Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (113 page)

On March 19 the empress arrived in Hiroshima. Those serving the emperor at imperial headquarters knew how inadequately he was cared for by his chamberlains
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and had long hoped that the empress would pay a visit, and the emperor had at last consented. The empress traveled with a retinue of palace ladies, including Chigusa Kotoko and Sono Sachiko,
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the emperor’s favorites among his concubines.
Gon no tenji
almost never left their quarters in the palace; it was unprecedented for them to travel so far.

It is hard to think of a European woman making so magnanimous a gesture. The empress, solicitous of her husband’s needs, brought him women who, she knew, would take her place in his bed. Nothing in the official accounts suggests that the emperor had female companionship in Hiroshima before this time, and there is no indication of his reactions on seeing the two concubines. Viscount Hinonishi Sukehiro recalled that during the empress’s stay in Hiroshima she lived in a building behind imperial headquarters but that for nearly a month after her arrival, the emperor did not visit her, continuing to live as before in his solitary room. One night he had occasion to visit her house, and from then on he went there every evening, not returning until morning to imperial headquarters.

The day after she arrived in Hiroshima, the empress expressed the wish to visit the hospitals where wounded men were recuperating. Her doctors advised her to rest after the fatigue of the long journey, but beginning on March 22 she went every other day to a hospital to comfort the wounded soldiers.
Nishikie
depict the empress solicitously visiting a ward where bandaged patients crouch on their beds in attitudes of profound awe. The empress remained in Hiroshima for more than a month.

On the same day that the empress arrived in Hiroshima, a Chinese delegation headed by Li Hung-chang arrived in Shimonoseki to open negotiations with the Japanese for the conclusion of the war. This time there could be no question of the qualifications of the delegate: Li was the chief minister of the Chinese government. Shimonoseki had been chosen by the Japanese partly because the name was familiar in the West ever since allied warships bombarded the city in 1864.
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The negotiations began the day after the Chinese delegation’s arrival. The Japanese side was represented by It
ō
Hirobumi, Mutsu Munemitsu, and others. Credentials were exchanged, this time without incident. On the same day Li formally requested an armistice along the lines proposed some months earlier by the American minister to Peking.

On March 20 It
ō
laid down his conditions: Japan was to occupy Taku, Tientsin, Shanhaikwan, and the fortifications surrounding these three cities. Chinese units at these places were to surrender to the Japanese all their military equipment and supplies. Japanese military officials were to have jurisdiction over the railway between Tientsin and Shanhaikwan. During the period of the armistice, the Chinese would be responsible for the expenses of the Japanese army. If the Chinese took exception to any of these provisions, they would have to submit their own armistice conditions; the Japanese would not revise theirs. Li Hung-chang was stunned by the severity of the provisions but asked for three days to consider the Japanese proposal.

On March 24 Li, It
ō
, and their staffs met in Shimonoseki. Li withdrew his proposal of a cease-fire, replacing it with a request to enter immediately into negotiations for a treaty of peace. It
ō
promised to submit a plan for a treaty the next day. After the meeting Li was on his way back to his hotel when a deranged man named Koyama Toyotar
ō
fired a pistol at Li, wounding him in the face.
²³

When word of the attempted assassination reached imperial headquarters in Hiroshima, the emperor was at once informed. He was greatly upset by the news and sent two high-ranking army physicians to Shimonoseki to minister to Li. The next morning, the empress sent a nurse to Shimonoseki along with bandages that she herself had made. On the following day the emperor issued a rescript expressing his profound grief and regret—even though Japan was at war with China—that such an attack had occurred. He declared that the assailant (who had been captured) would be punished according to the law and enjoined all his subjects to strive to the utmost to keep from further besmirching the honor of Japan.
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Until the attempt on his life, Li Hung-chang had been depicted in
nishikie
as a doddering old man, a fit representative of the weak yet deceitful Chinese people, and there were songs mocking him. But the attack created immense sympathy, and a steady stream of presents and messages of condolence flooded into Shimonoseki. Mutsu Munemitsu recalled, “Many of the same people who had used the most abusive language conceivable in personal attacks on Li Hung-chang suddenly spoke in laudatory terms approaching sheer adulation as they expressed their sorrow over the assault on him. Some even went so far as to recapitulate all of his past achievements and to assert that peace in the Far East hinged on whether he could recover from his wound.”
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Reaction to the attempted assassination was not the same as that to the attack on the Russian crown prince in
Ō
tsu, as the Chinese were unlikely to take vengeance. But there was the danger that Japan’s reputation abroad, established by victories during the war, might be tarnished and that Li might use the incident to gain the West’s sympathy. This would provide the perfect opportunity for intervention in the war by a third power.
²⁶

Mutsu felt that some grand gesture was required in order to convince China and the rest of the world that Japan sincerely regretted the attack. He urged that Li’s original request for an armistice for a period of several weeks be granted unconditionally. It
ō
Hirobumi, agreeing with Mutsu, persuaded cabinet members and imperial headquarters to accept a cease-fire, even though some believed that this would work to the disadvantage of Japan. The emperor’s consent was obtained, and on March 28 Mutsu brought to Li’s bedside a draft of the cease-fire convention. The preamble began: “His Majesty the emperor of Japan, in consideration of the fact that the progress of the peace negotiations has been interrupted by an untoward incident, issues instructions to the empire’s peace plenipotentiaries to agree to a temporary armistice.”
²⁷

Mutsu commented, “The convention thus declared that the cease-fire was entirely the product of His Majesty’s gracious will.” It is clear, however, that the emperor’s role was minimal; he merely accepted the plan, originally conceived by Mutsu, that It
ō
had offered him. The intent of the preamble may have been to augment the authority of the emperor in the eyes of the Chinese.
²⁸
In any case, Li accepted the armistice with evident pleasure and said that although he was physically unable to be present at the conference table, he would gladly open talks in his bedroom. The armistice, signed on March 30, provided that all naval and army units would cease fire for three weeks from that day.

