Gettysburg (28 page)

“‘What’s the matter, John?’” Reynolds called up to him.

“‘The devil’s to pay,’” Buford responded before descending to ground level. Reynolds needed to be briefed on the tactical situation, so Buford summarized it, in words that likely echoed those he used in a message sent this morning to George Meade: “The enemy’s force (A. P. Hill’s) are advancing on me at this point, and driving my pickets and skirmishers very rapidly.” Reynolds indicated that his men were still two, maybe three miles away. Could Buford hold until they arrived? “‘I reckon I can,’” Buford replied.

Reynolds now had to decide whether to hold here or fall back. The evidence suggests that he barely hesitated. According to Charles Veil, “The Genl ordered Genl Buford to hold the enemy in check as long as possible, to keep them from getting into town and at the same time sent orders to Genl Sickles … & Genl Howard to come on as fast as
possible.” A staff officer riding with Reynolds this morning recalled that “all his remarks and appearance gave me the impression that he had gone there to stay.”

John Reynolds turned to Stephen Weld and directed him to find Meade’s headquarters, “to say that the enemy was coming on in strong force, and that he was afraid they would get the heights on the other side of the town before he could; that he would fight them all through the town, however, and keep them back as long as possible.” Recognizing the young officer’s nervousness, Reynolds carefully explained where he would find the road to Taneytown, “and told me to ride with the greatest speed I could, no matter if I killed my horse.”

Then John Reynolds and John Buford rode out to McPherson’s Ridge to plan their next moves.

Almost from the moment Cutler’s brigade halted near John Sherfy’s peach orchard, it became apparent that there was trouble ahead. Hardly had the men gotten their bearings when, recalled one, “the sound of artillery firing was borne to them on the morning wind, and the whitish colored puffs of smoke dotted the faces of the distant hills.” The commander of the 14th Brooklyn could plainly see the “shells burst[ing] a little to the left of the road we were marching on.” In anticipation of an overland push, the call “Pioneers to the front!” rippled along the ranks, summoning the labor gangs forward in readiness to knock openings in the fences west of the road.

The 76th New York had stopped near some cherry trees ripe with fruit. Major Andrew J. Grover turned a blind eye while his men helped themselves to the sweet bounty. It helped divert their attention from the sight of a small procession of civilians leaving Gettysburg—”gray-haired old men tottering along; women carrying their children, and children leading each other, while on the faces of all were depicted the indices of the terror and despair which had taken possession of them.”

Cutler’s pause allowed the Iron Brigade to close some of the gap. The same cannon fire that Cutler’s soldiers were seeing could be heard by Brigadier General Solomon Meredith’s men as a dull, distant thumping. Veteran Loyd Harris joked to a fellow officer that the “Pennsylvanians have made a mistake and are celebrating the 4th three days ahead of time.” Someone in authority, hoping to strengthen the men’s determination, started a rumor that a former, very popular commander of the Army
of the Potomac—Major General George B. McClellan—had been put back in charge of the forces. “Our fellows cheered like mad,” recollected a 6th Wisconsin soldier.

While Calef’s and Pegram’s cannon continued their unequal duel, a small but bitter close-in combat flared along Willoughby Run as the dismounted Yankee horsemen stiffened their resistance, knowing that the main line was just behind them. It was likely during this phase that the greatest number of cavalry casualties occurred; among the fallen was Major Charles Lemon of the 3rd Indiana, cited by some as the first Union officer mortally wounded in this action.

Even as he was working his guns, John Calef spotted Generals Buford and Reynolds riding along McPherson’s Ridge, “conferring … as to the lay of the land and other military points of pressing interest.” An aide was sent on a direct route to the Codori farm to guide Wadsworth’s men, and Reynolds and his party returned to the seminary, where the general met one of Abner Doubleday’s staff officers, come in search of fresh orders. “I … received instructions to hurry forward the other two divisions of the corps as fast as possible,” the officer later remembered. There was a hard clarity to all of Reynolds’ actions now. He was determined to stop the enemy west of the town.

