Enemy on the Euphrates (61 page)

4.
   Wilson,
Loyalties
, p. 6; Carver, p. 10.

5.
   See the production data in Charles W. Hamilton,
Americans and Oil in the Middle East
, Gulf Publishing Company, Houston, 1962, p. 287.

6.
   Peter Sluglett,
Britain in Iraq
, 2nd edn, I. B. Tauris, London, 2007, p. 8.

7.
   A. J. Barker,
The Neglected War: Mesopotamia, 1914–1918
, Faber & Faber, London, 1967, p. 39.

8.
   Wilson,
Loyalties
, p. 8; see also Stephen Helmsley Longrigg,
Iraq, 1900–1950
, Oxford University Press, London, 1953, p. 77.

Chapter 4: Arab Mobilisation on the Euphrates

1.
   John Buchan,
Greenmantle
, Kindle edn, Duke Classics, 2012.

2.
   See the classic work by George Antonius,
The Arab Awakening
, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1938, 1945 edn, ch. 5.

3.
   See e.g., Jamil Muhsin Abu Tabikh (ed.),
Muthakarat al-Sayyid Muhsin Abu
Tabikh, 1910–1960: khamsun ‘aman min tarikh al-‘Iraq al siyyasi al-hadith
(Memoirs of Sayyid Muhsin Abu Tabikh, 1910–1960: Fifty Years of Iraq’s Modern Political History), Mu’sasa al-‘Arabiyya li al-dirasat wa al-nashar, Beirut, 2001, pp. 33–4.

4.
   Quoted in Adelson, p. 160.

5.
   Mahmoud Haddad, ‘Iraq before World War 1: A Case of Anti-European Arab Ottomanism’, in Rashid Khalidi et al. (eds),
The Origins of Arab Nationalism
, Columbia University Press, New York, 1991, p. 121.

6.
   ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani,
Tarikh al-‘Iraq al-haditha
(History of Modern Iraq), Matba‘ al-‘Irfan, Sidon, 1957, p. 84.

7.
   Quoted in ‘Abd al-Razzaq ‘Abd al-Darraji,
Ja‘far Abu al-Timman wa dawrahu fi al-harakat al-wataniyya fi al-‘Iraq
(Ja‘far Abu al-Timman and His Role in the Iraqi National Movement), 2nd edn, Ministry of Culture and Information, Baghdad, p. 39.

8.
   Abu Tabikh, p. 40.

9.
   Hasan al-Asadi,
Thawra al-Najaf ‘ala al-Ingliz aw al shararat al-ula li thawra al-‘ishrin
(The Uprising against the British at Najaf or the First Sparks of the Revolution of 1920), Ministry of Information, Baghdad 1975, p. 90; see also Yitzhak Nakash,
The Shi‘is of Iraq
, Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 61.

10.
  Abu Tabikh, p. 41.

11.
  IO/L/PS/20/235, The British Library, London,
Arab Tribes of the Baghdad
Vilayet, Government of India for Arab Bureau, July 1918, Calcutta 1919, p. 185.

12.
  Abu Tabikh, p. 42.

13.
  al-Darraji, p. 43.

14.
  Abid Khalid Muhsin, ‘The Political Career of Muhammad Ja‘far Abu al-Timman, 1908–1937: A Study in Modern Iraqi History’, unpublished PhD thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 1983, p. 102.

15.
  ‘Abd al-Halim al-Rahimi,
Al-haraka al-Islamiyya fi al-‘Iraq: al-juthur al-fikriyya wa al-waqi‘ al-tarikhi (1900–24)
(The Islamic Movement in Iraq: Ideological Roots and Historical Situation, 1900–1924), Dar al-‘alamiyya, Beirut 1985, appendix 6, pp. 297–8.

16.
  Ronald Storrs,
Orientations
, Nicolson & Watson, London, 1945, p. 122.

17.
  David Fromkin,
A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914–1922
, André Deutsch, London, 1989, pp. 104–5.

18.
  Gerald de Gaury,
Rulers of Mecca
, Harrap, London, 1951, pp. 257–8.

Chapter 5: The Jihad Defeated

1.
   Abu Tabikh, p. 42.

2.
   ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani,
Al-‘Iraq fi dawra al-ihtilal wa al-intidab
(Iraq between the Occupation and the Mandate), vol. 1, Matba‘ al-‘Irfan, Sidon, 1935, p. 16.

3.
   ‘Abd ‘Awn al-Rawdan,
Mausu‘a ‘Asha’ir al-‘Iraq: Tarikh, Ansab, Rijalat,
Ma’athir
(Encyclopaedia of the Tribes of Iraq: History, Genealogy, Leading Personalities, Achievements), Al-Ahliyya, Amman, 2003, vol. 2, p. 296.

