From the Tree to the Labyrinth (40 page)

27
.
De Interpretatione,
in
Aristoteles Latinus
II, 1–2, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Bruges-Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1965, pp. 5, 4–11 and pp. 6, 4, 11–13. The following is a translation of Aristotle’s original Greek text: “Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of—affections of the soul—are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses of—actual things—are also the same … A name is a spoken sound significant by convention, without time, none of whose parts is significant in separation … I say ‘by convention’ because no name is a name naturally but only when it has become a symbol. Even inarticulate noises (of beasts, for instance) do indeed reveal something, yet none of them is a name.”
Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione
, Translated with Notes and Glossary by J. L. Ackrill, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, pp. 43–44.

28
. Boethius translates
semeion
as
nota
on his own initiative, whereas he finds the identification of
symbolon
with
nota
already sanctioned by Cicero (
Topica
VIII, 35), on whom he comments as follows: “Nota vero est quae rem quamque designat. Quo fit ut omne nomen nota sit, idcirco quod notam facit rem de qua praedicatur, id Aristoteles symbolon nominavit” (
In Topicis Ciceronis Commentaria
IV, PL. 64, col. 1111 B). And here Boethius establishes the equivalency, as characteristic properties of
nota,
between
rem designare
and
rem notam facere,
in other words, between the significative function proper to Aristotle’s
symbolon
and the inferential or symptomatic function of
semeion.

29
. See
Latratus canis
(“On Animal Language”), p. 29, n. 20, and
De Resp.
476 a 1–b 12;
Hist. An.
535 b 14–24;
De an.
420 b 9–14. And along the same lines Boethius,
In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Commentaria majora,
PL 64, col. 423 D, where he explains that fish and cicadas do not have a voice but produce sounds with their gills or with their chests. Similar observations are found in Thomas (
In l. De Int.,
1, IV, 46) as well as in Pseudo Aegidius Romanus (
In Libros Peri hermeneias Expositio,
Venetiis 1507, fol. 49rb). The example of the
latratus canis
is already present in Ammonius, whose work, however, was only translated into Latin in 1268 by William of Moerbeke (
Commentaire sur le Peri Hermenneias,
ed. G. Verbeke,
Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum
I. Louvain-Paris: Nauwelaerts 1961, p. 47: “Hoc autem ‘secundum confictionem’ separat ipsum a natura significantibus vocibus. Tales autem sunt quae irrationalium animalium voces. Extraneo enim aliquo superveniente, canis latrans significat extranei praesentiam. Sed non secundum aliquam confictionem et condictionem ad invicem emittunt talem vocem canes” (“ ‘By convention’ distinguishes [the name] from the vocal sounds significant by nature. Such are the vocal sounds of the irrational animals. For, when a stranger suddenly appears, a dog by his bark signifies the presence of the stranger; but dogs do not produce this sort of vocal sound according to any convention or agreements among themselves”). Ammonius,
On Aristotle’s
On Interpretation 1–8, Translated by David Blank, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 39.

30
. “Neque solum nomen vox significativa est, sed sunt quaedam voces quae significant quidem, sed nomina non sunt, ut ea quae a nobis in aliquibus affectibus proferuntur, ut cum quis gemitum edit, vel cum dolore concitus emittit clamorem. Illud enim doloris animi, illud corporis signum est, et cum sint voces et significent quamdam vel animi vbel corporis passionem, nullus tamen gemitum clamoremque dixerit nomen. Mutorumque quoque animalium sunt quaedam voces quae significant: ut canum latratus iras significant canum, alia vox autem mollior quodam blandimenta XXXX decsignat, quare adjecta differentia separandum erat nomen ab his omnibus quae voces quidem essent et significarent sed nominis vocabulum non tenerentur” (
In De Int. Comm. Maj.,
PL 64, col. 420 C–D).

31
. See
In l. De Int. Comm. Maj.,
PL 64, col. 423 A–B: “Nec vero dicitur quod nulla vox naturaliter aliquod designet, sed quod nomina non naturaliter, sed positione significent. Alioqui habent hoc ferarum, mutorumque animalium soni, quorum vox quidem significat aliquid, ut hinnitus equi consueti equi inquisitionem, latratus canum latrantium iracundiam monstrat, et alia huiusmodi. Sed cum voces mutorum animalium propria natura significant, nullis tamen elementorum formulis conscribunt. Nomen vero quamquam subjacet elementis.”

