History of the Second World War (38 page)

The attitude of the British, who had made an
entente
with Japan two years before, was in ironical contrast to the way they echoed the American denunciation of Japan’s behaviour thirty-seven years later. A comment in
The Times
in February 1904 was:

The Japanese navy, thanks to the masculine decision of the Mikado and his advisers, has taken the initiative, and has opened the war by an act of daring. . . . Owing to its position in the outer roadstead, the Russian squadron was open to, and invited, attack. The invitation has been accepted with a promptness and a punctuality that do high honour to the navy of our gallant allies. . . . The moral effect of this exploit promises to be enormous, and may influence and colour the whole conduct of the war. . . . By these acts of vigour, the Japanese navy have profited by the initiative conferred on them by statesmanship, and have established a moral mastery of the situation.

The article on ‘Japan’ in the 1911 edition of the
Encyclopaedia Britannica
also praises the action of Japan in choosing war, and for taking up arms ‘against a military dictatorship and a policy of selfish restrictions’.

On October 21, 1904 — the 99th anniversary of Trafalgar — Admiral Sir John Fisher became First Sea Lord in Britain. He promptly began to urge on King Edward VII, and in other influential quarters, a suggestion that the rising danger presented by the growth of the German fleet should be forestalled by ‘Copenhagening’ it — that a sudden attack should be launched upon it without any declaration of war. He even went so far as to put out propaganda for such a coup. His constant advocacy of such a course naturally came to the ears of the German Government, and as naturally, was taken more seriously than in English political quarters.

It is not clear whether Admiral Fisher’s proposals had been mooted prior to the success of the Japanese coup at Port Arthur. In any case, the coup by which Nelson crippled the Danish fleet at Copenhagen without any declaration of war was a famous part of England’s naval history, familiar to every sailor. Togo, as a young naval officer, had spent seven years in England studying his profession. Thus the influence of Nelson’s Copenhagen coup on Admiral Togo’s initiative in 1904 may well have been as great as Admiral Togo’s influence on Fisher’s scheme.

For Americans, the Pearl Harbor coup of 1941 came as such a surprise, despite the lesson of history, that the shock produced not only widespread criticism of their authorities, headed by President Roosevelt, but a deep suspicion that factors more sinister than blindness and confusion were responsible for the disaster. Such a suspicion became rife, particularly among Roosevelt’s critics and political opponents, and has long persisted.

But while it is clear that President Roosevelt had long been hoping and seeking for a way of bringing America’s weight into the war against Hitler, the evidence of complacency and miscalculation in army and navy headquarters suffices to outweigh the arguments of American ‘revisionist’ historians that Roosevelt planned or contrived the Pearl Harbor disaster for that purpose, and the slender evidence on which such arguments have been based.

THE FALL OF HONG KONG

The early loss of this British outpost in the Far East was the clearest of all examples how strategy, and common sense, can be sacrificed vainly for the sake of fanciful prestige.* Even the Japanese never committed such folly ‘for face’ as did the British in this case. It was palpably the weak point in Britain’s position, and inherently far more difficult to hold than Singapore. This island port, adjoining the coast of China, was barely 400 miles from the Japanese air bases on Formosa whereas it was 1,600 miles from the British naval base at Singapore.

* In March 1935, General Dill, who had become Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, asked me to go to the War Office for a talk with him about current and prospective defence problems. The discussion focused on the Far East, and particularly on the question of trying to hold Hong Kong in the event of war with Japan. According to a note of the discussion made that evening: ‘I suggested, and he appeared to agree, that it would be better to risk its loss by holding it too lightly than to strengthen it so much as to make it, morally, a “Verdun” or “Port Arthur” with great danger to our prestige if lost.’

In a review of the situation early in 1937 the British Chiefs of Staff put Japan second to Germany as a possible enemy, and rated Singapore along with Britain herself as the keystones on which the survival of the British Commonwealth would depend, therefore emphasising that no consideration for the security of British interests in the Mediterranean should be allowed to interfere with the despatch of a fleet to Singapore. In discussing Hong Kong, they agreed that the period before relief could not be less than ninety days, and went on to say that even if a reinforced garrison could hold the colony the port itself could be neutralised by Japanese air forces operating from Formosa. But, in a more hopeful and less realistic way than the facts of the situation warranted, they rejected the logical conclusion on the ground that evacuation of the garrison would entail a loss of prestige, and of necessary encouragement to China in resisting the Japanese. Their own conclusion was that ‘Hong Kong should be regarded as an important though not vital outpost to be defended for as long as possible.’* That conclusion foredoomed the garrison.

