Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (33 page)

At Nanjing University, too, then three hours from Shanghai by train, posters
immediately went up condemning
Wenhui bao
, and demonstrations spread from the university to the main streets of the city. People carried wreaths from the center of Nanjing to lay at the Yuhuatai Memorial, which had been erected to commemorate the 100,000 Communists killed by the Nationalists. Later, the Gang of Four mobilized their supporters to remove the wreaths and block further demonstrations. They did manage to keep news of the Nanjing events out of the official media, but they were unable to stop informal reports from spreading to other cities.
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On March 26, the day after the demonstrations in Nanjing, Deng Xiaoping was brought to an enlarged Politburo meeting to be criticized as the head of the reviled capitalists in the party. He was also accused of forming a faction designed to seize power and, ultimately, to restore capitalism.
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Deng was in effect warned that he too would be held responsible for any demonstrations on April 5.

Just four days later, on March 30, the first wreaths honoring Zhou in Beijing began to appear at the Monument to the People's Heroes in Tiananmen Square. Poems and essays honoring Zhou Enlai were posted, and speeches praising Zhou and attacking the Gang of Four began to attract crowds. Other posters expressed support for Deng Xiaoping, and some people placed little bottles on the street, because the Chinese word for “little bottle” is pronounced “xiao ping.”

The party leadership in Beijing, attempting to head off any larger outpouring of emotions, announced that work units could commemorate Zhou within their units but Tiananmen Square was to remain orderly. Patrols were sent to block any demonstrations. Beijing municipal officials estimated that by Saturday, April 3, some one million Chinese had visited the square, with several hundred thousand there at peak times and never fewer than tens of thousands at other times during the day.
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The party leadership in Beijing sent out an urgent order: “Do not go to Tiananmen to lay wreaths.... The laying of wreaths is an outmoded custom.”
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But news spread by word of mouth, and on Sunday, April 4, there was a tremendous outpouring of people (estimated at more than two million) to pay tribute to Zhou Enlai, to oppose the Gang of Four, and to express support for Deng.

To avoid giving Jiang Qing any further excuse to attack him, Deng forbade his family members from going to the square, where poems, posters, white chrysanthemums, and wreaths were accumulating.
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Groups gathered to hear speakers risking possible arrest by loudly expressing both their devotion
to Zhou and their readiness to sacrifice their lives to defeat the Gang of Four, which was plotting to seize power. People in the square came from all walks of life: officials, students, workers, and peasants.
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A few of the boldest speakers were arrested. Roger Garside, a British embassy official who personally observed these developments, commented,

As a memorial for Zhou, this people's ceremony was more moving than any state funeral I have seen. As a political demonstration, it was utterly unlike anything I had ever seen in China … the crowds were acting out of conviction … expressing thoughts and feelings that had been flowing underground for years.... There was … anger at what had been done to the legacy of Zhou … a spirit of revolt against Mao…apprehension for the future of China and defiance of those who would certainly seek to punish the demonstrators.... The Mandate had been removed from Mao.
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On the evening of April 4, the Politburo met in the Fujian Room of the Great Hall of the People to discuss how to respond to events in the square. Politburo members Marshal Ye and Li Xiannian, who were sympathetic to the demonstrators, were on sick leave, and Deng Xiaoping was not present. Hua Guofeng chaired the meeting and Mao Yuanxin attended. At the meeting, Wu De, chairman of the Beijing Party Committee and head of the Beijing Revolutionary Committee (which had overall responsibility for maintaining public order in Beijing), reported that 2,073 wreaths had been presented on behalf of over 1,400 work units. At one location, the pile of wreaths was more than six meters wide. Wu De also reported that some of the demonstrators had been planning these activities for some time and that they had been influenced by Deng Xiaoping. Jiang Qing, in her attempt to stop the demonstrations, declared that Qing Ming was over and that before dawn all the wreaths should be cleared away and sent to the Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery in Beijing. Hua Guofeng directed Wu De to find a way to implement her request.
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On Monday, April 5, before dawn, some two hundred trucks from Beijing municipality arrived at Tiananmen Square. Workers tossed the wreaths onto the trucks and hauled them away. After sunrise, crowds began to swell to over 100,000 people. As they realized what had happened, they grew increasingly angry and began yelling, “Return our wreaths. Return our comrade-in-arms.”
The defiant crowds assaulted the Great Hall of the People, burned cars, smashed bicycles, struck a foreign cameraman, and assaulted a small building used by the militia.

