Gettysburg (85 page)
Authors: Noah Andre Trudeau
Returning toward the front, Patrick spotted a line of Rebel prisoners with a captured major in their midst. He rode over to the group and spoke with the officer, hoping to confirm a rumor he had heard that George Pickett had been killed in the attack. “‘No, sir,’” the Confederate officer replied. “‘Genl. Pickett is safe.’” Patrick looked up at the ridge line where so desperate a struggle had been fought, then ventured the opinion that with “‘a few more men Major, … you would have gained your independence right here.’” The captured officer thought for a moment. “‘Yes, General,’” he responded at last, “‘and right here we have lost it.’”
Because postbattle accountings of losses on the Federal side cover the entire period of the combat at Gettysburg, with no distinctions made among the three days, casualty counts are at best rough estimates. In its two days on the field, the Second Corps reported 4,369 killed, wounded, and missing, of which total approximately 2,800 fell on July 2, leaving losses of some 1,570 on July 3 (including casualties of the action at the Bliss farm). The addition of about 306 losses in the Second Vermont Brigade and perhaps 125 more in the artillery yields a presumed total of 2,001. Not surprisingly, the greatest
single loss was in the Philadelphia Brigade, which suffered 418 casualties in this day’s action.
The fighting on July 3 took one corps commander (Hancock) and his first replacement (Gibbon) out of action; the man leading the principal division involved, Alexander Hays, emerged without serious injury. On a brigade level, Alexander Webb was struck in the groin—”but God preserved me,” he noted. Equally unlucky were Hays’ brigadiers Thomas Smyth (wounded) and Eliakim Sherrill (mortally wounded). The cadre of young artillery officers likewise paid a high price, with James Rorty and Alonzo Cushing dead and George Woodruff mortally wounded.
Ironically, the ambiguities that initially surrounded the Confederate losses would inspire generations of researchers to sift through the historical record, ultimately resulting in more accurate totals than are available for the Union side. George Pickett’s division lost 2,640 men, or 45 percent of its roster, with the brigade losses at 1,057 for Armistead, 905 for Garnett, and 678 for Kemper. Of the 209 officers and men who began the advance in John Dooley’s 1st Virginia, 113 would become casualties. Included in their number was the regiment’s commander, Colonel Lewis B. Williams Jr., who, thanks to his insistence on riding, not marching, into this action, suffered a mortal wounding worthy of antiquity when he got shot off his horse and impaled himself on his own sword.
Heth’s Division, under J. Johnston Pettigrew, lost 1,592 men (or 42 percent), with Marshall’s command (Pettigrew’s Brigade) hardest hit (610), followed by Fry’s (Archer’s 535), Davis’ (440), and Brockenbrough’s (7). William Peel’s 11th Mississippi, in its first action in this battle, lost 312 out of 592 engaged. Trimble’s supporting line added 570 casualties (30 percent of its strength) to the total, with Lane contributing 381 of those and Lowrance (vice Scales) 189. The already hard hit brigades of Wilcox and Lang (vice Perry) gave up 204 and 155 more, respectively, to the casualty rolls. Missing from this accounting are numbers for the artillery units, which faced only long-distance opposition, suggesting a figure of 75 as an estimated loss. This brings the total Confederate casualties for the units directly involved in the Cemetery Ridge assault to 5,236.
The toll was especially heavy at the command level. Divisional commanders Pettigrew and Trimble were wounded, with the latter requiring an amputation. Brigadiers Garnett, Armistead, and Marshall were either killed outright or mortally wounded, while Kemper and Fry were less seriously injured. The carnage was far worse on the line. Of the fifteen regimental commanders under Pickett, eight were killed or died from wounds suffered in the
fighting, and five others were hurt; only two escaped without injury. Although the research undertaken on Pettigrew’s and Trimble’s divisions has been less exhaustive than that on Pickett’s, it is clear that their losses were comparable. A lieutenant in the 11th Virginia summed it up for all when he declared, “We gained nothing but glory and lost our bravest men.”
Sometime near midnight, along the line held by the 7th Ohio on Culp’s Hill, the men were sleeping with their regimental flag propped upright against the life-saving earthworks. Suddenly a figure darted out of the darkness and made a a grab for the standard. The Ohio color sergeant awoke in time to shoot the intruder, who proved to be a Confederate sergeant bent on obtaining a trophy. As the Rebel crumpled dead to the ground, the Union line to either side crackled with pinpricks of flame as taut nerves snapped and scared young men fired at demons imagined in the night.