*
Official History: The War Against Japan,
vol. I, p. 17.

Two years later, early in 1939, a new review of the situation produced the same general conclusion, but showed a very significant change in putting the security of the Mediterranean before the Far East in order of priority. That inherently made a defence of Hong Kong more hopeless still, and all the more so because a Japanese expeditionary force was now ensconced on the Chinese mainland north and south of Hong Kong, thus isolating this British possession and exposing it to land attack.

In August 1940, following the fall of France, the situation was reviewed afresh by the new team of Chiefs of Staff — in which Dill represented the Army, as he was now C.I.G.S. This time they faced the fact that Hong Kong was indefensible, and recommended the withdrawal of the garrison — then four battalions. Their view was accepted by the War Cabinet, now led by Mr Churchill. But nothing was done to implement the conclusion. Moreover, a year later they veered round again, and advised Churchill to accept the Canadian Government’s offer of two battalions to reinforce the garrison — an offer, and reversal of policy, that was prompted by the optimistic view of Major-General A. E. Grasett, himself a Canadian, who had recently been commanding in Hong Kong, and on his way back to England had told the Chief of the Canadian General Staff that such an addition would make the place strong enough to withstand attack for a long period. In advising acceptance of the offer, the Chiefs of Staff in Britain expressed the view that even at the worst it would enable the garrison to maintain a ‘more worthy’ defence of the island — another ‘prestige’ argument. On October 27, 1941, the two Canadian battalions sailed for Hong Kong, thus enlarging the vain sacrifice by nearly 50 per cent.

The Japanese attack from the mainland opened early on December 8, being delivered by a well-armed force more than a division strong (twelve battalions), with ample air cover and artillery support. By next day the British had fallen back to the so-called Gindrinkers Line in the Kowloon peninsula, and early on the 10th a key redoubt here had been seized by a Japanese detachment. This coup precipitated an early abandonment of the Gindrinkers Line and withdrawal to Hong Kong island, while the Japanese were still moving up for their planned attack on the Line.

Initial attempts to cross the straits were repelled, but served to stretch out the defending force. Then on the night of the 18th/19th the main Japanese force landed in the north-east corner, and its concentrated thrust soon drove through to Deep Water Bay in the south, splitting the defending force. One part of it surrendered on the evening of Christmas Day, and the other part followed suit next morning. Despite its reinforcement, Hong Kong had held out for barely eighteen days — a fifth of the time expected. The Japanese casualties were under 3,000, while they had captured the whole of the reinforced garrison, nearly 12,000 men. The loss of the island came in the centenary year of its occupation, and the 99th anniversary of its formal cession, by China, to Britain.

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES

At 0230 hours on December 8 news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor reached, and alerted, the United States Command in the Philippines. Meanwhile, morning fog on Formosa delayed the planned Japanese air-strike against the islands. But that handicap turned out to the advantage of the Japanese. For on the American side there was a confusion — which has been a continuing cause of controversy — as to whether the B.17s were to bomb Formosa in immediate reply. As a result of this they were ordered to fly around the great island of Luzon to avoid being caught on the ground. At 1130 hours they landed to prepare for their strike — just as the delayed Japanese aircraft arrived overhead. Owing to the defective American warning system, most of the American aircraft were knocked out on that first day, especially the B.17 bombers and the modern P.40E fighters. The balance of air strength thus swung to the Japanese, who dominated the air from then on with their 190 Army and 300 land-based Naval planes operating from Formosa. On the 17th, the ten remaining B.17s were withdrawn to Australia, and from Admiral Hart’s pretentiously named Asiatic Fleet its handful of surface ships were also sent away, leaving only his twenty-nine submarines in the area.

