Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (34 page)

Deng after April 7, 1976

On April 8, 1976, the day he was removed from all his posts, Deng passed to Wang Dongxing a letter to be delivered to Mao. In his letter, Deng made it clear that he remained faithful to party discipline, writing, “I fully support the party center's decision concerning Comrade Hua Guofeng assuming the positions of first vice chairman and premier.” Aware that Jiang Qing had tried to remove him from the party, Deng added, “I express my deep appreciation to the Chairman and to the party center for allowing me to remain in the party.”
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Yet Deng was forbidden to take part in high-level party discussions and public meetings. He was not allowed to participate in any of the funeral activities for Zhu De, commander of the Red Army, after he died on July 6, or for Chairman Mao, after he died on September 9.
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At the Politburo meeting on the night of Mao's death, Jiang Qing again tried to remove Deng from the party, although her efforts were repulsed by Hua Guofeng, who faithfully followed Mao's orders, as well as by Marshal Ye.
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The pressure from the criticism and isolation were heavy burdens, even for one as hardened as Deng Xiaoping, and some others would prove less sturdy. After April 5 the criticism sessions against Zhou Rongxin intensified; even
Wu De, who led the clearing of Tiananmen Square, acknowledged that the Gang of Four and Chi Qun had “struggled him to death.”
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Mao not only protected Deng and allowed him to keep his party membership, but he offered him some special consideration. On June 10, for example, Deng passed a letter to Wang Dongxing, to be forwarded to Hua Guofeng and Mao, indicating that his wife had been hospitalized for an eye disease and it would make a big difference if a family member could remain with her in the hospital. Mao gave his permission. On June 30, too, Deng received notification that he could return to his old home on Kuang Street from his temporary residence on Dong Jiaomin Lane. Even in his last days, Mao never completely gave up on Deng.

Nine days after the Deng family moved back home, there was a catastrophic earthquake, centered in Tangshan several hundred miles from Beijing, that according to official figures resulted in 242,000 deaths. The tremors shook Beijing badly and caused structural damage to an estimated one-third of Beijing's buildings. As in imperial times, some regarded the natural disaster as a sign that the heavens were dissatisfied with the top leadership. Deng and his family, like many others, camped out in the yard outside their residence until their fear that the building might collapse subsided. After moving back into their home, from April 1976 until when Deng returned to work in the spring of 1977, Deng's life centered, as it had in Jiangxi for over three years, on his family and the news he received from the radio and newspapers.

The Political Balance after April 7, 1976

The selection of Hua Guofeng as premier and first vice chairman meant that for the first time Hua had a higher political rank than any of the Gang of Four. Hua had tried to maintain good relations with all of the gang, but they moved to a different drummer: in short, they were radical propagandists, and he was a pragmatic problem-solver. Moreover, Hua's promotions made the Gang of Four regard him as a serious rival.

Hua, a modest middle-level official suddenly filling huge shoes, took a cautious approach in the charged political atmosphere. Many senior officials supported him because at least in the short run they saw no alternative for holding the country together, because he pursued moderate policies, and because he reached out to them to get their cooperation.

Until April 7, Mao retained enough power and energy to orchestrate high-level
politics, but he was aware that others did not expect him to live more than a year. As he had observed, the rats were abandoning the sinking ship. When he met former president Nixon on February 23, he had said, referring to the six factories and two schools dear to his heart, “I've only been able to change a few places in the vicinity of Beijing.”
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High officials continued to respect him for his early achievements, but they were discerning in deciding how much to follow him. He could no longer translate his aura into power to mobilize the country as he had in 1958 and 1966–1967.

Mao chose Hua, but the two had had very little direct contact before or after April 7, when Mao gave him a clearer mandate to lead. Until then, even from his sickbed, Mao actively orchestrated the criticisms of Deng and selected the future leadership core. After April 7, and especially after his first heart attack on May 11, however, Mao lacked the energy and even the vision to take an active role in tutoring Hua. Jiang Qing, in contrast, remained highly energized, criticizing Deng and other senior officials. She endeavored to deepen her networks, located primarily in the propaganda apparatus of both the civilian and military hierarchies, intimidating those afraid to cross someone who might gain power after Mao's death.

In May 1976, General Wang Zhen, one of Marshal Ye's most trusted friends, visited Ye at his home in the military compound in the Western Hills. There Wang Zhen raised the question of how to respond to the Gang of Four. Very few dared to say then what many knew—that it was really a Gang of Five led by Chairman Mao. Indeed it is reported that when Wang Zhen cautiously asked Marshal Ye's views of the Gang of Four, Ye, concerned about the possibility of bugging, replied by opening the four fingers of his right hand and moving the thumb down to the palm, indicating they should wait until Mao had passed away. Even if that story is apocryphal, it is believed by many people in Beijing and is consistent with Marshal Ye's actions.

Mao Yuanxin had played a central role as Mao's messenger in orchestrating the criticism of Deng and the rise of Hua Guofeng, but after April 5, as Mao Zedong took a less active role, Mao Yuanxin's role as messenger became less important.

Although Hua assumed higher formal positions on April 7, he did not gain control over the bureaucracy to exercise power in the way that Deng had. To the extent that Hua had a policy perspective that guided his actions, it did not depart greatly from Deng's practice of using pragmatic means to work toward the four modernizations. Higher-level decisions remained in
limbo and the bureaucracy, while waiting uncertainly for the new structure of power that would follow Mao, continued its daily work without clear overall direction.

