Exit Plan (49 page)

As defense minister, Lavon outranked the head of Mossad. He took the lead. “We hope you will convey to President Myles our desire to resolve our differences and work together to face a common threat. You can also tell him we don’t like being threatened by our friends.”

As they had discussed, Joanna spoke for both of them. “Right now, we’re the kind of friend who takes away your car keys when you’ve had too much to drink, or tries to warn you about the girl you’re asking out. Our information proves the Iranians aren’t close to having a nuclear weapon. Not only will your air force bomb a worthless target, you will give the Iranians exactly what they want.”

“They want to be attacked?” Lavon sounded incredulous, then amused.

“To hide their failure to develop a weapon,” she answered. “If you destroy Natanz, they can claim whatever they want, and you’ve destroyed the evidence. In fact, they want the world to agree with you, that they are about to get the bomb.”

“This is the valuable intelligence you had to convey? Some speculation by an analyst to explain away the conflicting data?” snapped Revach angrily.

“This information came from the same HUMINT source as the two files we sent you recently. The individual stated with certainty that the Natanz facility is being deliberately set up as a target. The test site, the bomb assembly facility—it’s all a sham.”

Lavon and Revach leaned toward one another and spoke softly. Not only was it hard to overhear them, but Patterson was pretty sure they were speaking in Hebrew.

Revach, now calmed, said, “In the past, your government has told us that this individual is an Iranian national. From the information you’ve provided, they appear to be very knowledgeable in nuclear matters and the specifics of the Natanz operation. Can we interview this person?”

Hardy answered now. “No. Not yet. The source is a married couple trying to defect, but the operation to extract them has experienced difficulties. Several of our people are on the ground with them, and we are working to get them all out of the country.”

Revach was chubby, almost fat, with a ring of white fuzz circling his bare scalp. His English was better than Lavon’s, but he spoke slowly, as if he had to check each word before he said it. “This would explain the presence of USS
Michigan
in the gulf. Her minisub, the ASDS, it has a troubled history, does it not? Wait. General Moradi’s press conference this morning. Was that the body of one of her crewmen?” Revach seemed surprised at his own conclusion.

Hardy answered, “Yes. The vehicle was lost and the rest of its crew is on the beach along with the people that were going to bring them out. The reason they decided to defect was their discovery of the plan to provoke an attack on Natanz.”

Patterson added, “The source has a flash drive with stolen data—not just on Natanz, but the entire nuclear program. The file we gave you about the Arak reactor core failure was to show you the depth of information. It shows the Iranians are hampered by numerous technical problems and may never successfully develop a nuclear weapon.”

The chief of Mossad sat quietly for a moment, then added, “We have picked up some plain-language police chatter about a hunt for fugitives along the southern coast. The intercepts imply a large-scale, high-priority search is underway.”

Hardy nodded. “That confirms their story, then.”

“It confirms nothing,” Revach answered sharply. “The Iranian authorities could be searching for your couple or someone else entirely. Even if this is true, your source may be willing to say anything to get your help escaping Iran.”

“What if you could examine the files they have? We have a list of the information the flash drive contains.”

“You don’t have the files themselves,” Revach countered flatly.

“We will have them soon. A new plan is in place to get them out, as early as tonight. If you can delay your attack, you can examine the evidence with us, and prevent a war.”

Revach sighed heavily. “That new data would still have to be considered in light of all the intelligence we have on Iran’s activities. There is new data, from intercepts and other sources.”

“We haven’t seen that. What about our information-sharing agreement?” Hardy asked. There was a challenge, if a soft one, in his voice.

“This has been discovered in the past day. It will be passed to your agency in good time, but we are a little busy right now.”

“And you didn’t think we’d listen,” Patterson concluded.

Lavon spoke carefully. “Many here believe that only the detonation of an Iranian nuclear weapon outside Iran’s borders would force America to act militarily. It would be our bad luck if that detonation was also inside Israel’s borders. The United States has made war on too many Muslim nations. Your government simply doesn’t have the political will to take on this challenge.”

Revach added, “We have made it clear to Iran and the world that we cannot allow them to have a nuclear capability, yet here they are about to execute a classic nuclear breakout. Mossad has spent much of its time trying to understand how they deceived us. Unlike the United States, we are willing to admit when we are wrong, and face the consequences.”

“Our information explains both the old and the new data,” Hardy responded.

“But it requires that we sit back and watch, hoping you are right. That is not acceptable.” Lavon stood and paced. “We believe that Iran would not organize a nuclear test unless it already had the material for three or more weapons. A weapons test announces to the world, especially the Muslim world, that they can defy the West’s sanctions. But that is only half their purpose. Their other, repeatedly stated goal is the destruction of the State of Israel.”

Revach said, “Just today, we’ve detected increased activity at what we’ve identified as a bomb assembly facility established at Natanz. There is also increased security around several missile storage bunkers at the Sajjad ballistic missile depot near Tehran, and around one of the missile assembly buildings. The Pasdaran 5th Ra’ad Brigade is based there, and they operate the Sejil-2 and Shahab-3 missiles with the range to reach Israel.”

