Empire (81 page)

453

ceptions in the style ofFranc¸ois Furet, Ernst Nolte, and Renzo De

Felice. It demonstrates the great importance ofthe
economic
element in the definition ofthe political choices ofthe twentieth century. The

revisionist histories, on the contrary, read the developments ofthe century as a linear progression ofideas that are often posed in dialectical opposition, with fascism and communism occupying the defining poles. See,

for example, Franc¸ois Furet,
Le passe´ d’une illusion: essai sur l’ideé communiste
au XXe siècle
(Paris: Robert Laffont, 1995), especially the chapter in which he discusses the relationship between communism and fascism

(pp. 189–248).

4. See Jon Halliday,
A Political History of Japanese Capitalism
(New York: Pantheon, 1975), pp. 82–133.

5. It is above all the ‘‘liberal’’ historiography ofauthors such as Arthur Meier Schlesinger that has insisted on the synthetic characteristics ofAmerican

progressivism. See his
Political and Social Growth of the American People,
1865–1940,
3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1941). See also Arthur

Ekirch, Jr.,
Progressivism in America: A Study of the Era from Theodore Roosevelt to Woodrow Wilson
(New York: New Viewpoints, 1974).

6. This is the central development traced by Michel Aglietta in
A Theory of
Capitalist Regulation,
and by Benjamin Coriat in
L’atelier et le chronomètre
(Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1979). See also Antonio Negri, ‘‘Keynes and

the Capitalist Theory ofthe State,’’ in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri,

Labor of Dionysus
(Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1994), pp. 23–51; and ‘‘Crisis ofthe Planner-State: Communism and Revolutionary Organisation,’’ in
Revolution Retrieved
(London: Red Notes, 1988), pp. 91–148. A good analysis ofthe New Deal and Keynesianism is also

provided by Suzanne de Brunhoff,
The State, Capital, and Economic Policy,
trans. Mike Sonenscher (London: Pluto Press, 1978), pp. 61–80.

7. The notion ofdiscipline developed by Michel Foucault certainly has a

different focus from the one we employ here, but we are refering to the

same practices and the same globality ofapplication. Foucault’s primary

theoretical concerns are that discipline is deployed through institutional

architectures, that the power ofdiscipline is located not in some central

source but in the capillary formations at its point of exercise, and that

the subjectivities are produced by internalizing discipline and enacting its practices. This is all equally valid for our consideration here. Our primary focus, however, is on how the practices and relationships of disciplinarity that originated in the factory regime came to invest the entire social

terrain as a mechanism ofboth production and government, that is, as a

regime ofsocial production.

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N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 4 3 – 2 4 6

8. The fundamental text that describes this development and anticipates its results is Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno,
Dialectic of Enlightenment,
trans. John Cumming (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972),

which was written in the mid-1940s. Numerous other works followed

in the description ofdisciplinary society and its implacable development

as a ‘‘biopolitical society,’’ works coming out of different cultural and

intellectual traditions but completely coherent in defining the tendency.

For the two strongest and most intelligent poles ofthis range ofstudies,

see Herbert Marcuse,
One-Dimensional Man
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), for what we might call the Anglo-German pole; and Michel Foucault,

Discipline and Punish,
trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1977), for the Latin pole.

9. Freda Kirchwey, ‘‘Program ofAction,’’
Nation,
March 11, 1944,

pp. 300–305; cited in Serge Guilbaut,
How New York Stole the Idea of

Modern Art: Abstract Expressionism, Freedom, and the Cold War,
trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1983), p. 103.

10. On the spread ofthe New Deal model to the other dominant countries

after the Second World War, see Paul Kennedy,
The Rise and Fall of the

Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000

(New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 347–437; and Franz Schurmann,

The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics
(New York: Pantheon, 1974).

