this point Deng met most of his foreign visitors in one of the provincial rooms in the Great Hall of the People, and they were housed in the gracious Diaoyutai guest facilities. Like Zhou, he entertained guests in a style that had caused Kissinger to comment, only half-jokingly, “I come from a country undeveloped in hospitality.”

In the fall of 1974, Deng met with officials from all major continents, including from countries as diverse as Japan, Pakistan, Iran, Yemen, Congo, Romania, Yugoslavia, Vietnam, North Korea, Turkey, Germany, France, Canada, and the United States. The meetings included political leaders, business leaders, journalists, scientists, and athletes. Certain themes came up repeatedly in his discussions. In particular, he was interested in how Japanese leaders had led Japan's economic development and how Japan had modernized its science and technology.

With some foreign leaders, Deng engaged in broad discussions on world affairs, especially in the context of the competition between the Soviet Union
and the United States. He strongly approved of efforts by the European countries to strengthen cooperation with each other and with the United States, which he saw as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, and he expressed skepticism about the ability to contain Soviet military growth by arms control agreements. He encouraged Turkey to resolve its problems with Greece, to avoid letting the “big fishermen,” the Soviet Union and the United States, take advantage of the conflict between the fish. He explained that China had difficulties with the Soviet Union because Khrushchev had tried to exert too much control over China. He also made clear to U.S. businesspeople that economic exchanges could progress more rapidly with formal diplomatic relations, and that in turn would depend on the United States ending its formal relations with Taiwan.

The Americans he met included George H. W. Bush, then head of the U.S. Liaison Office in China; Senators Mike Mansfield and Henry Jackson; and a delegation of university presidents.
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He exchanged views with Mansfield and Jackson, kindred souls, on how to resist Soviet advances. When he met the university presidents, he told them that scholarly exchanges would continue and increase.
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Mao Calls for Stability and Unity

Mao was a bold revolutionary who could ignore realities in the short run, but even he could not be impervious to serious problems forever. He had overpowered resistance to the Great Leap Forward, but in late 1958 and again after 1960, he had allowed some adjustments to deal with the disaster. By 1974, the chaos from the Cultural Revolution was so widespread that even he realized that something needed to be done. The economy was not really moving ahead and by mid-1974 reports were coming in that the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius had created even further disorder. Steel production had declined, and railway transport was down. Mao, thinking about his legacy, did not want to be remembered as the one who left the economy in a disastrous state.

In August 1974 Mao called the regional military commanders and the heads of their political departments to his residence in Wuhan's Donghu Meiling (East Lake in the Plum Mountain Range), one of his favorite locations. He told them that “The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has already gone on for eight years. Now it is time for stability. The whole party and the whole army should now unite.”
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Mao was mercurial, but in late
1974 he consistently supported the need for unity and stability. When he met Zhou Enlai in December 1974, Mao approved the use of the expression “stability and unity”
(anding tuanjie)
as a keynote for the Second Plenum that was to be held January 8–10, 1975.

The Implementer and the Watchdog Clash

By late 1974, it was becoming clear that Mao wanted Deng to play a major role in restoring stability and unity.
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On October 4, 1974, Mao announced that he was appointing Deng Xiaoping first vice premier of the State Council. The appointment reflected Mao's satisfaction with Deng's performance; it was the first clear indication to party leaders that Mao intended for Deng to take over Zhou's responsibilities as premier.

Mao's decision to wind down the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution and appoint Deng to bring stability and unity was as disturbing to Jiang Qing and her radicals as it was exhilarating to pragmatic senior officials. Mao asked Wang Hongwen, as head of daily party work, to announce the appointment, but Wang stalled long enough to convey the news to Jiang Qing, which gave her time to prepare a response. Other high-level political leaders knew that Jiang Qing and Wang Hongwen were promoting Zhang Chunqiao for the position. But Jiang Qing was unsuccessful in her attempt to persuade Mao to change his mind about Deng's appointment. Two days later, after delaying the announcement more than he should have, Wang had no choice but to follow Mao's order and announce Deng's promotion.
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Even though Mao had sent Jiang Qing off to live separately, until the end his life he regarded her as faithful to his cause of promoting the revolution and the only one both tough and determined enough to stand up to other high-level party officials, including the most resolute of them all, Deng Xiaoping. Yet Mao was upset at signs that she was scheming to seize power after his death. As recently as 1972, he had been unhappy that she had spent a week talking with an American scholar, Roxane Witke, who was planning to publish a book about her (just as Mao had talked to Edgar Snow to publicize his personal rise to power).
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The issue of Deng's promotion further soured their relationship. In her later recollections, Jiang Qing said that when Deng first returned in the spring of 1973, the problems between Mao and herself were not as serious as they later would become. This may have been due in part to Mao: in mid-1974
as Mao sought to restore unity and stability, he told Jiang Qing to calm down and Wang Hongwen not to pay so much attention to her.