Empire (78 page)

2. See Cindy Patton,
Global AIDS / Local Context,
forthcoming; and John O’Neill, ‘‘AIDS as a Globalizing Panic,’’ in Mike Featherstone, ed.,
Global
Culture: Nationalism, Globalization, and Modernity
(London: Sage, 1990), pp. 329–342.

2 . 4 S Y M P T O M S O F P A S S A G E

1. ArifDirlik,
The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global
Capitalism
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 52–83; quotation p. 77.

2. See, for example, Jane Flax,
Thinking Fragments
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 29.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 4 0 – 1 4 8

439

3. For an explanation ofhow many postmodernist theorists conflate the

varieties ofmodernist thought under the single rubric of‘‘the Enlighten-

ment,’’ see Kathi Weeks,
Constituting Feminist Subjects
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), chap. 2.

4. bell hooks,
Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics
(Boston: South End Press, 1990), p. 25.

5. Jane Flax,
Disputed Subjects
(London: Routledge, 1993), p. 91.

6. What is necessary for a postmodernist critique is first to identify what

‘‘modernist’’ means in the field and then to pose a successor paradigm

that is in some way consistent with some form of postmodernist thinking.

Consider, for example, a field that might at first sight seem an unlikely

candidate for such an operation: public administration, that is, the study

ofbureaucracies. The modernist paradigm ofresearch that dominates the

field is defined by a ‘‘prescription ofneutral public administration ascribed to Wilson (separation ofpolitics from administration), Taylor (scientific

management), and Weber (hierarchical command).’’ Charles Fox and

Hugh Miller,
Postmodern Public Administration: Toward Discourse
(Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1995), p. 3. Scholars who are convinced that this

paradigm is outdated and leads to undemocratic governmental practice

can use postmodernist thinking as a weapon to transform the field. In

this case, they propose ‘‘non-foundational discourse theory’’ as a postmod-

ernist model that will create more active public interactions and thus

democratize bureaucracy (p. 75).

7. See James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro, eds.,
International/Intertextual
Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989); Jim George,
Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical
(Re)Introduction to International Relations
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publications, 1994); and Michael Shapiro and Hayward Alker, Jr., eds.,
Territorial
Identities and Global Flows
(Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1996).

8. Homi Bhabha,
The Location of Culture
(London: Routledge, 1994), p. 18.

9. Gyan Prakash, ‘‘Postcolonial Criticism and Indian Historiography,’’
Social
Text,
no. 31/32 (1992), 8.

10. See Edward Said,
Culture and Imperialism
(New York: Vintage, 1993), pp. 282–303.

11. Edward Said, ‘‘Arabesque,’’
New Statesman and Society,
7 (September 1990), 32.

12. Anders Stephanson gives an excellent account ofthe conceptions ofthe

United States as a ‘‘new Jerusalem’’ in
Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).

13. ‘‘Like most visions ofa ‘golden age,’ the ‘traditional family’ . . . evaporates on close examination. It is an ahistorical amalgam ofstructures,

440

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 4 8 – 1 5 3

values, and behaviors that never co-existed in the same time and place.’’

Stephanie Coontz,
The Way We Never Were: American Families and the

Nostalgia Trap
(New York: Basic Books, 1992), p. 9.

14. Fazlur Rahman,
Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition
(Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1984), p. 142.

15. ‘‘The fundamentalism of the humiliated Islamic world is not a tradition ofthe past but a postmodern phenomenon: the inevitable ideological

reaction to the failure of Western modernization.’’ Robert Kurz, ‘‘Die

Krise, die aus dem Osten Kam,’’ translated into Italian in
L’onore perduto del
lavoro,
trans. Anselm Jappe and Maria Teresa Ricci (Rome: Manifestolibri, 1994), p. 16. More generally, on contemporary fallacies around notions

of tradition and group identity, see Arjun Appadurai, ‘‘Life after Primordialism,’’ in
Modernity at Large
(Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1996), pp. 139–157.