Meredith’s Iron Brigade had closed to within a quarter mile of Cutler’s unit, when James Wadsworth, at the head of the column near the Codori farm, saw a mounted man approaching across the fields to the west. Suspecting it was something important, Wadsworth rode out to meet the courier, who was in fact bringing orders from the wing commander: “‘Gen. Reynolds desires you to turn your leading brigade into the field, following along the ridge at the double [quick] toward the wood yonder,’” the messenger told him. “‘Hall’s Battery will strike across to relieve Calef’s guns, which are overmatched and have suffered severely. The General will meet the column and himself place the troops and guns. He wishes you, General, to hasten forward your other brigade.’”

Cutler’s column, with the 76th New York leading, drew even with the farm and from there began angling off the road, moving crosslots to the northwest. As the New Yorkers passed out of the area cleared by the brigade pioneers, they were “obliged to remove fences as they led the
army through fields, gardens and yards.” When the third-in-line 147th New York reached the turnoff and broke into a trot, officers shouted at the men to load their rifles. “Then was heard the wild rattle of jingling ramrods, as we moved toward the sound of the cannon,” recalled one soldier. Behind the 147th came the 95th New York and then the 14th Brooklyn, followed by the six guns of Hall’s 2nd Maine Battery.

After granting Johnson’s Division the right-of-way over Longstreet’s Corps and then themselves riding ahead, Robert E. Lee and his party had worked their way slowly past the files of men ascending the western side of the Cashtown Gap. According to one of Lee’s staff officers, they were near the crest when “firing was heard from the direction of Gettysburg. This caused Lee some little uneasiness … [, but he was] persuaded that the firing indicated a cavalry affair of minor importance.” Still, an engineer officer who saw Lee at about this time thought he looked “much older and somewhat careworn.” The army commander kept on at the same pace toward Cashtown, where he expected to find A. P. Hill.

At Army of the Potomac headquarters in Taneytown, Maryland, George Meade was waiting for an update. In a communication sent off at an early hour to John Sedgwick, whose Sixth Corps represented the army’s extreme right, Meade had outlined the likely scenarios. He was anticipating that John Reynolds would find the Rebels already in control of Gettysburg, in which case “he is instructed to hold the enemy in check, and fall slowly back.” That would trigger the actions mandated in the Pipe Creek circular. However, Meade also allowed for the possibility that Reynolds would find a battle, which would mean he would have to be reinforced. Meade’s best advice for Sedgwick was to be ready “to move in such direction as may be required at a moment’s notice.”

John Reynolds rode south along Seminary Ridge until he could see Cutler’s men approaching. He dispatched his escort to help speed their way by knocking down nearby fences. While he was waiting, the aide he had sent into town to urge the civilians to seek shelter returned and reported that his warnings had been ignored. Reynolds frowned, then nodded toward the staff officer’s binoculars, which were spattered with mud from his ride. “‘Oh, they have been throwing dirt in your eyes,’” he said in a wan attempt at humor.

Reynolds had started to attract a crowd. James Wadsworth rode over, followed by Captain James A. Hall, commanding the 2nd Maine Battery. Not far away was John Buford, whose exhausted cavalrymen were by now reaching the limits of their endurance. Reynolds instructed Hall to relieve Calef’s battery and then sketched out for Wadsworth where he wanted the first infantry regiments placed. Buford took it all in before spurring off to get Calef pulled back and his own troopers set to withdraw.

Henry Heth was no longer completely in the dark. Now poised to enter Gettysburg, he was convinced “that the enemy was in the vicinity of the town in some force.” Although he could only guess at what might be waiting for him on McPherson’s Ridge, any hope that it was merely militia was long gone. “I … supposed it consisted of cavalry, most probably supported by a brigade or two of infantry,” Heth would later report. Interviewed after the war, he would add, “I did some lively work to get my artillery, and advance troops in position, fearing that I might be attacked in force before proper dispositions could be made.”

Riders confirmed that both Archer’s and Davis’ Brigades were ready to go. Possibly because they had been less disrupted by Pegram’s exchange with Calef’s guns, or perhaps due to the eagerness of their commander, the three regiments constituting Davis’ Brigade jumped off first. Since the ground along Willoughby Run north of the pike offered few defensive possibilities, Thomas Devin had pulled most of his strength back to the Wills Woods, leaving only a thin screen. Once this force had been sent packing, the Mississippi and North Carolina troops found little to impede their way beyond the “thick underbrush and briars” near the creek.