That afternoon, the Politburo met again. Deng Xiaoping, who had not attended Politburo meetings for some time, was brought in to receive criticism. Zhang Chunqiao first attacked Deng by saying he was like Imre Nagy, the fiery leader of the Hungarian revolt of 1956.
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Mao Yuanxin passed on critical messages from Mao, some written, some oral, with Deng all the while remaining silent. Wang Hongwen then delivered to the Politburo Mao's order to prepare 100,000 militiamen to put down the demonstrators—but Ni Zhifu, in charge of the militia, replied that at most only 30,000 were available, with Wu De adding that they would be no match for the large numbers of protesters in the square.

Next, Zhang Chunqiao said that Wu De should make a broadcast to the protesters. Wu De therefore wrote out a brief message to be broadcast and showed it to Hua Guofeng and the other Politburo members, who approved it. The broadcast would not refer to the causes of the protests, but instead direct attention to a small group of counter-revolutionaries in the square who were turning the memorial into a political movement by attacking Mao and the Central Committee. It would also refer to the unrepentant person taking the capitalist road who had promoted the rightist reversal of verdicts instead of uniting behind Mao and the party. Because counter-revolutionaries are misusing the incident, the broadcaster would say, the revolutionary masses should immediately evacuate the square.

At 6:30 p.m. on April 5, the Politburo tapes were broadcast in the square. The next day, in the print version of Wu De's announcement that appeared in the
People's Daily
, Deng's name—which had been absent from the broadcast—was inserted, specifically identifying him as the unrepentant “capitalist roader.”
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The plan approved by the Politburo called for the militia to move in at 8:00 p.m., but at that time Wu Zhong, the commander of the Beijing Garrison who was on the scene, judged that too many protesters remained in the square. He explained to Hua Guofeng and Chen Xilian, who continued to phone him, that it was too soon for the militia to clear the area. At 10:30 p.m., the floodlights were turned on and Wu De's tape was played again, telling the demonstrators to leave the square. Finally, at 11:00 p.m. when Wu Zhong reported by phone to Wu De that only about a thousand protesters remained, Wu De gave permission to bring in the militia. More than a hundred
people who resisted were arrested. Although the police did not use firearms, they did use clubs and dozens of people were injured; pools of blood remained on the streets after the area was cleared.
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But no deaths were reported.

A few hours later, before dawn on April 6, some members of the Politburo met to review the incident. They concluded that the demonstrations had been planned and organized, and therefore they constituted a plot against the state. That afternoon, Mao Yuanxin met with Mao to discuss the nature of the incident, and the Chairman approved broadcasting that it had been a plot. There is no evidence that Mao personally believed that Deng was the “black hand” who had organized the demonstrations (as was publicly announced), but he did believe that if Deng were to remain in power, he would lead the party down the wrong path.
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By that evening, Jiang Qing had already met with Mao and again demanded that Deng be removed from the party, but Mao still did not agree.
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Gao Wenqian, who at the time was working in the party archives, reports that for Mao the news of what happened in Tiananmen on April 5 was “more than distressing.... At the very site where millions of young Red Guards had shouted ‘long live’ to him … the same multitudes … [were] roaring in protest against his rule.... The judgment of history, he knew, would be exceedingly harsh. [He] was suddenly overwhelmed by fear and depression.”
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China had not yet introduced voting, even in the villages, but the April 5 demonstrations had made it clear, at least in Beijing where the political consciousness was by far the highest, that Mao had lost the popular mandate, that Zhou Enlai was the public's hero, and that Deng Xiaoping had enough public support to become the preeminent leader.