If July 1 was the battle of accidental encounters and July 2 the fight for dominant position, then the combat on July 3 was driven solely by Robert E. Lee’s desire for a decisive victory. The information he was given persuaded him that he had cracked into the Federal position on his left and secured a commanding artillery platform on his right, making feasible a renewed effort against Cemetery Ridge. There were indications, for those who wanted to see it that way, that the Union army was tottering; but there were signs, too—again, for those who wished to think so— that it remained resilient and strong. Lee chose to join the former group.
The orders he issued to Ewell and Longstreet on the night of July 2 were open to—perhaps even begged—misinterpretation. Ewell perceived enough latitude in them to allow him to concentrate all his effort on Culp’s Hill without even feinting against Cemetery Hill; the nature and timing of this ill-conceived undertaking ensured that he would have neither artillery support nor infantry assistance from the rest of his corps, and that the enemy need not weaken any other sector to repel him. Longstreet, for his part, exercised the same authority he had invoked on July 2 to envelop the enemy’s flank, but this time he badly misread Lee’s intentions. The difficulty of overseeing such a far-flung line of engagement was highlighted once again as Lee attempted in vain to coordinate the two corps. Why he did not direct Ewell to withhold the bulk of his blows until the Cemetery Ridge assault began will remain one of Gettysburg’s mysteries. The repulse of Ewell’s first attacks, initiated before he learned of Longstreet’s delay, did not in and of itself compel him and Edward Johnson to sustain their effort until exhaustion finally set in, at 10:30
A.M.
Either these two were seriously misinformed as to the situation on Culp’s Hill, or they expected additional instructions that Lee never provided.
Once Lee’s original intention to fight on July 3 according to the July 2 plan had been frustrated, the decisions that were to shape the climactic assault on Cemetery Ridge were incremental but unstoppable, given his determination. With a renewal on the right ruled out, and an attack through the town likewise impracticable, the Federal center was the only objective remaining.
It says much about Lee’s depth as a military commander that the plans for the assault were as thorough as they were, especially considering the circumstances under which they were cobbled together. If all the parts had worked as they were designed to do, the grand attack might very well have succeeded. The rickety state of the Confederate command infrastructure, however, made perfect execution an impossibility. For all the confusion caused by small miscommunications, it was the large oversights that truly portended disaster. Pendleton’s failure to manage the army’s artillery situation in an effective manner not only resulted in the fatal supply shortage but also precluded Hill’s cannon from advancing with his infantry. In turn, Hill’s failure to recognize the severe damage suffered by Heth’s Division on July 1, and his eagerness to volunteer it for the charge, cast that command in a key role that it was ill prepared to play. That it performed as well as it did is testament to the courage of individual Confederate soldiers and to the leadership of their line officers, who paid an excessively high price for their participation. Finally, knowing Longstreet’s feelings about this attack, Lee should have reserved the decision to commit the second wave for himself. Barring a complete collapse of the Federal defense, it is hard to conceive of any condition that would have justified, in Longstreet’s mind, the release of that force.
To imagine that George Meade could have followed up Lee’s failed effort with an offensive of his own is to misunderstand both the situation and the man himself. The culture of the Army of the Potomac was very much defensively oriented; then, too, Meade was not a dominating personality, nor had he been in charge of the army long enough for his subordinates to be confident of what he expected of them. This was not a cohesive force operating as a single entity but rather a loose string of component parts bound together only by a conservative tradition and a prevailing tendency toward caution. Among the corps commanders on the field, only Winfield Hancock had the mix of tactical acuity, situational awareness, and determined aggressiveness that would have enabled a Federal counterpunch. His wounding and incapacitation at the height of the assault must be counted among the greatest losses suffered by the Army of the Potomac this day.
Fighting almost entirely from the relative safety of prepared defensive positions, and backed at almost every point by well-sited artillery, the Union army was comparatively unscathed on July 3, with just over 3,800 casualties. In bloody contrast, the Rebel advance, into the teeth of determined defenses on Culp’s Hill and across the open fields fronting Cemetery Ridge, cost Lee’s army its greatest number of losses, totaling more than 10,000.