Cutler’s column (1,600 strong) wriggled along the western base of Seminary Ridge, canteens clanking and arms pumping as guns were loaded. The leading three regiments reached the Chambersburg Pike just after John Calef withdrew his four cannon; together these actions attracted enemy artillery fire to the packed columns, prompting Colonel J. William Hofmann of the 56th Pennsylvania to order his men to lie down. The respite was momentary. Hall’s guns were due to take over the position vacated by Calef’s, so Wadsworth instructed Cutler to put three regiments on the battery’s right.

These units were in the process of crossing the pike when Hall, anxious to get his guns into action, cut off the 147th New York, the third in line. This incident, plus harassing fire from Confederate skirmishers, delayed the regiment’s deployment. Two other regiments trailing the 147th were headed for positions on the battery’s left; when the 147th halted, this pair left-faced and proceeded west, past the McPherson farm buildings and through a small orchard, to form a line of battle along the western spur of McPherson’s Ridge. John Reynolds met these two units on their way up the slope so he could give instructions to the 14th Brooklyn’s Colonel Edward B. Fowler.

Although Joseph Davis began the advance with his three regiments carefully aligned, it took only a few minutes for the formation to spread apart. Wary of the killing power of the Federal cannon along the pike, Davis’ right regiment, the 42nd Mississippi, eased away from the road to follow what one soldier in the brigade described as “a railroad which had been graded but not ironed.” The left regiment in Davis’ line, the 55th North Carolina, stuck with its skirmishers, who were drawn off toward the Mummasburg Road. The experienced 2nd Mississippi, for its part, settled into a position about midway between the other two. With the least opposition confronting them, the Tarheels got ahead of their brigade mates.

Lysander Cutler’s two leading regiments were still in marching formation as they crossed into the open fields north of the unfinished railroad. Cutler ordered them deployed from column into line. The 56th Pennsylvania got the word first and completed its transformation just as the 76th New York was beginning to reform. A Pennsylvanian recalled that the men “could see a line of battle in front and to the right, distant perhaps 450 yards.”

“Is that the enemy?” asked William Hofmann, commanding the 56th. When Cutler answered that it was, Hofmann barked the commands, “Ready, right oblique, aim, fire!” The first controlled volley of the battle sparked from the regiment’s 250 rifles, aimed at the 55th North Carolina. “Two men of the color guard of the regiment were wounded by this volley,” attested a Tarheel. The Confederate formation at once returned the fire, in an exchange that constituted the 640 rifles’ first combat. The bullets knocked down men and animals, among the latter Lysander Cutler’s horse.

Archer’s Brigade was also moving, though it had been slowed by stiff resistance from cavalry skirmishers pocketed along Willoughby Run. In
the words of one of Archer’s embattled voltigeurs, “Just before [we reached] Willoughby’s Run, the cavalry began to get stubborn.” When the heavy lines of battle crested the ridge, Pegram’s cannon ceased firing as the grime-streaked gunners waited for the infantry to clear their front. The two pieces with John Calef, southeast of the Herbst Woods, were under no such restriction. The artillery officer allowed himself a brief moment to observe that the enemy’s “battle-flags looked redder and bloodier in the strong July sun than I had ever seen them before”; then he gave the order to fire.

Calef’s little bombardment put a hurry-up into Archer’s men. An Alabama private thought his fellows “moved somewhat faster, attempting to run from under the shells, which were just falling behind us.” Once the infantry had cleared out of the way, Pegram’s guns reengaged, throwing shells toward McPherson’s Ridge with a hiss that one of Archer’s soldiers judged to be “the sweetest music I had ever heard.” Assaulted from all sides by these projectiles, spiteful shots taken by the slowly retiring cavalry skirmishers, and the prickly underbrush along Willoughby Run, Archer’s line finally reached the small valley of the creek. “We halted to reform, reload, catch our breath, and cool off a little,” related a member of the 13th Alabama.