On April 1 the Japanese forwarded to Li Hung-chang a draft of their treaty proposals. The terms were severe. Apart from the recognition of Korea as an independent country, already accepted by the Chinese months earlier, the treaty required China to cede to Japan the southern part of Feng-t’ien Province, Taiwan, and the Pescadores Islands. China would also pay Japan an indemnity of 300 million taels. Commercial privileges for Japanese subjects in China were also specified.

Li tried every line of approach to reduce the Japanese demands. Earlier, he had unsuccessfully tried to persuade the Japanese that the Chinese and Japanese peoples must “formulate a common approach to preventing our inundation and preparing for the union of the yellow races against the white man.”
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Now he warned that if Chinese territory were ceded to Japan, it would arouse indignation and hostility among the Chinese people, leading to a desire for revenge, and would prevent any future amelioration of relations between the two countries.

Li next questioned the huge sum the Japanese were demanding in indemnities, reminding them that the Japanese had started the war and invaded Chinese territory. He was nevertheless willing (as he had previously informed the American minister) to pay an indemnity, but the sum had to be reasonable. Setting so high a price for peace was dangerous: if the Chinese were unable to pay the sum demanded, it might lead to a fresh outbreak of hostilities with Japan. He closed his memorandum with an appeal for mercy:

I have served my country for half a century, and it may be that I am nearing the end of my days. This mission of peace is probably the last important service I will be permitted to render my sovereign and his subjects…. Our efforts here will determine whether our two great East Asian nations can henceforth live together in enduring friendship, mutual security, and prosperity. I pray, therefore, that Your Excellencies will take the greatest care to exercise mature judgment in your policies.
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The Japanese were unmoved by these arguments and reminded Li that the Japanese were the victors and the Chinese the losers. If the talks should fail, sixty or seventy Japanese ships were loaded with troops awaiting the command to head toward the battle area, and the fate of Peking itself was in doubt. It
ō
demanded an answer of yes or no to the Japanese demands.

The Chinese made a counterproposal that reduced the amount of territory to be ceded to Japan and cut the indemnity to 100 million taels. Li also proposed that if in the future disputes should arise between Japan and China, a third nation would be requested to arbitrate. If a nation could not be agreed on, the president of the United States would be suitable.
³¹

The Japanese delivered their final proposal on April 10. Once again, they required a yes or no answer. They reduced their territorial demands to the Liaotung Peninsula, Taiwan, and the Pescadores Islands and cut the indemnity to 200 million taels. Other provisions were left intact. After one more, futile, attempt to secure greater concessions, Li accepted the Japanese conditions. The treaty of peace was signed on April 17. Mutsu commented, “Thanks to the might and virtue of His Majesty, our nation’s prestige has been enhanced, our people’s happiness has been augmented, and East Asia was once again blessed with peace.”
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On April 21 the emperor issued a rescript on the resumption of friendly relations between Japan and China. He opened by stating his conviction that the fortunes of a country could be enhanced only in times of peace; and it was his belief, passed down from his ancestors, that it was his mission to preserve peace. This had been his aim ever since he succeeded to the throne, but hostilities had unfortunately broken out between the two countries and he had been unable to terminate the warfare that had lasted more than ten months. He expressed his gratitude to all who had made victory possible, especially the troops, who had endured innumerable hardships: “Although this result may be attributed to the spirits of my ancestors, how could it have been attained without the extraordinary devotion, bravery, and sincerity of my officials and subjects?”
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The rescript concluded with the warning that the Japanese must not let victory make them arrogant, despising others without reason and losing the trust of friendly countries. He expressed the hope that once the peace treaty with China was signed, friendly relations between the two countries would be resumed, and neighborly feelings would become stronger than ever.
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This statement, regardless of whether the emperor himself composed it, probably accorded with his real feelings. He was saying, in effect, that it was not (as official statements had declared) thanks solely to his might and virtue that the war had been won and Japanese prestige abroad enhanced; rather, victory could not have been attained without the efforts and sacrifices of his people. He did not express pleasure in having triumphed over a hateful enemy (in the manner of twentieth-century Western rulers) or in having removed the Chinese threat to Korean independence. Instead, he prayed that the two countries would resume the traditional ties of friendship that had been interrupted by an unavoidable war. This expression of hope that neighborly relations between Japan and China would become stronger than ever may explain his anger when he first heard of the decision to go to war with China.

After the peace treaty was signed in Shimonoseki, the emperor expressed his intention of proceeding to Ky
ō
to. He had always been fond of the old capital, and he may have looked forward to a stay at the Gosho after his cramped life in Hiroshima. The departure for Ky
ō
to would be on April 27.

On April 23 the ministers of Russia, Germany, and France called on Hayashi Tadasu, the vice minister of foreign affairs, and informed him that their three governments were opposed to the cession to Japan of the Liaotung Peninsula. The message from the czar of Russia stated that Japan’s possession of this territory would destroy Korean independence and that the threat to Peking posed by the occupation of Liaotung would be a perpetual obstacle to peace in the Far East. The czar urged, in his capacity as a sincere friend of the emperor, that Japan give up the Liaotung Peninsula.
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Needless to say, the Japanese did not take this profession of friendship at face value.