4.
   The story is related by Wilson,
Loyalties
, p. 29.

5.
   Ibid., p. 38.

6.
   Philip Willard Ireland,
Iraq: A Study in Political Development
, Jonathan Cape, London, 1937, p. 63n.

7.
   Quoted in Ghassan R. Atiyyah,
Iraq: 1908–1921. A Socio-Political Study
, Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, Beirut, 1973, p. 131.

8.
   al-Hasani,
Al-‘Iraq fi dawra al-ihtilal wa al-intidab
, p. 18.

9.
   The number and ethnic composition of the Ottoman combatants remain confused. The only contemporary Arab testimony – that of Sayyid Muhsin Abu Tabikh – puts the size of the total, combined force at 30,000 but does not give any further details (Abu Tabikh, p. 43). Gertrude Bell states, ‘The Turkish (
sic
) Army consisted of between 6,000 and 7,000 regular troops, the Arab tribal levies from the Euphrates, some 9,000 tribesmen under ‘Ajaimi (Sa‘dun) and his cousin ‘Abdallah al Falih, and over 1,000 Kurds. The tribesmen numbered in all over 18,000’ (‘Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia’, Cmd. 1061, 1920, p. 4); so summing 7,000 ‘regulars’ (not necessarily ethnic Turks), 17,000 Arab ‘tribesmen’ and 1,000 Kurdish ‘tribesmen’, gives us a total of 25,000 troops. Carver (p. 105), probably following Bell, states that al-‘Askari had ‘some 6,000 soldiers and 10–20,000 armed Arabs’. Barker (p. 67) states that the Arab tribesmen numbered between 10,000 and 20,000 while the regular Ottoman troops were ‘over 6,000 men in all – of whom nearly half were tough Anatolian Turks’.

10.
  Abu Tabikh, pp. 43–4.

11.
  According to Bell in her ‘Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia’, not only did the Arab tribesmen take ‘little or no part in the battle’ (p. 4) but as the Ottoman regular troops (whom she refers to solely as ‘Turkish’) retreated they were attacked by the tribesmen who ‘fell upon them, butchering and looting’ (p. 5). This story of the attack on the ‘Turks’ by the ‘treacherous Arabs’ was later taken up by Barker in
The Neglected War
. However, A. T. Wilson, who might have been expected to relish reporting such an incident, makes absolutely no mention of it, neither does Lord Carver in
The Turkish Front
. Bell’s exaggerated version of what appears to have been a number of isolated incidents, seems to have originally emanated from Turkish sources in Baghdad and should be treated with considerable scepticism. Firstly, it is not true that the tribesmen took ‘little or no part in the battle’; they did, and they suffered so badly from it that they were forced to retreat. Secondly, as for ‘treachery’, Barker rather spoils his story by stating that it was the ‘Turks’ who first fired artillery at the Arabs as some kind of punishment for their retreating. Thirdly, after both Arab tribesmen and regular Ottoman troops had retreated to Nasiriyya, they continued to fight side by side against the advancing British; one cannot really believe that such relatively ‘comradely’ behaviour would have survived the treacherous ‘butchery’ described by Bell and Barker.

12.
  al-Hasani,
Al-‘Iraq fi dawra al-ihtilal wa al-intidab
, p. 19.

13.
  According to Luizard, ‘Des milliers de ‘mujahidin’ trouvèrent la mort au cours d’opérations quasi-suicidaires’, Pierre-Jean Luizard,
La Formation de l’Irak Contemporain
, CNRS Editions, Paris, 1991, p. 328.

Chapter 6: Pacifying Arabistan

1.
   Wilson,
Loyalties
, p. 39.

2.
   Quoted in Marlowe, p. 65.

3.
   Quoted by Wilson,
Loyalties
, p. 44.

4.
   Ibid., p. 43.

5.
   Kent, pp. 202–3, assuming 8 barrels per long ton.

6.
  Quoted in Henry Longhurst,
Adventure in Oil: The Story of British Petroleum
, Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1959, p. 54.

Chapter 7: Imperial Objectives in the East

1.
   Quoted in Salim Tamari, ‘The Short Life of Private Ihsan’,
Jerusalem Quarterly
, no. 30, Spring 2007, p. 40; available at
www.jerusalemquarterly.org/ViewArticle.aspx?id=64

2.
   CAB/27/1, The National Archive, London,
British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia
(The De Bunsen Committee Report), 25 June 1915, p. 41. For a useful background to the De Bunsen Committee Report see Aron S. Klieman, ‘Britain’s War Aims in the Middle East in 1915’,
Journal of Contemporary History
, vol. 3, no. 3, 1968, pp. 237–51.

3.
   CAB/27/1,
British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia
, p. 124.

4.
   Since a copy of these telegrams (see below) is included in the final report of the committee, it seems reasonable to assume that they were, in fact, placed before the committee at some stage. The second meeting seems the most likely occasion since this was the meeting which first discussed desirable spheres of control.

