Hitler's Bandit Hunters (37 page)

On August 25, 1942, Otto Winkelmann announced the opening of a new colonial police school in in Vienna-Strebersdorf.
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In keeping with police practice, the personnel formed a cadre (
Stammpersonal
) with Major der Schutzpolizei Zohm on temporary secondment from Oranienburg until September 5. Apart from his staff, Zohm had a complement of eleven Meister und Wachtmeister. The school was supplied with engineering equipment, eight horses (five for riding, a commander’s mount, and two horses for teamwork), and support vehicles. The school was open to registrations from August 20. The colonial officers’ role with the Schuma and their tasks requires much more examination than can be included here. The guidelines for military-style action were issued to all colonial police officers. In the opening section, the
police officer was offered doctrinal guidance on German colonial policy. The use of armed violence was, in practice common with Imperial Germany, recognized as important in times of emergency. In this context, the war and the nature of conflict was discussed:

The aims of the fighting in this war: in the west is the destruction of their [Western Allies] abilities to continue fighting; but the war against Bolshevism is to their destruction per se…. In colonial war, it will always be a case of having the power to fight [and] the task of battle to solve problems.
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The guideline elevated Lettow-Vorbeck as the finest exponent of small war. His use of improvisation was extolled as the best tactic for combating the English. Lettow-Vorbeck’s methods were also praised for his use of discipline in combat. The guidelines pressed the colonial cadet to become a leader in the Lettow-Vorbeck mold. To develop this quality, the leader was taught to become skillful in the use of reconnaissance and intelligence. Mindful of security and safety, the colonial leader was advised to use silence, to march with care, and to prepare the attack on the enemy with skill.
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Although on occasion “milder” forms of retribution might be employed, the colonial guidelines suggested “the occupation of areas, destruction of facilities, placing leaders in exile, sending communities into the deserts, control of water sources, separation of intellectuals, and punishments ranging from taking away the kettle to wholesale destruction of the settlement.”
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In February 1942, Himmler formed a special task force to attract experts into the police as a special leadership corps. The idea behind this instruction was to bring specialists and skilled professionals into the police reserve. They were to bring instruction and special subjects as degrees.
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During the war, experience and expertise from colonial service was turned into operational training schedules. After the war, former Oberst der Kolonialpolizei Karl Gaisser provided a report for the U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Project titled the “Partisan War in Croatia.” In the introduction, he recalled his time as a colonial police officer in German Togoland and Cameroon, both noted for outbreaks of guerrilla warfare. In 1933, he emigrated overseas but was repatriated to Germany during the war. In 1942, Gaisser was assigned to the Colonial Police School in Oranienburg, where he had trained police officers and NCOs in guerrilla warfare techniques.
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Gaisser became the senior police officer in Croatia, where he led Bandenbekämpfung actions. Through the 1950s, Gaisser worked for the U.S. Army and completed a study of the German campaign in the Balkans (refer to
chapter 9
).
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The practice of bringing recruits east began in 1939 when the SS took control of depots in Poland and later in the Low Countries. Following basic training in Germany, recruits transferred to collection centers, located in
Poland, Russia, Holland, Austria, and later Italy. The Deutsche Dienststelle, in Berlin, records the Smolensk bandit school (Bandenschule), established in 1943, as falling within the Ch.BKV’s regime. Documents from the final period of German occupation in Russia in 1943–44 also indicate that the school was under their responsibility. Schenckendorff’s successor, General of Cavalry von Rothkirch, the commander of the Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Weissruthenien, proved his commitment to its promotion. On January 7, 1944, the rear area of Army Group Centre provided an allowance within its budget for a Bandenschule. The organization of the bandit school is itemized in
Table 6.1
. The training program relied on small groups of qualified Bandenbekämpfung instructors working closely with an army weapons school (
Armeewaffenschule).
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On May 31, Army Group Centre informed Rothkirch that the forthcoming course would include instructors from the 9th Army. The next day, a communication advised that it had not received its quota of instructors. By June 3, panic had set in as Rothkirch’s staff were concerned that they had not arrived and the course was to begin on June 11. Later that day, the start date moved forward to June 15. Meanwhile, the Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Weissruthenien ordered five officers to “volunteer” to instruct on fighting tactics by the Russians and bandits. However, misfortune befell the course, as on June 23, Major Shoen, commander of the school, and Major Wawzinek, police specialist for Bandenbekämpfung, were wounded by a Soviet mine. This embarrassment for the school, especially the loss of the course leader, was particularly painful for Rothkirch. On June 28, the school closed and was transferred to Lida as Operation “Bagration,” the Soviet offensive, was on the point of liberating Minsk.

In a series of documents from the surviving police files, it seems a serious proposal was being made to build a specialist Bandenbekämpfung school within Germany. Being within Reich borders, this meant the SS-Police were required to seek permission from other state authorities. In 1944, the SS wanted a purpose-built exercise ground for Bandenbekämpfung training. In November, the SS identified the Tucheler Heide as suitable. The Order Police officially contacted the State Forestry Service (
Reichsforstamt
) to landscape a Bandenkampfschule in the forest.
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The officer charged with responsibility to see the job through was Oberst der Schutzpolizei Eggebrecht, who wrote to Oberforstmeister von Hammerstein on behalf of Himmler to request the building of the Bandenkampfschule. The request required that the school be camouflaged and secluded within the forest and that earth bunkers and support shelters be constructed around the site. The construction involved cutting the trees from the forest, and the police were required to ask for permission to proceed from the Reichsforstamt. The reply was favorable and included the right to cut down trees, but the Reichsforstamt demanded payment of rent for the land and a formal contract of use. The file remained open until February 1, 1945, without any final decision recorded.
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The teaching programs for Bandenbekämpfung continued until March 1945.