The Removal of Deng and the Elevation of Hua, April 1976

On the morning of April 7, when Mao Yuanxin reported the latest developments to Mao, Mao gave him written directions about how to proceed at the Politburo meeting scheduled for later that day. When the Politburo met, Mao Yuanxin took out the note from Mao and showed it to the others. It read: “It was in the capital, it was at Tiananmen, there was burning and hitting. The nature of the movement has changed.” In short, the movement had become counter-revolutionary. Contradictions were no longer among the people; they were more serious: they were between the party and the enemy trying to bring down the party. Mao Yuanxin also conveyed to the Politburo
Chairman Mao's two proposals: first, that Hua Guofeng, the acting premier, be made premier and first vice chairman of the party; and second, that Deng, who until that time had not been officially removed from his positions in the government, party, or military, be stripped of all his positions. Yet even at this point Mao placed limits on the treatment of Deng: he also directed that Deng be “allowed to remain in the party to see how he behaves.” When Mao's proposals were conveyed, the Politburo fell silent, and then approved them. Once Mao spoke, there was never any question about the outcome.

Mao completely removed Deng from power. And yet, when Wang Dongxing first informed Mao that Jiang Qing might be mobilizing the masses to attack Deng, Mao directed that Wang Dongxing move Deng to a safe place not far from his children, and that Deng's location be kept secret from the Gang of Four.
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By giving Hua full power and by removing Deng from all official positions, Mao cleared the way for Hua to lead the country. From Mao's perspective, Hua had made no major errors during his months as acting premier, and Mao had no better choice who would be loyal to Mao's reputation and who had the potential to get along with radicals and senior officials. He had also shown great strength in putting down the April 5 demonstrations.

Knowledgeable officials in Beijing believe that until April 5, Mao had left open the possibility that Deng and Hua might share leadership positions, but after such a level of popular support for Deng it was just not possible: Hua would have been overwhelmed by Deng. By allowing Deng to remain in the party, Mao left open the possibility that Deng might again serve the country, though not anytime soon. That evening, at 8:00 p.m. there was a public announcement that Hua Guofeng had been named first vice chairman of the party as well as premier.
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Top officials in the party organized demonstrations in various cities throughout the country to show their loyalty to Hua Guofeng. Demonstrations were also organized at work units and universities. At Peking University, for example, all students were told to assemble to listen to an announcement at 8:00 p.m. on April 7. At the appointed time, loudspeakers throughout the campus bellowed out congratulations to Hua Guofeng for his new appointment as first vice chairman and premier, then announced a huge schoolwide meeting featuring representatives from each department at the university. At that meeting, those representatives denounced Deng and supported Hua, though observers noted that they carefully followed their scripts, without
showing nearly the same enthusiasm as did the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square on April 4 and 5.
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Although Hua rarely met Mao, when they met at the April 30 visit to Beijing by Prime Minister Muldoon of New Zealand, Mao took out a piece of paper and scrawled this message to Hua: “Go slowly, don't be in a rush. Act according to the past directions. With you in charge, I am at ease”
(Manman lai, buyao zhaoji, zhao guoqu fangzhen ban, ni banshi, wo fangxin)
.
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Hua did not publicize the last part of the message at the time, but there is no doubt of its authenticity and of Mao's meaning.
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Mao had chosen Hua as his successor. Mao's judgment that Hua would remain loyal to him and his policies was to prove correct, but his hope that Hua could unite the radicals and the pragmatists was not realized. Within days after Mao's death, Hua would conclude that it was impossible to work with Jiang Qing and her fellow radicals. Mao also wished that Hua, with support from some senior leaders like Marshal Ye and Li Xiannian, might provide long-term leadership, but these hopes, too, never came to fruition.