France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954 (41 page)

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Authors: William I. Hitchcock

Tags: #History, #Europe, #France, #Western, #Modern, #20th Century, #Political Science, #Security (National & International), #test

BOOK: France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954
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Page 195
That Mendès France now considered the EDC dead was clear when he traveled to Britain to see Winston Churchill at his country residence, Chartwell, on the day after the Brussels conference closed. Mendès France told Churchill that after the failure at Brussels, the EDC had no hope of passing in the Assembly. But Churchill was surprised to find Mendès France quite willing to move forward on the "little NATO" solution, suggested by Parodi in early August. This would incorporate Britain and the EDC countries into a unit within NATO, while containing some restrictions on Germany. Moreover, Mendès France was ready to grant Germany its sovereignty without further delay. According to the British minutes of the meeting, the French premier "was very definite that a France which rejected the EDC would never dare to reject an alternative, even that of German entry into NATO." Although Churchill and Eden urged him to stake his reputation on the EDC vote, Mendès France, it is clear, had already decided to find an alternative solution to the problem of German rearmament.
66
A full week before the French parliamentary debate on the EDC treaty, Mendès France and the Foreign Ministry began laying the groundwork for a new series of treaties that would restore German sovereignty immediately and provide a new framework for a German contribution to western defense. In doing so, the French found more encouragement from the British than from the Americans. Mendès France continued to receive reports from Washington about the apocalyptic implications of a French rejection of the EDC. These dark prognostications could not save the treaty, though they may have made Mendès France that much more eager to devise an alternative plan for German rearmament, one that could be quickly implemented in the wake of the EDC's rejection in parliament. By contrast with the American attitude, Eden was already discussing with Massigli the possible alternatives that lay ahead, reflecting a surprising amount of British support for Parodi's "little NATO" concept. Eden believed, as he told the British cabinet, that the best alternative for the British would be German entry into NATO, with many of the EDC safeguards on German action maintained. Such a plan would serve British interests quite well, Eden thought. "If the price of French acquiescence in such a NATO plan were our agreement to sit with the six EDC powers in a political Council of Ministers to control a six-power armaments pool on the EDC model . . . I think we could agree. This would in effect be much less than we have already undertaken towards the EDC." Given the evolution in British opinion, it is not surprising that Mendès France let it slip to the press,
 
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upon his return to Paris from Chartwell, that a viable alternative to the EDC was in the works.
67
The effect of the Brussels talks and the premier's visit to Chartwell had so damaged the prospects of the EDC that its rejection by the French parliament on August 30 was somewhat anticlimactic. The debate, after two years of delay, began on August 28, and Mendès France spoke on the following day. Although it was his government that was asking for ratification, the premier's remarks lacked any zeal. He placed the blame for the failure of Brussels squarely on the other EDC nations, and after carefully going through the content of the treaty he hinted that there were alternatives to the EDC should the Assembly not accept it. Mendès France conspicuously refused to engage his prestige or the fate of his government on passage of the legislation, making it quite easy for those who opposed the scheme to vote against it. On August 30, by a vote of 319 to 264, the parliament rejected the EDC.
68
What has always surprised most analysts of the EDC fiasco is how quickly the concerned countries managed to sweep the shambles of the scheme under the rug and begin anew on a far more workable plan for German rearmament. The two years of prophecy from Washington that a rejection of the EDC would destroy the Western Alliance proved far from accurate. To be sure, there was a ferocious outburst of spleen in Washington. France, after all, had sent down to defeat one of the keystones of America's postwar European policy.
69
Yet two factors led the Europeans to recover their balance in the wake of the unfavorable EDC vote and settle on a solution to the vexing rearmament problem in a relatively short time. First, the lengthy debate thoroughly discredited the supranational principle with respect to military affairs, clearing the way for an intergovernmental approach championed by Great Britain. At last, Britain adopted the leadership role in European affairs that it had forsaken at the time of the Schuman Plan. While the United States stood defeated and demoralized by the collapse of its own policy, Britain saw an opportunity for leadership on the continent that it readily seized. Second, Pierre Mendès France, the slayer of the EDC, now bore full responsibility for producing a new arrangement for German integration into the West. He had never liked the EDC scheme, and failed to spend on it any of his considerable political capital. Yet once he entered into negotiations on an alternative solution, he became personally committed to its success, and did prove willing to stake his government on it. This full engagement  so clearly missing from the EDC debate  provided the crucial margin for bringing the French Assembly around to accepting a German role in the Western Alliance.
 