5.
   CAB/27/1, Note by Viceroy of India: Future Status and Administration of Basra, 24 February 1915.

6.
   Ibid., 15 March 1915.

7.
   CAB/27/1,
British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia
, p. 44.

8.
   See ibid., p. 46 (I have converted the original reportage in the minutes into direct speech here and in the text referenced by nn. 9 and 12 below). It is not at all clear what Jackson meant by ‘draws through those regions’. Possibly he was referring to oil supplies from southern Persia which he anticipated would be transported via Basra and Baghdad by a future pipeline to the Mediterranean.

9.
   Ibid., p. 47.

10.
  Kent, p. 48.

11.
  Ibid., p. 118.

12.
  CAB/27/1,
British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia
, p. 47.

13.
  Stephen Roskill,
Hankey, Man of Secrets
, 2 vols, Collins, London, 1972, vol. 1, p. 286.

14.
  CAB/27/1,
British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia
, p. 9.

15.
  Ibid., p. 25.

16.
  Sykes, pp. 107–8.

17.
  Quoted in Harvey Broadbent,
Gallipoli, the Fatal Shore
, Viking Penguin, Sydney 2005, p. 110.

18.
  Kemal’s 19th Division contained the 72nd, 77th and Turkish 57th regiments; see E. J. Erickson,
Gallipoli: The Ottoman Campaign
, Pen and Sword Books, Barnsley, 2010, pp. 51–3. For questionable perceptions about the unreliability of the Arab troops at Gallipoli also see the criticism of this view by Erickson, ibid., pp. 56–7, 63–4.

Chapter 8: The Menace of Jihad and How to Deal with It

1.
   Quoted in Adelson, p. 190.

2.
   FO/882/13, The National Archive, London, Memorandum on Military, Political Situation in Mesopotamia (Section II), 28 October 1915.

3.
   Quoted in Adelson, p. 74.

4.
   Ibid., pp. 107–8.

5.
   Ibid., p. 242. Adelson actually describes the draft as ‘Sykes’s Formula’.

Chapter 9: The Lieutenant from Mosul

1.
   al-Hasani,
Al-‘Iraq fi dawra al-ihtilal wa al-intidab
, p. 79.

2.
   Eliezer Tauber, ‘The Role of Lieutenant Muhammad Sharif al-Faruqi – New Light on Anglo-Arab Relations during the First World War’,
Asian and African Studies
, vol. 24, 1990, p. 22.

3.
   Ibid., p. 23.

4.
   Ibid.

5.
   FO/882/13, Sir John Maxwell (Cairo) to Lord Kitchener, War Office, 16 October 1915.

Chapter 10: The Peculiar Origins of an Infamous Agreement

1.
   FO/882/13, Sir Mark Sykes to Sir Percy Cox (Mesopotamia), Cairo 22 November 1915.

2.
   Ibid.

3.
   See Tauber, ‘The Role of Lieutenant Muhammad Sharif al-Faruqi’, pp. 26–9; for criticism of various authors’ claims regarding the number of Ottoman officers who were members of al-‘Ahd also see C. Ernest Dawn, ‘The Origins of Arab Nationalism’, in Khalidi et al., p. 13.

4.
   Vis-à-vis all of the concessions made by Faruqi, Tauber states that these ‘were certainly not acceptable to Husayn’, ‘The Role of Lieutenant Muhammad Sharif al-Faruqi’, p. 35.

5.
   The Sykes–Picot Agreement, reproduced in Antonius, Appendix B, pp. 428–30.

6.
   I base this interpretation of the events in question partly upon the evidence of Sykes’s telegram to Cox, the substance of which is remarkably similar to the terms of the Sykes–Picot Agreement but also on the observation by Zeine that, ‘It has been suggested that Sir Mark Sykes took into consideration the opinion and suggestions of Faruqi as a basis for the Sykes–Picot Agreement’; see Zeine N. Zeine,
The Struggle for Arab Independence
, Khayats, Beirut, 1960, p. 16n.

Chapter 11: Two British Defeats but a New Ally

1.
   Quoted in Roskill, vol. 1, p. 230.

2.
   Quoted in Wilson,
Loyalties
, p. 83.

3.
   Barker, p. 481.

4.
   Lawrence James,
The Golden Warrior: The Life and Legend of Lawrence of Arabia
, Abacus, London, 1990, p. 153.

5.
   Tauber, ‘The Role of Lieutenant Muhammad Sharif al-Faruqi’, p. 35.

6.
   Antonius, p. 427.

7.
   There is considerable confusion as to the precise day on which the Arab Revolt started. According to Joshua Teitelbaum (
The Rise and Fall of the Hashemite Kingdom of Arabia
, C. Hurst & Co., London, 2001, p. 78), it started on 9 June 1916. Other sources give the date as 6 June.

Chapter 12: Colonel Leachman and Captain Lawrence

1.
   Quoted in Tauber, ‘The Role of Lieutenant Muhammad Sharif al-Faruqi’, p. 39.

2.
   T. E. Lawrence,
The Seven Pillars of Wisdom
, Jonathan Cape, London, 1935, p. 47.