The director’s voice hardened. “How long would you have us wait? Until the missiles leave for their dispersal points? Until they are fueling the missiles? No, wait, the Sejil-2 is solid fueled. They don’t have to wait. And actually, they could launch from pads located at the depot, with almost no warning at all.”

Hardy said, “A carrier strike group is moving into the northern Persian Gulf as we speak. It has two Aegis ships with ballistic missile defense upgrades. We can position them to reinforce your own formidable antimissile defense systems.”

“Untested in combat,” Lavon remarked. “Both yours and ours.”

Hardy conceded the point, but with a twist. “True, but the missiles that Iran would launch are very similar to those we’ve both tested against. And the SM-3 has been tested more often than your system.” The two Israelis paused and looked at each other, silently evaluating Hardy’s words. Sensing a chink in their armor, he played his last card. “The most likely scenario involves Iran launching two or even three brigade’s worth of missiles at one time, perhaps as many as twelve or fifteen missiles, of which one or two would have nuclear warheads. The Iranians have never launched that many missiles at one time. Have you seen preparations for a simultaneous launch of that magnitude? We have not.”

“This is true,” Revach agreed.

“Then we have at least twenty-four hours. Let us get our people out of Iran tonight, and we will look at the data on the flash drive together. We can have the lot uploaded to us here or anywhere else within an hour of them getting out of Iran.”

Patterson added her own arguments. “Imagine getting all this data, and what it will tells us. After we have reviewed it, we release it to the world together. It’s a triple embarrassment for Iran: First, that one of their own engineers turned against them; second, that they have consistently lied about having a nuclear weapons program—no more political cover for their allies— and finally, that they just can’t get it done. A humiliation like this could potentially bring down the government. On the other hand, an airstrike will only strengthen domestic support for their leadership.”

Revach actually smiled, just a little, while Lavon remained neutral, but at least he wasn’t frowning. “What if we find the information is false, or it doesn’t convince us?” the general asked.

“We only ask that you examine the data before acting,” Hardy answered. “We believe that if you see it, the information will convince you.”

“You’re going for broke,” Lavon answered, “but it’s our money you’re betting.” He paused for another moment, and looked at Revach, who shrugged.

“All right,” the general announced.
“If
we were intending to launch an airstrike against Iran, we will refrain from doing so for another twenty-four hours so that we may exa mine the intelligence on the Iranian nuclear program which you will provide once you obtain it yourself. And once we have seen it, Israel is free to act as it sees fit for its own self-defense.”

“With the United States supporting your decision,” Hardy completed.

“Then we have an agreement,” Lavon said, offering his hand.

~ * ~

Back in their own car, Patterson first hugged Lowell in celebration, then reminded him, “You just promised Israel unconditional U.S. support, even if they do attack Iran.” Her tone wasn’t critical, but there was a note of warning in it.

“That’s just Andy Lloyd’s current policy,” he answered, smiling. “Besides, we’re already betting that the data on that flash drive will completely discredit Iran’s nuclear program. Once you’ve gone that far, you might as well go ‘all in’ to convince the Israelis.”

He smiled again. “Let’s go shock the president and give him some good news.”

~ * ~

Like all submarine fire control systems,
Yunes’s
Russian-designed equipment allowed the operator to create an artificial target on the displays. This feature enabled the sub’s attack team to train as if it were fighting a real opponent. Everything about the target could be defined, from its acoustic characteristics to its own sensors and weapons.

Commander Mehr had started drilling his team while the torpedoes were still being loaded. It wasn’t that they were ignorant of antisubmarine warfare tactics, but they were rusty. After all, Iran was the only Persian Gulf country with submarines. Most of their training was against surface targets, while the ASW training requirement was a twice-a-year canned drill against another Project 877EKM-class boat.

No more canned targets now. Mehr had started them out slow. Simply creating a very quiet synthetic submarine target had been enough of a shock. Radiated sound levels were a fraction of what they’d seen from surface ships, with initial detection ranges well inside weapons range for both sides.

That had spurred Mehr to add rapid salvo-firing training against targets that suddenly appeared. He might only get one chance, and seconds would matter. Choices had to be considered and made now, before the fight started. For example, the TEST-71ME-NK torpedoes had two speed settings. They could run at 40 knots for 15,000 meters, or the range could be extended to 20,000 meters by slowing to 26 knots. Given that this would be a close-in fight, he’d ordered 40 knots preset into the weapons.

His first officer, Lieutenant Commander Khadem, ran the drills while Mehr watched and thought about how he would fight this enemy. Once the team was used to a target that could change depth, he would start experimenting. Should he use active sonar before he fired? What was the best number of torpedoes in a salvo?

The latter one was not a simple question. The newer version of the TEST-71 torpedo was a more flexible weapon than its predecessors. It had an acoustic seeker that would either listen for the target or use its own active pulses to locate the enemy sub and home in. It could also be wire-guided, with a thin wire that connected the torpedo directly to
Yunes.
A wire cassette would reel out the guidance wire to compensate for the movement of the torpedo and the submarine, allowing
Yunes
to see what the torpedo’s seeker saw and to control its movements.