Taking into account all actions of the three days, the price paid by the two sides was almost exactly, and terribly, even: 22,813 U.S., 22,874 C.S.
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With Jones now wounded, Lieutenant Colonel R. H. Dungan commanded the Virginia brigade.
*
In his writings, McClellan would consistently misidentify this unit as Captain William H. Griffin’s 2nd Baltimore Maryland Artillery, which was back at Gettysburg by this time.
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Minus the 6th United States Cavalry, which he had sent off toward Fairfield in search of a poorly guarded Rebel supply train that was reported to be there.
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The regiment that Merritt had detached prior to this action to raid a reportedly unguarded Rebel wagon train to the west had found that train well guarded after all, but not until after the regiment (the 6th United States Cavalry) had become engaged and lost heavily. For their actions in this affair near Fairfield, Pennsylvania, troopers George C. Platt and Martin Schwenk would receive the Medal of Honor.
†
Alexander’s time estimates were perhaps his only failing as a chronicler. He guessed that the cannonade had lasted twenty-five minutes and put the time of the action here described at 1:25
P.M.
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During this portion of the action, Sergeant George
H.
Dore of the 126th New York picked up his regimental flag after the color-bearer was killed, and held it for the rest of the day, in the process earning himself a Medal of Honor. Another went to Corporal William
H.
Raymond of the 108th New York, who succeeded in resupplying his regiment with ammunition while it was under a heavy fire.
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Sergeant Frederick Fuger assumed command upon Cushing’s death. His courageous defense of what remained of his battery would win him a Medal of Honor.
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For their contributions to this day’s actions against Pickett and Wilcox, two Vermont officers would be awarded the Medal of Honor. Lieutenant George G. Benedict exposed himself to enemy fire while sorting out the 13th and 16th Vermont Regiments, which had become bunched up in their movement to enfilade Kemper’s Brigade. Colonel Wheelock G. Veazy distinguished himself by his initiative in directing the flank movement of the 16th Vermont.
*
In this phase of the action, Corporal Henry D. O’Brien of the 1st Minnesota picked up his regiment’s fallen flag and urged his men forward, despite being twice wounded. For this he would receive a Medal of Honor, as would Major Edmund Rice of the 19th Massachusetts, who, though wounded, led his men in their countercharge.
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The evidence is strong that in addition to Wright’s and Posey’s commands, Mahone’s Brigade was also readied to advance at this time.
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A number of enemy regimental flags were captured in the course of this action, earning the Union soldiers involved Medals of Honor. Elijah W. Bacon, Christopher Flynn, and William B. Hincks of the 14th Connecticut; Morris Brown Jr. and Jerry Wall of the 126th New York; John E. Clopp of the 71st Pennsylvania; Joseph H. De Castro, Benjamin F. Falls, Benjamin H. Jellison, and John H. Robinson of the 19th Massachusetts; John B. Mayberry and Bernard McCarren of the 1st Delaware; John Miller and James Richmond of the 8th Ohio; Oliver P. Rood of the 20th Indiana; Marshall Sherman of the 1st Minnesota; and James Wiley of the 59th New York were all so honored. Also receiving the medal for his actions this day was Brigadier General Alexander S. Webb.
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Among those captured was a slightly wounded Lewis T. Powell of Company 1, 2nd Florida. Powell would eventually escape his captors, link up with Confederate secret agents in Baltimore, and wind up playing a prominent role in John Wilkes Booth’s 1865 assassination strike at the U.S. government leadership.
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For the courage he displayed in leading this countercharge, Captain William E. Miller of the 3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry would receive a Medal of Honor.
†
Farnsworth was one of the three young cavalry officers who were promoted several ranks by Meade right after he took command. George Custer and Wesley Merritt were the other two.
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Wells would be awarded a Medal of Honor for his leadership in this action.
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In the midst of this withdrawal, several Federal regiments (mostly from Crawford’s division) probed the area of the wheat field, where they scrapped with the 15th Georgia, serving as rear guard. In this, July 3rd’s final combat action, Sergeant James B. Thompson of the 13th Pennsylvania Reserves captured the Rebel regiment’s flag, for which action he would receive a Medal of Honor.