32
. Cf. Saint Thomas Aquinas and Tommaso de Vio Cajetan,
Aristotle On Interpretation
: Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan (Peri hermeneias), trans. from the Latin with an introd. by Jean T. Oesterle, Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University Press, 1962.

33
. See pp. 27–28, n. 15, in
Latratus canis
(“On Animal Language”), the references to Garlandus Compotista,
Dialectica
III (ed. De Rijk. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1959, pp. 64, 24–28); in L. M. De Rijk,
Logica Modernorum
(Assen: Van Gorcum, 1967, II, pt 2, p. 78, 7–16), the
Abbreviatio Montana,
p. 149, 15–24; the
Ars Emmerana,
p. 179, 12–19, the
Ars Burana,
p. 358, 1–7, the
Introductiones Parisienses,
p. 380, 11–18, the
Logica ‘Ut dicit’,
p. 418, 5–9, the
Logica ‘Cum sit nostra’,
p. 463, 7–17, the
Dialectica Monanensis.
For the thirteenth century, Peter of Spain,
Tractatus, called afterwards ‘Summulae Logicales’
(ed. De Rijk. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972, pp. 1, 23, 2, 9) and Lambert of Auxerre,
Logica
(ed F. Alessio. Florence, La Nuova Italia, 1971, p. 7).

34
. All prior manuals of logic began their treatment with a definition of
sonus
as a genus of
vox.
In his commentary on
De interpretatione
(IV, 38), Thomas will likewise affirm that “vox est sonus ab ore animali prolatus, cum imaginatione quadam.”

35
. But see Lo Piparo (2003, IV, 9).

36
.
Institutiones Grammaticae,
I, cap, de ‘voce” (ed. M. Herz, in
Grammatici Latini
II, Leipsig, 1855, reprint Hildesheim 1961, pp. 5–6).

37
. See
Latratus canis
(“On Animal Language”), p. 29, n. 20. The influence of Priscian’s classification is discernible from the beginning of the eleventhth century onward, when, thanks especially to the influence of the Irish grammarians operating on the continent, in particular in the context of the Carolingian cultural renaissance, his authority begins to supplant that of Donatus in the principal Episcopal schools (see Holz 1981). Analogous positions are to be found in Alcuin’s
Grammatica,
in the
Excerptio de arte grammatica Prisciani
of Rabanus Maurus, in Sedulius Scottus’s
In Donati artem maiorem,
etc. Later the same classification will be borrowed, for example, by Petrus Helias in his
Summa super Priscianum maiorem,
by Vincent of Beauvais in his
Speculum Doctrinale,
and eventually by Simon of Dacia in his
Domus Gramatice.

38
. “Dupliciter enim ea quae simpliciter voce divisa, videlicet in significativam et non significativam, litteratam et illitteratam, quarum hanc quidem articulatam, hanc autem inarticulatum vocant” (“Let vocal sound
simpliciter
be divided twice into two, i.e., into significant and meaningless, and into lettered and unlettered, the former of which is called ‘articulate’ and the latter ‘inarticulate’ ”). Ammonius, then, appears to put articulation only among the differences characterizing the
voces illitteratae.
“Accidet enim hanc quidam esse vocem significativam et litteratam ut homo, hanc autem significativam et illitteratam ut canis latratus, hanc autem non significativam et litteratam ut blituri, hanc autem non significativam et illitteratam ut sibilus quae fit frustra et non gratia significandi aliquid aut vocis alicuius irrationalium animalium repraesentatio, quae fit non gratia repraesentationis (haec enim iam significativa), sed quae fit inordinate et sine intentione finis” (“For there will be vocal sound which is significant and lettered, like ‘human being,’ vocal sound which is significant and unlettered, like the bark of a dog, vocal sound which is meaningless and lettered, like ‘
blituri
,’ and vocal sound which is meaningless and unlettered, like whistling which is done for no reason and not to signify anything or the imitation [by a man] of some vocal sound made by irrational animals when it happens not in order to mimic (for that would already be significant), but in a random and purposeless manner”). Ammonius,
On Aristotle’s
On Interpretation 1–8, Translated by David Blank, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 40.
(Commentaire sur le Peri Herm., op. cit., pp. 59, 3–60).
Thomas was doubtless familiar with Ammonius in William of Moerbeke’s translation. In his commentary on the
De Interpretatione
(IV, 39) he echoes one of its typical lines of argument: “Sed cum vox sit quedam res naturalis, nomen autem non est aliquid naturale sed ab hominibus institutum, videtur quod non debuit genus nominis ponere vocem, quae est ex natura, sed magis signum, quod est ex institutione, ut diceretur: nomen est signum vocale; sicut enim convenientius definiretur scutella, si quis diceret quod est vas ligneum, quam si quis diceret qupod est lignum formatum in vas.” In his commentary the example Ammonius gave was that of the throne (pp. 76). What is more worthy of note is that, shortly afterward (IV, 40), Thomas appears not to accept Ammonius’s proposal to define
nomen
by taking
signum
as its genus. This is why in Figure 4 we preferred to insert
sonus
as our genus. See in this connection
Latratus canis
(“On Animal Language”).

