Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (56 page)

From late 1977 until mid-July 1978, there were almost continuous rounds of discussions on the details of a possible treaty, but the anti-hegemony clause remained the chief sticking point. In March there were signs of progress, as Japan seemed willing to consider a slightly altered, carefully worded statement.
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The Japanese believed that if a mitigating clause were inserted that
said the treaty was not aimed at any third party, the Soviets would tolerate it.

On July 21, 1978, under Deng's guidance, formal negotiations began: the two sides held the first of what would become fourteen rounds of discussions on the treaty, and in the ensuing rounds various draft proposals were exchanged. By the beginning of August, the Japanese negotiators in Beijing were sufficiently hopeful that the Chinese would yield on the mitigating clause that Foreign Minister Sonoda personally traveled to Beijing for the negotiations. Later, the deputy head of the Japanese Treaties Division, Togo Kazuhiko, reported that Deng Xiaoping apparently made “a political decision,” and that when Foreign Minister Huang Hua during the negotiations accepted the Japanese wording, “We were so happy that under the table I shook hands firmly with my boss.” The mitigating clause read: “The present Treaty shall not affect the position of either Contracting Party regarding its relations with third countries.”
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The treaty was signed in Beijing on August 12, 1978, by Huang Hua and Sonoda.
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Why would Deng Xiaoping—after over eight months of discussions—suddenly break the diplomatic logjam and permit the Japanese to include their mitigating clause in the treaty? He was in a hurry to get on with modernization, but at the time the prospect of conflict in Vietnam gave a special urgency to moving quickly. Deng had announced two weeks earlier, on July 3, the withdrawal of all Chinese advisers from Vietnam. By then, it seemed likely to Deng that Vietnam would invade Cambodia and that if it did so, China would be forced to respond. To discourage the Soviets from entering the conflict, Deng sought to deepen relations with the major powers, Japan and the United States, as quickly as possible. As expected, the Soviets were upset with Japan over the treaty, but with the mitigating clause, they tolerated it.
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The Treaty of Peace and Friendship did not require that a high-level Chinese leader go to Japan to celebrate its signing. It was appropriate for China to send a high-level leader to Japan to reciprocate Tanaka Kakuei's 1972 visit to China, but for six years no Chinese leader had traveled to Japan. Deng clearly was ready to go to the island nation.

Deng's Triumphal Visit to Japan, October 19–29, 1978

In the first sixty years after World War II, three foreign leaders who visited Japan had such an electrifying effect on the Japanese public that they fundamentally changed the way the Japanese public regarded their country. In the
early 1960s Robert Kennedy, brother of President John F. Kennedy, engaged groups of students and ordinary citizens in frank, lively public dialogues that went beyond what the Japanese public had ever before experienced with a foreign leader. Bobby Kennedy's vitality; his refreshing, youthful idealism; his sincere desire to serve humanity around the world; and his obvious respect for the views of others deepened Japanese understanding of the meaning of democracy at its best and strengthened Japan's goodwill toward Americans.
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Three decades later, in 1998, another foreign leader, President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea, made an equally dramatic impression on the Japanese when he thanked those Japanese who had helped save his life in 1973. Kim had been kidnapped and abducted by the South Korean CIA while in Tokyo, and placed in a small boat to be drowned; he was saved only by a daring rescue mission. When Kim, trying to overcome the deep Korean hostility to Japan, speaking in Japanese with obvious sincerity, said that South Korea and Japan should not look backward, but instead only forward, toward a future of peace and friendship, he touched his listeners. In public opinion polls of the Japanese and Korean people in the following months, each side revealed a far more positive attitude to the other side.

Visiting Japan between these two electrifying moments, Deng in 1978 had an equally dramatic effect on the Japanese people. In the 2,200 years of contact between China and its island neighbor, Deng was the first Chinese leader to set foot in Japan. He was also the first to meet the emperor of Japan.
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When Deng said that despite an unfortunate period during the twentieth century the countries had enjoyed two millennia of good relations, and that he looked forward to a future of good relations, it touched the Japanese who knew how much the Chinese had suffered from Japanese aggression and who deeply wanted to express their sorrow and to extend the hand of friendship. Deng came with a spirit of reconciliation and he brought the hope that the two peoples could live together in a new era of peace and goodwill. Many felt that at last the healing, some three decades after World War II, had begun.

During Deng's trip, many Japanese expressed sorrow for the suffering they had inflicted and Japanese political leaders pledged they would never let such a tragedy occur again. Deng accepted their apologies without demanding that they spell out the horrors in more detail. To many Japanese in various spheres, helping China modernize was an expression of their repentance about Japan's past behavior as well as a way of contributing to China's prosperity, an act that would itself increase the chance that the two could live together in peace.

Virtually all Japanese households already had televisions, and the Japanese public shared the deep emotions as their leaders apologized to Deng on behalf of their nation. Although television was not widely diffused in China, film strips and photos shot in the Japanese factories that Deng visited allowed the Chinese public to see the warm welcome the Japanese were giving to Deng—as well as the new technology that showed how far behind China really was.