16. Akbar Ahmed,
Postmodernism and Islam
(New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 32.

17. Rahman,
Islam and Modernity,
p. 136.

18. Robert Reich,
The Work of Nations
(New York: Random House, 1992), pp. 8 and 3.

19. See Arjun Appadurai, ‘‘Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,’’ in
Modernity at Large
(Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1996), pp. 27–47.

20. See, for example, Jean Baudrillard,
Selected Writings,
ed. Mark Poster (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988); and Umberto Eco,
Travels in Hyper-reality,

trans. William Weaver (London: Picador, 1986), pp. 3–58.

21. Stephen Brown,
Postmodern Marketing
(London: Routledge, 1995), p. 157.

Whereas marketing practice is postmodernist, Brown points out, market-

ing theory remains stubbornly ‘‘modernist’’ (which here means positivis-

tic). Elizabeth Hirschman and Morris Holbrook also bemoan the resistance

ofmarketing theory and consumer research to postmodernist thinking in

Postmodern Consumer Research: The Study of Consumption as Text
(Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1992).

22. See George Yudice, ‘‘Civil Society, Consumption, and Governmentality

in an Age ofGlobal Restructuring: An Introduction,’’
Social Text,
no. 45

(Winter 1995), 1–25.

23. William Bergquist,
The Postmodern Organization: Mastering the Art of Irreversible Change
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1993), p. xiii. See also the essays in David Boje, Robert Gephart, Jr., and Tojo Joseph Thatchenkery,

eds.,
Postmodern Management and Organizational Theory
(Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1996).

24. See Avery Gordon, ‘‘The Work ofCorporate Culture: Diversity Manage-

ment,’’
Social Text,
44, vol. 13, no. 3 (Fall/Winter 1995), 3–30.

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 5 3 – 1 6 6

441

25. See Chris Newfield, ‘‘Corporate Pleasures for a Corporate Planet,’’
Social
Text,
44, vol. 13, no. 3 (Fall/Winter 1995), 31–44.

26. See Fredric Jameson,
Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1991); and David Harvey,
The
Condition of Postmodernity
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).

2 . 5 N E T W O R K P O W E R : U . S . S O V E R E I G N T Y

A N D T H E N E W E M P I R E

1. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay,
The Federalist,
ed.

Max Beldt (Oxford: Blackwell, 1948), p. 37. This passage is from Federal-

ist no. 9, written by Hamilton.

2. See J. G. A. Pocock,
The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought
and the Atlantic Republican Tradition
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); and J. C. D. Clark,
The Language of Liberty, 1660–1832
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

3. On the Atlantic passage ofthe republican tradition f

rom the English

Revolution to the American Revolution, see Antonio Negri,
Il potere

costituente
(Milan: Sugarco, 1992), chaps. 3 and 4, pp. 117–222; and David Cressy,
Coming Over: Migration and Communication between England and

New England in the Seventeenth Century
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

4. Again, see Negri,
Il potere costituente.
See also J. G. A. Pocock, ‘‘States, Republics, and Empires: The American Founding in Early Modern Perspective,’’ in Terence Ball and J. G. A. Pocock, eds.,
Conceptual Change and
the Constitution
(Lawrence: University Press ofKansas, 1988), pp. 55–77.

5. See Polybius,
The Rise of the Roman Empire,
trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), Book VI, pp. 302–352.

6. See Alexis de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America,
2 vols. (New York: Knopf, 1994), in particular the Author’s Introduction, 1:3–16.

7. See Hannah Arendt,
On Revolution
(New York: Viking, 1963).

8. We are refering directly here to Max Weber,
The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism,
trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribner’s, 1950); but see also Michael Walzer,
Exodus and Revolution
(New York: Basic Books, 1985).

9. For detailed analyses ofthe conflicts within the Constitution, see primarily Michael Kammen,
A Machine That Would Go of Itself
(New York:

Knopf, 1986).