11. On the history ofthe decolonization process in general, see Marc Ferro,
Histoire des colonisations: des conqueˆtes aux inde´pendences, XIIIe–XXe siècle
(Paris: Seuil, 1994); Frank Ansprenger,
The Dissolution of the Colonial
Empires
(London: Routledge, 1989); and R. F. Holland,
European Decolonization, 1918–1981
(London: Macmillan, 1985).

12. On the effect of U.S. hegemony on decolonization struggles, see Gio-

vanni Arrighi,
The Long Twentieth Century
(London: Verso, 1994),

pp. 69–75; and Franc¸ois Chesnais,
La mondialisation du capital,
rev. ed.

(Paris: Syros, 1997).

13. Harry S. Truman,
Public Papers
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 176; cited in Richard Freeland,
The

Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism
(New York: Schocken, 1971), p. 85. On the rigid bipolar ideological divisions imposed by the

cold war, see again Kennedy,
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,

pp. 373–395; and Schurmann,
The Logic of World Power.

14. On the decentering ofmanufacturing and service production (coupled

with the centralization ofcommand), see two books by Saskia Sassen,

The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International Investment and
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 4 7 – 2 4 8

455

Labor Flow
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), especially pp. 127–133; and
The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 22–34. More generally, on the

mobility ofcapital and the countervailing or limiting factors, see David

Harvey,
The Limits to Capital
(Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1984), pp. 417–422.

15. See Wladimir Andreff,
Les multinationales globales
(Paris: La Dećouverte, 1995); and Kenichi Ohmae,
The End of the Nation-State: The Rise of

Regional Economies
(New York: Free Press, 1995).

16. On the resistances ofpeasants to capitalist discipline, see James Scott,
Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 235 and passim.

17. On the economic projects ofmodernization in Mao’s China, see Maurice

Meisner,
Mao’s China and After,
2nd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1986), pp. 113–139.

18. Robert Sutcliffe, for example, writes, ‘‘No major country has yet become rich without having become industrialized . . . Greater wealth and better

living standards under any political system are closely connected with

industrialization.’’ Robert Sutcliffe,
Industry and Underdevelopment
(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1971).

19. On global and peripheral Fordism, see primarily Alain Lipietz,
Mirages
and Miracles: The Crises of Global Fordism,
trans. David Marcey (London: Verso, 1987); and ‘‘Towards a Global Fordism?’’
New Left Review,
no.

132 (1982), 33–47. On the reception ofLipietz’s work among Anglo-

American economists, see David Ruccio, ‘‘Fordism on a World Scale:

International Dimensions ofRegulation,’’
Review of Radical Political Economics,
21, no. 4 (Winter 1989), 33–53; and Bob Jessop, ‘‘Fordism and Post-Fordism: A Critical Reformulation,’’ in Michael Storper and Allen

Scott, eds.,
Pathways to Industrialization and Regional Development
(London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 46–69.

20. See, for example, Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, ‘‘Socialism and Eco-

nomic Development in Tropical Africa,’’ in
Essays on the Political Economy
of Africa
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), pp. 11–43; John

Saul, ‘‘Planning for Socialism in Tanzania,’’ in Uchumi Editorial Board,

ed.,
Towards Socialist Planning
(Dar Es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972), pp. 1–29; and Terence Hopkins, ‘‘On Economic Planning in

Tropical Africa,’’
Co-existence,
1, no. 1 (May 1964), 77–88. For two appraisals ofthe failure ofeconomic development strategies and planning

in Africa (but which both still imagine the possibility of an ‘‘alternative’’

socialist development), see Samir Amin,
Maldevelopment: Anatomy of a

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N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 5 0 – 2 6 1

Global Failure
(London: Zed Books, 1990), especially pp. 7–74; and

Claude Ake,
Democracy and Development in Africa
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1996).

21. For an interesting personal account ofthe Bandung Conference and its

significance, see Richard Wright,
The Color Curtain: A Report on the

Bandung Conference
(New York: World, 1956). The major speeches delivered at the conference are included in George McTurnan Kahin,
The

Asian-African Conference
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956). On the nonalignment movement, see Leo Mates,
Nonalignment: Theory and Current Policy
(Belgrade: Institute for International Politics and Economics, 1972); and M. S. Rajan,
Nonalignment and Nonalignment Movement
(New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1990).