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No sooner had the French rejected the EDC than the British government moved into high gear. Though a strong current of Schadenfreude ran through the Foreign Office as they beheld France's woes, the temptation to "let the French stew in their own juices" while the Anglo-Americans rearmed Germany was not, in Frank Roberts's view, "practical politics."
70
Mendès France would have to be taken at his word that he was willing to consider a new scheme for German rearmament. While Washington fumed and plotted against the French premier, London called for a meeting of the six EDC powers with the United States, Britain, and Canada. French and British officials resumed their discussions about an "Atlantic" solution to the German problem, namely, German entry into NATO under certain restrictions. Though the precise nature of these restrictions remained to be determined, it was clear that French and British views were converging on a more flexible, balanced, and simpler scheme for German integration with the European powers, one in which Britain could play its natural role as a counterbalance to German preponderance. As the British ambassador to France, Gladwyn Jebb, wrote to London, ''the one thing that could pull a vast majority of the French people together on a solution is one that made them feel that Britain is not merely at their side, but is together with France inside some organization which is smaller than, and especially tighter than, NATO."
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With the EDC gone, this prospect seemed far more palatable to the British.
On the weekend of September 5, according to Eden's recollection, the British prime minister, soaking in his Sunday bath, fixed on the novel solution. The Brussels Treaty of 1948 between France, Britain, and the Benelux countries, which Bevin had triumphantly called Western Union, had initially been designed to promote tighter European unity, demonstrate to the Americans that the Europeans were pulling together, and also provide the French some security from Germany. But the pact had been made meaningless by the formation of NATO the following year. Now, Eden believed, if the Italians and Germans could be added to the Brussels Treaty, and some executive powers be granted to it, it might provide the "little NATO" that the French and British were looking for. Here, in nascent form, lay what later analysts would term the "European pillar" of western defense. Best of all, the United Kingdom, already a full Western Union member, could play its full role, as Eden put it, "sharing from within instead of buttressing from without."
72
Despite Eden's claim to paternity, however, it is clear that the Brussels pact solution had also occurred to the French, as Mendès France explained in a telegram to
 
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Massigli on September 8. A delighted Massigli now thought that this striking convergence of Anglo-French attention on Western Union offered a way out of the impasse to the EDC crisis.
73
Eden then undertook a tour of the EDC capitals to sell his plan. The Benelux countries accepted it; Adenauer, obviously delighted at the prospect of German entry into NATO, believed it an excellent scheme; and the Italians proved amenable. All agreed that a strong British presence on the continent, even without supranational institutions, would help bring France and Germany together as allies. Oddly, only the United States, still wedded to the integrated army plan, expressed hostility to Eden's ideas. Nonetheless, with the backing of the Europeans, Eden descended upon Paris, where he found Mendès France initially opposed to German entry into NATO. The Frenchman thought entry into the Brussels Treaty alone might be enough to satisfy Germany. This Eden rejected categorically, and after a day's reflection, Mendès France relented. Germany would be brought into NATO through the means of a rejuvenated and expanded Brussels Treaty, though important restrictions on German arms would have to be devised.
74
Behind this superficial agreement, however, serious differences remained in the French and British positions, as the negotiations at the nine-power London conference, held between September 28 and October 3, revealed. The French wanted the Brussels Treaty organization to be granted substantial powers, especially in the area of arms procurement and production, as a means of controlling the German arms industry. The British, by contrast, clearly viewed the Brussels Treaty as window dressing to make German entry into NATO more attractive to the French parliament. Moreover, the French wanted specific stipulations on German military structures before agreeing to the recreation of the
Wehrmacht,
while the British disliked any overtly discriminatory restrictions. As Mendès France made perfectly clear in his opening address, he sought to maintain certain key controlling features of the EDC while disposing of the objectionable supranational ones. These divergences echoed the long-standing Anglo-French disagreement about the use  or abuse  of European institutions for the purpose of controlling Germany. In seeking such controls, Mendès France continued along a path well traveled by Bidault and Schuman.
75
The final outcome of the London talks revealed how much the allies were willing to give France in return for its pledge to restore German sovereignty and invite Germany into NATO. On the specifics of German rearmament, it was agreed that the numbers of German troops would not
 
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exceed the twelve divisions envisaged by the EDC; the German General Staff would not be able to act independently of NATO; and Germany would never produce atomic, bacteriological, or chemical weapons  though France would retain this privilege. Most important from France's point of view, the Brussels Treaty organization would create an agency to oversee arms production and procurement for the member states, able to restrict the growth of an independent German arms industry. On this last point in particular, France fought vigorously and overcame hesitations from its partners at the London Conference. Most crucial of all, the United Kingdom committed itself to keep on the continent the four divisions then serving under NATO, and would not remove them against the will of a majority of the Brussels Treaty powers. Here was the longsought continental commitment for which France had so ardently hoped since the outset of discussions on the EDC. In light of the British commitment, Dulles stated that he would recommend to President Eisenhower that the American pledge of support for the EDC, made in April 1954, be transferred to the Brussels pact organization.
76
Of course, Mendès France had done so well at London precisely because his colleagues knew that only a rousing French success there would be adequate to ensure that the agreement received the approval of the French Assembly. On this point, the Assembly delivered an encouraging sign. On October 12, after the Assembly had debated the London accords, Mendès France asked for a vote of confidence to demonstrate that the Assembly supported his continuing negotiations within the North Atlantic Council to bring the London accords to fruition. He won resoundingly, with 350 votes from the Socialists, Radicals, and the majority of the ex-Gaullists. The Communists opposed him, while the MRP, which never forgave Mendès France for leading the EDC to defeat, abstained. Victory seemed close at hand. Following a further round of follow-up negotiations in Paris, the NAC gave its approbation to the London accords on October 22. The following day, Mendès France and Adenauer agreed to a temporary settlement of the Saar issue, which would keep the European character of the Saar in place until an eventual peace treaty with Germany.
77
The path was cleared for the signing of the final treaties, transforming the Brussels pact into the Western European Union (WEU) and bringing Germany into it and NATO.
78
Two troubled months lay ahead, however. The treaty had to go through hearings in the Assembly's commissions, and in the meantime Mendès France became embroiled in a scandal over leaks of military secrets concerning the war in Indochina. Moreover, in these months, the

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