Table 6.1: The Organization of the Bandenschule (1944)

In March 1943, the Soviets launched a campaign since called the “War of the Rails.” In March, “bandits” undertook 404 attacks on the railways and blew up the Desna bridges, cutting the line between Gomel and Bryansk.
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In August, a band attacked the Minsk–Bobruisk railway line. The commander of Einsatzkommando Tatarka, with seven volunteers from an army security detachment (
Wehrmachtsstosstrupp
), undertook an ad hoc preventative action against the band. According to the 608th Security Regiment’s after-action report, the SS were praised for their actions in preventing serious destruction for the loss of two wounded. During the early days of August, the Bobruisk–Minsk railway line was the scene of further partisan attacks. Reports from trusties indicated that explosives specialists had been gathering in the area. On August 8–9, 1943, Jagdkommando Wald set ambush positions, fought off a strong band, and killed fifteen to twenty “bandits” at the cost of two SS troopers killed. The SS captured one partisan. Through interrogation, they discovered he had moved into the area only that evening to blow up the railway line. According to Pannier, the railway line was closed for months by “bandits,” but through his actions, it was reopened. Operations in the area included the protection of the harvests, maintaining the free access of the railways and the policing of local industries. To these ends, Pannier reported that he had conducted surgical actions against the “bandits” and cleansed the
bandenverseuchtes Gebiet
. Pannier’s September 1943 report recorded numerous local Bandenbekämpfung operations arising from securing and protecting the harvest in his area of Bobruisk. All the available troops had been deployed for the protection of the harvest.
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In his general appraisal of the situation, Pannier indicated that Stalin had ordered an increased level of “bandit” activity in his area. The “bandits” were using communications to coordinate their actions, part of the centralization of the bands, into brigades with liaison staff working directly under orders from Moscow. The range of “bandit” actions included random machine-gun fire, grenades, surprise attacks, laying mines, and the destruction of railways or extensive use of road blocks sometimes more than 1 kilometer long. Pannier mentioned with some concern that the “bandits” no longer fled from a fight but were now looking for a face-to-face battle. His losses were rising but not enough to prevent the completion of his tasks.

The operational priorities of the harvest, local defense against insurgency and running the sub-camps, influenced the training schedule. The 3rd Company was assigned harvest security duties, while another company served in the complex defense lines and another protected the camps. The men on these duties had not received general training, but the companies on guard duty received further individual training in weapons handling, observation, and information gathering, conducted in an ad hoc manner. The conclusion Pannier came to was that even the smallest amount of training had raised the
men’s “bravery” in combat. The proximity to the bands had raised the level of seriousness of the training exercises. According to Pannier, the troops had responded to the challenge; the 6th Company’s performance, in particular, raised the expectations of becoming a solid formation. Pannier’s final assessment of the men was 10 percent good, 70 percent mediocre, and 20 percent useless, stated in the most polite terms.
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On August 12, 1943, an Einsatzkommando from the central strongpoint of SS-Waldlager Bobruisk conducted a reconnaissance in the vicinity. In the village of Tschikili, they met the command squadron of a band and, after a brief fight, killed five “bandits,” one of whom was Senior Lieutenant Pavlo, a scout liaison officer, who had been carrying important papers. The papers included a list of his agents in Bobruisk who were to be arrested. Pavlo had been ordered to employ them in raising a new brigade. The papers also indicated that the bands were being supported by regular groups (
Stammannschaft
) of parachutists under a Major Scharki. On August 14, 1943, Einsatzkommando Bobruisk spent the day removing roadblocks along the route from Makarovichi to Kozlovichi. On the edge of a wood near Makarovichi, the Einsatzkommando stumbled across five mounted “bandits” in full Red Army uniform. This opened an attack on the village that was met with strong opposition. The bands brought up artillery and fired randomly into the Einsatzkommando. Eventually, after suppressing a heavy machine gun, the area was cleansed (
gesäubert
), and the Einsatzkommando moved to Tschikili. The band suffered forty dead and wounded, and the SS had three slightly wounded by a mine explosion that occurred when they were removing a roadblock.
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The first section Pannier referenced as falling under the command was the territory called Bandengebiet South Bobruisk. This was a target for concentrated counter-force. On August 18, the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th companies of the SS-Jäger Battalion were deployed to the area Glusk-Kasarichi-Barbarov-Kletno southeast of Bobruisk to secure the harvest. Immediately after their arrival, the “gangs” opened a counter-offensive with all their force. After extensive artillery fire on August 24–25, the “gangs” attacked in several places where the 2nd and 3rd companies were deployed. The “bandits” attacked with two companies, supported by machine guns and tanks. The attack on the 2nd Company was conducted by two tanks and men dressed partially in Red Army uniforms. The 3rd Company managed to force the enemy to stop and retire. They retired from the close-quarter antitank action (
Panzernahbekämpfung);
this led the 3rd Company, joined by the 2nd Company, to counter-attack, sending the gangs in a southwesterly direction. The “bandits” tried to build a fire and retreat, but caught in a pincer (
zangenartige
) movement, they fled. The counter-attack reached a hamlet 500 meters from Kasarichi and stopped at an old factory. The casualties had included three German wounded, one severely, for six “bandits” dead and six wounded. The companies captured various weapons and documents.
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