In 1974 and 1975, when Deng was responsible for meeting high-level foreign leaders, he saw far more visitors from Japan than from any other country. Through his personal interactions with these Japanese representatives, he had come to understand that the Japanese people, from all levels of society, shared an affinity for Chinese culture. Again and again, Japanese hosts expressed to Deng their gratitude to China as the wellspring of Japanese culture—their Buddhism, their written language, their art, and their architecture, especially in the cities that Japanese embraced as the heart of old Japan, Nara and Kyoto. During his ten days in Japan, Deng Xiaoping met people from all walks of life: government leaders, members of the ruling party and the opposition parties, representatives of big business, ordinary citizens from local communities, and members of the media. He was hosted by many of the people whom he had welcomed to Beijing in 1973–1975 and 1977–1978. He greeted them, as Chinese greet people they have seen before, as “old friends.”

Deng arrived in Japan on October 19, 1978, before he became the paramount leader, but he was treated as if he already spoke for China.
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When in Japan, Deng had a full schedule. Deng, the ex-military commander who believed in strict discipline, could not help but be impressed by the care his hosts took in arranging his visit; they paid as much attention to detail as quality-control engineers in a Japanese factory.

On the morning of October 23, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo and four hundred Japanese formally welcomed Deng in the hall at the State Guest House and then took part in a ceremony to ratify the Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Twenty-eight ambassadors from leading countries with embassies in Tokyo attended the ceremony, but, in accordance with a request by the Chinese, the Soviet ambassador was not invited.
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After the ceremony, when he went to meet Prime Minister Fukuda, Deng took out a pack of Panda cigarettes and offered cigarettes to everyone, which immediately lightened the mood. Deng said, “For years I have been looking for an opportunity to visit Japan, and finally I can realize it. I am very happy
to have the chance to get to know Prime Minister Fukuda.” Fukuda replied, “The unusual relations between China and Japan that have existed for almost a century have come to an end. The purpose of the treaty is to establish permanent peaceful and friendly relations. The treaty is the result of decisions by Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping.” When Fukuda said that he knew China only from before the war and hoped some day to have a chance to visit China again, Deng immediately replied, “On behalf of the Chinese government I invite you to visit China at a time convenient to you.” His host accepted on the spot, saying, “I will definitely visit China.”
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After Fukuda spoke of strengthening their relationship, Deng laughingly said, “It's really amazing for Japan to take such a poor person [China] as a friend.”
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After Sonoda and Huang Hua signed and exchanged the official documents, Deng unexpectedly gave a big hug to Fukuda, who looked nonplussed but quickly recovered and took it as a sign of goodwill. (Deng would do the same to Communist comrades in other countries.) Deng declared that the peace treaty, by “advancing the political, economic, cultural, technical, and other exchanges, would have . . . a positive influence on the peace and security of the Asian and Pacific area. . . . Friendly relations and cooperation are the common wish of the billion Chinese and the Japanese people, and it is the current of historical advance. . . . Let us on behalf of the people in both countries continue the friendship generation after generation.”
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During his visit, Deng also had a two-hour lunch with the Japanese emperor at the Imperial Palace. To guarantee that the emperor will speak freely to visitors, the Japanese do not keep a record of such discussions, but Deng later reported that they had an excellent conversation. Foreign Minister Huang Hua, who was in attendance, reported that Deng had said “bygones should be bygones, and we must be forward-looking in the future and work in every field to develop relations of peace and friendship between our two countries.” In noting that the emperor had used the expression “unfortunate happening,” Huang Hua reported that this “amounted to an indirect apology to the Chinese for the war damage.” Both the emperor and Deng expressed the view that the two countries could now enjoy a peaceful and friendly relationship that would continue forever.
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That afternoon, Deng had a ninety-minute talk with Fukuda, who later hosted a banquet attended by a hundred Japanese political, economic, and academic leaders, including the secretary general of the Liberal Democratic Party, Ohira Masayoshi; Fujiyama Aichiro, former foreign minister; and Nakasone Yasuhiro, a rising star who later became prime minister. In his talk at
the banquet, Fukuda, after reviewing the two thousand years of close relations, declared that in “this century we suffered the distress of an unfortunate relationship.” He then departed from his printed text to add, “this was indeed very regrettable,” a message the Chinese recognized as an apology. Fukuda continued, “Such a thing can never be allowed again. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship is precisely meant for this, and for our vows to each other.”
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Deng replied that “although our countries have gone through an unfortunate period, in the more than 2,000 years of history of good relations, that period was really only a short instant.”
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Deng explained to his hosts that he had come to Japan for three reasons: to exchange documents ratifying the Treaty of Peace and Friendship; to express China's appreciation to Japanese friends who in recent decades had dedicated themselves to improving Sino-Japanese relations; and like Xu Fu, to find a “secret magic drug.” Japanese listeners laughed, for they were familiar with the story of Xu Fu, who, 2,200 years earlier, on behalf of Emperor Qin, had been dispatched to Japan to find a drug that would bring eternal life. Deng went on to explain that what he really meant by the “magic drug” was the secret of how to modernize. He said he wanted to learn about modern technology and management. In the good-natured banter that followed, the speaker of Japan's lower house, Hori Shigeru, remarked that the best drug would be good Sino-Japanese relations.
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Later, when Deng was touring the Nij
Castle in Kyoto, his host said, “All the culture you see here was introduced by our ancestors who learned it from China and then gradually adapted it in our own unique way.” Deng immediately responded, “Now our positions [as student and teacher] are reversed.”
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