The Death of Mao, September 9, 1976

On May 11, scarcely one month after the Tiananmen demonstrations, Mao suffered a heart attack (myocardial infarction). He remained conscious, but was seriously weakened. Until then, Mao had continued to receive Politburo documents and to give final approval on Politburo decisions before they were distributed and implemented. But after May 11, he no longer looked at documents. On June 26, Mao suffered a second heart attack, on September 2 a third, and on September 9, at 12:10 a.m., he died. Hua, who automatically became acting chairman of the party, immediately called together the Politburo members who met in the wee hours of the morning to approve the wording of the official announcement of Mao's death that would be released at 4:00 p.m. that same day.

The death of Mao brought on national state-led mourning. The larger-than-life man who had dominated the party for over forty years and the nation for twenty-seven years had passed away, and ordinary people who knew almost nothing about politics wept as they paid their respects to the leader they had been taught to revere. Even those who demonstrated on April 5 worried about the future of China and even how it might affect their personal lives. Would China return to the chaos of 1966–1969? Would the government fall apart and force the nation into civil war?

However much high-level officials harbored similar concerns, in the short term they plunged into their work to stay atop all the immediate arrangements—the preparation for ceremonies, the treatment of the corpse, the wording of announcements, the liaison with diverse groups at home and abroad, and the preservation of security in the capital. The 377-member funeral committee, headed by Hua Guofeng, was announced immediately; the list was a defining moment for ranking the overall positions of officials and their contributions to the party and the country.

For the elaborate ceremonies in both Beijing and the provinces, political juggling was temporarily put aside while all worked together to pay respects to Mao's memory. Leaders at all levels took their assigned places, reaffirming their positions in the political hierarchy. Hua Guofeng was firmly in charge,
and he was later given high marks for his overall management of the mourning activities. Daily memorial services were held in the Great Hall of the People from September 11 to September 17.

On September 18, following protocol, Wang Hongwen, who had been removed from actual work but not from his formal position, was allowed to chair the memorial proceedings. But the pride of place was given to Hua Guofeng who delivered the memorial speech in Tiananmen Square, praising Mao as the “greatest Marxist of our time” while an estimated one million listeners attended to pay their respects. On that same day, the whistles of all factories and trains in the country blew a three-minute tribute. Hua also announced that following an autopsy, Mao's body would be preserved and displayed. Later, a mausoleum was erected in Tiananmen Square where viewers lined up outside before being allowed to enter and take their turn viewing his body. It was a blow to Deng Xiaoping and the officials with whom he had worked closely during 1975—Hu Qiaomu, Zhang Aiping, Wan Li, and Hu Yaobang—that they were excluded from the community of party leaders paying their respects to Mao. Deng, nonetheless, erected in his home a special altar where he and his family paid their own private tribute to Mao.
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Once the memorial activities had ended, high-level political leaders resumed their maneuvering to define and control the images presented to the public, positioning themselves for the struggles that were sure to come.

The Arrest of the Gang of Four

Jiang Qing told her Western biographer Roxane Witke, “Sex is engaging in the first rounds, but what sustains interest in the long run is power.”
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She proudly announced after Mao's death that she had been his most faithful dog, but she might have added “attack” before “dog” to indicate her specialty: she was unrivaled in her fearlessness in destroying targets that Mao identified. The educated public, aware of her origins, privately derided her as a courtesan and a second-class actress who had risen improperly. She lacked the confidence and grace of someone who had risen to power naturally; instead she displayed the haughtiness of one who had elbowed her way to the top. She was regarded as rude and inconsiderate even by people who worked for her. She displayed the elemental anger of someone who had been shunned by senior party officials since the 1940s; by serving Mao, she acquired the power to deliver payback, and she did so ruthlessly. A symbol of Mao's worst side,
she was easily the most hated figure in China. Starting in 1974, when Mao began to seek national unity and stability, Mao treated her as a loose cannon in need of some restraint, but he remained appreciative of her loyalty, concerned about her welfare, and protective lest he need to call on her again.

There was no indication that Mao ever intended Jiang Qing to be a high-level leader, and when she revealed such ambitions, he restrained her. Once Mao had formally designated Hua as first vice chairman and premier, the possibility of her getting a top position, or playing an important role in the leadership in fact disappeared, although her ambitions did not.

Jiang Qing never acquired the vision, the organizational skills, or the ability to get the positive cooperation from other power holders that was needed to be a real contender for power. She had burned too many bridges, destroyed too many high officials, and alienated too many colleagues. She lacked the self-restraint to be part of a loyal opposition. She lacked support among senior party officials, who were far more skilled in organizing; within the military she had virtually no support outside the Political Department.

During Mao's last year, Jiang Qing endeavored to deepen her base, working through the civilian propaganda apparatus and the Political Department of the PLA as she continued Mao's revolutionary class struggle against the bourgeoisie. She kept in touch with the radicals in the Shanghai militia who had access to arms. Generals did not worry that she would win in a military showdown—they were concerned that some military officers might be intimidated into cooperating with her and that she might stir up so many radicals as to create long-term struggles and chaos, which would only slow China's progress.

Jiang Qing realized that her best hope was to find or perhaps to alter some document of Mao's that would allow her to secure more power and define Mao's legacy. Immediately after Mao's death, Jiang Qing went to Mao's personal assistant Zhang Yufeng day after day, demanding that all of Mao's documents be turned over to her. She did receive some documents and kept them in her possession for a few days, but when Hua Guofeng insisted that all of Mao's papers were to be held by Wang Dongxing, she reluctantly passed them over. She then began pressing Ji Dengkui to gain access to archives of materials originally collected and controlled by Lin Biao, which were being housed at Lin's former home at Maojiawan.
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