22. On nomadism and the constitution ofsubjectivities, see Gilles Deleuze

and Feĺix Guattari,
A Thousand Plateaus,
trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1987), especially pp. 351–423.

23. On the formal and real subsumption in Marx, see primarily Karl

Marx,
Capital,
vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage, 1976), pp. 1019–38.

P R I M I T I V E A C C U M U L A T I O N S

1. Karl Marx,
Capital,
vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage, 1976), p. 918.

2. See primarily Samir Amin,
Accumulation on a World Scale,
trans. Brian Pearce (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); and Andre Gunder

Frank,
Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America
(New York:

Monthly Review Press, 1967).

3 . 3 R E S I S T A N C E , C R I S I S , T R A N S F O R M A T I O N

1. On crisis and the restructuring ofcapitalist production in the 1960s and 1970s, see Michael Piore and Charles Sabel,
The Second Industrial Divide
(New York: Basic Books, 1984). On the financial and economic crisis,

see Robert Boyer and Jacques Mistral,
Accumulation, inflation, crises
(Paris: PUF, 1978).

2. See Antonio Negri, ‘‘Marx on Cycle and Crisis,’’ in
Revolution Retrieved
(London: Red Notes, 1988), pp. 43–90.

3. See the historical essays ‘‘Do You Remember Revolution?’’ written col-

lectively and ‘‘Do You Remember Counter-revolution?’’ by Paolo Virno

in Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt, eds.,
Radical Thought in Italy
(Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1996), pp. 225–259. See also Paolo

Carpignano, ‘‘Note su classe operaia e capitale in America negli anni

N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 6 2 – 2 6 8

457

sessanta,’’ in Sergio Bologna, Paolo Carpignano, and Antonio Negri,
Crisi
e organizzazione operaia
(Milan: Feltrinelli, 1976), pp. 73–97.

4. On the ‘‘welfare explosion of the 1960s,’’ see Frances Fox Piven and

Richard Cloward,
Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare
(New York: Pantheon, 1971), in particular pp. 183–199. See also Piven and

Cloward,
The New Class War: Reagan’s Attack on the Welfare State and Its
Consequences
(New York: Pantheon, 1982).

5. See Luciano Ferrari Bravo, ‘‘Introduzione: vecchie e nuove questioni

nella teoria dell’imperialismo,’’ in Luciano Ferrari Bravo, ed.,
Imperialismo
e classe operaia multinazionale
(Milan: Feltrinelli, 1975), pp. 7–70.

6. Claude Ake goes so far as to characterize the entire world capitalist system as a conflict between ‘‘bourgeois countries’’ and ‘‘proletarian countries’’

in
Revolutionary Pressures in Africa
(London: Zed Books, 1978), p. 11.

7. This Third Worldist perspective is implicit in much ofthe writing of

Immanuel Wallerstein, Andre Gunder Frank, and Samir Amin.

8. For a thorough historical account ofthe events and the protagonists at

the Bretton Woods Conference, see Armand Van Dormael,
Bretton

Woods: Birth of a Monetary System
(London: Macmillan, 1978). For a

historical account that gives a broader view ofthe comprehensive U.S.

preparation for hegemony in the postwar period by posing the economic

planning at Bretton Woods together with the political planning at Dum-

barton Oaks, see George Schild,
Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks:

American Economic and Political Postwar Planning in the Summer of 1944

(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995).

9. Giovanni Arrighi,
The Long Twentieth Century
(London: Verso, 1994), p. 278–279.

10. On the international financial crisis that began in the 1970s with the

collapse of the Bretton Woods mechanisms, see Peter Coffey,
The World

Monetary Crisis
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1974); and Arrighi,
The
Long Twentieth Century,
pp. 300–324.