39
. See Max Pohlenz,
Die Stoa. Die Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung,
Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1948–1955 and Pinborg (1962: 155–156).

40
. See
Latratus canis
(“On Animal Language”), p. 31, n. 25. This identification is particularly explicit in John of Dacia’s
Summa grammatica,
and it appears in the second half of the fourteenth century in a manual of logic like the
Summulae Logicales
of Richard of Lavenham (see Spade 1980: 380–381), where the pseudo-language of parrots is discussed, citing Isadore and an epigram of Martial’s.

41
. The position of the grammarians on the relationship between meaning and articulation would appear less original if we were to accept the reading of
De Interpretatione
proposed by Lo Piparo (2003) mentioned in Note 27 above. If
kata syntheken
is not to be interpreted as
ad placitum
but “by virtue of articulation, by syntactic composition of sounds otherwise deprived of meaning,” we might be entitled to suspect that the grammatical tradition had somehow been influenced by an original reading of Aristotle. And in that case the grammarians would not have considered it implicit that one articulates in order to express something, but rather that a linguistic articulation was necessary if one was to express oneself conceptually. If this was the case it would be more comprehensible why for them articulation was so closely tied to the meaning to be expressed.

42
. For a more detailed discussion see
Latratus canis
(“On Animal Language”), p. 13, n. 16, and p. 17, nn. 29 and 36, where the somewhat anomalous solution of a contemporary of Thomas, the Pseudo-Kilwardby, is also considered. Influenced by Priscian, he is inclined to exclude animal voices from the field of conventional signification, and yet, unlike the other grammarians and Modistae who will come later, he attempts a classification of all
signa.
In his system, then, animal sounds are indeed excluded from the
voces significativae,
only to reappear, albeit with some ambiguity, among the
signa naturalia.
“Ad hoc dicendum quod diversae sunt scientiae de signis. Signorum enim quaedam significant aliquid ex institutione et quaedam significant naturaliter ut effectus generaliter sive sit convertibilis sive non convertibilis cum sua causa est signum suae causae. Quod patet tam in genere naturae quam in genere moris. In genere naturae fumus est signum ignis non convertibile et defectus luminis sive eclipsis a corpore luminoso est signum interpositionis tenebrosis corporis. Similiter in genere moris delectatio, quae est in operationibus, est signum habitus voluntarii, sicut dicit Philosophus in secundo Ethicorum ubi dicit quod opportet signa facere habituum delectationem vel tristitiam in operationibus. Et sic patet quod effectus generaliter est signum suae causae. Unde Philosophus primo Posteriorum demonstrationes factas per effectum vocat syllogismos per signa in illa parte: ‘Quoniam autem ex necessitate sunt circa unumquodque.’ Secundum quorundam expositionem signorum vero quae significant ex institutione quaedam sunt instituta ad significandum tantum, quaedam sunt instituta ad significandum et sanctificandum. Signa ultimo modo sunt signa legis divinae de quibus nihil ad praesans. Quae autem sunt instituta ad significandum tantum quaedam sunt voces, de quibus dicit Philosophus quod sunt notae passionum.… Et de talibus signis est scientia rationalis quia rationis est componere partes vocis et ordinare et ad significandum instituere, non naturae vel moris, ut postea patebit. Quaedam autem sunt res ut signa metaphysica (?) sicut sunt gestus et nutus corporei, circuli et imaginationes de quibus nihil ad praesens.” (See “Roberti Kilwardby quod fertur Commenti super Priscianum maiorem Extracta,” ed. K. M. Fredborg et al.,
Cahiers de l’Inst. du Moyen-Age grec et latin
15, 1975, pp. 3–4). [
Translator’s note:
In n. 29 to the collaborative essay alluded to at beginning of these notes, “On Animal Language in the Medieval Classification of Signs,” Eco suggests, after citing the same Latin passage by Kilwardby, that, instead of “imaginationes” in the last sentence, the text ought to read “imagines.”]