10. Throughout his reading ofPolybius in the
Discourses,
Machiavelli insists on the necessity that the Republic expand so as not to fall into corruption.

See Negri,
Il potere costituente,
pp. 75–97.

11. The combination ofref

ormism and expansionism in the ‘‘Empire of

Right’’ is presented wonderfully by Anders Stephanson,
Manifest Destiny:
442

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 6 7 – 1 7 3

American Expansion and the Empire of Right
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).

12. Virgil, Ecologue IV, in
Opera,
ed. R. A. B. Mynors (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), verses 4–5, p. 10. The original reads, ‘‘Ultima Cumaei uenit

iam carminis aetas; / magnus ab integro saeclorum nascitur ordo.’’

13. Bruce Ackerman proposes a periodization ofthe first three regimes or

phases ofU.S. constitutional history. See
We The People: Foundations

(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), in particular

pp. 58–80.

14. ‘‘What one shared above all was a sense ofan entirely new kind of

country, uniquely marked by social, economic, and spatial
openness.
’

Stephanson,
Manifest Destiny,
p. 28.

15. Marx explained the economic origins ofthe United States when analyzing

the American economist Henry Charles Carey. The United States is ‘ a

country where bourgeois society did not develop on the foundation of

the feudal system, but developed rather from itself.’’ Karl Marx,
Grundrisse,
trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York: Vintage, 1973), p. 884. Marx also

discusses the difference of capitalist development in the United States

(along with the other settler colonies, such as Australia), in
Capital,
trans.

Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage, 1976), 1:931–940. For Tocqueville’s

analysis ofthe socioeconomic roots ofthe United States, see
Democracy

in America,
vol. 1, chaps. 2 and 3, pp. 26–54.

16. Thomas Jefferson ‘‘saw expansion as the indispensable concomitant of a

stable, secure, and prosperous Empire ofLiberty.’’ Robert Tucker and

David Hendrickson,
Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 162.

17. U.S. Constitution, Article I, section 2. On the three-fifths rule, see John Chester Miller,
The Wolf by the Ears: Thomas Jefferson and Slavery
(New York: Free Press, 1977), pp. 221–225.

18. For a briefhistory ofthe crises in the Constitution precipated by black slavery from the Constitutional Convention to the Civil War, see Kammen,
A Machine That Would Go of Itself,
pp. 96–105.

19. On the emergence ofthe U.S. industrial working class as a powerful

force in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see David

Brody,
Workers in Industrial America: Essays on Twentieth-Century Struggles
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 3–47; Stanley Aronowitz,

False Promises: The Shaping of American Working-Class Consciousness
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), pp. 137–166; and Bruno Ramirez,
When

Workers Fight: The Politics of Industrial Relations in the Progressive Era, 1898–

1916
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978).

N O T E S T O P A G E S 1 7 5 – 1 7 9

443

20. For a good analysis ofthe relationship between U.S. expansionism and

European imperialism in terms offoreign policy, see Akira Iriye,
From

Nationalism to Internationalism: U.S. Foreign Policy to 1914
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977).

21. Cited in Frank Ninkovich, ‘‘Theodore Roosevelt: Civilization as Ideol-

ogy,’’
Diplomatic History,
20, no. 3 (Summer 1986), 221–245; quotation pp. 232–233. Ninkovich demonstrates clearly how Roosevelt’s imperialism was solidly grounded in the ideology ofthe ‘‘spread ofcivilization.’’

22. On Woodrow Wilson and the fortunes of progressive internationalism,

see Thomas Knock,
To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for

a New World Order
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

23. See Antonio Negri, ‘‘Keynes and the Capitalist Theory ofthe State,’’

in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri,
Labor of Dionysus
(Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1994), pp. 23–51.

24. The effects of Monroe’s original declaration were ambiguous at best, and Ernst May has argued that the doctrine was born as much from domestic

political pressures as international issues; see
The Making of the Monroe
Doctrine
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975). The doctrine only really became an effective foreign policy with Theodore Roo-