As to land forces, despite the new decision — on MacArthur’s insistence — that the whole of the Philippines should be held, he had contrarily it shrewdly kept most of the 31,000 regulars (Americans and Filipino Scouts) near Manila, so that the far-stretching coastlines were covered only by low-grade Philippine troops, nominally about 110,000 in total. That decision, however wise strategically, meant that the Japanese would meet little difficulty in getting ashore wherever they chose to land.

The attack was entrusted to the Japanese 14th Army under General Homma. He employed 57,000 men in the landings and initial operations. Relatively, the number was not large, thus making surprise and air superiority the more essential. It was also necessary for the Japanese to capture some outlying islands and weakly-defended coastal regions so that airfields could be quickly built for their short-range Army aircraft.

On the opening day, they seized the main island of the Batan group, 120 miles north of Luzon, and on the 10th made another bound to Camiguin Island, just north of Luzon. That same day two other detachments landed on the north coast itself, at Aparri and Vigan, while on the 12th a fourth one coming from the Palau Islands landed unopposed at Legaspi in the far south-east of Luzon. These paved the way for the main landings, which took place in the Lingayen Gulf, only 120 miles north of Manila, beginning on December 22. Eighty-five transports carried General Homma’s 43,000 troops. On the 24th another force of 7,000, coming from the Ryukyu Islands, landed in Lamon Bay on the east coast, opposite Manila. None of these forces met any serious opposition, as the raw and poorly equipped Philippine Army crumbled quickly, especially when tanks advanced on them, and the Americans moved to their aid too late. The Japanese casualties hitherto had been less than 2,000.

MacArthur, realising that he could not fulfil his hope and plan of crushing the invaders before they were properly established ashore, had already on the 23rd reverted to the original plan of withdrawing to the Bataan Peninsula, with all that remained of his forces. His decision was precipitated by reports that overestimated, by almost double, the strength of the Japanese — and discounted most of his own Philippine troops. On the 26th Manila itself was declared an open city. Despite the initial state of confusion, MacArthur’s troops managed to carry out a step by step withdrawal, under pressure, and were established in the Bataan Peninsula by January 6 — helped by the fact that the Japanese strength was actually about half their own.

But once back in this peninsula — which was about twenty-five miles long and twenty miles wide — the Americans suffered from having to feed over 100,000 mouths, including civilians, instead of the 43,000 reckoned in the original plan. Moreover the peninsula was extremely malarious, so that very soon barely a quarter of the American forces were fit enough to fight.

The opening Japanese attacks on the peninsular position were repulsed, and so were the amphibious flanking attacks they attempted. On February 8, after a month’s effort, they suspended their attacks as their forces had become so weak — 10,000 being sick with malaria, while their 48th Division had been sent off to help the attack on the Dutch East Indies. By the beginning of March only 3,000 troops were manning the Japanese lines, but the Americans, unaware of this situation, made no attempt to take the offensive. Moreover their own effectives were now down to a fifth of their numbers, and their morale suffered from MacArthur’s departure for Australia on March 10. It was also evident that no effort was being made to come to their relief — a decision made early in January by the authorities in Washington.

By the end of March the Japanese were reinforced with over 22,000 fresh troops, as well as by more aircraft, and many more guns. Their attacks were resumed from April 3 onward, and the Americans were pushed backward down the peninsula, until on April 9 the remaining commander there, General King, surrendered unconditionally to avoid ‘mass slaughter’.

The fight now shifted to the fortified island of Corregidor, which had a garrison of nearly 15,000 men (including those on three smaller islands adjoining it). But only two miles separated it from the Bataan peninsula, which enabled the Japanese to maintain a heavy artillery bombardment over the straits as well as continuous air attacks. This pounding went on week after week, gradually pulverising the defences and putting most of the American guns out of action, while also hitting the island’s water supply. The bombardment rose to an intensity of 16,000 shells on May 4. Just before midnight on the 5th, 2,000 Japanese troops crossed the straits, and landed. They met fierce resistance and lost more than half their strength before they got ashore, but the landing of tanks turned the scale and caused the defenders to crumble — although only three tanks actually went into action. Next morning, May 6, General Wainwright, who had been commanding Corregidor since leaving the peninsula, sent out a broadcast message of surrender — to avoid vain loss.